General Alfred M. Gray Jr., the 29th Commandant, has attained iconic status within the Marine Corps. After serving as an enlisted sergeant during the Korean War, becoming an officer, and rising to the commandancy, General Gray was viewed by enlisted and officer alike as the quintessential warrior. As Commandant during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gray found himself in a transitional moment that called for the transformation of the service. He fostered this warrior image and used it to mold the Corps into his vision of a highly flexible expeditionary fighting force capable of meeting threats in asymmetric low-intensity conflicts as well as conventional battles. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently facing a similar moment in their organizational development, one that calls for dynamic, visionary leaders willing to take chances and drive their services forward into the next iteration of defense policy and strategy.
Discerning the Man from the Myth
The concept of military transformation, historically speaking, is relatively recent. Evolving directly from Soviet marshal Nikolai Ogarkov’s military technical revolution, it focuses on the active implementation of emergent military technology to increase operational capability. This requires speculation about the future of warfare and how best to wage it. Inherently the probability of error is high, as seen by the U.S. military’s inability to predict the wars of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Mark Mandeles in Military Transformation Past and Present, the relative efficacy of a military’s transformational products is directly proportional to its ability to foster creative ideas, develop them, test them, modify them, and implement them. Mandeles argues that this process must be embraced by the entire organization. Its leaders should seek out and encourage initiative and innovation among their subordinates. General Gray, being a highly effective transformational leader, did exactly that. He empowered his juniors, challenged their intellect, and created organizations capable of institutionalizing future warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures.1
Exactly what Gray did as Commandant is documented in several histories of the Marine Corps.2 They do not, however, delve into why he made particular changes, the mechanisms he used to instill change, the criticisms that went along with them, and, now with nearly a quarter-century of hindsight, an assessment of his undertakings. The above deficiencies are difficult to correct, for many, if not all, are difficult to discern from the now-legendary stories that have surrounded Gray’s career since he took his post in 1987. Separating myth from reality is even more difficult when the personality of the studied subject is magnetic and attracted loyalty without the slightest bit of effort.
This “cult of personality” did not go unnoticed by General Gray, who used it to his advantage. He reached out to enlisted Marines and cultivated a “warrior” image and rhetoric to perpetuate this appeal. He is still the only commandant of the Marine Corps to have his official picture taken in camouflage utilities. This was a sure sign for many that he was a “field Marine” and not a headquarters bureaucrat, and accounts of his interaction with the enlisted ranks highlight this.
One description by G. J. Michaels of a Marine serving in a light armor battalion in the first Gulf War is especially telling. Michaels describes Gray as “a hero to a lot of Marines” and “a real Marine’s Marine.” When he spoke to Michaels’ battalion in the Saudi Arabian desert in 1991, he “used his characteristic gruff and frank tone,” and when Gray “opened the floor for questions” he did what no other Commandant would have done: As Michaels accounts, a Marine sergeant was having trouble reenlisting and expressed this complaint to the Commandant. Gray asked him, “Do you want to reenlist for four or six years?” When the sergeant replied with “four, sir,” Gray immediately swore him in. This, according to Michaels, opened a floodgate of gripes that young Marines wished resolved. Gray fixed these problems in his usual non-bureaucratic way by means of “on-the-spot” promotions and reenlistments, and would have continued had the battalion commander not intervened. Michaels saw the Commandant later on Christmas, but this time a ring of officers shielded him from the enlisted Marines.3
The effect of this and many similar acts throughout Gray’s commandancy was profound. Enlisted Marines trusted him and were willing to accept the changes he brought about. This anecdote is indicative of Gray’s brashness and willingness to take on bureaucratic blocks to what he perceived as practical solutions to real problems. When countering the bureaucracy, he supported his reasoning by using the traditions of the Corps that he felt were most relevant. In this instance, Gray was “taking care of Marines” and not undermining the authority of his subordinate commanders, nor degrading the enlisted Marines’ faith in the Corps’ personnel policies and procedures. Stories detailing the experiences of Marines who met Gray abound on the Internet and are frequent in conversations with those who served in the “Gray years.” Gray’s radio call sign as Commandant was “Papa Bear,” which reflects what he thought of himself.4 In his mind, he was the Marines’ protector and he went to great measures throughout his career to prove this. No other Commandant before—or since—has garnered as much appreciation from both officers and enlisted Marines.
Early Career
As with any Commandant, Gray’s past experiences shaped his worldview and guided him during his years as the Corps’ senior officer. There is no doubt that his rise from the enlisted ranks had much to do with the adoration he received. Much like the enlisted Marines’ “demigod,” Lieutenant General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, he was only an enlisted Marine for a short period of time. Joining the Corps in 1950, Gray was commissioned as a second lieutenant on 9 April 1952. The enlisted experience, however minimal, laid the foundations for his approach to leadership. His chief assignment during his enlisted tour was with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Platoon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.5
Serving in a reconnaissance platoon gave Gray his initial experience of bringing together two very different but intimately connected requirements for waging successful wars: intelligence and operations. As a reconnaissance Marine, he gained a much broader picture of combat than the regular-line infantryman. He would have been charged with reconnaissance missions to support the overall objective of the landing force. To accomplish that task, Gray required knowledge of the proposed plan for the amphibious landing, an intimate understanding of the force commander’s concerns and critical intelligence requirements, and would have gotten practical experience in the complexities inherent in mounting both small (squad-sized) and large (battalion-, regimental-, and division-sized) unit operations. By operating in this capacity, he could observe and take part in developing the intelligence-operational nexus critical for success. His follow-on assignments as an officer would add considerable breadth and depth to the crash course he received in warfighting while serving with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Platoon.
Stationed overseas, mostly in Korea, from 1950 to 1954, Gray went from private to first lieutenant. After his commissioning, he was an artillery officer in 2d Battalion, 11th Marines as well as an infantry officer in Chesty Puller’s alma mater, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. On his return to the United States, Gray attended the Communication Officers School at Quantico, Virginia, in 1955. After graduation and promotion to captain, he was sent to command “special operations” units “in the Pacific and the Far East.” These, generally, were signals-intelligence officer billets. In 1961, Gray came back to the United States and served at Headquarters, Marine Corps as the Special Operations and Plans Officer, G-2 Division.6
In April 1964, then-Major Gray assumed command of a composite unit of signals-intelligence specialists and infantrymen specifically built to exploit the signals traffic intercepted in the region of Khe Sanh, Republic of South Vietnam. As historians John Prados and Ray Stubbe comment, “Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. . . . achieved the distinction of becoming the first U.S. ground unit commander to conduct independent operations in South Vietnam.” Within weeks, this unit was pulled out of the jungle after Viet Cong probing attacks confirmed its existence. Although he was in command of a tactical formation, his mission had national-level strategic implications.
Gray returned to Vietnam in 1965 with an artillery regiment, 12th Marines, as operations officer. In 1967, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and given command of 1st Radio Battalion. While serving as Radio Battalion’s commanding officer, he was instrumental in arguing for the 3d Marine Amphibious Force’s reinforcement of Khe Sanh prior to its siege by the North Vietnamese Army. Gray witnessed officers, including flag officers, directly opposing the reinforcement due to their unwillingness to accept the signals-intelligence estimate he provided as well as analyses coming from other sources.7 In his subsequent higher-level commands as 2d Marine Division commander, 2d Marine Amphibious Force commander, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gray would vehemently argue for and aggressively pursue the implementation of a type of warfare that was “smarter” and was led by the principle that intelligence drives operations. Gray’s past experiences in Vietnam at the minimum educated him, but most likely they drove his passion for the adoption of these maneuver-warfare principles.
Special Ops Pioneer
Throughout Gray’s career he was placed in “special operations” billets. Far from the current image of special operations officers leading SEALs and A-Teams in direct action “shoot ’em up” Hollywood operations, he was mostly involved in the gathering and exploiting of intelligence through the planning of conventional-type missions. In 1980, as a major general, Gray was appointed the Deputy for Development/Director, Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia. While serving in that billet, he was sent to be the sole Marine Corps representative on the Special Operations Review Board, a conglomeration of Army, Air Force, and Navy active-duty and retired general and flag officers who had special operations experience. Their mission was to review the Desert One debacle (the failed attempt to rescue 53 American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran) and make recommendations to Congress and the Joint Chiefs so that the tragedy would not be repeated.8
From this review board, Gray became a strong advocate of the Marine Corps’ acquisition of a light armor–type vehicle. It would serve as an expeditionary quick-strike capability that could both move rapidly across the battlefield and engage Soviet-type armor. When Major General Gray testified before Congress in 1980 about the Corps’ critical need for such a vehicle he already was an advocate of maneuver warfare. He stated that a light armor vehicle was needed because, “we do believe that the addition offers a significant new dimension in terms of both firepower and mobility, particularly our ability to conduct maneuver warfare, which we are most interested in improving upon.”9 Gray’s testimony occurred at the same time the U.S. Army was debating the adoption of AirLand Battle, a maneuver warfare–based doctrine, over the post–Vietnam-era active defense operational paradigm. How much he studied these debates is not clear, but as a graduate of the Army War College in 1973 he most certainly was aware of them.
Gray’s dealings with special operations did not end when he moved to higher commands after the Special Operations Review Board disbanded. Instead, he became the de facto “expert” in special operations pertaining to the Marine Corps. Gray’s predecessor, Commandant General Paul X. Kelley, was ordered by Secretary of Defense Caspar M. Weinberger in 1983 to conduct an internal review of the Corps’ special operations capabilities. Kelly turned to Gray and tasked him with defining the Corps’ role. In 1985, Kelley approved his study that described 18 different special operations missions that the Corps was able to execute. In December of that year, Kelley approved the creation of a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) that was special-operations capable (SOC).
This was just in time for the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which created a new combatant command called the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that would control all the services’ special operations forces. The MAU/SOCs were able to retain their independence from USSOCOMM because Gray connected the 18 SOC missions to the traditional functions of the Corps. During his commandancy, Gray was able to maintain this independence from USSOCOM by leaning on the study he conducted. He continually argued that there was no mission overlap between USSOCOM and the MAU/SOCs; rather the MAU/SOCs supplemented and supported USSOCOM’s forces.10
Shift to Maneuver Warfare
As Commandant, Gray cannot be separated from either the cult of personality surrounding him, nor his past experiences. The former was one very important mechanism he used to facilitate the transformation of the Corps, while the latter is crucial for understanding the “why.” Gray’s career was unique in that he was an enlisted infantryman, infantry officer, artillery officer, communications officer, and intelligence officer. All of these billets guided him toward the most significant change he made to the Marine Corps: the official paradigm shift in the Corps’ warfighting philosophy from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare, the virtues of which were espoused in FMFM 1 Warfighting, a manual commissioned by Gray, that allowed his Marines to be unconstrained by the strictness of most doctrinal publications. This 1989 publication was unprecedented for a field manual in any of the services. Unlike the U.S. Army’s 1985 version of FM 100-5, in which AirLand Battle was described in extreme operational detail, Warfighting was broad and spoke of maneuver warfare in general principles. In the foreword, Gray wrote that this was intentional and the doctrine “require[d] judgment in [its] application.”11
In keeping with his leadership style, General Gray’s first sentence in Warfighting takes full responsibility for the doctrine by stating, “This book describes my philosophy on warfighting.”12 By doing this, he welded FMFM 1’s reception throughout the Corps to his reputation. If one were to criticize the doctrine, he would be criticizing General Gray. The publication of Warfighting set off a flurry of articles in the Marine Corps Gazette that argued both for and against its adoption. The critics crafted their arguments carefully, making sure that Gray’s name was never mentioned. Instead, the writers used proxies like the ever-controversial William Lind, author of Maneuver Warfare Handbook, and Captain John Schmitt, the actual author of FMFM 1.13
The legacy of Gray’s commandancy is tied directly to the success of FMFM 1 Warfighting, which would become the fundamental piece of doctrine driving the Corps. As Commandant, he focused on the mind, body, and soul of the Marine Corps, rather than its armor and weapons. He was a transformational leader not because of the technology he championed, but the intellectual renaissance he led by empowering his officers and enlisted Marines. In the desert sands of Kuwait, the streets of Somalia, the Euphrates River Valley in Iraq, and the mountains of Afghanistan, Marines have continued to apply their military craft, the principles of which were written over 20 years ago when General Alfred M. Gray Jr. was Commandant of the Marine Corps.
1. Mark Mandeles, Military Transformation Past and Present: Historic Lessons for the 21st Century (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2007), 1–10.
2. Alan R. Millett, Commandants of the Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), viii. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Free Press, 1991), 632–4, 650–1. Edwin H. Simmons, The United States Marines: A History, 4th Edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 278–9. J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, Third Revised Edition (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1992), 818–20.
3. G. J. Michaels, Tip of the Spear: U.S. Marine Light Armor in the Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 92–4.
4. Moskin, Marine Corps Story, 789.
5. J. L. Holloway, III et al., “Special Operations Review Group” (study presented to Congress, August 1990), 77.
6. Ibid.
7. John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 19–22.
8. Holloway et al., “Special Operations Review Group,” 1.
9. Michael N. Peznola, “Marine Light Armor 1980–1999 Operational Goals, Tactical Results: A Study in the Dynamics of Change” (paper presented to the School of Advanced Warfighting, November 1999), 3.
10. John K. Love, “An Analysis of the Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable),” master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994, 1–4. Lawrence D. Nicholson, “An Analysis of the Twenty-One Missions of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable),” master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994, 1–5.
11. Alfred M. Gray Jr., foreword, in FMFM 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1989).
12. Ibid.
13. Craig A. Tucker, “False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM 1 Warfighting” (monograph delivered to the School of Advanced Military Studies, November 1995).