2014 Mine Warfare Essay Contest Third Prize Winner
“It’s fragmented,” said retired Rear Admiral Paul Ryan, former Commander of the U.S. Navy’s Mine Warfare Command, to a Virginia Pilot reporter in April 2014. “There is no single champion for mine warfare.”
And that presents challenges. The post-World War II political history of mine warfare (MIW) in the U.S. Navy—with politics defined as who gets what, when, where, and how—is fraught with a lack of sustained and stable commitment: relatively long periods of benign neglect, disinterest, uncertainty and insufficient funding punctuated by relatively short bursts of grave concern and avid support—usually directly related to some MIW embarrassment recently experienced—but soon followed by relatively long periods of benign neglect, disinterest, uncertainty and insufficient funding as Navy leadership focuses on more important concerns.
MIT political scientist Harvey Sapolski in his 1972 book The Polaris System Development explained the inherently and necessarily political process by which a government program can achieve high priorities and guarantee resources for research and development, programmatic and operational success. “The success of the [Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine] program was dependent upon the great skill of its proponents in bureaucratic politics. Without their quick recognition of the political nature of decisions determining the procurement of weapons, I do not believe that sufficient resources could have been assembled to create the...FBM Fleet.”
There is perhaps only one other U.S. Navy program that has had similar R&D, bureaucratic, programmatic and operational success as the Polaris FBM project: the Aegis anti-air warfare (AAW) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke surface warships. Looking at Polaris–strategic deterrence––and Aegis––AAW and BMD––some secrets of naval warfare bureaucratic-political success can be gleaned for the future of the U.S. MIW community.
Sapolski’s Secrets of Success
First, Polaris and Aegis had a set of well-defined goals that stayed constant. The Special Projects Office was focused on building a solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile and a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile-launching submarines to enhance U.S. strategic deterrence. The Aegis Shipbuilding Program (PMS 400) had the goal of building a fleet of AAW surface warships armed with advanced phased-array radars and surface-to-air (and -space) missiles capable of defeating massed Soviet Naval Aviation raids. And, since 2002 Aegis BMD has pushed the envelope, experiencing 28 intercepts in 34 flight-test attempts through 2013––unprecedented in all elements of the nation’s BMD systems.
Both were born and sustained in favorable environments. For Polaris, it was the demand-pull for a survivable nuclear deterrent within a strategic context of mutual assured destruction and bitter U.S.-Soviet rivalry and a budgetary context of virtually unlimited resources—particularly by today’s standards. Aegis was conceived as the Soviet navy began to break out of its historic boundaries, seeking to challenge the U.S. Navy everywhere and holding at risk aircraft carrier battle groups with increasingly capable anti-ship cruise missiles launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. “Aegis...don’t leave homeport without it” was the Program Office’s Unique Selling Point—and it sold! And this has continued with Aegis BMD, extending the shield well beyond forces at sea.
The success of both Polaris and Aegis also depended upon their proponents’ ability to promote and protect their programs. Competitors had to be eliminated; reviewing agencies had to be out-maneuvered; defense and Navy officials, admirals, congressmen, defense industry, the media, and academicians had to be co-opted. Every opportunity to promote and protect Polaris and Aegis had to be seized and won—whether the challenge came from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, another service, the Congress or the Navy.
Finally, both had to have long-term champions skilled in bureaucratic politics and possessing great managerial strengths to manage technological complexity. Both Polaris and Aegis were “Rocket Science” and needed leaders with broad and deep technical, engineering, and program-management expertise. Admirals Levering Smith, William F. Raborn and Wayne E. Meyer were masters in these areas––as was Admiral H.G. Rickover in the development of nuclear power. And it did not hurt that Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), personally established the Polaris Special Projects Office.
So What for USN MIW?
Compare the Polaris/Aegis political-culture experience with MIW since 1945. Instead of a single set of well-defined goals that stay constant, MIW goals and program elements often compete among themselves for priorities and resources and are far from stable, particularly in terms of funding:
- Should we emphasize mine countermeasures (MCM) at the expense of offensive or defensive mines and mining?
- Within the MCM arena, what is the best way to allocate scarce resources between mine hunting and mine sweeping?
- What element of the MCM Triad—airborne (AMCM) and surface (SMCM) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)—needs to be supported most urgently?
- How can “Big Navy” be convinced to sustain a modern mining capability?
This situation is made more complex by the fact that, except in rare cases, the MIW community does not procure its own major platforms—and can be held hostage, at times, by the competing goals, priorities and dynamics of other warfare sponsors. Witness the challenges of providing sufficient resources to keep the Sea Dragon MH-53 airborne MCM helicopters ready for tasking as they continue to be “sun-downed” or to the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) that could jeopardize MCM modernization as the Avenger surface MCM vessels are retired. Indeed, in 2014 the Navy MCM community is “betting the farm” on the R&D, bureaucratic, programmatic and operational success of the LCS program. (When the Navy reorganized the LCS Program Executive Office out of the previous PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare in 2011, the MIW programs manager, PMS 495, was included in the LCS “portfolio.”)
Moreover, USN MIW tends to be emphasized in non-favorable environments and as knee-jerk reactions to an embarrassment and urgent, albeit ultimately ephemeral perceptions of need. Two quotes illustrate this:
- First: “...when you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is the rock-bottom foundation for all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine- and air-conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week.”
- And the second quote: “...I believe there are some fundamentals about MIW that we should not forget. Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That is not likely to change. It is probably going to get worse, because mines are going to become more sophisticated.”
The first speaker was Admiral Forrest Sherman, CNO, in late October 1950 lamenting the fact that an extensive minefield in a 400-square mile area off Wonsan, North Korea—a mix of some 3,000 Soviet 1904- and 1908-vintage moored mines and more modern magnetic-influence bottom mines—kept a 250-ship amphibious task force at bay. The operational plan had allocated only ten days and insufficient MCM vessels to clear several channels, intelligence on the mine threat was all but absent, and maps and charts of the area were inadequate. Ultimately, only 225 of the 3,000 mines were swept, and the North Koreans (and Russians) had another 1,000 mines in reserve.
The second quote is by Admiral Frank B. Kelso, CNO, in October 1991 reacting to the more than 1,300 mines that had frustrated planned Marine assaults against Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm, according to the Navy’s 1992 Mine Warfare Plan. A few of the mines were of a 1908-vintage and a crude Iraqi design but others were modern Soviet and Italian multiple-influence weapons, including at least 200 of a multiple-acoustic type that had never been seen before in the West. The operational plans had allocated only a few days to clear assault lanes, intelligence on the mine threat was all but absent, and maps and charts of the Northern Arabian Gulf were inadequate. Our intelligence about the Iraqi mine-threat was so incomplete that two U.S. warships suffered mine-strikes in areas that intel analysts assessed as mine-free—the helicopter assault ship Tripoli and guided-missile cruiser Princeton were damaged severely, with Princeton taken out of the war by a single $15,000 weapon.
Both Wonsan and Operation Desert Storm had the near-instantaneous effects of revitalizing USN MIW—at least mine countermeasures. And not only in an infusion of much-needed funding, but also in the understanding that somehow MIW was still important to the Navy during a period of great change: Global Strategic-Nuclear War in the 1950s and the uncertainty of the Post-Cold War Era in the 1990s. But both were short-lived and by the early 1960s and late-1990s, “business as usual” was the unofficial MIW motto as resources became increasingly tight and attention turned to other needs. (Since the mid-1980s, USN mines are another, even more dismal story.)
The two other factors of success for Polaris and Aegis—their proponents’ ability to promote and protect their programs against all other programs inside and outside the Navy, and the existence of long-term champions skilled in bureaucratic politics—have largely been absent in the MIW community. Rarely has a CNO—Forrest Sherman in 1950, Frank Kelso in 1991—put MIW on the line and protected the program of record from those who had different priorities. More recently, CNO Admirals Vern Clark and Jonathan Greenert “talked-the-talk” and “walked-the-walk” for MIW, earning them the title of “Mine Warfare CNO.” But, between Kelso and Clark and Clark and Greenert…not so much.
Moreover, the reality is that only one CNO since 1945 had an actual tour in MIW: Admiral Mike Boorda—C.O. of the minesweeper Parrott (in 1966-68). Others might point to Admiral Robert Carney, who had at least one MIW experience: as C.O. of the light cruiser Denver, on the night of 23 July 1943 he laid a large quantity of mines along the Bouganville sea lanes extensively used by Japanese naval forces. Not that it might matter, no other CNO since the end of World War II has had any real operational, or engineering/technical, or programmatic experience in MIW––Clark and Greenert included. And, rarely has the notional MIW “boss”––Commander Mine Warfare Command (COMINEWARCOM) or since 2006 the Naval Mine and Antisubmarine Warfare Command (NMAWC)––had any meaningful MIW experience before taking command.
That’s not to say there have not been MIW champions—perhaps “gadflies” is more appropriate—who remained champions after leaving the MIW community. Rear Admiral “Chuck” Horne (former COMINEWARCOM) comes to mind, as does Marine Corps General James Jones, who served as the CNO’s Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85) in the mid-1990s. Jones kept his ear close to the “MIW ground” while he was Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations in USMC HQ and later as senior military advisor to Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Concerned that MIW funding had “turned south,” Jones was the catalyst of two SecDef letters to the Secretary of the Navy, instructing on the need to protect MIW funding. Clearly, here was someone who understood the art and science of bureaucratic infighting and maneuver––and that MCM was the sine qua non of USMC amphibious assault.
Looking at the four decades between Wonsan and Operation Desert Storm and the decade between Desert Storm and Freedom, it is clear that the use of mines and the need for effective mine countermeasures have indeed touched and shaped the Navy’s political consciousness. But, like the person who pulls out his hand from a bucket of water, the impression left behind has been fleeting. And it is personality dependent.
During his stint as Secretary Cohen’s senior military advisor, General Jones asked a visitor, “What do we have to do, to keep the Navy’s attention focused on mine warfare?”
“Ships got to sink and people have to die, or it will be business as usual,” came the reply.
“Sadly, I agree,” he said.
The great irony and paradox for the Navy MIW community’s political culture and history since 1945 and looking ahead is that mines do work and that mine countermeasures will almost certainly be needed in a future crisis or conflict. The Navy’s post-WWII operational history underscores this irony: of the 19 U.S. Navy ships that have been severely damaged or sunk by adversary action since September 1945, 15 mine victims. When the Navy employed mines, as in Haiphong in 1972, they were effective operationally and politically. More to the point of mines and mining in Navy strategies and operations, in various fleet exercises during the past decade, senior flag officers were concerned that they could not carry out OpPlans because of a lack of modern mines and the platforms to deploy them. And, during international MCM exercises in the Arabian Gulf in 2012 and 2013, stimulated by Iran’s “mine-rattling” threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, numerous U.S. and foreign navy surface and airborne MCM and EOD forces tested capabilities against threats, which helped identify strengths and weaknesses should the next time be real.
And yet, during this same period, the MIW community has been subjected to a near-constant roller coaster of long periods of neglect punctuated by short but intense “get-well” efforts. Only since 2003 or so have these sinusoidal trends been short-circuited, generating a “mini-Renaissance” in MIW—primarily MCM. Unlike the history of the previous 50 years, there was no apparent “mine embarrassment” in the early 2000s that generated sufficient support to get MIW funding up to levels where it made a difference. When asked about that during an interview, Admiral Clark replied succinctly, “because it’s the right thing to do.”
Captain Glenn R. Allen, the CNO’s MIW resource sponsor (N952) in 2014, offered this insight during an April 2014 conversation. “The program of record requirements when written were visionary, but the technology has yet to advance to the required level to achieve them even 20 years later. Unfortunately, the acquisition process and limited budget do not allow the MIW program to seize on those technologies that––almost––meet the requirements and get them in the fleet along the way to full operational capability.”
One of the political-culture challenges for the MIW community in 2014 stems from the fact that it is a “community” in name only. As much as MIW programs and command are fragmented, so the MIW industry is fragmented, dominated by smallish-companies or smallish elements of larger companies competing for smallish funding streams. What used to be a vibrant MIW Caucus on Capitol Hill is moribund, if not worse. In short, the need for a community critical mass is compelling.
In 1993, during the first of several post-Cold War reorganizations, the Navy established the Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85/N75/N95), headed by a USMC major general and a Navy one-star deputy. The intent was to focus expeditionary warfare resource sponsor attention on several crucial “…from the sea” warfare areas. The reality is that there has been “Director Churn,” with the average tenure being on the order of 18-20 months, far too short to have an impact that survives the next rounds of cuts once the new people are on board.
Moreover, there have been very few mine-warfare admirals, selected for flag from the SMCM, AMCM or EOD communities who have the knowledge, wisdom, respect and ability to take the fight to the Pentagon and beyond. That is not to say that the current system cannot or will not work. But with a flag champion of some longevity in Mine Warfare and influence—along the lines of a Levering Smith, William F. Raborn, H.G. Rickover and Wayne E. Meyer/Father of Aegis—the community can more actively shape its political culture and assure future programmatic and operational success.
“MIW is a very complex mission area,” Capt. Allen continued. “I often draw parallels of MIW to BMD when speaking to senior officials to help them understand that complexity. When prosecuting a threat, warfighters employ sensors in an environment, which affects the sensors while discriminating a target, developing a targeting solution, destroying the threat and assessing the residual threat after the engagement. There are two major differences between MIW and BMD. First, the engagement takes place over hours vice minutes. Second, a single BMD ‘shot’ may cost $10 million, while $10 million is all that is available to fund the MIW program of record for an entire year. Mine warriors have really been forced to do more with less.”
Lessons to be Learned
There is a short-list of Polaris and Aegis lessons-learned for MIW in 2014 as it looks ahead to an ambiguous but dangerous future given the nature of the worldwide mine threat.
Articulate clearly your MIW vision and establish a set of well-defined goals and programs that stay constant for more than a couple of budget cycles.
Take advantage of the Quadrennial Defense Review process and the resurrection of the tri-service “cooperative” maritime strategy to shape and sustain a Joint environment favorable to MIW. As Admiral Greenert has acknowledged, “It’s all about assured access.” And assured access is a Joint concern.
Take every opportunity to promote and protect the program of record: work to eliminate competitors; out-maneuver reviewing agencies; and co-opt officials, admirals, congressmen, defense industry, the media, and academicians. If “co-opt” is too strong a phrase, then substitute “educate” or “inform” key constituencies, stakeholders and partners in the vision, requirements, capabilities and programs of the nation’s MIW forces.
Reorganize MIW so it can do all these things. Somebody must be responsible to provide trained and ready MIW forces to the combatant commanders. However, as Rear Admiral Ryan recognized, “It’s fragmented.” Perhaps this responsibility should be a function of the U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Unfortunately, there is no MIW “czar” in USFFC, or anywhere else. And, responsibilities are split between NMAWC in San Diego, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command in Little Creek, Virginia, N95 (and other CNO warfare/platforms resource sponsors) in the Pentagon, and numerous program offices in the Office of Naval Research and Navy systems commands, laboratories and warfare commanders.
And finally, find and nurture long-term champions who are skilled in bureaucratic politics and possess great managerial strengths to manage technological and operational complexity. After all, mines and MCM systems are sophisticated and highly complex weapons that wait…but more often than not wait too long.