Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era
(See B. Tillman, pp. 16-21, June 2009; T. A. Davis, T. Williams, J. F. Keiler, J. Gabbert, pp. 6-7, July 2009 Proceedings)
Colonel Todd Fredricks, U.S. Army—I have shared Barrett Tillman's concerns for some time. While I am not a professional Sailor I do understand that the United States is a maritime nation and the foundations of our Navy as an active duty, and not a reserve service, are based on the Founders' understanding of our geopolitical position in the world. Two hundred
plus years have not changed this reality. The U.S. Navy needs to be at sea; it needs to be in the littorals and in the riverine regions ensuring freedom of navigation and interdicting threats as they arise. The current problems we face in adequately interdicting pirates off the Horn of Africa stem from a force structure centered around large carriers which present no economy, are unavoidably large and enticing targets for advanced antiship weapons, and cost enormous amounts of money to maintain. We simply cannot afford more ships.Nearly three decades ago in his book Race to the Swift (B. T. Batsford, 1985), Brigadier Richard E. Simpkin wrote of "weapon system obsolescence." He argued that at some point in time a given weapon system's technology becomes so encumbered by its need for self-defense that it becomes effectively useless. The term he used is "senile." Surely the carrier has arrived at this place in its evolution. Smaller, simpler, open-architecture, robustly seaworthy platforms built to integrate improvements in unmanned technologies, weapon systems, networking, threat detection and tracking, and perhaps a rapidly deployable mission-specific system of modules to address a range of operations, would allow the broadest and most agile response for the 21st-century Navy.
The lower cost of acquisition/operation of individual smaller platforms would permit the Navy to operate a greater number of platforms across more square miles of water and bolster the perception that it is a global, force-projection power that is "everywhere" all the time. A larger number of smaller ships can simply be in more places than a smaller contingent of carriers and their support platforms. For keeping the peace, smaller ships can port at more facilities, providing a "show of presence" globally. It also allows a larger number of nations to witness the professionalism of the U.S. Navy while enjoying the benefits of commerce brought by Sailors on liberty. For would-be security threats like pirates, this visible presence can only cause them to think twice before engaging in hostile actions.
For engagements against overtly posturing, open-ocean capable powers, a larger U.S. Navy consisting of smaller platforms with the capacity to patrol independently, or to swarm in squadrons, embodies flexibility. Combined with a larger number of attack submarines, wielding advanced weapons such as those described by Captain Portner in "Changing the Face of Undersea Warfare" (June 2009, Proceedings), such swarms would allow us to counter any effort on the part of threats to engage us with large fleets or weapons specifically designed to cripple our carriers. Simply put, we would deny our enemies the single center of gravity that drives U.S. maritime warfare doctrine. We would own the decision cycle.
Barrett Tillman
"If you don't like the message, shoot the messenger." That's been the gist of most responses to my article. Unfortunately, it's clear that some critics have not bothered to read it, while most others missed the point entirely.Contrary to some accounts, I never said we don't need a navy. I said that some powerful politicians wonder why we have a navy since apparently we seldom use it. A related question is whether we need the navy we have, but let's set that aside for now.
Some background: in seeking an eye-catching title, I conceived the phrase "post-naval era." The naval era was characterized by fleet-versus-fleet engagements, approximately from Salamis to Leyte Gulf. That 2,400-year period ended in 1944. (The potential for war with the Soviet Navy ended in 1989.) Therefore, actual naval warfare has exerted no effect on world events in 65 years. The article also noted three significant amphibious operations since 1945, one involving the United States 59 years ago.
Opponents of the military can read a calendar tracking the decades without war at sea. They recognize the global trend and, from their perspective, reach the logical conclusion: we can cut military-naval spending 10 to 25 percent, as per President Barack Obama and Representative Barney Frank (D-MA).
Furthermore, I observed that conventional warfighting no longer appears on the list of military roles and missions. I didn't make that decision-the Department of Defense did, in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Whether or not I'm the first to point it out, people on The Hill definitely have noticed. I've heard from them.
Some critics of "Fear and Loathing" assert that we must continue building a blue-water navy to oppose Chinese expansionism. Yet anti-naval partisans can say the U.S. Navy exceeds the combined fleets of China and Russia by 2.5 to 1. As for "the China syndrome," would Beijing force a war with its second-biggest trade partner? Why would China risk its immense stake in the American economy? The questions should answer themselves. But again, politicians opposed to a large military establishment have the same information, so we need to be able to answer them.
Other readers insist that the Navy is increasingly relevant with the resurgence of piracy. But that's grasping at nautical straws. If we claim that killing three Somali criminals represents a significant naval action, we're setting ourselves up for a fall: "Navy supporters say the 21st-century threat is pirates so let's park most of those carriers and submarines."
Regardless of whether we need the Navy we have, in order to retain any viable Fleet the service needs to start addressing the topics raised in "Fear and Loathing." Frankly, my disappointment extends beyond the knee-jerk reactions to a controversial phrase. I'm hoisting a storm warning, but the defensive responses to an important (perhaps vital) subject bodes ill for the future of the service. If naval officers are more concerned with the questioner than the question, we're in far deeper trouble than anyone realized.
Where Have All the Mush Mortons Gone?
(See J. R. Holmes, pp. 58-63, June 2009 Proceedings)
Commander John D. Alden, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mush Morton was adaptive and aggressive, but he and many of his brave compatriots still rest in the depths of the Pacific Ocean, so they may not be the best examples for the innovative culture sought by Dr. Holmes. Some of his comments about submarine development prior to World War II also need clarification.
Since the 1920s our submarines were designed by naval officers with advanced degrees in naval architecture and marine engineering, not by civilian contractors. They received firm guidance in the form of characteristics specified by the General Board and, after 1926, by the Submarine Officers Conference as well. Submarines by then were considered warships, not auxiliaries, but none of those after the V-1 class were intended to directly accompany the battle fleet. The V-5 and V-6 (later named Narwhal and Nautilus) were designed as long-range cruiser submarines equipped as commerce raiders, but this mission vanished when unrestricted warfare was officially outlawed by the naval treaties following World War I.
The prototype of the World War II fleet boat was the V-7 (later Dolphin) designed as a general-purpose submarine whose roles were spelled out by the Naval War College as: to act as an advance scout for the battle fleet, to conduct independent offensive operations against enemy combatant ships, and to operate tactically in conjunction with the battle fleet.
Submariners at the start of World War II were untrained for unrestricted commerce warfare because national policy had banned it by treaty. Similarly, the steadily improved classes of boats built between the Dolphin and the renowned Gatos were ostensibly designed primarily for a scouting role. If commerce raiding was envisioned in establishing their characteristics, it could not have been mentioned anywhere. In the event, the submarines designed as scouts for the battle fleet were admirably suited for the war against Japanese commerce. The submarine force itself was never wedded to the Mahanian battle-line strategy.
Achieving the culture of entrepreneurship urged by Dr. Holmes does need adaptive and aggressive young officers, but it requires far more change at all levels of the naval establishment. As we attempt to retool our naval culture and rebuild our Fleet, to me the most vital lesson we should learn from the past is simply that when the crisis comes, we will have to fight with what we have, not with what we thought we were going to need.
Let's Resolve the Scorpion Mystery
(See J. I. Holwitt, p. 10, June 2009; B. Rule, A. T. Dunn, pp. 7, 80-81, July 2009 Proceedings)
Bruce Rule—With respect to Lieutenant Commander Dunn's comment that we cannot know the event or events that led to the loss of the Scorpion (SSN-589), I concur that we cannot know all the events; however, the results of the reanalysis of the acoustic data previously discussed clarify what did happen and, as usefully, what did not happen. This clarification allows us to dismiss what Lieutenant Holwitt has accurately characterized as "lurid conspiracy theories that claim Scorpion was sunk by the Soviets."
In addition to the original acoustic data (tape recordings and time-versus-signal level charts), surviving associated documentation of the Scorpion event has provided the basis for limiting the range of possible scenarios and explaining the sequence of acoustic events and their durations.
Specifically, COMSUBLANT message 271946Z May 1968 provides the position reported by the submarine at 0001Z 22 May, and the course (290) and 18-knot speed of advance (SOA) for the remainder of the transit from her reported position to the WESTLANT SUBLANE.
As previously discussed, two low-order explosive events contained within the sub's pressure hull occurred at 18:20:44Z on 22 May when, at 18-knots, she should have been 330 nm, bearing 290 from the 0001Z position. Her wreck site lies 297 nm, bearing 290 from the last reported position or 33 nm behind the 18-knot point of intended movement (PIM) for the 18:20:44Z time of the internal explosions.
If the moving "box" extended 50 nm ahead and 100 nm behind the PIM, Scorpion was well within that box. This circumstance suggests the condition that resulted in her loss was the immediate result of the internal explosive events and not the result of an extended duration, evolving situation of which the internal explosions were the culminating events. A major casualty that occurred at transit depth and resulted in the loss of propulsion and electrical power is consistent with the failure of the sub to transmit subsequent to the 18:20:44Z time of the internal explosive events.
The 2008 reanalysis of the Scorpion acoustic data identified, for the first time, the 4.46-Hz bubble-pulse frequency (BPF) created by the pressure hull collapse at 18:42:34Z on 22 May. The BPF represents the number of times in one-second that the air within a collapsed structure oscillates (cycles) from maximum compression to maximum expansion back to maximum compression. The BPF is the reciprocal of the oscillation period, which means that the Scorpion pressure hull was completely destroyed in half the 0.224-second reciprocal of 4.46 Hz or 0.112 seconds.
The Scorpion's pressure hull collapsed forward (the operations compartment) and near the after machinery spaces. These locations are separated by about 90 feet. The still-accepted 1968 assessment is that the first collapse event triggered the second collapse event. For this to have been the case, the second collapse would have to have been triggered in less than the 0.112-second period during which sections of the pressure hull and internal bulkheads were completely destroyed.
The shock-wave from the first collapse event would have propagated through the pressure hull at the speed of sound in steel which is about 15,000 feet-per-second or 10,200 mph. This shock wave would thus have triggered the second collapse in 0.006-seconds or about 1/20 (5 percent) of the time required to destroy the Scorpion.
The time required for world-class sprinters to react to the starting gun has been measured as about 0.12 seconds, the same interval during which Scorpion was destroyed.
Looking for Anomalies in All the Wrong Places
(See M. Munson, pp. 34-37, July 2009 Proceedings)
Bruce B. Stubbs, Director, Office of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness—Lieutenant Munson has written a thought-provoking essay on Navy maritime domain awareness (MDA). His questions should be addressed, especially from technical and operational perspectives, about how best a focus on ships and anomalous behavior can support actionable intelligence. This is compelling given the need to identify those who would do us harm among some 135,000 ocean-going merchant vessels and the many millions of smaller vessels and craft in the global maritime domain.
The Navy is a critical component, among several, in an inter-agency and international effort to protect vital interests in the maritime commons. Lieutenant Munson is correct that focusing on anomaly detection alone is an ineffective approach to MDA, but that is just one of many tools we are pursuing to ensure effective MDA.
U.S. MDA comprises an all-threats and -hazards approach, and DOD MDA goals are as far-reaching in effect as they are challenging to achieve: to enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter, and defeat threats from all sources as early and distant from the United States as possible; to enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the full array of maritime threats; and to sustain application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and the efficient flow of commerce.
MDA-essential tasks and operations extend well beyond individual ocean-going ships and take into account smaller vessels and craft, crews and passengers, cargoes, and facilities and infrastructure. And we do not assume that threats to maritime interests can always be correlated with suspicious or unusual behavior. Indeed, we anticipate that terrorists or others intent on doing harm will be on their best behavior, so as not to raise suspicions or concerns. We thus are looking at all the variables and a broad spectrum of indications and warnings-some that might look benign at first glance or that originate far from the sea-that can trigger our concern and focus our responses on specific threats.
We are also reviewing whether the proper focus of U.S. MDA should be on the global maritime universe or on specific threats and how adversaries might use the seas to attack America's homeland, interests, and friends. In this calculus, vessels and cargoes are important variables, but people and networks-e.g., al Qaeda-are critical nodes for focusing intelligence activities, achieving capabilities, and shaping responses.
In short, MDA is a source for actionable intelligence, informed decision making, and effective responses to a complex set of common problems. In the United States, MDA is a government-wide process to help us understand what is going on in the maritime domain, how that might affect our vital interests, and how best we should respond. Essays like Lieutenant Munson's provide important perspectives in this task.
Improving FleetTac and DivTacs
(See R. Oldani and R. Eytel, pp. 81-83, June 2009 Proceedings)
Michael Trevett—In a word, signalmen, or more accurately the loss of this rating, is perhaps the best answer to what has become of naval proficiency in tactical communications and divisional tactics in the surface warfare community. Despite the emphasis on voice communications in this otherwise fine article, signalmen were the experts on almost every issue raised, such as knowing the rules, order of call signs, double or multiple call-ups, action versus information signals, turn versus corpen, and the rest.
Unfortunately, this fundamental point was missed, particularly in the list of recommendations to improve tactical communications and divisional tactical maneuvering exercises (DivTacs). In fact, it is fascinating to realize that signalmen were the shipboard and Fleet experts on each of the ten rules recommended by the authors. Serving as a Navy signalman in the 1980s and 90s, I vividly remember assisting junior officers in learning the various communications protocols. Additionally, there was no need to be under way to maintain our proficiencies. We signalmen held weekly tactical communications drills and exercises in port to hone not only our "Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity," but also our reliability and speed.
Some have made arguments that these skills can be maintained by officers, quartermasters, or other ratings, but as the authors ably point out, this simply has not been the case. The Coast Guard has attempted this for decades by assigning the responsibilities of signalmen to quartermasters. However, the tasks of visual and tactical communications are so subordinate to their primary tasks that most Coast Guard quartermasters can barely communicate with the various visual means and procedures. While Coast Guard quartermasters are professionals in their primary roles, in my 23 years of service in the Navy and Coast Guard I never knew of a Coast Guard quartermaster sufficiently skilled to send and receive actual tactical maneuvering signals between ships, particularly not in or for multi-ship formations. According to the authors, this seems to be the direction the Navy is heading. This may be acceptable for a coast guard or foreign navies, but the U.S. Navy needs higher standards and better skills for communicating and tactical maneuvering. Even without the benefit of research groups or scientific studies, I would wager that the decline of and problems associated with Navy tactical communications and DivTacs can be correlated to the elimination of the signalman rating and the subsequent loss of those experienced professionals.
Ships of State
(See M. J. Quigley, pp. 54-58, July 2009 Proceedings)
William Lloyd Stearman, Senior U.S. Foreign Service officer (Retired)—Lieutenant Quigley tellingly highlighted a capability long neglected by the Navy: an ability to wage "gunboat diplomacy." I would, however, specifically call for an effective visible show of force capability in the Fleet, now nonexistent. The present Navy's idea of a show of force is oxymoronic, a carrier task force far over the horizon, becoming a mere abstraction to those targeted. Unfortunately, all of our current naval combatants are too vulnerable and too unthreatening in appearance (with only one small gun in sight) to produce any kind of show of force. The Soviets, on the other hand, had a fine appreciation of shows of force and thus designed their ships to look threatening, for example the current cruiser Peter the Great bristles with exposed weapons, concealed on our ships.
We have the most effective naval show of force instruments in history, the Iowa-class battleships, which the Navy has tried its best to get rid of. The psychological impact of these ships was best described by the 28th Marine Corps Commandant and "father" of CENTCOM, General P. X. Kelley, "There is no weapon system in the world that comes even close to the visible symbol of enormous power represented by the battleship."
A strong case for battleship reactivation is that they can be effective in heading off conflicts. Even preparing to reactivate them could have a sobering effect on Tehran, which now no doubt believes, with some justification, that if need be, Iran could dominate the Persian Gulf with its antiship missile capability versus thin-skinned U.S. ships. A battleship presence could radically change this equation.
Our last ambassador to a unified Yugoslavia, the late Warren Zimmermann, told me that a battleship ready to fire off Dubrovnik in October 1991 could well have stopped the Serbian aggression that created such widespread and long-lasting havoc in the region. As former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and once the State Department's leading Arabist Hume Horan told me the battleship is "the ideal instrument for impressing the Arabs and [would be] a major asset in the area." A strong case could, for example, be made that a battleship off Kuwait City in July 1990 could have been used to effectively deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Kuwait, which triggered the Gulf War. Timely shows of force headed off Iraqi attacks on Kuwait in 1961 and 1973.
Congress mandated that the deactivated and donated battleships Iowa (BB-61) and Wisconsin (BB-64), along with their infrastructure, be maintained as mobilization assets. (To ensure this they should be returned to the Naval Vessel Register.) Nevertheless, they had fallen into limbo until a 2007 study produced by DOD's Joint Advanced Warfighting School made an exceedingly well-documented and compelling case for reactivating them for both naval surface fire support (now virtually absent, though essential) and their show-of-force capabilities. Recently, for example, Lieutenant General George J. Flynn, Commanding General of the key Marine Corps Combat Development Command, cited the 2007 study as justifying serious consideration for reactivating the two ships.
Rank, Rate, or Pay Grade
(See W. J. Holland Jr., p. 10, July 2009 Proceedings)
Kevin Billings, Former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics—I was intrigued to read Rear Admiral Holland's discussion of replacing rank with pay grade particularly because it could not have been further from the experience I had in two-and-a-half years as a senior civilian leader in the Air Force and prior to that as an unpaid advisor to the Secretary of the Army.
To the contrary, rank-not pay grade-was the coin of the realm. I cannot remember a single instance when an individual officer in any service was referred to as an "O-something" and not their rank, with perhaps the exception of a second lieutenant or ensign being referred to as a "butter bar."
OSD is clearly a different animal, but even in my dealings on the Third Floor, pay grade only seemed to be used when discussing a generic opening or the level appropriate for an assignment.
Perhaps I had a sheltered existence. I admit I was surrounded by exceptional Airmen-all 330,000 of them. Nonetheless, Rear Admiral Holland's point is well taken.
Book Reviews: Victory Point
(See D. J. Danelo, p. 154, May 2009 Proceedings)
Ed Darack—After returning from Afghanistan in the fall of 2005, having conducted numerous interviews on operations Red Wings and Whalers just weeks after they had been concluded, I noticed numerous factual inaccuracies in all types of media outlets on Red Wings, and little coverage of Whalers. Unfortunately, the trend of inaccurate information continues to this day, notably in the review of Victory Point in Proceedings. Within the first few sentences, the review's author, David J. Danelo, reveals that he either briefly skimmed the book, or paid little attention while reading it. He states that the plan for Red Wings called for a four-man Navy SEAL team to "capture or kill" Ahmad Shah. This is complete nonsense. I clearly detail that Red Wings was planned as a five-phase op, where the initial phase would use a four-man team to surveil known target sites, and provide guidance for the direct-action phase (a much larger team to take on the suspected 20 insurgents believed to be with Shah).
I then cringed when I read "Nineteen Navy SEALs died." Nineteen special operations personnel died on 28 June 2005—three Navy SEALs in the initial ambush of the four-man team, and then eight other SEALs and eight Army special operations aviators of the 160th SOAR(A) when their MH-47D was shot down during an attempted rescue.
Danelo states that I "barely" discuss Marcus Luttrell, when in fact he and his after-action report can be found on 23 of the book's 316 pages.
Danelo then makes the outright (and outrageous) fabrication that I "correct or amplify portions of the SEAL's narrative with a voice that forcefully and clearly defends the Marine point of view" and did not cite the book Lone Survivor as a source. I never once mentioned the book and did not use it as a source. I used key points of Luttrell's after-action report and first-person interviews of those in the combat operation center at Jalalabad listening to the reconnaissance team's communication to develop this part of the book. I independently interviewed approximately ten sources who had read his official after-action report (which I discuss in the book) and corroborated each source with one another.
I wrote the part of Victory Point that used the aforementioned information more than a year before the release of Lone Survivor. When that book was published, I discussed it with my sources who had read both the book (which was written by Patrick Robinson based on interviews with Luttrell) and Luttrell's after-action report, to gauge if I should change or add anything in my manuscript. We concluded that the information relevant to my book strayed to such a degree in Lone Survivor from the Luttrell after-action report that I should not use that book as a source. I did not cite Lone Survivor as a source because I did not use any information from it. Furthermore, I discuss the Luttrell after-action report and other relevant sources of information in my book. Mr. Danelo did not contact me or anyone related to my book to verify his position. Space does not allow me to note the other misrepresentations in his review; the above, particularly the last, are the most egregious.