The '85 Percent Solution'

The recent sharpening focus on climate change and the Arctic has revealed geographical and temporal dimensions: Greater areas of the region are now ice-free for longer periods of time during the year. This is creating challenges for the nation’s “maritime guardian,” the U.S. Coast Guard, as outlined in the service’s 2013 Arctic Strategy:

Numerous studies have examined national and Coast Guard shortfalls in the Arctic, from the need for additional icebreakers and long-range patrol vessels to improved communications and maritime domain awareness capabilities and aviation assets. There is no obvious or easy way to close these gaps.¹

Until now.

Effective, persistent presence is the foundation for virtually all operations in the Arctic (and elsewhere), but is unmet by the 2015 Coast Guard force structure. Too many jobs in too many areas of concern are stretching available resources.² However, for enhanced Arctic situational and domain awareness, there might be an innovative and affordable “85 percent solution” based on the service’s successful Legend-class national security cutters (NSCs).³ (See NSC characteristics in the accompanying chart.)

The first three operational NSCs are generating impressive performances on counter-narcotics and fisheries patrols, international naval exercises, and even open-sea Arctic patrols. Incorporate the NSC’s capabilities into a hull capable of working in first-year ice––i.e., that which has no more than one year’s fall-to-summer growth––and the Coast Guard would have an ideal multi-mission, command-and-control platform to work the northern latitudes, which is lacking in 2015. And this design could generate an additional 45–70 NSC days in the navigable portions of the Arctic region each year.

Mindful of the adage “the perfect is the enemy of good enough,” an ice-strengthened NSC would respond to national strategy and policy drivers and the effects of global climate change in the Arctic. What’s more, it could carry out critical roles, missions, and tasks for longer periods of time and in more remote areas during each year than it is capable of doing today. Not intended to be a replacement for the service’s two polar icebreakers, and certainly not capable of Arctic operations in the dead of winter, an ice-strengthened NSC or two home-ported in the region would complement the icebreakers and be critical persistent-presence “gap fillers.”⁴

Arctic Impacts

There is increased interest in the viability of shipping via the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and other Arctic areas, which in some cases could shave off 40 percent of transit-miles compared to traditional, non-Arctic avenues. The Northern Sea Route, along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles long. The Northwest Passage runs through the Canadian Arctic islands and consists of several routes. Between 2007 and 2013, merchant shipping in the Arctic increased by more than 110 percent. Over one million tons of cargo transited the region in 2012. While shipping through the Northern Sea Route decreased slightly in 2014 compared to 2013 (53 ships as opposed to 71), transits of the Northwest Passage continued apace.

In 2013, the ice-strengthened cargo ship MV Nordic Orion became the first of her type to transit the usually ice-covered Northwest Passage above North America. The next year, the MV Nunavik, also an ice-strengthened cargo ship, was the first merchant vessel to navigate the passage without an icebreaker escort. As transits increase in frequency and volume, however, so do the risks to the safety of the shipping itself and to other important interests.

In addition to commercial shipping’s enthusiasm for much shorter routes to and from markets, destination and adventure tourism, scientific expeditions, commercial fisheries, and non-renewable resource extraction will grow in the years to come, increasing risk.

For example, on 12 July 2014 the North Slope Borough Search and Rescue alerted Coast Guard 17th District watch standers in Juneau, Alaska, that a 36-foot sailboat had become trapped in the ice approximately 40 miles northeast of Barrow.⁵ The Coast Guard medium icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB-20), luckily nearby, rescued the lone sailor who was attempting to sail from Vancouver, Canada, to eastern Canada via the Northwest Passage.

More such incidents should be expected. How the Coast Guard might respond to a stricken cruise ship with 500—if not many more—passengers and crew on board is a growing concern.

What Lies Beneath

The Arctic Ocean and seabed are rich in natural resources. Estimates indicate that the region holds some 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its untapped natural gas, and more than one trillion dollars’ worth of minerals, including gold, zinc, palladium, nickel, platinum, lead, rare-earth minerals, and gem-quality diamonds. Since 2005, commercial investors have sunk some $3.7 billion in offshore leases, and the amount of exploration and investment in the region is likely to rise as ice continues to melt.⁶ In addition, more than 50 percent of America’s fish stocks come from the Alaska exclusive economic zone.

Finally, geopolitical/national-security dynamics could bode ill for the United States and other Arctic states. In late January, Army General Joseph L. Votel, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, stated the primary concern is Russia and its growing activities in the Arctic.

We don’t know what we don’t know, so it is important for us to engage and understand what is happening out there and understand the spaces in which they can begin to assert some of their influence. . . . I consider this to be a future challenge for us. . . . Our ability to see and understand is an important requirement for all our operations. . . .⁷

In his first Posture Statement as Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Paul J. Zukunft underscored the need to adapt to the changing Arctic dynamics:

Resource development and opportunities for new trade routes are growing in the Arctic. Management of these issues is critical to a safe and responsible use of this vital region now and in the future. Climate change consequences are wide ranging and are most readily seen in the polar regions. The impacts of decreasing ice coverage in the Arctic include increased human activity and a greater interest in the region’s natural resources. To achieve national objectives in the polar regions, the Coast Guard will. . . advocate for national capability. . . .⁸

On 21 May 2013, then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. released the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, which outlined the ends, ways, and means to achieve strategic objectives in the Arctic during the next ten years. Of the three strategic objectives in the Arctic––improving awareness, modernizing governance, and broadening partnerships––the first one has important implications for effective, persistent presence in the region:

Coast Guard operations require precise and ongoing awareness of activities in the maritime domain. Maritime awareness in the Arctic is currently restricted due to limited surveillance, monitoring, and information system capabilities. Persistent awareness enables identification of threats, information sharing with front-line partners, and improved risk management.⁹

Demand Proliferation

The Coast Guard’s cutters, boats, aircraft, and shore infrastructure must satisfy often daunting and frequently dangerous demands in carrying out the service’s statutory missions. That is particularly true for the Arctic. During his July 2014 testimony before the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger outlined the framework for Coast Guard Arctic operations:

The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867, when Alaska was purchased from Russia. Then, as now, our mission is to enforce U.S. laws and regulations, conduct search and rescue, assist scientific exploration, and foster navigation safety and environmental stewardship. The Coast Guard uses mobile command and control platforms including large cutters and ocean-going ice-strengthened buoy tenders, as well as seasonal air and communications capabilities to execute these missions within more than 950,000 square miles of ocean off the Alaskan coast.¹⁰

These mobile and seasonal assets and facilities have proved to be crucial in enabling the Coast Guard to carry out its Arctic operational priorities. An important responsibility is to provide effective, persistent presence in Arctic areas of concern to the United States. However, persistence is increasingly in jeopardy, as there are no permanent home ports, air stations, and facilities north of Anchorage. Kodiak is the closest base with ships to the Bering Sea, still some 1,600 nautical miles from the Bering Strait and then another 600 miles to the Beaufort Sea. The tyranny of distance is formidable.

Furthermore, it appears that there will be no permanent expansion of the afloat or ashore allocations, at least for the next ten or so years.¹¹ Instead, the service will continue to rely on temporary deployments by national security cutters, smaller cutters and patrol boats, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters that have the communication and intelligence capabilities needed for a sustained offshore presence during the summer-season operating window, typically from June to September.

Not an Icebreaker!

One reason for the Coast Guard’s short Arctic operating window is the fact that––other than the two icebreakers, one Great Lakes icebreaker, and a handful of buoy tenders and tugs––none of the Coast Guard’s surface assets is ice-strengthened and capable of operating safely in areas of even first-year ice.¹²

In 2015, the Coast Guard has only two special-design cutters––the heavy icebreaker Polar Star (WAGB-10), earmarked for Antarctic breakout and resupply operations, and the medium icebreaker Healy, designed and operated to carry out Arctic scientific research for the National Science Foundation––available for intermittent presence year-round in the northern latitudes.¹³

But neither ship is routinely fitted out, trained, and operated to perform other primary Coast Guard missions and tasks––particularly law enforcement, command and control, communications, and response to man-made and natural disasters––in addition to icebreaking. (Expanded Arctic missions, particularly command and control, would be addressed in any future icebreaker program, but it could be decades before new-design cutters are placed in service.) While they might be able to carry out some tasks, they are hamstrung in providing the effective, persistent presence that is critical for Arctic operations. No matter how capable, an icebreaker cannot be in two places at once. This reality highlights a compelling need for “gap-fillers” to meet Arctic operational challenges with full multi-mission cutter capabilities and capacities.

The Coast Guard’s 2014 Arctic Shield exercise provides a glimpse of the value that the NSC brings to the Arctic region.¹⁴ In addition to other cutters and boats, the national security cutter Stratton (WMSL-752) deployed as a command-and-control platform and conducted various missions, including maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and law enforcement. The Stratton had more C4ISR (command, control, secure communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities and capacities than all the other Arctic Shield 2014 assets, afloat or ashore, combined. The NSC fleet thus provides a mix of capabilities required in high-stress operational areas that include the north slope of Alaska, Bering Sea/Gulf of Alaska, eastern Pacific, Caribbean, West Coast, and East Coast/North Atlantic. Add ice-strengthened hulls and the result will be truly multi-mission cutters capable of an expanded Arctic presence and operations across the expanse of Coast Guard requirements in other important areas, as well.

‘An Elegant and Affordable Solution’

The service’s program of record calls for procuring 8 national security cutters, 25 offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast response cutters. In mid-2015, the first four NSCs were in service, the fifth through seventh were in various stages of construction, and long lead-time materials were being procured for the eighth, with full funding appropriated in Fiscal Year 2015. “The acquisition of the NSC is vital to performing DHS missions in the far off-shore regions,” the Coast Guard’s 2016 Budget in Brief notes.¹⁵

While none of these cutters (as configured in 2015) is ice-strengthened for Arctic operations, an elegant and affordable solution could be incorporated into a “flight 2” ice-strengthened NSC, should the resources be found to respond to expanded needs. Notionally, one or two ice-strengthened NSCs could be homeported in Kodiak, compared to none in Coast Guard plans, to satisfy growing Arctic requirements.¹⁶

The proposed structural enhancements to the baseline NSC hull would ensure independent operations in fast ice up to one foot thick and 60 percent ice coverage, and open ice up to two feet thick and 30 percent coverage.

Nothing is free, and the ice-strengthened design will add 75 tons to the baseline NSC, resulting in a reduction of service life margin to 70 tons. But there will be no impact on stability. While range and endurance will not be affected (still 12,000 nautical miles at 12 knots and 60 days), the overall effect of the modifications on performance is a reduction of only one knot at maximum sustained speed, to 27 knots.

But it looks to be a bargain: The estimated rough-order-of-magnitude cost (including non-recurring engineering) of modifying an NSC in-line for ice-strengthened operations is less than five percent of the cost of the current NSC.

This would be a class unto itself but with maximum commonality. With the exception of the propeller blades and hubs, sea chest heating piping, and structural differences, all systems and their training, operation, and maintenance would be identical to the eight baseline NSCs. But an ice-strengthened NSC could provide the effective, persistent presence needed to protect important U.S. and world interests in the Arctic beyond today’s capabilities.

Others have suggested that an ice-strengthened offshore patrol cutter be considered for a “flight 2” design.¹⁷ It would be a decade if not longer, however, before any such cutter would see service, inasmuch as the project is just 18 months into the first phase of a three-phase design, engineering, construction, and delivery program. And already it is encountering fiscal challenges, as Admiral Zukunft told the House Appropriations Committee in March.¹⁸ Should the resources be found for a ninth (or tenth) NSC to be an ice-strengthened NSC variant, however, the first ship could be deployed to the Arctic within five years of getting the green light.

An ice-strengthened NSC is not in the Coast Guard program of record. Even if funded, it would not be a replacement for medium and heavy icebreakers. It would, however, provide effective, persistent presence of world-class multi-mission capabilities and capacities to meet expanded Arctic responsibilities, all the while retaining the ability to carry out roles, missions, and tasks for which the NSCs were originally designed—in short, good enough.

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter Characteristics

Length Overall: 418 feet
Beam: 54 feet
Draft: 22.5 feet
Full Load Displacement: 4,500 long tons
Total Enclosed Deck Area: 54,159 square feet
Aviation Flight Deck Area: 4,040 square feet
Propulsion: Combined Diesel and Gas Turbine (or CODAG) with two 9,655 hp MTU diesels, one 29,500 hp LM2500 gas turbine and combining gear, two shafts/variable-pitch propellers
Maximum Sustained Speed: 28 knots
Sprint Speed: 30-plus knots
Range: 12,000 nautical miles at 12 knots
Endurance: 60 days
Crew: 120 notional crew/148 accommodations
Armament:
    Hard Kill: Mk110 57mm gun
                    Mk15 20mm close in weapon system Blk1B
                    4 .50-caliber machine guns
    Soft Kill: Mk53 Nulka electronic warfare decoy and SBROC chaff
Sensors: X- and S-band surface-search radar; TRS-3D air-search radar; SPQ-9B fire-control radar; Mk46 electro-optical/infrared sensor; SLQ-32 electronic-warfare system; UPX-36 identification friend or foe
Communications and Intelligence: HF, VHF, and UHF, SCIF
Boats:
      Stern Launch: Long-range interceptor (LRI-II) and over-the-horizon (CB-OTH-IV) craft
      Davits Launch: OTH craft
Aviation: Hangar can accommodate two MH-65C or MH-60T helicopters, or one helicopter and two unmanned aviation systems (UASs), or four UASs

1. United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 36.

2. America’s 21st Century Coast Guard: Resourcing for Safety, Security and Stewardship, 2013 White Paper on Resourcing the Coast Guard (Washington, DC: USCG Headquarters, Director of Strategic Management and Doctrine, undated).

3. USCG Headquarters, National Security Cutter, www.uscg.mil/acquisition/nsc/; Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, R42567, 9 January 2015). Norman Polmar, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 19th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 582–584.

4. Sam LaGrone, “Coast Guard Analysis Says U.S. Needs 3 Heavy and 3 Medium Icebreakers, Path to Ships Unclear,” USNI News, 25 February 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/02/25/coast-guard-analysis-says-u-s-needs-3-heavy-and-3-medium-icebreakers-path-to-ships-unclear.

5. “Coast Guard Icebreaker Rescues Man aboard Sailboat Trapped in Arctic Ice,” U.S. Coast Guard Press Release, uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2203213/Imagery-Release-Coast-Guard-icebreaker-rescues-man-aboard-sailboat-trapped-in-Arctic-ice-.

6. David Kashi, “U.S. Military Responds to Arctic Ocean Melting,” International Business Times, 13 January 2014, http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=350&siteid=2096&id=4401716&t=1389629247.

7. Stew Magnuson, “SOCOM’s Gen. Votel Sees Tensions in Arctic, IS Expansion as Future Threats,” National Defense, 27 January 2015, www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1722.

8. Posture Statement: America’s Coast Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2015), 3. uscg.mil/budget/posture_statement.asp), 3.

9. United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, 10.

10. Testimony of Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, Vice Commandant, on “Implementing U.S. Policy in the Arctic,” before the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, 23 July 2014, 1.

11. Antonieta Rico, “Papp: No plans for more Coasties in Arctic,” Navy Times, 1 June 2013, http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20130601/NEWS03/306010006/Papp-No-plans-more-Coasties-Arctic.

12. Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RL34391, 27 January 2015).

13. Chuck Oldham, “USCG Polar Star Frees Fishing Vessel from Antarctic Ice,” DefenseMediaNetwork, 15 January 2015, www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/uscgc-polar-star-frees-fishing-vessel-antarctic-ice/.

14. “Coast Guard Completes Arctic Shield 2014,” Coast Guard Press Release, 31 October 2014, http://coastguardnews.com/coast-guard-completes-arctic-shield-2014/2014/10/31/.

15. United States Coast Guard 2016 Budget in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard), uscg.mil/budget/budget_in_brief.asp, 6.

16. Scott C. Truver, “Arctic Missions Demand More High-Endurance Cutters,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 April 2014, www.armedforcesjournal.com/arctic-missions-demand-more-high-endurance-cutters/.

17. Rick Wharton, “The Time is Now: Icebreaker Replacement Must Move Forward to Overcome Capability Shortfalls,” the Columbia Group, November 2012, 5. On the OPC Program, see www.uscg.mil/acquisition/opc/.

18. Megan Eckstein, “Commandant Zukunft: Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutter Underfunded by $69M,” USNI News, 24 March 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/03/24/commandant-zukunft-coast-guards-offshore-patrol-cutter-underfunded-by-69m.mandant-zukunft-coast-guards-offshore-patrol-cutter-underfunded-by-69m.