NATO after Afghanistan
(See K. Kamp, pp. 54
59, June 2010 Proceedings)Captain Tom Fedyszyn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Kamp's proposal to return NATO to its former self after its withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to appeal to those happy to return to the "good old days" when NATO was the world's supreme player in global defense. His goal is that the Alliance resume its focus on "defense of the population, territory, and vital interests of its member nations." His logic, unfortunately, demands the denial of the world in which we live
one that NATO helped shape.The concerns he voices are precisely those arguing against his conclusion. NATO's former self was obsessed with major combat and developed militaries accordingly. Today, he acknowledges, most European members give defense short shrift in the budget, except for exorbitant personnel expenditures. His concerns over Russia are a direct result of the competition fostered by "traditional" NATO. A reversion to this Alliance can lead only to Russia's perception of again being encircled by an aggressive Western adversary.
His worries about nuclear developments and state-on-state conflict originate far from European territory and, if anything, argue for more, rather than fewer Alliance activities beyond Europe.
The world has changed. The NATO territorial security guarantees provided in 1949 kept Europe safe and free. Today, they would reinvigorate past animosities with Russia, bleed European defense budgets, and draw our collective attention away from the problems so clearly stated in NATO's own strategic concepts
global instability, terrorism, and human insecurity. While it is undoubtedly politically correct to cloak oneself in NATO Article 5 territorial-security guarantees and a return to our European roots, one should consider whether this emphasis is the proper strategic response for today's world.The Climate Is Changing, the Navy Is on Course
(See R. Parsons, p. 8, June 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Larry G. DeVries, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—The article by Captain Parsons covers a lot of terms: climate change, global warming, intensifying heat waves, irreversible sea-level rise, escalating competition for resources, environmental security. Quite a list.
But the underlying assumptions to some of these predictions, used previously by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, have changed recently.
For instance, sea-level expert Nils-Axel Mörner, a Swedish geologist and recent president of the International Union for Quadrenary Research Commission on Sea Level Changes and Coastal Evolution, predicts no significant increase in sea levels by 2100. Storm-forecasting pioneer Dr. William Gray, a noted Colorado State University researcher, showed worldwide cyclone intensity is not increasing. And in testimony before Congress, Dr. John Christy, director of the University of Alabama's Earth Systems Science Center, confirmed that the frequency of droughts, hurricanes, thunderstorms, hail, and tornadoes has not increased in recent years.
According to Dr. Roy Spencer, principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, analysis of new satellite data casts doubt on the trend in global temperature increases since 2001. In fact, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation shifted in 1997, and the climate system has phased into a new, approximately 30-year cycle of global temperature cooling. This cycle change is consistent with similar cycles in the 20th century.
Interpreting "climate change" as synonymous with "climate variation" is one thing. But it is safe to say the jury is still out on "climate change" as a euphemism for "catastrophic man-made global warming requiring intervention," as some have suggested.
The Navy needs to consider, and should also plan for, the most likely event
that the climate variation of the recent past is likely to be similar to the variation in the climate environment for the immediate future. The fire-ready-aim approach to most climate-related impacts suggested by the author needs to be significantly tempered.Patrick C. Wider—Most disturbing is the trend of the media to support one particular unproven scientific theory. The science behind the theory of anthropogenic global warming is, plain and simple, junk science. Unfortunately, as related in the June issue of Proceedings, it would appear that the U.S. Navy and its lawyers now subscribe to this highly controversial theory.
Anthropogenic global warming is not settled science. Rather, it is a questionable theory that has been predicted by a limited number of incredibly complex mathematical computer programs that attempt to simulate the many feed-forward and feedback temperature-control mechanisms inherent in the Earth's atmosphere. The predictions of these math models are highly dependent on the accuracy of the chosen model architecture, gains, limits, integration methods, and assumed initial conditions.
To accurately model atmospheric temperature trends over the last century, one would have to know and model precisely the conditions present in the atmosphere 100 years ago as well as the various changes to the atmosphere that have occurred over that period of time. To make these models work, the modelers assume or calculate values for all of these variables. Less well known variables are adjusted until the model's predictions appear to correlate with conditions such as temperature.
Once one understands the process, one also understands that these predictions can never be settled science, since the detailed knowledge of what went into these models is only known to a very small number of the participating atmospheric scientists. Only the modelers themselves know precisely how they initialized and tweaked their models to achieve any apparent agreement with the atmosphere's history.
Notably, none of the most widely believed atmospheric models predicts the apparent stabilization of the Earth's temperature that has occurred over the last dozen years. The reason is that they haven't been tweaked to do so, since these trends don't agree with the a priori assumptions made regarding the steady increase in atmospheric CO2 that has occurred during this period and its presumed effect on temperature. One must also question the impartiality of scientists who derive most of their income from private and government funding that is granted in direct proportion to the severity of alarmist predictions.
The number-one greenhouse gas in the atmosphere by several orders of magnitude is water vapor, over which we can have absolutely no control. And yet there are those who want us to spend billions of dollars to limit something that is almost an asterisk when one lists the various effects on atmospheric temperature by magnitude. Wasteful spending of this kind will certainly adversely affect the standard of living of millions. All the while atmospheric CO2 promotes plant growth, something the alarmists fail to mention.
Real improvements in the atmosphere can be achieved by eliminating fly ash, ozone, nitrous oxide, and sulfur dioxide from the chimneys of coal-fired power plants and by building nuclear power plants as the need arises. Hopefully, nuclear fusion will ultimately be mankind's energy savior, providing us with abundant and affordable electric energy.
The Wrath of Rickover
(see W. J. Toti, pp. 28
31, June 2010 Proceedings)Captain Tom Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Toti provides yet another example of the Rickover Personality Cult. Rickover established his cult by first surrounding himself with
middle- and senior-grade officers who committed themselves to his bidding, for a range of reasons, and then inducted young, bright midshipmen and junior officers as acolytes who became unswervingly dedicated to the cult. It can be argued that the U.S. nuclear submarine program never would have become what it was without Rickover. I would counter by saying that the application of good management practices and careful personnel selection would have produced the same or better results. Rickover's handling of personnel was archaic, brutal, and completely unnecessary. Additionally, the cavalier usurping of funding, independent of national strategy, that he inflicted on the rest of the Navy for two decades was bizarre, but reflected the power and influence that his cult was able to exercise.Captain Howard J. Kerr, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In 1974, while serving in the White House, I attended a reception for newly selected White House Fellows.
One of the Fellows, with whom I had attended graduate school, spotted Admiral Rickover and insisted that I introduce him to the "Kindly Old Gentleman." I had never met the admiral, and my instinct was to leave it that way. My friend insisted, and as I approached the admiral (I was in uniform) I had the sense I should have followed my instinct.After I introduced myself, Admiral Rickover wanted to know why I was at this reception and what my acquaintance was with this White House Fellow. I responded that my friend and I had attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy together.
Ignoring my friend, the admiral wanted know why I had "wasted my time and taxpayer dollars attending a school like that." He opined that one could learn everything the Fletcher School had to teach by reading a few books in one's spare time. My friend decided to come to my defense and take up the cause of our alma mater. The admiral paused momentarily and then offered the following challenge: he would go to the Fletcher School and take the equivalent of Ph.D. written and oral examinations, and if he failed, he would support the Navy in continuing to send officers there for graduate study. But if he passed the examination, we would support his efforts to cancel the program. The President entered the room and the admiral turned and walked away. He never did acknowledge or say hello to my friend.Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & Ethics
(See R. Sanchez, pp. 66
68, June 2010 Proceedings)Paul Scharre—Ensign Sanchez has done an excellent job of bringing attention to the ethical and policy issues associated with autonomous unmanned platforms.
Unfortunately, his prescription may not be the right medicine for the problem.Sanchez proposes that the Department of Defense sidestep the thorny issue of how to employ autonomous unmanned vehicles that comply with rules of engagement and the laws of war by prohibiting any autonomous systems that use weapons without direct human control.
While normatively appealing, unfortunately this prohibition is already pass . Both the Aegis combat system and the land-based Patriot missile-defense system have autonomous modes and have been in operation for decades. Autonomous active protective systems for ground vehicles are in development in the United States, and numerous countries already have deployed autonomous anti-radiation unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The fact that human and mechanical error have led to unauthorized engagements in the past should certainly give us pause as more sophisticated autonomous systems are developed. A complete prohibition on their use, however, seems both unlikely and unfeasible.Weapon autonomy on a platform like the Fire Scout (the example Sanchez uses) is a luxury at best, a needless risk at worst.
But some situations, such as tactical missile defense, will likely continue to require automated systems that take advantage of faster-than-human reaction times. Autonomy also may be necessary in potential fast-paced force-on-force engagements against a sophisticated adversary that possesses counter-command-and-control capabilities.Ensign Sanchez argues that autonomous weapons use would not be ethical until programming reached the level of human judgment.
This ignores the fact that autonomy is already used in limited circumstances, such as the counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM) system, which automatically shoots down incoming projectiles over U.S. bases overseas. The crucial factor is whether commanders understand the capabilities and limitations of autonomous weapons (including the consequences of potential malfunctions) so they can limit them to situations where their ethical behavior can be assured. For existing systems, these limits may be quite narrow.The challenge is that, as processors become more powerful, the range of situations autonomous systems may be capable of reacting to is rapidly widening.
At the same time, as the complexity of these systems increases, it becomes more difficult to predict with 100-percent accuracy how the programming will react to every possible situation it might face in the real world, particularly if confronted by an adaptive adversary. Ensign Sanchez rightly points out there is a serious danger that technological capabilities could outpace policies, rules of engagement, and safety measures required to control autonomous weapons. Ensign Sanchez's call for hard thinking on when autonomy may be appropriate and when it is not is an urgently needed summons. Simplistic solutions may not be found, but Ensign Sanchez's diagnosis of the risks of autonomy is the first step in understanding how to manage the possibility of increasingly autonomous capabilities.Side by Side'
(See E. Montgomery, pp. 62
64, June 2010 Proceedings)Chief Petty Officer James Patterson, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I was moved by the fine essay written by Second Lieutenant Montgomery. I had the honor and privilege to join many others in saluting Lance Corporal Brian P. Montgomery on his journey to his final resting place.
Semper Fi, Marine!Regain ASCM Standoff: Improve the Harpoon
(See J. Patch, pp. 78
80, June 2010 Proceedings)Douglas Pauly—I read Commander Patch's article and several questions immediately came to mind. First, why invest in a marginal, limited improvement in the Harpoon when a bona fide long-range antiship strike weapon can readily be produced that will fire from the Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS)
When the Tomahawk cruise missile family was developed, one of the variants was an antiship missile that could be fired from both the Mk 143 armored box launcher and from the VLS. Why can't these weapons be brought back into service It is my understanding that many of the antiship versions were converted to land-attack variants after the Cold War was deemed over. But a search of the Internet reveals several sites that imply that some of these missiles remain available for service if the need arises. Regardless, the plans exist for producing such a weapon and putting it back into production. Is this a viable option as opposed to improving the HarpoonThe original Tomahawk antiship missile (TASM) had a 1,000-pound warhead in comparison to the Harpoon's 500 pounds. The TASM's range was more than 250 miles, a greater distance than any improvements contemplated for the Harpoon will produce.
If a new incarnation of the TASM is required or desired, Raytheon proposed one last year. In fact, its newest version offers a substantially increased range over that of the original TASM. The proposed upgrade will be a true multi-role weapon capable of hitting moving ships. Cost data are not available, but Raytheon claims it can have this new missile ready within 36 months. Commander Patch's article did not offer costs for the Harpoon upgrade, either, but costs for existing versions were provided in his endnotes. Given what is advanced here, which solution offers the Navy the best bang for its buck
I think resurrecting the TASM or a similar system is worth looking into, and soon.The Smoking Lamp is Out . . . For Some
(See J. Murphy, p. 20, May 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Charles D. Connor, U.S. Navy (Retired), President and CEO, American Lung Association—As a retired Navy captain who now heads the American Lung Association, I must disagree with Chief Murphy's article on several important points.
Chief Murphy and I both agree that eliminating smoking on board submarines is a good idea. However, Chief Murphy's primary argument against it is that this is not the time for such a sweeping move, particularly in light of the introduction of women on subs. His fallacy is believing that ending tobacco use is some sort of subversive culture change, rather than a public-health necessity.Enacting regulations to improve the health of our fighting force is nothing new. Requiring an expected level of fitness and healthy body-fat ratio is not a cultural decision, but a medical one that makes perfect sense. Military readiness dictates that our troops be healthy and fit enough to serve.
Tobacco
officially a poisonous plant has an enormous adverse impact on Department of Defense and Veterans Administration healthcare spending. Tobacco use is the greatest preventable cause of illness and death in America, and its impact on our military personnel is just as great. According to a 2009 report by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, every year the Department of Defense spends more than $1.6 billion on tobacco-related medical care, increased hospitalization, and lost days of work. Reducing smoking rates throughout all branches would bring down this number and allow more resources to go to treating combat injuries, purchasing equipment, and upgrading facilities.The Institute of Medicine report recognized that the military cannot simply eliminate tobacco use overnight; to be successful, strategies to eliminate tobacco use in the military will need to be phased in over time.
But when it comes to secondhand smoke, the Navy has made the correct decision to act quickly. As the Navy itself discovered through urine tests, exposure to secondhand smoke is dangerous and unacceptable especially in an environment like a submarine.The men and women who serve deserve the best from us, especially with regard to their health.
And they deserve assistance in helping to quit using tobacco products to ensure that good health is realized. Eliminating exposure to secondhand smoke and reducing tobacco use in the Navy is a win-win for health, readiness, and spending.Now that we have made subs smoke-free, let's make the next step a smoke-free Navy.
Get Serious About Naval Gunfire Support
(See K. P. Green, pp. 49
52, May 2010; and M. R. Tollefson, p. 6, June 2010 Proceedings)Colonel Mark A. Olinger, U.S. Army (Retired)—Naval expeditionary forces provide the enduring values of forward presence, the ability to prevent or respond to crisis, and to win our nation's wars. Being able to execute operational maneuvers from offshore in critical regions allows the United States to gain and maintain access globally, defeating hybrid threats in complex and chaotic environments. The requisite capacity to execute forcible-entry operations from the sea in support of regional combatant commanders must be maintained.
While a Tarawa- or even an Inchon-like assault landing is not envisioned for future amphibious operations, the lessons learned from them are applicable today when discussing fire support. Now, as then, assault landings have to rely on fire support from ships and aircraft until the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can establish its organic fire-support systems ashore. To reduce a gap in MAGTF organic fires, the Marine Corps is working to develop the capability to provide 24-hour ground-based fires and counter-fires under all weather conditions. To bridge the existing gap in naval gunfire support, consideration must be given to the development of an inshore fire-support class of ships.
As a minimum, ample fire support will be needed if only to reduce antiship-missile and air-defense systems. With the goal of MV-22 insertions up to a range of 200 nautical miles, the following type of fire-support tasks may need to be performed: preparation of the coastal areas 50 to 100 miles north and south of the objective; diversionary air strikes to keep the enemy deceived and confused; preparation of the objective; support of the assault landings; air defense of forces afloat and ashore; and air interdiction as required.
Targets can include airfields, bridges, roads, railroads, troop concentrations, supply points, fuel tanks, electric-power infrastructure, and command-and-control facilities. Overall, the fire-support plan must be developed to shape the battlefield so the enemy maintains a level of uncertainty on where the assault landing will occur.
With more than half of the world's population and more than three-quarters of the world's cities within 50 miles of the sea, the littorals will remain focal points of cultural, economic, environmental, and military tensions that potentially could lead to instability, crisis, and conflict. To protect U.S. security interests, citizens, and allies, U.S. forces must not only be combat-effective, but also diplomatically useful in deterring conflict across the full range of operations. Fast, austere, and lethal naval expeditionary forces can do this for the nation.
U.S. Navy in Review
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 66
72, and "Flag Officers & Senior Enlisted Leaders of the Naval Services" pp. 119 136, May 2010 Proceedings)Commander T. G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—According to Dr. Truver's article, at the end of 2009 the Navy had 286 ships. Turning to the photo gallery, the service also had more
than 300 flag officers (not counting selectees). Is this a "benefit" of "jointness" If so, can we afford it If being in a joint command means that everybody must see stars, then frock them for appearance's sake, but pay them at a level more appropriate to the scope of their responsibilities in an otherwise reduced military.And within the
service itself, bloat is rampant. I can remember when CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT was one admiral, with many more units under his command, and now there are two hats, both four-stars. COMSURFPAC, a type commander, was once a rear admiral and is now a vice admiral (with fewer ships); and the Special Operations commander, essentially a type commander, is an admiral and senior to numbered fleet commanders.I'm sure the situation is similar in all of the armed forces.
It's time someone, such as the Secretary of Defense, steps in and regains control of the situation.Naval Officers Must Be Culturally Educated
(See M. Adamshick, pp. 164
166, May 2010 Proceedings)Lori Melling Gattuso—I was amazed to see
a picture of a group of male and female midshipmen wearing shorts and short-sleeve or sleeveless tops while visiting a Hasidic Jewish community in New York City. A simple Internet search of Hasidic dress codes might have alerted the midshipmen to dress in a way that would not offend those they met. If the Naval Academy is hesitant to teach these students to wear culturally acceptable clothing on official trips, at least they could have been made to wear uniforms. Dressing in such a way on a cultural-education field trip is an indicator that the Naval Academy is failing in its endeavor to train our future officers in cultural awareness, and reflects poorly on our naval service.