A common mantra among naval leaders is: “We never want to see our sailors or Marines in a fair fight.” To make sure of that, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) supports the science and technologies that enable our Fleet and forces to “attack effectively first,” in the words of Naval Postgraduate School professor Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
ONR balances resources traditionally devoted to long-term research with those focused on providing short-turnaround solutions to urgent operational needs. Along with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Fleet, and the acquisition community, ONR has designed and set in place a decision-making process in which the warfighters determine the equilibrium as well as where the research money goes. In the coming period of fiscal pressure, this can serve us well in leveraging the value of naval study for both the wars we are in now and the future ones in which we may find ourselves.
In his influential book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Naval Institute Press, 2000), Professor Hughes summarizes the basic requirement for victory: “The first objective in battle is to bring the enemy under concentrated firepower while forestalling his response” (p. 27). This involves more than sound tactics—it necessitates technology, which must be researched and developed.
Research for Future—and Current—Needs
Beginning with the authorization by Congress in 1916 of the Naval Research Laboratory, ONR’s contributions to national security have been notable. Among the Department of the Navy’s long list of research firsts are the flight of an unmanned aircraft in 1927, demonstration of radar, early development of nuclear submarine propulsion, and development of the Global Positioning System, which revolutionized the science of navigation. More than 60 scientists conducting ONR-sponsored research have earned Nobel prizes in physics, chemistry, and medicine.
Often overshadowed by past successes is the fact that ONR is increasingly involved in developing or improving systems used in today’s, not just tomorrow’s, naval operations. ONR may not be a combat command, but it is intimately involved with the continuously evolving science of warfighting.
The mention of naval research often conjures images of brilliant scientists working on experiments in unhurried academic settings. This is because the type of basic and applied research they carry out may have possible naval application at some time in the future. However, this is only one of the research areas under ONR’s umbrella.
Leaders in the command today understand that the priority is to deliver innovation for the conflicts in which we are already engaged. Additionally, they must address day-to-day naval and military operations designed to prevent or deter future wars. Deterrence is not a concept necessarily associated with science. Aside from strategic nuclear forces, it involves forward presence and declared national-security policies. As we learned from the collapse of the Soviet military, determined game-changing science and technology programs—like the Strategic Defense Initiative—can have profound deterring or dissuading effects on potential opponents.
ONR plays a critical role, with input from the Navy and Marine Corps, in developing and prototyping the technologies that can have just such an impact. At the same time, ONR is responsible for stimulating, supporting, and funding the basic and applied sciences that constitute the initial discovery and invention phase. This long-term research, often associated with university scientists and laboratories, receives 40 percent of the naval science and technology (S&T) funding budget. But even this early phase of research is anchored on advancing the science of naval warfighting through nine areas of focus: access to the maritime battlespace, autonomy and unmanned systems, expeditionary and irregular warfare, information dominance, platform design and survivability, power and energy, power projection and integrated defense, total ownership cost, and warfighter performance.
Research in these areas is intended to flow into ongoing and future “innovative naval prototypes” (INPs), as well as upgrades to the performance of existing systems. These are funds well spent to help increase the capability of legacy systems, while looking for leap-ahead technologies, or the “next big thing.”
‘Customer’-Driven, Collaborative Research
OPNAV sets resource requirements, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) manages programs. ONR brings important technology developments that support naval warfighting, often through acquisition programs, including improvements to existing weapon systems and quick-turnaround projects intended for ongoing combat operations. Ten percent of the overall ONR budget goes directly to quick-reaction projects.
Directed through ONR’s TechSolutions Program Office, these are fielded within 12 to 18 months. Recent examples include an integrated aircraft-carrier catapult calculator; solid-state lighting replacements for fluorescent bulbs in ships and submarines to save energy and eliminate lighting noise; protective eyewear with tints that adjust instantly to a low-light environment upon entering a building from bright sunlight; and food-service-management software for naval chefs, including menu-planning tools, recipes, nutritional analyses, budget information, and inventory tracking for improved logistics.
Potential solutions often are based on technology that ONR nurtured from the basic or applied research stages, or that was developed elsewhere, not necessarily with military applications in mind. Whatever the source, there is a planned, yet adaptive, quick-reaction process for providing solutions to technical problems identified by combatant commanders, Fleet and Marine force commanders, including submarine squadron commanders, Marine field commanders, or service personnel who develop requirements.
The Warfighter Shapes the Investments
Especially in an environment of austere budgets, it is essential that we make “every dollar count,” in the words of Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A. It is more important than ever that we place investments where they will deliver the greatest impact and have the highest probability of transition to programs of record and, ultimately, to the Fleet and Marine force. This also means we must monitor every transition and have the willpower to terminate projects that are not on track.
The emphasis on quick-reaction technical research and development is part of an overhaul that was made to ONR’s S&T investment process. It placed the preponderance of funding influence with Navy and Marine Corps leaders who determine warfighting requirements. The result is a Naval Science and Technology Strategic Plan accommodating quick-reaction projects, acquisition-enabling technologies, disruptive innovations—those that can deliver true leap-ahead capability—and basic research.
In addition to 10 percent of the S&T budget that is devoted to quick-reaction projects, 30 percent is dedicated to acquisition enablers designed for incorporation into existing programs, platforms, and systems. This portion is controlled directly by a three-star-level Technology Oversight Group composed of the deputy commander, Fleet Forces Command; commanding officer, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8); deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/6); principal deputy assistant secretary of the Navy (RD&A); and the Chief of Naval Research. Four more members are nonvoting: the deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4); director, Warfare Integration (N8F); Surgeon General of the Navy; and deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel (N1).
Many of these officers also have an engineering or science education and may have served in naval-engineering billets. They represent a vast concentration of senior-level experience in today’s naval warfighting challenges. It is a practical, rather than just theoretical, approach to selecting promising developments for use at sea or in the field. Thus, the Department of the Navy’s decision-making process, unique among the services, is advised in controlling investment in science and technology by world-class warfighters, engineers, and scientists. Close coordination among stakeholders and experts from the warfare centers and systems commands is critical and helps ensure technology transition.
Peering into the Future—and Its Technologies
Stepping out in time from the immediate to the very soon, ONR’s Future Naval Capability program is designed to fill known gaps as identified by OPNAV (N81) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The process delivers mature technologies (those proven to work and ready to become components of new systems) for inclusion in ongoing or planned acquisition programs. In many cases, the intended results supplement or improve existing systems by providing additional or extended reach, reduced maintenance, increased autonomy, or reduced total ownership cost.
Examples of the 186 ongoing future naval capabilities include networking and battle management of distributed electronic warfare assets, alternative antisurface warfare torpedo homing and target discrimination, single-sortie mine countermeasures detect-to-engage systems, cooperative networked radar system, next-generation multistatic active search radar, air-independent propulsion systems for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and sprayable acoustic damping.
High Risk, High Payoff
When the first Aegis-equipped warship, the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), went to sea in 1981, few envisioned the system would have ballistic-missile-defense capability in 20 years. Even fewer imagined that in 30 years, the Navy’s surface fleet would be the nation’s premier theater ballistic-missile-defense force. Today we can visualize what that mission may look like in 20 more years, because those technologies are already being tested.
Because they are not yet mature enough to provide to the acquisition community for engineering development but have been demonstrated on a limited scale as prototypes under test conditions, they are in the innovative-naval-prototype phase. INPs require more development to become effective weapons under the demanding conditions of the field or sea. The science either works or shows enough promise to support a potential decision for further investment in engineering. These technologies represent the type of futuristic “cool stuff” one might see in the character Q’s test labs in James Bond movies. Current examples include:
Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance: The PLUS INP consists of an autonomous, long-range antisubmarine warfare system based on a cluster of self-organizing UUVs, reducing the amount of time manned ASW systems are required to conduct search, localization, classification, and tracking of submarines.
Free-Electron Laser: This high-risk technology holds long term promise for changing the equation of shipboard defense and, possibly, even ballistic-missile defense. Although lasers have existed for decades, the challenge has been to focus a coherent beam of sufficient power to achieve destructive effects on missiles or aircraft at tactically useful ranges. ONR has been working on developing a megawatt-class laser that can be selectively tuned to atmosphere-penetrating wavelengths.
Electromagnetic Railgun: Designed to provide offensive and defensive capability using non-explosive rounds, this railgun requires no explosive propellant. Projectiles consistently achieve velocities of Mach 7.5, which can equate to ranges of 100 nautical miles. These “hypersonic” velocities open possibilities for missile defense and other applications. By converting energy one time—from the chemical energy in fuel to kinetic energy out of the barrel—enormous efficiency is realized in magazine space, reduced logistics and reduced cost per engagement.
Large Diameter Unmanned Undersea Vehicle: The goal of the LD-UUV INP is the development of a long-endurance UUV that can perform a variety of functions in challenging littoral environments. The project includes development of air-independent propulsion systems with months of endurance, and autonomous control systems that can execute mission plans and monitor operating conditions without help from a controller. These systems will function, essentially, like satellites on extended missions, meaning they must have the ability to self-diagnose, self-repair, and continue to execute complex tasks in a dynamic environment. They will need to “think” almost like people.
Autonomous Aerial Cargo/Utility System: The idea here is to develop an unmanned vertical-takeoff-and-landing capability that can deliver cargo loads to ships and forces ashore autonomously, and possibly assist in casualty evacuation. The challenge is the development of advanced self-directed capabilities that could control a VTOL aircraft through an untrained operator, to land in an unprepared zone. This program aims to take UAVs beyond the surveillance and missile-attack role, and beyond the need for constant guidance from the ground, to help keep resupply convoys off of dangerous roads.
Integrated Topside: InTop is an innovative, open-architecture approach to reducing the numbers of required shipboard antennas by using scalable multifunction apertures, along with the necessary computer hardware and software. This flexible methodology also reduces cost, topside weight, power requirements, maintenance, and radar cross-section, while opening access to the entire spectrum through the use of wide-band gap electronics.
Sea Base Enablers: This INP is testing a variety of new technologies, including three Transformation Craft (T-Craft) concepts and dynamic crane applications, to determine relative motion and evaluate ramp excursion and structural loads. T-Craft is intended to move heavy equipment loads—up to ten M-1 tanks—at 40-knot speeds from a sea base onto shore, possibly by combining surface-effect and hovercraft capabilities.
Transition to Reality
Of course, each of these programs carries risk, and there are plenty of threats for which countermeasures have yet to be developed. Even after considerable work, there are no guarantees. The most promising technologies still depend on their successful integration into supporting systems. For example, electric weapons such as lasers and railguns require considerable amounts of electrical power—sometimes over prolonged periods and sometimes in microseconds.
These improvements are achievable. Any new system must ultimately be operated with confidence, reliability, and combat effectiveness, by sailors and Marines in the naval and expeditionary environments. When engineering development begins, that is the point at which the technology—no longer research—is handed off from the S&T community to the development and acquisition community.
About 10 percent of the ONR budget is devoted to INPs, each individually approved by an S&T corporate board consisting of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A). INP programs are both high risk and high payoff. It is easy to imagine the revolution in naval warfare that operational lasers or a railgun would bring.
ONR’s job is to advance the science of warfighting and make technologies available for transition to combat capability, so that an educated decision can be made on the part of resource sponsors. In the coming fiscal environment, that determination will rely on a persuasive business case, as well as a compelling warfighting case.
In tracking past future naval capabilities, more than 90 percent have made the transition to acquisition, with about 70 percent completing the journey to programs of record. But what of the funded developments that fail to transition?
In an effort to maximize return on investment, an independent Transition Review Board conducts a forensic evaluation on every failure to derive lessons learned. It could be the result of changes in requirements of the targeted acquisition programs, or the technology may no longer meet those requirements. S&T, after all, is about risk management. As long as we push the edge, success cannot result every time. It is critical that we learn from failure and continue to strive.
Of course, the future will not depend on the development of any single technology. Success is about adapting existing technologies for naval requirements, as well as funding the basic and applied research that can provide new equipment for naval applications.
A Hard Look at the Money
Having a good plan is critical, but it is execution—useful results—that matters. For the Department of the Navy’s research community, success can be defined as the development of technologies that allow U.S. naval forces to deter, dissuade, or achieve victory through the capacity to attack effectively first, as well as to defend themselves and the nation from attack.
ONR operates on a funding-and-transition system using a decision-making structure that channels scarce funds into areas of science and technology that strike a balance between having the greatest possible impact on naval warfighting and the highest probability of success. The process leverages expertise in naval operations and the most promising research in operationally related areas. Work funded by ONR thereby aims at naval relevance.
Even failure of a program is important for continuing research efforts. When the Transition Review Board’s analysis kicks in, determining why a plan failed is the most scientific method of improving future choices in S&T funding. This is how the plan continues to adapt.
It is often said that no one can predict the future because there are too many unknowns and too many changing factors. But we can and should take all possible measures to foresee these. The Navy and Marine Corps’ structure for balancing efforts between current requirements and future potentials helps ensure we use our advanced-technology resources most wisely and deliver capability that is compelling and affordable.