When something becomes an “enterprise” or a “portfolio” rather than a weapon system or a means to kill the enemy, military professionals should be concerned. And yet over the past several decades, it appears that the uniformed leadership itself has often actively sought out business practices and philosophies for guidance.
Beginning in the 1960s with Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, our military has been subjected to processes aimed at increasing efficiency. This coincides with an effort to reduce the conduct of war to a predictable, systems-analysis approach, similar to that of the industrial assembly line.
Admittedly, business-based methodology has its place. Military acquisition offers plenty of room for improvement; logistics and supply officers must manage limited resources to rapidly achieve maximum military effect. However, a strict corporate paradigm jeopardizes the martial mindset. Language can shape and define organizational culture, and business terminology has now permeated the profession of arms—diluting the teleological foundation of our military.
How Business Invaded the Military
One of the best-known DOD programs in the 1990s was Total Quality Management, often rebranded into the presumably more palatable Total Quality Leadership.1 Still in use in small specialized circles such as logistics and organizational management, it has been replaced with a new quality process: Lean.
Lean Manufacturing was invented by the automaker Toyota in the late 1990s. At its most basic, Lean Operations Management seeks to eliminate waste and maximize efficiency. The DOD has incorporated many of these principles, especially in supply and maintenance functions.
Six Sigma (from the world of statistics, where “sigma” refers to the measure of standard deviations) is the fastest-growing business-management system in commercial industry today and has also been adopted by the DOD. This methodology provides businesses with tools to improve capability by seeking process improvement to increase performance and decrease variation. The process aspires toward a high degree of consistency (i.e., low variability); ideally, this leads to defect reduction, as well as profit, employee morale, and product-quality improvements, and eventually to business excellence. The objective of these improvements is typically described in these terms: “The defectivity rate of the process will be 3.4 defects per million units.”2
When the process is properly applied, the result is an organization that does a better job of serving owners and customers. However, one must question the relevance and use of Six Sigma in the operational military domain. Are the military’s customers the government it supports, the nation’s citizens (i.e., “shareholders”), or the enemy upon whom it must visit violence? Does military execution gain effectiveness from re-couching its mission in business terms that reference customers rather than adversaries? The operational environment may cause us to accept inefficiency if it ensures effectiveness in mission accomplishment. In a firefight, is the soldier best served by having only the right number of bullets?
A further business-world development is the combining of Lean Operations Management with Six Sigma. This union has found its way into the DOD through programs like Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21). As a recent reattempt to instill a quality mindset within the rank and file, the Air Force proposed the following objectives for AFSO21: “Develop an environment and culture which promotes elimination of waste, standardization of best practices, reduced cycle times in delivery of effective combat capability across all related products and services, and involvement of all Airmen in the relentless pursuit of excellence.”3
This is a top-down approach to fundamentally change the way the Air Force performs its mission, both in peace and in war, yet the reference to combat is buried beneath layers of management jargon. Interestingly, the Air Force started deployment of this particular project about the same time the RAND Corporation completed work on a study called “New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decision-Making.” This is an effort to encourage the DOD to emulate “best commercial practices” (BCPs): the methodology of commercial firms engaged in similar activities.4
Holding the Dividing Line
In the study, RAND recommended several military functions that might resemble commercial counterparts—activities such as administrative services, education and training, medical care, logistics, and civil engineering. These are largely activities that are separable from direct military operations. However, RAND thought it important to note at the end of the list that “the DOD can use commercial models for other activities as well, but finding useful analogs becomes increasingly difficult as the department’s core military activities are approached.”5
The fact that RAND took the time to identify the fundamental differences between the commercial world and the DOD highlights the fact that not all BCPs are applicable to the military. Certain inherently non-commercial aspects to the DOD’s missions do not exist in the private sector. This is most evident in the execution of combat operations.
The study emphasized that commercial firms face competition that threatens them on a daily basis; however, the military operates in a potentially lethal environment. Therefore, before adopting the corporate perspective, the DOD must carefully distinguish activities that are truly similar to commercial BCPs.
The recurring theme in applying BCPs and quality tools to the military primarily involves their application in non-kinetic missions: activities that closely resemble those of commercial enterprises. Problems develop when the DOD tries to adopt these practices in areas that cross into the kinetic domain and start to impact their effectiveness.
Top Manager, or Top Leader?
Success at the military staff level is often associated with strict adherence to a business process, regardless of the resultant support to the warfighter. This quells initiative, dilutes mission focus, and engenders risk aversion. Because the profession of arms has been charged with what social theorist Max Weber called the “monopoly of legitimate violence” in guaranteeing the Constitution, the stakes are not a damaged bottom line, but rather life and death of the individual—and potentially the nation.
Senior military leaders are beginning to recognize the military’s overdependence on corporate practices and models—but many of their calls for reform are shrouded in business terminology. In the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Secretary Robert Gates admonished the military to account for institutional risks “associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices.” He warned that “we must guard against increasing organizational complexity leading to redundancy, gaps, or overly bureaucratic decision-making processes.”6
When now–Central Command Commander Marine General James Mattis led the U.S. Joint Forces Command, he directed it to embrace operational design to improve the problem framing that is so critical to focused planning. Perceiving that the military was robotically applying the joint planning process to operations, Mattis stated that “over-proceduralization inhibits the commander’s and staff’s critical thinking and creativity, which are essential to finding a timely solution to complex problems.”7 Was this an acknowledgement of pressing contemporary challenges, or was it a corporate-influenced call for rapid and efficient solutions?
In a similar vein, Admiral Eric Olson, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, said in his 2010 Commander’s Guidance: “We must also continuously scrutinize our organizations, processes, procedures and equipment inventories to identify and eliminate the redundancies and inefficiencies that seem to creep into our activities.” He directed his personnel to “reaffirm the logic and purpose of our systems, processes, and actions.”8 Thus, while advocating combat effectiveness, Admiral Olson employed a corporate lexicon.
These distinguished leaders agree that the military must review the manner in which it operates. Their concerns must be taken seriously, as the capability gap between our nation’s foes and our military widens. The disparity is not solely a result of enemy activity. It is also due in large part to the rigidity inherent in a large bureaucratic organization. In our “over-proceduralization” of operations against a fluid and evolving enemy, the United States cedes the fundamental principle of flexibility. In this struggle, the military must identify the dividing line between conducting business and practicing the art of war.
Where Business Works—and Doesn’t
Increasing efficiency can also result in greater effectiveness. Admiral Olson recognized the need to increase the alacrity with which Special Operations Force (SOF) operators receive “enemy-mitigating technologies” on the battlefield. To address this, the mission-based experimentation and rapid-employment-of-innovative-technology processes were developed. They have shown great potential for increased efficiency by leveraging the “creativity, aggressiveness . . . warrior ethos . . . and . . . renegade spirit that established SOF as the preeminent force.”9
These acquisition efforts, combined with judicious application of business modeling, can be very useful to our military. They allow a more timely delivery of mission-critical capability that preempts the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, and act loop.10 And they free up resources that translate into more capability and capacity—in other words, spare capacity, which is a taboo concept in the domain of Lean.
But capacity is often a key requirement for meeting unforeseen circumstances on the field of battle. Thus, increased procedural efficiency may directly translate into combat effectiveness. A business mindset may be fine in the appropriate environment, but it should never cross the line into the execution of military operations.
Case in Point
Many recent examples, from strategic to tactical, provide evidence that business-like efficiency is detrimental to mission accomplishment. One that is particularly clarifying involves an excessive trust in Lean logistics paradigms for the delivery of spare parts from parent units in the continental United States to their forward detachments conducting combat operations in the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR).
In 2004, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) was supporting combat operations of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit with a two-plane KC-130R detachment. Due to the nature of operations in austere conditions, aircraft brakes were wearing out at a greater-than-normal rate. The detachment maintenance officer identified this concern and requested augmentation in the number of spare brakes ordinarily afforded a two-plane detachment.
The normal (previous) expectation was that the U.S.-based squadron delivered the parts with its own organic lift, another KC-130. When preparing to fulfill this critical equipment deficiency for one of its own units engaged in combat operations (already lacking one of four functional brakes per aircraft), the U.S.-based squadron was denied permission to supply its own detachment. Instead, it was directed to allow the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) system to manage the delivery.
Multiple promised dates came and went without receipt of replacements, forcing the detachment to continue operations with significantly degraded braking systems. After several weeks the detachment was tasked with a high-priority mission. Marines in the region were decisively engaged with Taliban forces. Rotary-wing close air support was being used at such a rate that the aviation fuel supplies at the helicopters’ forward operating base (FOB) had run critically low and needed immediate replenishment to continue supporting the Marines under fire.
Just before launching on the emergency fuel-resupply mission, the crew of the KC-130 was notified that a second brake on their plane had failed. There was still no relief from USTRANSCOM in the form of replacement brakes. Knowing their fellow Marines were under fire, the crew elected to execute the mission with only one good brake on either side of the aircraft, a 50 percent degradation of the total system. They calculated the landing at the FOB’s dirt runway would be mitigated by the natural braking effect of its slope. Despite significant risk, the mission was successful, the local Taliban forces were defeated, and the KC-130 returned safely to its base.
A frustrated maintenance officer then personally flew to the logistics hub serving the tactical AOR. There he found the brakes lying in a large pile of “misplaced” or unclaimed parts. No one knew how long they had been there. This case illustrates how an “efficiency expert” trespassing into the realm of the warrior jeopardized lives. The business-model approach failed when supplying tactical units engaged in combat. The enemy is not in the board room where business models reside, but the enemy does have a vote in the prosecution of war.
Private Enterprise Is Not the Military
According to another RAND study, “The Strategic Distribution System in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” individual service logistics business models such as the Air Force’s Lean Logistics, the Army’s Velocity Management, and the Marine Corps’ Precision Logistics that were in place throughout the 1990s were eventually evaluated as both inefficient and ineffective for the DOD as a whole. This was a significant concern, particularly with the emergent emphasis on fighting as a joint force at the time of the RAND study.
This is why USTRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency, with RAND’s assistance, partnered to create the Strategic Distribution program. The idea was to create “fast, reliable, cost-effective support to customers in peace and war.”11
But, as should be clear by now, this stated goal raises several issues. In addition to the neutering effect of its business lexicon, the fundamental focus of the military organization has been perverted. Cost-effectiveness, or efficiency, may be a measure of success in peace, but it is hardly relevant when lives are on the line in combat. In the previously related 2004 anecdote from Afghanistan, directed reliance on this system, when alternate means were available, nearly cost American lives.
This assertion is reinforced by Daniel Haulman, chief of the Organizational History Branch, Air Force Historical Research Agency, in his study “Intertheater Airlift Challenges of Operation Enduring Freedom,” in which he describes many of the challenges and shortcomings that lead to failure or shortfalls in support of the warfighter. Two relevant factors stand out: “insufficient in-transit visibility of cargo,” which likely led to the Marine KC-130 detachment not receiving the critical replacement brakes; and “hostile fire in the theater,” for which commercial carriers such as FedEx and UPS do not, presumably, account in their business-model calculus. In fact, further investigation of this incident revealed that a number of contracted commercial air carriers moving the military’s supplies had been engaged by enemy fire. As a result, the parts had been lost or at best diverted—with no overall accountability.
Dr. Haulman’s study also aptly points to the “unnecessary airlift of cargo that could have gone by other means.” Otherwise stated in the Afghanistan case, if the parent unit, VMGR-252, had been permitted to resupply its own Marines, as had been done for decades previously, the unnecessary risk faced by many Marines, both on the ground and in the air, would have been avoided.
The problem permeates not only the operational and tactical realms, but also the strategic level. Civilian DOD leadership’s insistence on efficiency in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom, resulting from an agenda-driven effort to “showcase military transformation,” provides a compelling example.12 This Lean business-influenced strategy was conducted in clear opposition to the advice of many top military leaders. It certainly appeared to demonstrate a belief in the primacy of efficiency over effectiveness for military operations. Armed conflict has nothing to do with a financial or procedural bottom line.
While it is healthy and often beneficial to consider the military arena from different perspectives, the fundamental distinction between the corporate and martial domains must not be forgotten. A focus on efficiency to the detriment of effectiveness jeopardizes the very freedom on which our economy and, more important, our nation depend. While in a republic “arms must yield to the toga,” they should not become overly enamored of the accountant or the spreadsheet.
1. Kai Yang, Basem S. El-Haik, Design for Six Sigma (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. COL Paul Dunbar and MAJ Travis Condon, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century: CONOPS and Implementation Plan, U.S. Air Force, p. 5.
4. Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton, eds., New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decision-Making (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), p. 211.
5. Ibid., p. 212.
6. Robert M. Gates, Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy. June 2008, pp. 21, 23.
7. GEN James N. Mattis, “Memorandum for United States Joint Forces Command, Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design,” U.S. Joint Forces, Norfolk, VA, 14 August 2008, p. 1. Emphasis added.
8. ADM Eric T. Olson, Commander United States Special Operations Command, 2010 Commander’s Guidance, p. 3.
9. Ibid., p. 2.
10. Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art Of War (New York: Time Warner Books, 2002), pp. 334–36.
11. Marc Robbins, Patricia Boren, Kristin Leuschner, The Strategic Distribution System in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom (RAND, National Defense Research Institute and Arroyo Center, March 2004), p. viii. Emphasis added.
12. Fred Kaplan, “Beware Rumsfeld’s Snow Job,” Slate magazine, 25 November 2008.
Lieutenant Colonel Day is assigned as the program manager, Global Distribution Synchronization, Strategic Plans and Logistics Directorate, U.S. Transportation Command. He previously served as commander, 379th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron, Ali al Salem Air Base, Kuwait.
Captain Ullman is the operations director at Special Operations Command, Africa. He served previously as commander, Naval Special Warfare Tactical Development and Evaluation Squadron Four.