The Commanders Respond
(See R. Griggs, P. Maddison, et al., pp. 16–29, March 2013 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—It seems that “multinational” is the byword for all navies today. Admiral Bilgel from the Turkish Naval Forces states that a primary goal for his navy is to “participate in multinational exercises and operations in sharing burdens.” Admiral Stanhope says that the Royal Navy is “expanding the pool of collaboration with the United States, France, and our many other allies.” Admiral Rao says that the Spanish Navy is “taking part in the NATO and EU ‘Smart Defense’ and ‘Pooling and Sharing’ initiatives to share costs and capabilities.” And as Admiral Kawano of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force stated so clearly, “With most militaries under budgetary and personnel constraints, complementary cooperation is likely to become even more prevalent.”
But this proliferation of multinational military operations could also be fraught with peril. For example, does this mean that because we are part of various multinational agreements that we are automatically going to get involved in wars in which we may have no immediate or vital national interest? Will a multinational agreement drag us into an unnecessary war, one that may prove difficult to contain once it begins?
Or what if two allies, such as Greece and Turkey or Turkey and Israel, come to blows in a dispute? Worse, if the United Nations insists for whatever reason that a naval blockade of Syria is warranted, do we follow the desires of the U.N., even though we have no vital national interest in Syria? Are we going to get involved in endless Libya-like wars because other U.N. members want us to? In the case of Libya, France and Britain were the primary supporters of action in that civil war. Are we to now get involved in the Syrian civil war because of our multinational obligations at the U.N.?
And what if the United States needs to take a unilateral naval action against another nation? Do we dither and wait to form yet another multinational coalition, or do we act in our own national interest when it is needed? President Ronald Reagan didn’t feel the need to form a coalition to attack Libya. Will American presidents have that same flexibility in the future?
It also seems that navies are downsizing their capabilities for multinational operations. Spain has the reduced-crew Metero-class offshore-patrol vessels, Germany has the new Class 125 frigate project (a ship specifically designed for low-intensity operations), Turkey has its MILGEM program, and we have a large investment in the littoral combat ship, designed with a small crew to patrol and (hopefully) survive in the littorals. But are these smaller ships taking away badly needed resources from our blue-water capabilities and reducing our ability to fight offensive fleet actions against other nations?
Multinational operations are not a cure for shrinking naval budgets and fewer warships. And less-capable warships are just that, less capable. Western navies seem to be rolling the dice that another major naval war will not occur. Unfortunately, when people make that assumption, they’re usually wrong.
We Need More Than a Reading List
(See C. Nelson, p. 12, March 2013 Proceedings)
Captain John Jackson, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Commander Daniel Dolan, U.S. Navy; director and co-director, respectively, of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Professional Reading Program—Lieutenant Commander Nelson noted in his thoughtful and timely column that “we need more than a list if we want to create a culture of professional sailor-scholars.” We could not agree more. More work does need to be done to foster “a culture of professional reading” in the U.S. Navy.
Considering that the CNO Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) has provided more than 120,000 books in the form of organized lending libraries to ships, squadrons, submarines, and shore stations since its inception in 2006; that a Naval Administration Command message discussing the program was published by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in October 2012; and that 70,000 copies of the CNO-PRP Program Guide were distributed Fleet-wide in January 2013, it is a bit surprising that Lieutenant Commander Nelson considers the CNO’s Professional Reading Program to be “a secret to many sailors.”
The CNO-PRP and the Navy General Library Program have gone to considerable lengths to make great books available to the Fleet. In December 2012 the CNO-PRP provided a tangible lending library to more than 600 Navy commands. This lending library consisted of 18 “Essential”-category reading books. Each book is specially labeled as part of the CNO Professional Reading Program. The program is supported by an informative official website and with Facebook and Twitter presence. Further, the Navy General Library Program has assembled an impressive e-library at http://navy.lib.overdrive.com. Along with thousands of other titles, most of the CNO-PRP–selected titles are available here in e-book and/or audio versions. Additionally, the CNO-PRP is prominently promoted in Navy Exchanges around the world, and books are available for purchase both in their retail stores and on the Navy Exchange website.
We believe that access and availability of books is not the problem. Echoing the concerns of Lieutenant Commander Nelson, the Naval War College’s Professor Milan Vego wrote in the January 2013 issue of Proceedings, “Today’s Navy officer corps’ knowledge and understanding of naval theory and military history is far from adequate.” Such knowledge of history is something that can and should be acquired over the span of a sailor’s or officer’s career path. From Admiral Mike Mullen, who turned the Navy’s reading program into more than just a list, to Admiral Jonathan Greenert, who has re-energized the Professional Reading Program with the addition of 18 new books, right down to the deckplates with “sailor-scholars” such as Lieutenant Commander Nelson, there is a growing sense that a knowledge gap exists.
This gets to the lieutenant commander’s main point, which is that we need to create a culture of professional reading and self-development. His assessment of the state of professional development joins a growing chorus of flag officers and naval scholars who are signaling that this is important—and it is. The CNO-PRP and General Library Program have provided the materials and tools to grow a culture of reading for professional development, but it is up to the leaders of today’s Navy to nurture that culture. The improvement of our Navy’s warfighting capability and the success of our Navy in every endeavor can only stand to benefit from the power of knowledge in action.
LCS, JHSV, MLP . . . What?
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86–87, March 2013 Proceedings)
Captain John G. McCandless, U.S. Navy (Retired); chairman, USS Detroit Blue & Gold Committee, Metropolitan Detroit Council, Navy League of the United States—Mr. Polmar has a solid, sound argument for a return to a logical first-letter designation system for U.S. Navy ships, starting with dropping the odd and awkward classification of LCS for our new class of combatants.
The Webster’s definition of “littoral” is: “of, relating to, or situated or growing on or near a shore especially of the sea.” When I mention our new class of littoral combat ships to non-Navy acquaintances, all have given me a puzzled look and asked, “What’s littoral?”
Even if there was a better familiarity of the word “littoral,” LCS is not a logical descriptive choice for this new class of ships. While they are shallow in draft, they are also fully capable of extended blue-water operations. They are multi-mission combatants and should be described as “destroyers.” Change their designation to DLM—for Destroyer, Littoral (or Light), Multi-mission.
Michiganders would better understand the role and importance of the USS Detroit (LCS-7) if her designation was changed to DLM-7 to correctly describe her multi-mission role as a U.S. Navy warship when she is commissioned in 2015.
Master Sergeant Bill Brockman, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Mr. Polmar’s excellent article is completely in accord with my thinking. I was struck by the juxtaposition of the article with a couple of the letters in “Comment & Discussion” reacting to the February 2013 article “Semper Huh?”
I don’t have to stretch my thinking very far to see a connection between senior civilian and military leaders corrupting and abusing naming and classification systems and a lack of knowledge of the history and traditions of one’s military branch.
In my own service, the Air Force, we have such recent examples as skipping from F-23 to F-35 (for the Joint Strike Fighter) because an Under Secretary of Defense and a major general serving as program director mistakenly thought the X-35 designation automatically became the F-series designator. Since no one could dare to correct this official after his mistake had been made publicly at a press conference, it stands to this day.
I hope Mr. Polmar’s recommendations at the end of the article will be followed, but I won’t hold my breath.
Abandon the Littorals . . . To Robots!
(See P. von Bleichert, p. 10, March 2013 Proceedings)
C.Henry Depew—Mr. von Bleichert makes a good case for keeping the blue-water Navy in the deeper waters and using other means for control of littoral waters. A problem with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is their dependence on electronic control, leaving them open to electronic interference created by those opposing us. A coming problem with the use of UAVs is the other side adapting the same type of vehicle for counter-UAV warfare. For about $500 I can purchase a nice radio-controlled airplane. Add some explosive to it (and a contact fuse), and I have an opportunity to take out a UAV that is a problem. For a couple of thousand dollars, I can have a faster and higher-flying vehicle to do the same thing.
Bring Historic Ships Back into the Fleet
(See D. F. Winkler, pp. 62–67, February 2013, and R. S. Elkin, p. 84, March 2013 Proceedings)
Benjamin Franklin Cooling, PhD; professor of national-security studies, National Defense University—As a follow-on to Commander Winkler’s stimulating piece, I want to home in specifically on the plight of arguably the modern fighting Navy’s most famous treasure, the USS Olympia. I am particularly concerned with her situation because of my book, Olympia:Herald of Empire (Naval Institute Press, 1999), as well as years of association with her as part-time curator. I believe she deserves especial notice from the naval community due to her continuingly uncertain future.
Four years ago, we learned that her present steward, the Independence Seaport Museum (ISM) in Philadelphia, wished to jettison its responsibility for her care and preservation. Thus, two years later there began a lengthy disposal procedure, ongoing to this day, with a proffered solution, according to one spokesman, by the end of this year. A procedure called a “three-phase transfer application process” has been conducted by a review panel composed of representatives from the ISM, the Navy, the National Park Service, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. From an initial candidate pool of six potential “new homes” for the venerable warship, the panel has whittled the finalists down to two.
In the meantime, the Olympia, still maintained by the ISM and open to the public, has continued to degrade physically, causing a corps of dedicated and concerned professionals to remain skeptical of stopgap measures along with (a) the Navy’s indifference to the pearl of its steam-and-steel heritage, and (b) equal indifference (if not ignorance) of the American public as to what has been transpiring.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation graciously established the USS Olympia National Fund, but with no particular fanfare to elevate public awareness of the troubled ship. The Trust maintains that “this is a repository of funds, raised through the collective efforts of individuals and groups for the stabilization, repair, relocation, and restoration of the USS Olympia.” But while the Trust offered its administrative and online resources for the fund, it did not commit to marketing efforts. A paltry sum of less than $25,000 was raised, $20,000 of which went immediately to various emergency repairs at the request of the ISM. The Trust remains “the repository of funds raised”—but not an advocate for fundraising activities.
Needless to say, the fund needs replenishment. In this era of sequestration and austerity, with the U.S. Navy apparently unable or unwilling to shoulder the stewardship of Admiral George Dewey’s flagship at Manila Bay in 1898 and bearer of the Unknown Soldier home to Arlington at the conclusion of World War I, it falls to the private sector to do as it did in 1954 during the earlier Olympia preservation effort—raise the money from donations of all sizes, to ensure that future generations will be able to appreciate what her crew always called “the Queen of the Pacific.”
Semper Huh?
(See M. Junge, pp. 26–31, February 2013, and T. A. Davis, pp. 8–9, March 2013 Proceedings)
Donald C. McElfresh—In his letter, Captain Davis discusses the esprit de corps of the Navy and states, “In the ‘modern’ Navy, personnel appear to be civilians who fill military jobs when they report to work.” This reminded me of when our ship, the USS Renshaw (DD/DDE-499) had her reunion in Seattle more than ten years ago and we visited the USS Fife (DD-991). It was around Saturday noon, and the liberty party was at the head of the pier waiting for a bus. The group was composed of young men and women in jeans, sweaters, and windbreakers—there wasn’t a dress blue in the bunch. The captain of the Fife told us how they went to sea only three days a month and the rest of the training was (essentially) “videogames.” They did have a well equipped recreation room and basketball courts, and 65 of the crew of 324 were women. He said that one of the first things he did when taking command was to break up the couples in the crew. It would appear from Captain Davis’ letter that it has gotten worse, and not only that the “old-time sailors” have gone the way of wooden ships and sails, but the Navy now resembles the U.S. Postal Service.