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An SM-3 Block 1A interceptor is launched from the guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur (DDG-73) during a successful intercept test in the Pacific on 10 September. With its Aegis weapon system, the Decatur and her sister DDGs, along with Aegis-equipped cruisers, would be crucial in a Pacific counter-A2/AD scenario.
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U.S. Navy - The SEA-Air Battle

By Norman Polman
December 2013
Proceedings
Vol. 139/12/1,330
Article
View Issue
Comments

Obama administration and Department of Defense officials are publicizing the so-called “strategy” of the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) and the “pivot” of U.S. military forces to the Pacific area.1 But neither the ASB nor the pivot is a “strategy.” Rather, they are operational concepts that should support the U.S. national-security strategy.

One strategic goal is to deter and defeat aggression. Another is to support U.S. allies around the world. And maintaining open sea lanes for commerce is a subset goal. There are others, spelled out in lofty terms in rarely read documents.2

But how are these goals met by the ASB and pivot? The ASB is intended to overcome the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) efforts of potential enemies. Today and for the immediate future, the only potential enemies with A2/AD capabilities are Russia and China. While Iran and North Korea certainly rank as “enemies,” their A2/AD capabilities are minimal against potential U.S.-Western military forces.

China is the potential antagonist that is normally discussed in the A2/AD context. In the “real world,” the possibility of a major non-nuclear conflict between the United States and China is highly unlikely:

• China-Taiwan relations are at an all-time high and continue to improve; the financial investment that China has in Taiwan and Taiwan in China is significant and increasing; and recently seafloor cable traffic between them has been established.

• China and the United States have no territorial or religious disputes, the major sources of conflict in the world.

• China is highly vulnerable to interruption of its seaborne commerce, especially the shipment of petroleum from the Middle East.

• Conflict between China and the United States could result in financial catastrophes for both nations, and Walmart—America’s largest retail chain—would be out of business until other Third World sources for unexpensive goods could be established.

But let’s accept that a conventional conflict could occur between China and the United States and that the ASB is initiated to destroy China’s A2/AD capabilities. Of course, this begs the question of “why?” To cause regime change in Beijing? To deter a Chinese attack on Japan over territorial disputes? Or to stop China from occupying South China Sea islands that are the subject of multinational claims? Accepting that the United States does initiate the ASB for one of these reasons, how are A2/AD operations to be carried out? China is building a force of DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles to “kill” U.S. carriers (and other surface ships) approaching within some 1,500 miles of the mainland.

Even if the United States could bring aircraft carriers with F/A-18 Hornet (and in the future, F-35C Lightning) strike aircraft within their range, how would they fare against China’s surface-to-air missile batteries and several hundred air-defense fighters? And how long would it take to assemble perhaps three carriers in the Western Pacific from the total U.S. force of nine operational CVNs?

Similarly, what is the potential effectiveness of a maximum of 19 B-2 Stealth bombers and some larger numbers of B-1 and B-52 bombers with stand-off weapons? If these land-based aircraft bombed Chinese territory, the U.S. airfields on Guam would be an immediate target for Chinese land-launched missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched cruise missiles. Would these threats prevent U.S. allies in the area—Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan—from allowing American use of their territory to launch bombers or even aerial tankers?

In this context the most effective—and probably survivable—U.S. force would be surface warships at ranges of several hundred miles and nuclear-powered submarines (SSN/SSGN) launching Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM) with conventional warheads. Tomahawks have the range (approximately 1,000 miles) and the accuracy to destroy many of the A2/AD targets. And of course, missile-launching ships and submarines are independent of forward bases. Further, the Chinese navy has a very limited antisubmarine capability.

What would be their A2/AD targets? Certainly China’s military airfields (there are scores of them), coastal radars, and possibly command centers. How would China’s leadership respond to attacks on their homeland?

And what of U.S attacks on the feared DF-21D antiship missiles and their C3/targeting systems? The DF-21D missiles are operated by the 2nd Artillery, China’s strategic missile force, which also has the nation’s nuclear-warhead intermediate (regional) and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Would a U.S. strike on the DF-21D force—if it could be differentiated from nuclear missiles—be accepted by the Chinese leadership? What if some target missiles are incorrectly identified? Would there be escalation to nuclear conflict if a Chinese strategic-nuclear missile is destroyed while seeking out the antiship weapons? And are the DF-21D C3/targeting centers collocated—or the same—as those for strategic missiles?

Similarly, the 2nd Artillery’s C3/targeting is based in large part on satellites. Would the United States expend its limited antisatellite weapons in a conventional conflict? Would China accept destruction of its dual-capability (nuclear and conventional) C3/satellite systems?

An objective analysis of the methods of defeating A2/AD forces probably would center on two U.S. military components: Aegis surface ships (CG/DDG) and attack submarines (SSN/SSGN). The Aegis ships—with a ballistic-missile defense system—could be employed to defend surface ships, merchant and naval, from hostile air, ballistic-missile, and to some degree submarine attacks. And, of course, the Aegis cruisers and destroyers also carry TLAMs. No other “mobile” U.S. forces can provide these capabilities in significant numbers.

The most effective U.S. strike and, to some degree, antisubmarine capabilities reside in the SSN/SSGNs. Submarines are not advance-base dependent, can remain on station for months, and have a potent strike capability.

Thus, one could argue that if “A2/AD defeat” is a basis for U.S. military strategy, these two types of naval platforms must be emphasized. This should be done at the expense of some “marginal” defense programs, if necessary including aircraft carriers and littoral combat ships.

The submarine picture, however, reveals several shortfalls. The advanced-capability Mark 48 is one of the best torpedoes in existence, but the stockpile is limited, and the production line should be restarted. The U.S. Navy also has a handful of submarine-launched mobile mines and no submarine-launched antiship missiles. Both of the latter shortfalls must be rectified—the technology and, indeed, the weapons exist; no expensive research and development is required. Rather, the submarine community must acknowledge and correct this situation.

The A2/AD concept is not a strategy, but it provides useful operational models and should be pursued—but with realistic forces and doctrines.



1. This article is based, in part, on a lecture that Mr. Polmar gave to the senior class at the National War College, Washington, D.C., on 24 October 2013.

2. U.S. military strategy is spelled out in two periodically published documents, the National Security Strategy and Military Strategy of the United States of America.


Mr. Polmar, a columnist for Proceedings and Naval History magazines, has served as an adviser or consultant to three Secretaries of the Navy and to two Chiefs of Naval Operations, as well as to members of Congress. He is the author of several books, including the Naval Institute’s Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet.

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