The most important maritime choke point on the planet is the Strait of Hormuz, where oil flows out of the Middle East through six miles of shipping lanes between Oman and Iran. What if you were told that in 20 years, an unexpected choke point would capture our attention: the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia? The United States must make modest maritime and infrastructure investments now to ensure it maintains its status as guarantor of peace on the maritime commons of a new Arctic frontier. Our national strategic risk is that the infrastructure and manpower is stretched too thin to cover the current level of activity in the Arctic. The fear is that it will be overwhelmed and unable to respond as maritime traffic and resource extraction increase in the region. Beyond the tipping point when the United States is unable to respond, operational saturation will occur, resulting in loss of life and/or irreversible environmental damage.
Climate change is creating a dramatically different environment in and around Alaska, allowing access to new shipping lanes and maritime resources. Cooperation is remarkable among the Arctic Council and observer nations, from shipping standards to international search-and-rescue (SAR) agreements, and many of its members have clearly defined their grand strategy for development in the Arctic. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ensure peaceful maritime transit and safety around the globe, but if they are not present in that region, the spirit of cooperation could deteriorate to conflict. After looking at Arctic cooperation versus conflict, we make specific recommendations in defense, security, and safety to prevent operational saturation and ensure a new national strategy for the region.
Strategic Anxiety
With limited financial resources, the United States is willing to accept the risk associated with delaying expensive Arctic capabilities. A sense of national anxiety persists, but it is difficult to pinpoint the cause. Is it the risk of another Deepwater Horizon disaster, this time in the Arctic? Is it responding to a Carnival cruise ship in distress in a truly fragile environment instead of the tranquil Gulf of Mexico? Is it global-resource competition between nations? Illegal fishing?
The United States must be prepared to respond in each of these instances and not violate the public trust by being late when called to assist in this unforgiving and austere environment. While challenges are managed today by a combination of federal, state and corporate activities in and around Alaska, the core of American anxiety is that it will be unable to respond as challenges become more frequent and persistent. While state and local agencies can respond to a singular event, when it is one of many incidents going on at the same time, the United States risks the dreaded operational saturation.
Many critics of Arctic spending say this is simply a pessimistic take on an uncertain situation. However, simultaneous emergency-response events in an area that stretches from Minneapolis to Dallas and Jacksonville to San Diego when there is persistent maritime activity more than just three months out of the year is a reasonable assessment. America’s growing anxiety is a result of knowing this, yet continuing to delay action as Shell prepares for additional exploratory drilling, China readies its icebreakers for more transits through the Bering Strait to Europe along the Northeast passage, and people migrate north.
A Different Frontier
Arctic sea ice melted to its lowest recorded level in 2012, beyond the 2007 level that had raised global awareness of Arctic climate change (see Figure 1). Issues such as Arctic sovereignty claims, commercial shipping through the region, Arctic oil, gas, and mineral exploration, endangered species, the protection of Alaskan native cultures, and increased military operations will cause the region to become an arena of international cooperation or conflict.1
The economic potential is staggering and resonates in our National Strategy for the Arctic Region’s guiding principles and requirement for responsible regional stewardship.3 According to the U.S. Geological Survey, nearly 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of its undiscovered gas reserves lie north of the Arctic Circle. This could mean 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.4 State-owned and multinational corporations are posturing themselves to extract enormous quantities of offshore oil, gas, precious ores, and rare-earth minerals. A key to the United States achieving energy independence is safe and effective extraction of the vast gas and oil reserves predicted to be off Alaska’s North Slope.
Cooperation or Conflict?
The United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, and the Russian Federation, commonly referred to as the Arctic Five, came together along with Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, the Arctic Eight, to establish a high-level forum in Ottawa, Canada, in September of 1996. They signed a declaration that established them as members the Arctic Council.5 The number of observer-status nations has slowly increased to include Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain. China, Italy, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore hold ad hoc observer status.6
China marks the Arctic as a domain of strategic significance, acquiring land for rare earth mineral mining in Greenland, building a large icebreaker fleet, and focusing on the new transportation routes across the North Pole.7 It is developing a large-scale Arctic research program as well as bilateral commercial and economic relations with small Arctic states such as Iceland and Denmark. China is investing in joint energy, mineral exploitation and navigation projects and is stimulating development of bilateral trade.8 These growing interests will result in an exponential increase in the volume and duration of human activity in the Arctic, testing the spirit of international cooperation.
China’s long-term Arctic strategic vision and activities are cause for concern, as its extensive “nine dashed line” territorial water claims in Southeast Asia and lack of transparency in its naval buildup point to an uncertain future. One day the Bering Strait will seasonally resemble the Strait of Malacca. If the United States fails to champion and enforce customary maritime law and the free flow of commerce in the Arctic as it does in the Strait of Malacca, China’s behavior indicates it is unlikely to become the guarantor of a peaceful Arctic.
Russia, with a third of its nation above the Arctic Circle, has been the most aggressive Arctic Five nation from a defense perspective, viewing the polar region as a critical economic base for future prosperity. From the controversial “flag-planting” incident on the North Pole seabed and resumption of reconnaissance and nuclear-capable bomber missions off the coast of Alaska, to plans to modernize its fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers, Russia has indicated a concerted effort to match diplomatic actions on Arctic issues with military capacity.
In response to dramatic minimum sea ice in 2007, National Security Presidential Directive- 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive -25 Arctic Region Policy was signed in 2009 and updated on 10 May with a National Strategy for the Arctic Region.9 The latest strategy builds on the NSPD-66 by establishing three lines of effort (Advance U.S. Security Interests, Responsible Arctic Stewardship, and International Cooperation) and four strategic guiding principles (Safeguard Peace and Stability, Decisions using Best Information, Innovative Arrangements, and Coordination with Alaska Natives) to discipline our Arctic strategy and ensure freedom of the seas.10
Unfortunately, the United States’ fiscal decisions will not fulfill the strategy. For example, there is no persistent domain awareness, and our icebreaking capability and infrastructure are limited. The notable exception is international cooperation, but the U.S. State Department stopped short of appointing a special ambassador for Arctic issues like six other Arctic Council members despite requests from Senator Mark Begich (D-AK).11 The inability of the United States to realize these policy goals can quickly change the Arctic dynamic from cooperation to conflict. It has a vital national interest in the Arctic, not only in its sovereign territory but as a guarantor of a peaceful maritime commons. As we examine recommendations, we will tie them to the newly signed National Strategy.
Defense
Warfare in the Arctic is unlikely, but the “no-fail” mission of protecting the homeland is paramount. Increasing human activity, commercial development, and potential competition in the region requires cross-cutting domain awareness for safety, security, and defense. The United States should take a measured approach to defense in the Arctic, balancing near-term missions, long-term threats, and looming fiscal realities. Enhancing domain awareness supports the National Strategy line of effort to advancing U.S. security interests.12 It ensures prompt discovery and recognition of threats to life, property, and the environment for timely decision-making and effective response.
Maritime domain awareness could be improved during seasonal spikes in activity by allocating additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. If the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR increased prioritization of U.S. Northern Command Arctic awareness gaps, P-3/P-8 maritime patrol missions and RQ-4 reconnaissance sorties from the military or civilian corporations could detect, characterize, and identify maritime traffic, establish baseline databases for use in the event of an environmental or natural disaster response, and demonstrate sovereignty.
The ability to track vessels in or near the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) enhances safety, serves as a foundation for maritime security, and allows the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense (DOD) to maintain a common operating picture. According to a Northern Command white paper, currently “there are few systems available in the Arctic to monitor the movement of ships.”13 DOD should deploy surface-search radars at key geographic choke points, such as the Tin City Long Range Radar Site near the Bering Strait and along Unimak Pass and integrate the information into existing North American Aerospace Defense and Coast Guard tracking networks.
Arctic Security
The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated that the biggest threat to national security is the debt, with interest payments equaling the DOD budget.14 Ensuring safe and secure extraction of the oil within the EEZ and continental shelf is a vital national interest as America looks for additional revenues to solve budgetary challenges and provide for future energy security while conserving resources per our national strategy.15 The immediate area for concern in the Arctic is establishing extended seabed claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty. In the Arctic, seabed claims beyond the EEZ are critical as nations vie for resources including oil and precious minerals in the relatively shallow Arctic waters where summer ice melts make extraction more feasible.16 We support UNCLOS ratification by the U.S. Senate.17 This ensures America a seat at the table to negotiate maritime territorial claims and settle maritime disputes, including in the Arctic Ocean, and in accordance with our National Strategy it will strengthen international cooperation.18
We come again to the question of cooperation or conflict, as enforcement of claims, protection of sovereignty, and natural resources belonging to nations will create a security requirement that could spiral into a defense issue, as evidenced by current claims over the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China. Outside the Arctic-nation EEZs, there is a global commons at the center of the Arctic Ocean which several nations not party to the Arctic Council have demonstrated an interest in as observers to the council. This includes China, whose icebreaking capacity equals that of the United States, an Arctic nation.19
The U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, and the Maritime Arctic
The Coast Guard has just enough capability to handle the current level of maritime-security activity in the Arctic. The expected bullpen player when the Coast Guard calls is the Navy. But it has limited surface Arctic capability, the primary roadblocks being infrastructure, search-and-rescue (SAR) assets, the harsh environment and high cost of operations, incomplete maritime charting, limited communications and satellite sensors, lack of ice-hardened hulls, icebreaking capacity, and finally, limited Arctic experience.20 The Navy’s 2009 Arctic Roadmap, entering its final phase, established Task Force Climate Change but did not result in a significant increase in U.S. Navy Arctic capability. While the Arctic is not unfamiliar to the Navy, “expanded capabilities and capacity may be required for the Navy to increase its engagement in this region.”21 The recent establishment of Navigation North (NAVNORTH) as the Northern Command’s maritime component commander provides an opportunity to exercise its command and control of U.S. naval forces in exercises on the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex and the North Pacific Sea.
The Ardent Sentry/Arctic Edge exercise scheduled for the spring of 2014 will test many relationships and standing authorities for Joint Task Force–Alaska and exercise its interactions with the Coast Guard in a scenario centered around the response to an earthquake similar in magnitude to the 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake, which registered 9.2 on the Richter scale and claimed 128 lives, most from the ensuing tsunami.22 Recreating a similar event will stress SAR and Defense Security Cooperation Agency handover procedures.23 The Navy and NAVNORTH should maximize its participation in this exercise.
A powerful lesson from the Coast Guard Arctic Shield exercise in 2012 was not only the training received by its units deploying to Barrow, Alaska, but also the benefit to citizens in remote areas who form the backbone of domestic-security partnerships. During the exercise, Coast Guard units trained veterinarians in austere locations where they may deploy by providing services to small Alaskan communities. Medical personnel also provided sports physicals for local athletes.24 Through exercises, this low-cost engagement allows personnel, who may have to respond to future security incidents, the opportunity to build personal bonds with citizens in remote areas who would otherwise be challenged to receive these services. The Navy should be incorporated into Arctic Shield for engagement and logistics, not only furthering our Stewardship Arctic Region line of effort, but also building relationships essential to the National Strategy guiding principle of consult and coordination with Alaska natives.25 An additional recommendation is the incorporation of irregular-warfare forces into these exercises so they can train in the core mission area of stability operations, which specifically includes countering illicit trafficking and response to natural disasters.26
Safety
As human activity increases, safety is a concern in the immediate future. Increased vessel traffic has heightened the probability of incidents where even limited exposure to Arctic cold and sea water reduces human endurance to minutes. These hazardous environmental conditions prevail in a region with scarce emergency resources and where vast distances result in lengthy response times.27 Given America’s sparse, widely dispersed assets, the long-term impact of a spill or major rescue operation could prove cataclysmic, and the inability to respond would be attributed to operational saturation.
Commercial maritime traffic is increasing in the region as well, with many looking at the utility of Arctic sea routes as a cost-saving measure. The Northern Sea Route, along the Russian northern coast, could reduce a maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about 13,000 miles by way of the Suez Canal to about 8,000, cutting transit time by 10 to 15 days.28 These routes are noted to have sparked strong interest in China, Japan, and South Korea as viable alternatives for shipping goods to Europe.29
However, Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice President of Maersk Line, Limited, has argued that Arctic shipping routes do not offer an attractive alternative to the more traditional routes, and are highly unlikely to be advantageous in the future. He believes the variability in transit time due to shifting ice and unpredictable weather is unacceptable in a world of “just-in-time” supply. He further notes that variability eliminates network efficiencies. Arctic routes are useful for only a small part of the year, and are more expensive because of poor economies of scale. Therefore, Carmel would not expect to see a large increase in commercial transit shipping.
As a response to maritime traffic stressors, the Arctic Council penned a SAR agreement that was signed by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in May 2011. The agreement is the first legally binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council and commits parties to provide appropriate assistance in the event of an incident and take other steps to address growing SAR requirements in the region.30
The United States should create a seasonal SAR base at Barrow, Alaska, which would also advance our security interest effort by evolving Arctic infrastructure and strategic capabilities.31 The Coast Guard District 17 Arctic Shield 2012 exercise demonstrated the service’s ability to execute a seasonal SAR capability from the airport in Barrow. The nearest Coast Guard Air Station is in Kodiak and requires a four-hour fixed-wing or ten-hour rotary wing flight to support the most northern Alaskan population of Barrow, a distance of 820 miles. By sea, Coast Guard cutters routinely patrol the Bering Sea, but it requires at least three days once embarked to reach the Arctic Ocean.32
Prudhoe Bay, 200 miles east of Barrow, is the unofficial northern terminus of the Pan-American Highway used during Arctic Shield 2012 to transport the Navy supervisor of salvage (SUPSALV) tactical oil-spill response equipment. Prudhoe Bay has limited port facilities, requiring SUPSALV equipment to be loaded onto a commercial barge. Resupply of a Coast Guard cutter would require a helicopter from the Deadhorse public airport or barge out to approximately 12 nautical miles where the vessels could safely anchor, much farther than the 1,200 yards at Barrow. If leasing facilities or new construction are not possible due to the strains it places on the community and need for research and investment, the United States should purchase or recapitalize commercial off-the-shelf expeditionary type structures/facilities similar to what was used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Needed: Additional Icebreakers
On 27 August 2010 the MV Clipper Adventurer, a cruise ship carrying 128 passengers, ran aground on a charted rock off the Nunavut coast while making its way from Port Epworth to Kugluktuk in the North West Passage. None of the passengers was injured, but they were forced to stay on the ship three days until a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker arrived to ferry them to Kugluktuk.33 If the same event occurred off the coast of Alaska, the United States would require luck to respond in time. It currently has one operational icebreaker that splits time supporting National Science Foundation missions in Antarctica and the Arctic.
The U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Report addressed recapitalization of polar icebreakers, finding that the most cost-effective option would be to build two new heavy icebreakers. The High Latitude Study included a broader analysis of the Coast Guard’s needs, finding that the common and dominant contributor to the significant mission impacts in the Arctic is a gap in polar icebreaking capability, and that the existing fleet is insufficient to meet the service’s statutory mission requirements in both the Arctic and Antarctic. To meet all missions and advance U.S. security interests with ice-capable platforms, the United States needs three icebreakers.34 The Coast Guard estimates it will take eight to ten years to design and build one, and it is estimated to cost $859 million.35 This is required to evolve our Arctic strategic capability in accordance with our National Strategy.36 America’s past experience with a leased icebreaker shows it could not fulfill mission requirements, when last July Sweden called the Oden home off of the U.S. Antarctic McMurdo Research Station resupply and science mission support, breaking its commitment and putting the entire 2011–12 research season in jeopardy. The National Science Foundation was forced to commission a Russian vessel.37
Considering all this, it is clear the United States has a vital interest in the Arctic and must ensure it never reaches operational saturation through modest investment in domain awareness, exercises, SAR facilities, and replacing the United States icebreaker fleet. These steps will relieve America’s anxiety over the Arctic and make sure it is prepared to continue cooperation and deter conflict. Action is needed to realize our Arctic Region Strategy, positioning the United States as the guarantor of a peaceful Arctic frontier opening.
1. Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 8 October 2010).
2. NASA Earth Observatory, “Visualizing the Sea Ice Minimum” 27 September 2012, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79256#.
3. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 10 May 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
4. Steve Hargreaves, “Oil: Only part of the Arctic’s massive resource,” CNN Money, 19 July 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/17/news/economy/Arctic-oil/index.htm.
5. The Arctic Council, Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, 19 September 19, 1996), 1 (a).
6. Heather Exner-Pirot, “Non-Arctic States: The Observer Question at the Arctic," The Arctic Yearbook 2012, Akureyri, Iceland. www.arcticyearbook.com.
7. Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, America, Allies, & The Arctic: NORTHCOM Commander Talks Polar Strategy – EXCLUSIVE.” AOL Defense, http://defense.aol.com/2012/12/14/america-allies-and-the-arctic-northcom-commander-talks-polar-st/.
8. Olga Alexeeva, Olga and Frédéric Lasserre, “China and the Arctic,” The Arctic Yearbook 2012, Akureyri, Iceland, www.arcticyearbook.com.
9. The January 2009 national Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-66, dual titled as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-25, or NSPD-66/HSPD-25, establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and outlines national security and homeland security interest in the region. www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm.
10. National Strategy for the Arctic Region.
11. Mia Bennett, “Begich aims to raise U.S. profile in Arctic by creating ambassador,” Alaska Dispatch, 21 April 2013, www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130421/begich-aims-raise-us-profile-arctic-creating-ambassador.
12. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 6.
13. United States Northern Command, Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working Group White Paper, 2012.
14. Sgt. 1st Class Michael J. Carden, U.S. Army, “National Debt Poses Security Threat, Mullen Says,” Department Of Defense, Department of Defense News, 27 August 2010. www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60621.
15. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 7.
16. Mark N. Clemente and Michael R. Horn, “A Comprehensive Look at the Arctic, Issues and Challenges” (lecture, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 7 November 2012).
17. University of Virginia, School of Law, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” www.virginia.edu/colp/los.html.
18. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 9.
19. RADM Jonathan White, Oceanographer of the U.S. Navy, “Challenges from a Changing Climate and Arctic,” (lecture, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Senior Executives in National Security, 28 November 2012).
20. Ibid.
21. U.S. Department of the Navy, “Arctic Roadmap,” 10 November 2009.
22. U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquakes, States, Events “Historic Earthquakes, Prince William Sound, 1964,” http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/events/1964_03_28.php.
23. CDR LaDonn Allen, USCG, “Arctic Lexicon and Five-Year Plan Brief,” 20 November 2012, PowerPoint Presentation, 22.
24. USCG D17 D3/D5 Panel Interview, (Discussion of Arctic Shield 2012).
25. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 11.
26. John Sandol, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, interview by author Campagna, December 2012.
27. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009, second printing. www.pame.is/amsa-2009-report.
28. Laird and Timperlake, “America, Allies, & The Arctic.”
29. Heather A. Conley, A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2012.
30. Arctic Council website, www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/oceans/search-and-rescue/157-sar-agreement.
31. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 6.
32. Adam Shaw and David Godfrey, Overcoming Logistical Support Challenges, How Coast Guard operational and support units collaborated to support the Forward Operating Location in Barrow. Juneau, Alaska, 2012.
33. CBC News North, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2010/08/30/arctic-ship-stranded-home.html.
34. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2.
35. Mia Bennett, “Congressional Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation holds hearing on icebreakers,” Foreign Policy Blog, 7 December 2011, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/12/07/congressional-subcommittee-on-coast-guard-and-maritime-transportation-holds-hearing-on-icebreakers/.
36. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 6.
37. Jerry Beilinson, “Why the United States Must Build More Icebreakers Now.” Popular Mechanics, 17 February 2012, www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/infrastructure/why-the-us-must-build-more-icebreakers-now-6693195.