Today some 50 percent of the U.S. strategic nuclear warheads are in the Navy’s 14 nuclear-propelled submarines of the Ohio class. In the near future that number could increase to some 70 percent under the New START arms agreements, according to Rear Admiral Joseph E. Tofalo, Director, Undersea Warfare (OP-97) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.1
But, as Shakespeare wrote, “there’s the rub.” The 14 Ohio-class boats are wearing out and must be replaced in the next two decades. The Navy has developed an Ohio replacement program to construct 12 new SSBNs. The reduction in numbers is possible because the follow-on SSBNs will have 42-year reactor cores, alleviating the need to take submarines out of service for a midlife, multiyear refueling.
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have stated that the Ohio replacement program is the service’s highest priority. The major issue is cost—these 12 submarines threaten to break the bank of Navy shipbuilding plans. Discounting the first submarine of the class—which shoulders large design and research-and-development (R&D) costs for the entire class—in 2010 the Navy estimated that the cost of new SSBNs 2 through 12 would be $6 to $7 billion per unit.2
Subsequently, the Navy initiated major cost-reduction efforts and the Department of Defense issued an acquisition-decision memorandum establishing a target of $4.9 billion per submarine (in Fiscal Year 2010 dollars). In 2013 the Navy stated that its efforts had reduced the average unit cost for boats 2 through 12 to about $5.4 billion dollars. Department of Defense acquisition tsar Sean J. Stackley has told Congress that the overall Ohio replacement program will cost a total of $100 billion over a 12- to 15-year period.3
Additional efforts at cost reduction are under way. According to Admiral Tofalo’s office, “Cost control is paramount throughout the Ohio replacement program.”4
Still, even a $5 billion annual add-on to the basic Navy’s shipbuilding budget—now an average of some $13 to 14 billion per year—will drain the coffers. Without additional funding from Congress, the production of 12 new submarines could gut the Navy’s shipbuilding budget for more than a decade, according to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus.5
For several reasons there appears to be little hope that the basic shipbuilding budget can be increased to cover the cost of the new SSBN program. Even without new SSBNs the Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan calls for a funding increase, and this occurs as the nation is increasing military operations against ISIS terrorists in the Middle East.
There probably are three methods of paying for the Ohio replacement program:
• Pay with non-Navy shipbuilding funds
• Significantly reduce the unit costs
• Develop alternative options.
Both the House and Senate armed services committees have provided provisions in their respective FY 15 defense authorization acts for the establishment a National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund to pay for the SSBN program. To date funds have not been authorized for the program.
There are two “rubs” to this approach. First, such a budget method was considered in the late 1950s during the Eisenhower administration to fund the original 41-submarine Polaris force. In reality the Navy paid for the program with a reduction in attack submarine construction, cancellation of the Regulus II strategic cruise missile and the P6M Seamaster flying boat programs, and other cuts. Similar cuts are predicted by many for core Navy shipbuilding programs under this “national” budgetary method.
Second, if the Ohio replacement is paid by non-service funds, the Air Force undoubtedly would expect similar funding for its planned Long-Range Strike Bomber, which Congress has approved but not yet funded. The proposed 80 to 100 strike bombers would have a production cost of $44 to $55 billion (plus design and R&D costs). And, if this approach works for the new bomber, would it be sought to fund the next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile and the next intercontinental ballistic missile?
Thus, using non-Navy or “national” funds for the Ohio replacement is far, far from a done deal.
Meanwhile, the Navy is continuing efforts to reduce costs of the new SSBN. According to Admiral Tofalo, “Ohio replacement reuses and re-hosts current submarine systems to the maximum extent possible” and “will build on the success of the Virginia-class construction program through collaboration with industry to leverage modular construction techniques, cost-reduction initiatives, and other shipbuilding efforts.”
The Virginia class—now in series production—is a shipbuilding success story, with the submarines coming in at or slightly under budgeted cost (i.e., approximately $2.5 billion each) and significantly ahead of schedule. These submarines are constructed jointly by the Newport News,Virginia, yard and the Electric Boat complex at Groton, Connecticut, and Quonset Point, Rhode Island.
Another aspect of cost reduction is the development of the common missile compartment that will be used in the Ohio replacement SSBN as well as in the next-generation British SSBN. The new U.S. ballistic-missile submarine will carry 16 Trident D-5 missiles and the British boats each will carry 12. The current U.S. Ohio-class SSBNs carry 24 missiles and the British Vanguard-class submarines have 16 missiles, thus a significant reduction in payload is in the offing.
The major leverage of Virginia-class technology for the replacement SSBN has raised questions. Submarine specialists—in and out of the Navy—have expressed concern over this technology because the Virginia design dates to the late 1980s and was developed as a low-cost alternative to the Seawolf (SSN-21) class. Thus, basic Virginia features are more than two decades old although there have been several, significant improvements during the production run of the class, in part due to the submarine’s excellent open-architecture configuration.
In the current period of intensive development of non-acoustic submarine-detection concepts and technology, that leverage could have a serious impact on the new SSBN’s survivability—especially since the Ohio replacement is expected to be in service into the 2080s. Obviously, this subject cannot be discussed in detail in this open forum. But it is crucial to note that the Soviet Union/Russia has frequently “surprised” the West with underwater weapons and sensors, as well as with technologically highly advanced submarines.
Part Two will discuss proposed alternatives to the 12-submarine Ohio replacement program.
1. RADM Joseph E. Tofalo, USN, presentation to Naval Submarine League, Arlington, VA, 12 September 2014.
2. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X] Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2014), 14.
3. Sean J. Stackley, testimony before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee, House, 24 April 2014.
4. CAPT Michael Cockey, USN, email to author, 12 September 2014.
5. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 15 September 2014.