Terrorist Naval Mines/Underwater Improvised Explosive Devices

2014 Mine Warfare Essay Contest Second Prize Winner

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda—an international terrorist network[1]—attacked the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and tried to target the White House in Washington, DC.  These terrorists sought to inflict damage upon American centers of economic, government, and military power, and to make clear that—despite superpower status—the United States is highly vulnerable to asymmetric attack.  It is a stated goal of al-Qaeda and its splinter organizations to inflict economic pain, mass casualties, and panic upon the American homeland.[2]

As a continental nation, the United States is bound to the planet’s waterways for both commerce and defense, and operates an intricate network of lake-, river-, and sea-ports as part of its Marine Transportation System.

PORTS

There are some 360 ports located along the nation’s Atlantic, Great Lakes, Gulf, and Pacific coastlines, as well as in Alaska, Guam, Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, Saipan, and the Virgin Islands.  Among these, the Port of South Louisiana is the largest facility, and, the Port of Monroe, Michigan: the smallest.  These ports are sprawling, often built close to urban population centers, are accessible by both land and water, and accommodate a spectrum of vessel types.

Barges, ferries, ocean-going cargo and passenger ships, and recreational watercraft call on U.S. ports, with some 7,500 foreign ships doing so every year.[3]  U.S. ports provide approximately 3,200 cargo and passenger handling facilities,[4] and 150 of them are considered deep draft and able to service large ocean-going vessels.[5]  By volume, more than 90 percent of the nation’s exports and imports—including highly hazardous materials—pass through ports, making them integral to the safe movement of coastal, inland, and foreign commerce.[6]  Such facts make U.S. ports enticing targets for terrorists.

Multiple Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource threat assessments have focused on port security.[7]  They address threat vectors that include human infiltration—frogmen, submersibles, and suicide teams (such as those that crippled the USS Cole)—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction smuggled among the hundreds of thousands of shipping containers that U.S. ports handle each year; and, use of vessels for ramming others, or fixed port infrastructure like docks and bridges.  Those charged with port security have focused attention and resources on CBRNs.

However, since such weapons of mass destruction are difficult to acquire, handle, and deliver—especially now that port security regarding this attack vector has been hardened—it is likely those that seek to harm American ports will utilize vectors more likely to succeed, especially those that exploit holes in defenses; the so-called ‘path of least resistance’.[8]  One such path is naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices.

THE WEAPONS

Naval mines have been used for more than two centuries by weak naval powers against the strong.[9]  Such weapons that wait include: bottom; floating; limpet (attached directly to a target ship’s hull); moored; and rising types.  They can be deployed in surf zones; shallows; or, in deep water, and can be detonated acoustically; on command; by contact; pressure; vibration; or by underwater electrical potential.[10]  Such naval mines are multitudinous.

More than 50 world navies have in their inventories 250,000-plus naval mines representing over 300 types ranging in design from simplistic to highly sophisticated.  Some 30 countries produce naval mines, and at least 20 countries export them.[11]  Relatively cheap, naval mines range in price from a few tens of dollars to approximately $30,000 for an advanced, multiple-influence weapon.[12]  Though many mines represent World War I or II technology, they can be easily retrofitted with modern components like fiberglass or plastic enclosures, and counter-countermeasures, such as booby-traps that make detecting, and/or disabling them highly problematic.[13]  Naval mine designs can also be improvised.

Utilizing such items as fuel bladders, 50-gallon drums, and discarded refrigerators,[14] underwater improvised explosive devices can use commercially-available or synthesized (made from agricultural and industrial components) explosive material.  Such weapons would have the inherent tactical and strategic advantages of naval mines.

Naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices (M/UWIEDs) can inflict major damage on shipping, are covert and surprising, and allow little or no chance for retaliatory action against the laying force.[15]  Low-cost, easily deployed, and difficult to counter, M/UWIEDs require minimal training to use,[16] are capable of economic disruption, and inflict fear, mass casualties, panic, and uncertainty.[17]  Such features are coveted by terrorists.

A terrorist M/UWIED could damage or sink a ship.  If mine countermeasure assets were not readily available, this would portend that a large minefield was present, likely bringing port traffic to a standstill.[18]  Laid in critical channels or waterways, such weapons could also hamper military sealift, a strategic element that forms the foundation of U.S. wartime deployment of heavy equipment and stores.[19]  If used in conjunction with other forces against a port, terrorist M/UWIEDs would act as a force multiplier.[20]  Such an attack profile could include a coordinated air/land/sea operation that would distract and divide responders, and—especially when used in conjunction with suicide strikes—maximize confusion and destruction.[21]

PRIORS

Terrorists have used naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices in recent history, laying them in California’s Sacramento River, the Gulf of Suez/Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Louisiana’s Lake Ponchartrain.

In January of 1980, during the U.S. grain embargo of the Soviet Union, an unknown person telephoned authorities claiming to have laid mines in the Sacramento River channel.  Calling himself a ‘patriotic scuba diver,’ this terrorist shut down all shipping movements on the river, and forced the Navy to deploy a mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel to the area.  After several days of mine-sweeping—an operation that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in merchant marine lay-days (idle cargo, mariners, and vessels)—the threat was deemed a hoax.[22]

In the summer of 1984, 23 vessels transiting the Gulf of Suez/Red Sea suffered damage from underwater explosions.  These occurrences spurred a massive multinational MCM effort that included U.S. Navy assets.  Though only one naval mine was recovered, it was found that Libyan naval personnel had used a commercial ferry to covertly lay a mine field.[23]

Disguised to look like it was carrying oil barrels, an Iraqi tugboat intercepted during 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom had really carried numerous naval mines, and was configured to deploy them by using a deck-mounted conveyor belt.[24]

In early 2004, a tugboat operator spotted a suspicious object floating upon the waters of Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana.  The U.S. Coast Guard was notified, and Louisiana’s Jefferson Parish Bomb Squad contacted.  The object was found to be an underwater improvised explosive device consisting of timed pipe-bombs surrounded by an air-filled flotation bag.[25]

Lessons?  Even a faked terrorist M/UWIED port attack could have a detrimental effect on a port;[26] seemingly innocuous vessels can be effective mine-layers; and, naval mines can be improvised and laid in highly-trafficked domestic waters.[27]  Such methods could easily become part of a maritime campaign of terror.

TACTICS

By 2002, U.S. intelligence officials had identified over 15 cargo ships believed to be part of ‘al-Qaeda’s Navy’.[28]  Moreover, as of 2011, there were more than 79,000 merchant vessels sailing the seas;[29] many of which hide ownership under layers of incorporation, and are manned by tens-of-thousands of seamen that often use false names and fake documentation.[30]  There are also large numbers of legitimate commercial vessels operating in U.S. ports.  Many would make effective mine-layers.

Fishing vessels have standard deck equipment like cranes and winches that are unlikely to arouse suspicion.  According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s 2010 count, there are 82,047 commercial fishing vessels documented by the U.S. Coast Guard in the United States.[31]  Furthermore, recreational maritime traffic within or near U.S. ports is prolific, and could be used to perpetrate a terrorist M/UWIED-laying operation.

The most recent Coast Guard statistics report a total of 12,101,936 numbered (registered) recreational boats operating in America’s waters.[32]  During World War II, the U.S. Navy drafted cabin cruisers, sailing boats, and yachts, converting them to patrol boats.  In one case, a yacht was stripped of its pipe organ, three marble fireplaces, and a seaplane before anti-submarine equipment was installed that included depth charges and mine-laying racks.[33]  It does not take a stretch of the imagination to understand that pleasure boats could easily be converted to wicked purposes, including a platform for terrorist M/UWIED-laying.  A 2006 Defense Agency Threat Reduction (DATR) study conducted by the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy proposed just such a hypothetical attack.

The DATR study chose the Port of New York-New Jersey as its target.  In 2010, this port handled 5.3 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units—better known as TEUs, or, simply, shipping containers—and had cruise ship and ferry terminals within its boundaries.[34]  The study chose Italian-built Manta naval mines[35] as its primary weapon, and shipped the mines’ parts to various post office boxes throughout the United States before forwarding them on to post office boxes in New Jersey.  Said parts were then transported to a Brooklyn, New York basement where they were assembled and stored until needed.

The hypothetical terrorists decided that the laying of the live (as well as dummy) mines would occur prior to September—the beginning of a three-month period of peak cargo volume at the target port—and would be perpetrated in ‘The Narrows’—a tidal strait separating the boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island—as well as the Red Hook cruise ship terminal opposite Governors Island; the main shipping channel; and, at various anchorages.[36]  A private yacht was chosen for the mine-laying operation.

Harbor dinner cruises were used as a cover, and the yacht’s master cabin was outfitted with a moon pool—an opening in the hull that allowed access to the water.  The mines were brought aboard with general provisions and stored in the master cabin.  Dinner cruises commenced, and the yacht sailed the waters off Lower Manhattan, the Statue of Liberty, and the Jersey coast.  Set to activate two months after the laying operation’s completion, the mines were deployed from the yacht’s moon pool, and plotted on a master chart using GPS coordinates. [37]  The Defense Agency Threat Reduction study consulted with the U.S. Navy, and, with the service’s input, estimated this hypothetical terrorist operation could lay 162-324 dummy and live mines over 54 nighttime dinner cruises.[38]  Though the study focused on marine vessels, aircraft, too, could be used by terrorists to lay M/UWIEDs.

Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have a long history of mine-laying.  Aerial mine-laying began on November 20, 1939, when nine German floatplanes laid a field in England’s Thames Estuary.[39]  During World War II, U.S. aerial mine-laying was the primary means of creating large fields—especially in the Pacific Theater against Imperial Japanese shipping and warships[40]—and would again be used during the Vietnam War.  Aerial mine-laying could be part of a terrorist campaign directed at U.S. ports.

PREPARED?

The Coast Guard is the lead maritime law enforcement authority and component of U.S. homeland security as related to ports.  Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard is responsible for the protection of ports, and the facilities and vessels therein, from acts of subversion or violence.[41]  Therefore, it is logical that the Coast Guard possess a first response mine detection capability to detect and localize naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices until Navy MCM assets arrive on scene.

Coast Guard MH-65 Dolphin and MH-60 Jayhawk helicopters should be modified with electrical and mechanical interfaces that accept the new AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, and the service’s MQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicles should have the AN/DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis system aboard.  Coast Guard cutters and smaller vessels should have available the various new towed and unmanned sonar mine-hunters developed for the Navy, and select Coast Guard vessels should be fitted with hull-mounted mine-hunting sonar.  Assuming Navy MCM assets would require time to deploy, it also makes sense that the Coast Guard have basic means to immediately clear mines.

The helicopter-mounted Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System—a cost-effective laser-targeted 30mm cannon with super-cavitating rounds that impact and detonate mines—would be an effective means of accomplishing preliminary clearance of a waterway.  Furthermore, the Unmanned Influence Sweep System, consisting of an unmanned boat towing a sweep, should be added to Coast Guard inventory.  These, and other mine countermeasure systems, should be stationed where geography, port size/volume, and proximity to naval bases and potential forward areas of operation demand them.

Such Coast Guard stations include: Alameda, California; Apra Harbor, Guam; Calumet Harbor, Illinois; Honolulu, Hawai’i; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; Miami Beach, Florida; Port Arthur, Texas; Portsmouth, Virginia; San Diego, California; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Seattle, Washington; and, Staten Island, New York.

THEY WAIT!

Mines have haunted commercial and military shipping for ages.  Like terrorists, this threat, these weapons, they wait…

The threat of terrorist naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices to U.S. ports cannot be ignored.  Though such weapons may not bust a city, nor infect citizens with superbugs, or irradiate entire districts, when laid in one or more ports, such weapons have an immediate and lasting effect on the economy and security of the nation.[42]

The U.S. Navy is a forward-deployed global force, and, therefore, will not always have the assets on hand to deal with such a terrorist threat to the homeland.  Consequently, it is likely that the Coast Guard will have to shoulder the first response to mines in U.S. waters, managing the first few days of such a crisis all by its lonesome.

Armed with relevant equipment, the Coast Guard could deter enemies and counter any such attack, as well as increase its ability to effectively patrol foreign ports during expeditionary combat operations.

The September 11^th terror attacks taught the United States that threat vectors must be anticipated and cannot be ignored, and that first responders must be given the tools and training to face and overcome such threats.  Let us not ignore the threat of naval mines/underwater improvised explosive devices to homeland waters.  For, as Admiral Thad Allen, 23^rd Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, stated: “What keeps me up at night?  The threat of…IEDs [in U.S. waters]”.[43]

Mr. von Bleichert is a college instructor and PhD candidate (public policy and administration, specializing in homeland security).