Engaging Yemen’s Maritime Forces
Strait of Bab el-Mandeb squeezes between Yemen and Africa (specifically, Djibouti and Eritrea). It is a prime area for piracy or waterborne terrorist attacks. Through this narrow, critical waterway pass 80,000 tons of shipping daily. Additionally, Yemen’s southeastern coast is a gateway for smuggled goods originating from Pakistan’s Makran coast, trade that often finances al Qaeda operations in Yemen and other parts of the region.Yemen faces other internal challenges, including rebels in the north and secessionists in the south, a growing population, and dwindling reserves of oil and water. According to the CIA World Factbook, it is the poorest country in the Middle East, with an annual gross domestic product per capita of $2,600.
The country is ill-equipped to handle these challenges alone. Engaging Yemen’s security forces is a priority for nations concerned with maintaining stability in this strategically important location. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower stresses the need to work with partner nations to protect sea lines of communication and commerce.
No single nation has sufficient resources to cover the entire maritime domain, and the strategy emphasizes the importance of building international relationships: “Trust and cooperation cannot be surged,” it specifies. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) is actively engaging Yemen’s maritime forces through its theater-security cooperation program.
How We Work with Partners
Central Command has tasked all component commands with engaging Yemen’s security forces, and capacity-building of regional partners should be conducted by personnel with cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise. The Navy’s foreign-area-officer program was specifically created for such a task. As one of those officers, my job is to work with the Yemeni navy and coast guard to increase their capabilities and cooperation with our naval forces.
NAVCENT falls under the military’s Title 10 funding restrictions, which prohibit the command from training foreign militaries and limits engagements to professional exchanges in which expertise—including tactics, techniques, and procedures—is shared by both sides. Along these lines, the theater-security cooperation program includes a variety of activities:
• Exercises: air, surface, diving, and amphibious
• Professional exchanges: visit, board, search, and seizure operations; engine maintenance
• Ship riders: a U.S. Navy vessel hosts a partner nation’s officers or sailors for three to five days
• Information exchanges: piracy or smuggling
• Office calls: senior leaders
NAVCENT uses another organization in its engagement strategy: the Combined Maritime Forces, comprising 25 nations organized into three combined task forces. Each one, commanded by a senior naval officer from one of the group’s nations, is responsible for a particular mission. Liaison officers from those countries, as well as a few from non-member countries such as Yemen (which chooses to participate in these activities and operations), work in the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters at the Naval Support Activity compound in Bahrain, where NAVCENT is located.
During the past few years, security concerns in Yemen limited NAVCENT’s ability to conduct exercises in-country; until 2009, the last one was in 2005. Reengaging Yemen has been culturally and linguistically challenging. For me, the effort required everything I learned at the Defense Language Institute. While some may question the value of learning Arabic in a region where so many of our partners speak English, it is important to remember that everyone does not speak English, and a translator is not always readily available.
Yemen’s Maritime Services
NAVCENT’s primary partner in past engagements with Yemen has been the Yemeni coast guard, a Ministry of the Interior organization. We had previously worked with the Yemeni navy, but our relationship had weakened during the past few years. For a number of reasons NAVCENT enjoys a stronger rapport with the coast guard, primarily because the United States helped create it in 2002. Retired U.S. Coast Guard Captain Robert Innes was recalled to active duty to manage the service’s creation and organization. In addition to being modeled after the U.S. Coast Guard, Yemen’s has been viewed as the easier force to work with because of its officers’ proficiency in English, eagerness to participate in U.S.-offered training and engagements, and accessibility.
The Yemeni navy, on the other hand, is a larger and more formal organization in the Ministry of Defense. English proficiency is not at the same level as in the country’s coast guard, because the former Soviet Union actively courted Yemen and many senior officers speak Russian as their second language. This, coupled with a more formal communication process, has led many to conclude that the country’s navy is not interested in engaging with U.S. naval forces. However, this is not the case.
In fact the Yemeni navy is anxious to engage with NAVCENT, as it has in the past. During my initial meetings with Yemeni naval leaders, I was told of their long history of working with the U.S. Navy, and that they did not know why things had changed. I responded (in Arabic) that our relationship remains important, adding my specific intention to increase cooperation between both of our navies and the Yemeni coast guard.
Words Lead to Actions
Forging a relationship with the Yemeni navy has been an incremental process. Before the August 2009 exercises, I had arranged for an information exchange to be hosted by the country’s coast guard at its headquarters, inviting the navy. The navy had expressed interest but sent no representatives. Fortunately this was not the case with the diving and amphibious exercises, in which the navy and coast guard jointly participated. Since then participation by both services in NAVCENT-sponsored engagements has been strong, and liaison officers from both now work in Combined Maritime Forces headquarters.
None of these engagements would have been possible without the work of liaison officers at the American embassy in Sana’a. Representing NAVCENT in regional embassies and to partner nations’ maritime forces, liaison officers are typically reservists recalled to active duty for a year, or active-duty officers filling individual-augmentee requirements. They are capable and effective officers.
Surprisingly, no foreign-area officers currently serve as liaison officers in any of the region’s embassies; because of funding constraints, NAVCENT has no permanent billets in these embassies. One would think the Navy would send its cultural and linguistic specialists in-country.
One of our previous liaison officers captured the irony of this situation as we drove through a hotel gate in Yemen. After I exchanged a few words in Arabic with the guard, the liaison officer, who did not speak Arabic, noted, “Yeah, you’re the one who should be working at headquarters.” Recently, Rear Admiral Jeffrey Lemmons, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ director for international engagement, announced a plan for creating a reserve component of the foreign-area-officer community. Such a cadre could improve the situation with liaison officers as long as the reserve billets remained funded.
The Future Demands Persistence
NAVCENT enjoys a good relationship with the Yemeni maritime forces because of our aggressive theater-security cooperation program. For this to remain effective, the relationship must be in the best interest of both countries. The United States and Yemen desire a secure, stable Republic of Yemen government that can secure its borders and prevent extremists’ freedom of movement.
Strengthening Yemen’s navy and coast guard will help to weaken al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula by strangling the seaborne smuggling networks that finance its operations. NAVCENT is advancing these interests by using a Navy foreign-area officer to build partnerships with the country’s maritime forces. But the Yemeni navy and coast guard will continue as our partners only if the United States addresses Yemen’s needs, maintains its commitments, and engages the nation in a manner that aligns with its larger goals. To do less will be a waste, not only of assets but also of time.
We Can Change Navy Energy Culture
The Navy burns extensive amounts of fossil fuels that don’t only move ships but also support electrical and other energy-demand loads on board the ships, from operating radars to hair dryers. The latter is considered part of a vessel’s “hotel load,” that is, the energy cost of supporting a crew and internal operations, including heating, cooling, cooking, and so on. Depending on the class of ship and operating conditions, this load can account for significant portions of total fuel use. But we can help to make it much less.
The Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) studied energy use on board the USS Princeton (CG-59) a decade ago.1 When it came to basic operations and the hotel load, the study team found that retrofitting motors, pumps, chillers, lights, and potable-water systems could save an estimated 20–50 percent of the ship’s electricity. That could cut total fuel use by about 10–25 percent. (Notably, the RMI team saw this as the low-end potential, seeing a possible 75+ percent reduction “if combined with possible improvements in propulsion and electric generation.”)
This load includes inefficient pumps, wasteful water systems, and similar problems that translate into greater fuel use and, therefore, reduced range, which translates to less operational capability. Reducing demand for electricity (often referred to as “negawatts,” kilowatts not used due to energy efficiency) to the point that 10–25 percent less fuel is consumed would result in greater operating flexibility, with increased range and fewer refuelings.
The Cost
The RMI team studied the ship’s fully burdened cost of fuel and the systems supporting the hotel load. At the time, oil costs were in the range of $20 per barrel (roughly one-fifth of today’s price). The team calculated that the Princeton’s electricity cost the Navy (and the taxpayer) 27 cents per kilowatt hour, or about six times the average industrial cost of electricity ashore. As an RMI team member put it, “This high cost makes negawatts really juicy.”
The Rocky Mountain Institute analysis pointed to the potential for more than $1 million in savings annually, much of that requiring zero upfront investment, and most of the recommendations paying back the initial costs within a few years. In arenas such as these, the Navy, spurred by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’ aggressive energy goals and through the efforts of Task Force Energy, has been exploring and investing.
The Problem
When I deployed in 1999 on board the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) as part of Operation Allied Force (Kosovo), I was astonished to see washer/dryers in officers’ heads. Many officers were doing much of their own laundry, and the machines seemed to be running 24/7. Evidently, the officers’ mess had bought the machines. These were the least expensive systems available, using roughly 50 gallons of water for each load.
Every time someone opened the hatch to that head, the noise of the rumbling machines hindered conversation, while a wave of hot, humid air from the straining dryers poured into the passageway. The water had to be desalinated, the generators needed to produce the electricity for running the machines, and the hot air had to be removed by the ship’s heating, ventilation, and cooling systems. All of this, of course, came at many times the cost of doing the same thing in our own homes. But the officers’ mess was responsible for none of these costs—only the purchase price. Everyone in the mess would have moved on from this ship in several years; thus the cost had a short-term horizon. The officers seemed unaware of the operational implications of their laundry habits.
About a year later, I had the opportunity to visit the RV Triton, a UK trimaran research vessel.2 Sitting in the pseudo combat information center, I was surprised when someone stuffed a load of laundry into the washer/dryer next to a computer. I asked why he wasn’t worried about all the noise and humidity.
A Royal Navy officer explained that this machine made almost no noise, with no notable change to the humidity when washing and drying. Having the machines sitting there made it easier to move the clothes from the washer to the dryer, as it was just a step away from his desk.
These units were top-end, highly efficient systems that used just seven gallons of water per load and perhaps 10 percent of the electricity used by the cheap machines on board the Kearsarge. According to the Triton crew, they were part of the ship’s equipment (like the Kearsarge’s ship’s laundry), and costs of operating and supporting it were factored into the purchase decision.
Even though a low-end washer/dryer combo might cost $1,300 less than the top-end option, it costs about $3 more per load on board a ship. And this understates likely costs, because it assumes 30 cents per kilowatt hour, highly optimistic in the face of $100 per barrel of oil.
At a mere 12 loads per day, the cheaper machine costs $35 per day more to operate. In a month, that totals $1,085 more than the higher-end machine’s operation, or nearly the purchase-cost differential. Over a six-month deployment, a basic system would cost more than $8,000, a standard Energy Star unit would cost about $4,800, and a high-end system would run in the range of $4,100. Over ten deployments, the total-ownership cost for that “cheap machine” would top $75,000, an Energy Star unit would total about $37,000, and a high-end luxury unit might not hit $20,000.
Clearly, for the American officers’ wallets the cheap-to-buy inefficient machines were the best answer. But there is no doubt that the more expensive upfront cost of a high-quality, high-efficiency system represents the best answer for the ship’s total capability and (lower) total ownership costs for the Navy and nation.3
The Solution
Decades ago, shipboard entertainment might have been a weekly film on the flight deck. In the 1980s this transitioned to increasing numbers of televisions in common areas such as wardrooms. The 1990s saw a proliferation of personal electronics, which became nearly universal in the 2000s among service personnel. Computers, DVD players, lamps, iPods, and more became ubiquitous. The energy demands of these items may be infinitesimal in isolation, but cumulatively they add measurable loads to shipboard systems.
Changing pumps or chillers to reduce electrical loads requires a Navy investment. But could a shift in policy enable a reduction in Sailors’ and Marines’ energy loads on board ship? At this time, I am unaware of any requirement that personal computers, lamps, or other items be Energy Star–certified or otherwise verifiably efficient. Executive officers are required to certify all personal electronic systems for safety, so for a lamp, they check the wiring.
Why could this not be extended to certifying energy efficiency? The Chief of Naval Operations could not only send a Navy-wide message and promulgation, he could at the same time achieve tangible savings in energy use through mandating that all personal electronic devices be energy misers (Energy Star or equivalent). He could give XOs the authority (and responsibility) for certifying efficiency along with safety.
This would also increase operational capability through reduced fuel demand, and all deploying Sailors and Marines would have a lesson in the critical value of energy-smart acquisition and practices.
1. Chris Lotspeich and Amory Lovins, Energy Efficiency Survey Aboard USS Princeton CG-59, Boulder: Rocky Mountain Institute, 2001 (http://www.rmi.org/rmi/Library/S01-09_EnergyEfficiencyUSSPrinceton).
2. Triton Trimaran Research Ship, United Kingdom, naval-technology.com, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/trimaran/.
3. Adam B. Siegel, “Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 3rd Quarter, 2008, pp. 109-112; Siegel, “TOC2: Total Ownership Cost + Increased Capability = Nothing to Fear,” Defense News, 25 October 2010, p. 100.
Handling the Arleigh Burkes, Part 5: No Valet Parking
This article adds to destroyer shiphandling information in several previous Proceedings issues: October 1994 (pp. 66-68), July 2000 (85-86), June 2002 (86-88), September 2003 (84-85), and April 2007 (69-70). Our hope is to contribute to the body of literature upon which a junior officer may draw, and to present additional options to captains handling these great warships alongside piers.
Shiphandling evolutions in homeport can have the unintended side effect of dulling destroyer shiphandling skills. In Norfolk, for example, two powerful Moran tugs and a very skilled harbor pilot expertly handle a DDG-51 during all evolutions. This “valet parking” approach to pierside shiphandling has created a false sense of security for captains and does not demonstrate to junior officers how to dock and undock a 9,000-ton destroyer, a side effect that becomes immediately evident during docking evolutions in a foreign port. Many overseas tugs are less powerful, and barriers such as language and cultural habits make shiphandling much more challenging than in homeport.
Teaching junior officers to be warriors, mariners, and fine shiphandlers is the responsibility of the commanding officer, a tradition dating from the birth of our Navy that should continue. Learning to land and get a destroyer under way by using the time-tested methods and understanding of controllable, semi-controllable, and uncontrollable forces is the mark of a true mariner, surface warfare officer, and shiphandler. The use of tugs is prudent in many situations, but overreliance on them in benign environmental conditions is a training opportunity missed.
Lines and Capstans
Perhaps the least-understood tool that conning officers have at their disposal is mooring lines, which are very strong and safe when handled correctly. Coupled with the use of powerful capstans, mooring to a pier without tugs can be a safe evolution, free of concerns about pilots and tugs that conning officers or captains may not control. By using lines and capstans to affect the pivot point, any conning officer can place a destroyer safely alongside a pier in most environments. In all cases, bow placement is the key to mooring without tugs (see Figure 1).
Step 1: Head toward the pier using 2-3 knots at 10-15 degrees off the pier heading.
Step 2: Aim the bull nose perpendicular to line one’s bollard, hold the bow in place, and send over lines one and two. Using the anchor to hold the bow in place against offsetting conditions can be a good idea; simply pick it up after mooring is complete.
Step 3: Take line one to power on the capstan. The pivot point is now fixed on the bow, allowing the engines to develop significant leverage and move the stern toward the pier.
Step 4: Move the stern toward the pier with an easy twist, carefully managing the stern closure rate. Check line one as necessary to manage the tension on the line caused by the twist.
Step 5: Send line six over as soon as possible, and stop the twist once line six is on the bollard. Use small pitch adjustments to bring the ship to the final position parallel to the pier. Send over all lines and prepare to heave around.
Step 6: Heave around the fore and aft capstans to warp the ship while maintaining parallel position alongside the pier. The capstans are strong, so be careful not to develop excessive side momentum that would cause the ship to bounce off the fenders or pier separators. The spring lines can be used to help maintain position while closing the pier.
When getting under way, using the mooring lines and capstans to control the pivot point is key. Snub down on line one and slack all other lines, and the pivot point will move to the bow, which will then pivot on the forward-most fender, twisting the stern away from the pier up to 10-15 degrees. It is then possible to back away from the pier with a 1/3 bell, using the thrust from the inboard engine as a cushion for the bow to ride on as the ship backs away.
Poor Man’s Tug
This option involves using the centerline anchor and capstans instead of tugs to get under way from the pier, in an evolution dubbed the “poor man’s tug.” Dropping the anchor when mooring to the pier creates, in effect, a bow tug ready to pull the bow away from the pier.
Step 1: Approach the pier at 10-15 degrees from the pier heading. Aim the bullnose toward line one’s bollard on the pier, but at a 30- to 40-yard lateral separation from it. This will be the anchor drop point. While performing the pier approach, the amount of room to maneuver, i.e., the location of shoal water, pier layout, and other ships, will dictate the speed and declination at which the ship approaches the anchor drop area and pier.
Step 2: When in position, drop the anchor and veer chain while backing down with moderate pitch. Care must be taken to not pile too much chain on top of the anchor, as that may reduce the effectiveness of the anchor chain when maneuvering the bow away from the pier as the excess chain is brought in perhaps at a critical moment when the conning officer is counting on a predictable force.
Step 3: Again point the bow roughly 10-15 degrees ooff the pier heading and commence the pier approach. Once the bow is close enough, send line one over while keeping in mind that as the bow is being positioned, the anchor chain will continue to pay out. It may be necessary to engage and disengage the wildcat with the forward capstan to warp the bow to the pier in offsetting wind and current situations, and the stern may require an easy twist away from the pier to control the closure rate. Under onsetting conditions use the wildcat, working against the anchor chain, to control the bow and ease it onto the pier by slowly paying out anchor chain.
Step 4: Twist the stern to the pier using either a full or hard rudder, depending on the current. Use care with line one as the stern walks to the pier, to ensure the strain does not build too greatly. The idea is to get line six in position to heave it to the pier and then take it to power using the aft capstan. It will be necessary to ease tension on line one as the twist begins to move the stern toward the pier, but always keep the bow ahead of the stern. And remember the sonar dome!
Step 5: With lines one and six over, the bow and stern can then be warped into position by using the fore and aft capstans, recognizing the careful coordination between line one’s and six’s linehandling teams that may be required if it is necessary to alternate using the capstan and the wildcat with line one. Land the bow first against the pier separator or fender, and continue to pay out anchor chain. Upon completion of linehandling evolutions, set the brake and pass the stoppers. Be sure to veer enough chain to let it lie flat on the bottom to allow other ships to pass over it.
Use the anchor or poor man’s tug to pull the bow away from the pier, and an easy twist to lift the stern off the pier, with some modifications for environmental conditions as described in the following (depicted in Figure 2).
Step 1: Take in all lines with the exception of line one, keeping it around bollards to help maintain control of the bow.
Step 2: Heave around the anchor chain to lift the bow away from the pier, and check line one to control the opening rate from the pier.
Step 3: Twist the stern away from the pier with an easy twist. It is okay to let the stern get a little ahead of the bow, but do not let the bow get ahead of the stern, or the stern risks hitting the pier.
Step 4: Take in line one once the bow is well clear of the pier, and heave around to the short stay. Listen to the anchor reports to ensure that the chain does not ride against the sonar dome or reset the anchor. Heave on in, and back away once the anchor is outside the hawse pipe.
• Astern winds: Slack line six and snub down on line one, allowing the bow to close the pier at a controlled rate while kicking out the stern.
• Offsetting winds: Leave lines one and six on the pier, and slack them to let the ship blow away from the pier at a controlled rate. Heave around the anchor to pick up chain if desired.
• Onsetting winds: Take in all lines, twist the stern off the pier, and heave around the anchor chain to ensure the stern does not get ahead of the bow as the bow swings away from the pier. The wind will then catch the stern and lift it off the pier.
Lessons Learned
It is critical to understand that the anchor chain will continue to pay out as the ship’s breast lines are used to warp into the pier and linehandling evolutions occur. The anchor-handling and linehandling teams must all remain aware that the brake should not be set, and that chain should be allowed to continue to pay out and settle on the basin floor, as previously discussed. The speed of payout must remain sufficient to keep the anchor chain tending “12 o’clock, no strain” to lie flat on the basin floor, but not so fast that too much chain is paid out and the chain’s effect on the bow is reduced. Line one’s linehandlers must remain aware of the anchor chain as they perform their functions.
Another key factor is the wildcat. It is imperative to keep constant anchor status relayed to the bridge so the conning officer can maintain control of the ship. This is more difficult than it initially appears. Heaving around lifts the anchor chain off the basin floor; when the order is given to “avast heaving,” the chain settles again and continues to swing the bow out. It thus requires significantly more foresight than during normal undocking evolutions. The varying use of the wildcat’s several speeds may help alleviate this to some degree.
These evolutions are by no means new, but they have been lost in preference for valet parking. The sea and anchor watch team must be highly proficient to accomplish these advanced maneuvers, and must be governed by the concepts of operational risk management. Every shiphandling evolution has a certain amount of risk associated with it, mitigated by proper training for each evolution as well as by safety briefs and walkthroughs completed on station.
Additionally, these evolutions require a thorough understanding of controlling the pivot point and how to use all controllable forces engines, rudders, anchor, lines to safely and properly position the ship alongside the pier. Combining the controllable and uncontrollable forces for these evolutions requires the utmost concentration and skill of all watchstanders involved. But the result is complete control of the evolution for the captain and conning officer, with no uncertainty about foreign tugs or pilots. And our junior officers learn the fine art of handling DDG-51-class destroyers alongside a pier.
Lieutenant (j.g.) Hansen serves as navigator in the Laboon, in which she served previously as first lieutenant and antisubmarine warfare officer. She has deployed twice in support of Standing NATO Maritime Group Two’s Operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield.