Technology Can Help with Combat Operational Stress
By Major Marek M. Sipko, U.S. Marine Corps
Men and women who participate in combat operations have always been affected by the experience. Persistent reactions to operational stress are clearly identifiable in the literature of antiquity, and military surgeons have described characteristics since at least the 18th century. The specific reactions have changed somewhat from generation to generation and war to war, but much has not. Terror is still terror; grief is still grief. Courage, honor, and self-sacrifice play the role they always have in military operations.1
Major adverse operational stress reactions are similar to those of the American Civil War and the wars of the 20th century. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not much different, with the constant threat of improvised explosive devices. IEDs have taken a heavy toll on our forces; the stress of expecting an explosion must be tremendous.
Humans exposed to stress can be compared with trees in strong winds. Many adapt by bending, but some cannot and snap. Among humans, some actually become stronger under stress, but others begin to break. Everybody breaks at some point, but for each individual that point is different.
Stress injuries can be healed, under the vigilant care of mental health professionals. Such cases are categorized into normal stress reactions (about 70 percent of the total), temporary stress injuries (about 20 percent), and stress illnesses (about 10 percent). The goal is always to prevent the temporary stress injuries and quickly identify and treat the illnesses.2
Operational and combat stress significantly contributes to the loss of fighting force and negatively impacts military readiness. It can lead to suicide, multiple psychosocial problems, and premature departure from the service. Statistical data show that stress is taking a notable toll on the Marine Corps, especially in the number of new mental disorders diagnosed.
Pressure Is Increasing
The number of active duty Marines who are diagnosed with mental disorders has grown each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In 2003, there were 11,972 new diagnoses; that number has risen steadily, until in 2007 it reached 17,742. That is an increase of 5,770, or 48 percent.3 This is a very serious increase, and in most likelihood it can be attributed to the Marine Corps' continued combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Similarly, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has increased among active duty Marines every year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In 2003, there were 271 new diagnoses; that number has risen until in 2007 it reached 1,869. Since 2003, the number of new PTSD cases grew by 1,598, which translates into a whopping 590 percent increase.4 This is a powerful statistic, and few doubt that the increase can be attributed to the Marine Corps' continued participation in the current war effort.
Statistics regarding substance abuse among active-duty Marines reveal that drugs and alcohol are avenues of psychological escape for mentally stressed individuals. Researchers believed that as extensive deployments continued, the number of Marines affected by substance abuse would also increase. This has proven to be the case, as documented in stastitics from the Defense Medical Epidemiology Database (DMED).
The number of new drug-abuse or drug-dependence diagnosis cases among active duty Marines has also grown since the beginning of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Since 2003, new cases grew by 1,597, or 58 percent. This has especially become evident during the past two years, and can likely be correlated to weariness of war. Some Marines, unable to see the light at the end of the tunnel, may turn to drugs for stress relief.
As for new cases of alcohol abuse or dependence, DMED data show similarly that there has been a steady increase. Since 2003, the number of new diagnoses grew by 424, which is a 13 percent increase. This also has become particularly clear during the past two years and, again, may be correlated to war fatigue.
Certainly, ongoing combat brought attention to the need for stress control interventions. The evidence of negative reactions—including increases in PTSD, alcohol and drug abuse, and new mental-health cases—demonstrates that stronger and more vigorous efforts must be made to prevent stress casualties and restore those who already suffer from it.
Focus on Prevention
A comprehensive, systematic, multidisciplinary preventive health concept is not new. But it has been minimally employed for combat stress control and military mental health programs. And the Marine Corps' preventive program seems like an afterthought that came up only after our forces began losing individual Marines and Sailors to factors that can be attributed to stress.
Nine years ago, the Department of Defense directed all services to design and implement programs to preserve mission effectiveness and warfighting abilities, and to minimize the short- and long-term adverse effects of combat on the physical, psychological, intellectual, and social health of service members.5 Specific steps include:
- Consult with commanders about prevention.
- Manage operational stress reactions in both units and individuals. Achieve this by identifying at-risk populations. Assess unit morale, cohesion, and stress levels.
- Evaluate units after exceptionally stressful events; conduct critical-event debriefings.
- Provide consultation to commanders about end-of-tour debriefings.
- Evaluate and treat Marines and Sailors suffering from serious stress reactions and mental disorders.
Many Marine Corps and Navy officers think this directive has not been sufficient, because the Department of Defense approach has been rather reactive in nature. These officers feel strongly that we need to have more of a proactive approach that includes significant changes in unit and individual training. In November 2007, the Marine Corps Gazette published the Combat/Operational Stress Continuum Model. Commanding generals of Marine Expeditionary Forces introduced the model, which emphasized resiliency and prevention through education and training.
Accompanying this model, a letter stated the need for a program that was unit leader-oriented, multidisciplinary, integrated, and without stigma. The Marine leaders advocated underscoring the Corps' warrior ethos and enhancing unit cohesion and mental toughness. Their desire was to field and maintain resilient, combat-ready Marines and Sailors. The generals also indicated that the program's focus in the operating forces needed to be wellness and prevention, which could be achieved through appropriate training. The service is now in the process of adopting this approach through the publication of a bulletin to be released in the near future.
Maximize Web Use
Marine Corps generals believe that appropriate training is the key to prevention of these mental-health issues. Education based on the continuum model needs to be rank- and grade-focused, and standardized across the Corps to include all formal schools, pre-deployment training programs, and sustainment training.
To facilitate current worldwide operations, there is a need for development of alternative training means, such as interactive Internet resources, situational vignettes, videos, and other best-practice programs to enhance and expand training quality, accessibility, and consistency. Finally, Combat Operational Stress Control presentations should be maintained on the official Marine Corps Web site.
It is fascinating to see that instructional technology holds the key to future training for stress control. Many Marine Corps and Navy officers envision Web-based applications that can be accessed anywhere, anytime. Asynchronous presentations and situational vignettes will be reused many times by many thousands of Marines. This reuse factor will drive down the costs—a great benefit of information technology.
The presentations and vignettes will have to be interactive to reinforce the learning process and boost retention rates as much as possible. Computer-based training (CBT) will be available through DVDs that can be used when Internet connectivity is spotty or unavailable. This will be especially useful in forward-deployed situations. Forward-deployed troops will be able to pop a DVD into a laptop and conduct their CBT as appropriate.
Combat Operational Stress Control training based on state-of-the-art instructional technology could become a force-multiplier because of its flexibility and reusability; it provides the capability for training and education that is continuous and accessible 24/7, anywhere in the world. Because the program is comprehensive and multidisciplinary, the supporting instructional technology needs to mirror those aspects and also be comprehensive and multifaceted.
Today's delivery methods allow for a high degree of interactivity and simulations that translate into successful memory retention rates. A technology-enhanced education can teach the basics about predictable emotional, intellectual, physical and behavioral reactions to operational stress. The training can emphasize effective leadership, enhance unit cohesion and morale, and help with communication.
Instructional technology can help us achieve these goals—using less bureaucracy and more flexibility. This will directly benefit the Marine Corps' greatest and most important resources: individual Marines and Sailors.
1. W. P. Nash, Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries. In C. R. Figley and W. P. Nash, eds., For Those Who Bore the Battle: Combat Stress Injury Theory, Research, and Management (New York: Routledge, 2006).
2. Captain William P. Nash, USN, Presentation, Marine Corps Combat/Operational Stress Control: "Where We Are, How We Got Here," Tri-MEF Combat Stress Conference, Camp Pendleton, CA, 5 September 2007.
3. Defense Medical Epidemiology Database (DMED), http://afhsc.army.mil/. To access the data, first register at http://amsa.army.mil. Then go to Data Access Tool tab.
4. DMED.
5. DOD Directive 6490.50, Combat Stress Control (CSC) Programs, 23 February 1999, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html.
Special Operations Need Their Own Ships
By Lieutenant Rafael E. Duyos III, U.S. Navy
Charged with the responsibility for maritime special operations, the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command must carry out its mission using platforms that are provided on an ad hoc basis from conventional naval surface forces, usually amphibious ships. NSW—Special Operations Command's naval component—has no designated, independent platforms.
In the air as well as on land and sea, this situation is unique. With the exception of the Naval Surface Force, Special Operation Command (SOCOM) is provided with dedicated assets and organizations from the Air Force, Army and the Navy's submarine force.
The time has come to move away from exclusively using ad hoc arrangements to support maritime special operations (MSO). Instead, MSO requires multiple levels of dedicated support with different platforms and unique command, control, and logistics organizations. This structure will integrate the pointed nature of special operations with the sustainment and overwhelming power of conventional naval forces.
Support for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Is Inadequate
SOF have used every surface platform in the naval inventory, from carriers to tugs and barges. During World War II and Korea, underwater demolition teams, the precursors of modern naval special warfare, were stationed on board high-speed transports (APDs). The same ships that provided underwater demolition team berthing and logistics would ultimately be their insertion platform and provide close-in fire support. The underwater demolition/APD teams were highly effective in conducting advance force operations and other MSO.1 However, since Korea no surface platform has been dedicated, much less designed, to support SOF.2
The lack of dedicated ships and organizations leads to a conflict in priorities for training, operations, and resources. Amphibious ships, those that SOF are most likely to use, are dedicated to the Marine Corps' primary mission: battalion-size or larger operations. Further, amphibious ships provide the Marine Corps with strategic lift, which limits the availability for SOF.
Even if the amphib is available, each ship that SOF embark must be trained in the technical and tactical aspects of special operations. After the ship has been trained, it can become a valuable addition. But because it is not dedicated, no long-term personal or organizational relationships are developed, and the training process must be repeated each time SOF embark.3 Thus, institutionalized tactical knowledge and command and control relationships cannot be established.
Doctrinally, operational and tactical control of SOF may or may not be given to a fleet commander.4 Although the intent is to provide flexibility, this relies on the experience and personality of the SOF and naval commander. Giving operational and tactical control of special operations forces to a conventional commander can lead to their misuse. If a non-SOF commander sees SOF as additional conventional assets rather than specialized units, SOF readiness decreases.
Typically, a special operations commander receives only tactical control of the ship. That is beneficial for short-duration missions, but not having operational control means that missions are dictated by logistics and other administrative concerns controlled by other organizations that may or may not have the same priorities as the SOF commander. And captains tasked to support SOF are evaluated by their conventional superiors—which means that the assessment of a ship's CO support for MSO is secondary to that of the ship's primary-mission performance.
Proposed Maritime SOF Fleet
To effectively support maritime special operations, we need both material and organizational changes. The material components include: eight new SOF support ships (these are referred to below as littoral multipurpose ships) and eight current ships-of-the-line modified with SOF-specific equipment and trained to conduct MSO (referred to below as advanced force ships).
More important, these ships require an organizational structure to employ, train, and sustain them in both independent and joint operations (see Figure 1). The intent of the system is to provide a layered mechanism to support maritime special operations through the full range of conflict.
Littoral Multipurpose Ship (LMS)
Foreign internal defense, theater security cooperation, and humanitarian missions are the overwhelming majority of SOF missions in the maritime environment. They require a relatively inexpensive and uncomplicated vessel—with 100 percent availability to the theater special operations commander.5 In these situations, the LMS can support itself and the forces ashore, independently of other naval or joint forces. The LMS can also provide limited strategic mobility, now lacking in SOCOM.
This vessel should be smaller than current L-class ships: approximately 10,000 tons with a well deck, flight deck, multiple crane system, berthing for a minimum of 95 SOF personnel, and storage for gear. Additionally, an LMS equipped with navalized artillery will give SOF an organic, precision fire-support asset. Singapore's Endurance-class LST is an appropriate starting point for the LMS design.
Advance Force Ship (AFS)
Multi-mission ships such as destroyers or cruisers can be minimally modified with SOF-specific equipment, and trained to support special operations. These can serve as the proposed AFSs.6 We need their warfighting capabilities so that SOF can conduct operations in regional conflicts against nations with modern defenses.
In comparison with the LMS, the AFS provides limited SOF berthing and storage for surface and subsurface craft and vehicles. But it also has greater speed and robust area defense capabilities from air, surface, and subsurface threats. Further, the AFS provides a vigorous strike warfare capability with either cannon or missiles. Ships that qualify as AFS are relatively expensive, so this would not be an asset dedicated solely to the theater special operations commander. Rather, it would be like the support that submarine forces give SOF: assigned as required to train and execute specific missions.
LMS and AFS Command and Control Organizations
A new command, Naval Special Warfare Transport Group 5 (NSWTG-5), should be formed within NSW to manage operations and coordinate long-range scheduling. Led by a flag surface warfare officer, NSWTG-5 would act as the type commander for the LMS. Further, NSWTG-5 could act as NSW's executive agent for the LMS and all conventional Navy surface support. NSW, through NSWTG-5, could maintain operational and tactical control of the LMS and crews, shifting to the appropriate level in each theater.7
Support for the AFS can be similar to that provided to SOCOM by the naval submarine force. In both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, a single ship squadron can be assigned the SOF-modified AFSs, tasked and operationally controlled like any other Fleet ship. If the ship is tasked with MSO, tactical control of the AFS can be given to either SOF or the fleet commander, while operational control remains with its own immediate superior in command. NSWTG-5 coordinates with AFS's type commanders regarding training, maintenance, and upgrades of SOF-specific gear on board the AFS.
Meet Today's Challenges with Bold Solutions
Our naval surface forces are best suited to large, force-on-force battles. Small-unit, strategic operations that are surgical, subtle, and inherently flexible are challenging for this force. We cannot overcome these problems with ad hoc unions of SOF and large Fleet ships. Instead, as during World War II and the Korean War, the solution lies in the synergy between integrated and self-contained units.
In his discussion of the World War II APD flexibility, Michael Haas wrote: "The key . . . lay in the teamwork developed between the ship's crew and the raiding forces it carried and launched into combat. Not surprisingly, this teamwork and sense of common purpose between the two groups led to a camaraderie that soon became recognized as a hallmark of the best APD operations."8
It is time for the Navy and SOCOM to recreate such effectiveness, to face the challenges of both regional adversaries and global terrorism.
1. See John B. Dwyer, "Behind the Lines: Secret Naval Raids in Korea," Military History,1 December 2002, 66-72; and Michael E. Haas, In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
2. NSW did not have sole use of any vessel larger than 65 feet until the late 1980s, with the advent of the Cyclone-class (PC-1) patrol coastal ships (PC). That program did not work; for a detailed explanation, see Michael A. Polidro, "The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations: An Alternative Model for the Employment of the Cyclone Class (PC-1)," master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. See also Brian D. Peterson, "The Patrol Coastal: Then, Now, and in the Future," Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth June 1998. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA350057.
3. For another perspective on the difficulties of integrating SOF and the conventional Navy, see Joseph D. Becker, "Special Operations Afloat: Haiti Operation Yielded Valuable Lessons For Marrying SOF and Navy Force Projection," Armed Forces Journal International (February 1996): 18-20.
4. Joint Pub 3-05.1, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf.
5. Although humanitarian missions are not doctrinally an SOF mission, they are featured prominently in SOF's annual histories.
6. Even a recommissioned DDG would fit the model. See Julie Higgins, Jason Rhoades, and Michael Roach, "Advanced Gun System (AGS) Backfit: DD-988 Naval Gunfire Support Ship Conversion," Project in Naval Ship Conversion, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/3531/AGS+Conversion+Study.pdf.
7. This OPCON relationship is not uncommon among special forces units, and in no way prevents the use of the forces by the geographic component commander during in-extremis situations. See http://www.pacom.mil/staff/socpac/index.shtml.
8. Haas, In the Devil's Shadow, 132.
Soft-Kill Capture of the Supercavitating Torpedo
By Steve Cordell
In the days of the 45 mph torpedo, I described in a patent a torpedo-capture curtain to protect submarines at depth from enemy torpedoes.1 The theory was that given the reaction time measured then in scores of seconds, a curtain released in the path of a torpedo would have time to fully open, orient itself perpendicular to the path, capture the torpedo, and slow it down, allowing the sub to escape.
Even a torpedo salvo might have been stopped with that method, using individual curtain releases. Such a spring-actuated curtain would not be effective today, but the theory, applied to current technologies, could possibly be effective for a soft kill of high-speed torpedoes.
The Squall torpedo travels at around 230 mph. Its danger to our ships is recognized: supercavitation is the use of cavitation effects to create a bubble of gas wholly enveloping a torpedo, allowing it to travel at great speed. The German company Diehl recently exhibited a non-traditional torpedo, Barracuda, with a speed of around 500 mph.2
Even though the Navy recently canceled "High-Speed Torpedo and Torpedo Salvo Defense" in its small-business requests for proposals, we should continue to research this problem.
How the Curtain Might Work
A torpedo capture curtain would be made of strong, light webbing. Its components would all be lightweight, strong and thin coarse-webbed Kevlar and titanium. The processor would execute the opening sequence when at depth, releasing sea anchors and wrapping around the torpedo in a helix, then releasing supersize sea anchors to turn the weapon off course and downward. Thus captured and immobilized, the torpedo could be reverse-engineered (after its control and sensor algorithms and friendly ship signatures were discovered).
For a Squall, electronic or sonic countermeasures are not effective because they are unguided and aim at the target intersection. At the torpedo's tremendous speed, the Navy assumes a reaction time of less than 10 seconds for defense.3 Some proposed defenses are hard-kill methods that attempt to destroy the weapon. Powerful bombs or depth charges released in its path would either destroy the torpedo or slow it down considerably. Research on supercavitating projectiles aimed at the torpedo at depth has produced viable future possibilities.4
But soft-kill defenses that merely rendered the torpedo ineffective could be considerably cheaper than hard-kill methods. For example, if the torpedo's gas envelope were compromised, it would lose its great speed advantage. It would still be a live torpedo—at a slower speed and easier to capture.
High-speed torpedoes are unguided missiles with integrated explosives. The U.S. Navy and allies, as well as potential enemies, are working on mechanisms to steer torpedoes. The Barracuda has this capability-but since it is operating in the noisy environment that it creates, feedback and reaction to outside influences (such as fine-tuning its own re-targeting) require very sophisticated onboard sonar and processing equipment.
The Capture
A torpedo-capture curtain could be launched from mounts on any surface ship. Rapid response would be most important, since there are only seconds from time of detection and determination of the track to an interception point far enough from the ship to effectively disable the torpedo.
- Launching steps: Track torpedo, finalize programming of curtain in its launcher, accelerate gyros to full speed, orient curtain package, launch.
- Interception point steps: Curtain assumes final attitude at interception point, powered plunge into water, partially opens at prescribed depth, powered opening on reaching programmed depth, powered release of small sea anchors, helical wrap around torpedo, release of further-slowing sea anchors. Only then, powered opening of main sea anchors on preprogrammed side to gently turn torpedo off its intended path and slightly downward.
The Technology
The program-controlled curtain would have both pre-launch and pre-water entry countdown sequences similar to the car-airbag or jet-fighter ejection-seat tasks. Shipboard engineering and communications involve both own-ship and towed side-looking sonars; the design encompasses the launcher and the curtain package, with its stabilizing gyros and sequenced, thruster-powered opening and release mechanisms, as well as its own sensors, processor, and logic.
The curtain could be built using simple, proven, and inexpensive parts. Design tasks would be to create a technology capable of capturing—without tearing—a standard-size torpedo running at high speed; and a launcher with countdown sequence that could rapidly project the curtain and accurately hit the intended interception area in time to execute the sequences above and below the waterline.
The proper pieces of equipment and their position for detection of high-speed torpedoes (e.g., sonar fixed on ship, towed midships or trailing own-ship, an escort or helicopter trailing sonar, etc.) are yet to be determined. Much more research is needed before the pre-processing software modules for detection/tracking can be specified and designed. The number of dual-package launchers be needed is also unknown (dual because of close torpedo salvos or second-chance launch). Reliable intelligence about enemy salvo philosophies is needed before we can determine the number and placement of launchers for full ship coverage at cruising or unusual speeds.
• Capital ships: At some point during travel, the launched high-speed torpedo or a salvo is tracked with sonar. The towed side-looking sonar currently in the Fleet may be sufficient to begin tracking. Immediately known to all ships of the task force is launch time and the weapon's starting position. Data are integrated using the available hardware/software suite, and are processed by new, dedicated software to be integrated with current programs.
For the curtain technology, the data could then be made available to a fire control system, modified to handle the curtain launcher. With no time for human decision, during data integration and fire control calculations the automatic launcher would be continuously updated before the final launch commands. Much of the time available would be required for flight time after launch, curtain attitude corrections, and expansion after water entrance.
• Submarines: After launch of the high-speed torpedo, the boat assumes that it is the target. The torpedo track is determined, and computer logic automatically accelerates the boat and attempts to set an optimum bearing (with, again, no time for human decisions). For the curtain, after tracking and contact prediction, the device could be programmed and ejected at the optimum interception time. It would then expand, capture the torpedo, and slow it so the sub could escape.
Developmental Needs
As will be obvious to readers who are skilled in the art of undersea warfare, many aspects of this proposed torpedo-capture method need much more research and development. Intensive effort is needed, but the simple elements have been in service for years and are already proven.
A single computer on a chip would suffice for the curtain logic. Activation for jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) and rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) thrusters and the sea anchors at the correct depth would not be complicated.5 More complex would be developing the capability to respond to sensor data from various separate, unconnected points on the curtain in a noisy environment, with a torpedo milliseconds away from capture.
The sensors are self-powered and redundantly wired to the processor, so feedback should be reliable. JATO or RATO ignition is on demand and thrusting is uncontrolled, but phased testing should determine the required size, charge, ignition timing, and placement of attachments.
Using the ship's data processing suite would pose no problems. On a ship with no conventional fire control system, any simple, proven fire control suite could be converted for the launching task. Integration of the information would be vital: milliseconds would count. Cruising carriers travel about 65 yards within the defense window of 9 seconds. Yet to be determined is the location of multiple launchers for long ships to defend against torpedo salvos.
The opening of nets and curtains under water is not mysterious. But rolled or folded components, especially large ones such as this, call for a significant investment in research, design, and testing.
1. Steve Cordell, U.S. Patent 5,146,045 (1992), Underwater Mine; and German Patent 39 20 187. See www.freepatentsonline.com.
2. Volker Lange, "Highspeed in der Tiefe" (high speed in the deep) Morgenwelt magazine, 23 June 2005, www.morgenwelt.de/609.1.html.
3. Small Business Innovative Research Request for Proposal, Navy Topic N07-203: High Speed Torpedo and Torpedo Salvo Defense, p. 5. Topic canceled during proposal submittal phase before Sept. 17, 2007: No reason stated. www.dodsbir.net/solicitation/sbir073/navy073.pdf. See also description paragraph on p. 1.
4. See, for example, Sik Ahn Seong, "Integrated Approach to the Design of Supercavitating Underwater Vehicles," Ph.D. diss., Georgia Tech. Electronic resource, no. TL560.1.G45x A3526c. Main goal is development of simulation-based design tool providing guidelines on vehicle and hydrodynamic configuration, and control system for supercavitating vehicles.
5. JATO and RATO are devices for providing additional thrust to seaplanes during takeoff on a calm sea, and to accelerate cars for speed trials, among other tasks.