Modern-Day Minehunting, Destroyer Style
(See S. J. Coughlin, pp. 42-46, June 2008 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles F. Horne III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Steve Coughlin's article about his ship's and his command's hands-on operating of the Navy's great Remote Minehunting System (RMS) is so on target and so timely for Proceedings' many Fleet and ashore Sailors and officers to read and take on board.
As the author explains so eloquently, our Navy needs organic mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities within its strike groups ready to perform on-site and on time. Our Navy at all levels has worked diligently and effectively over the past ten-plus years to develop these MCM systems for our 21st century fleets, and the RMS is one of these great systems now entering service.
This is the time to mainstream mine warfare (MIW) throughout our Navy, including all our ship and aircraft crews. As Commander Coughlin so graphically points out, we need this MIW knowledge and expertise in place and throughout our seagoing battle groups, not just in the dedicated MCM forces that take so long to get to the critical theater.
Three cheers to Proceedings for featuring this commanding officer's article in your June ASW and Mine Warfare issue. I hope our Navy will strongly consider mainstreaming both ASW and MIW as our two vital capabilities for assured access against submarines and mines.
Commander Robert K. Morrison III, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, HSV 2 Swift (Gold Crew)—Having precommissioned and later served as combat systems officer on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, I can understand the desire to expound on the capabilities of a new weapon system and sensor package. I have great respect for Commander Coughlin, but his article on the RMS on board the Bainbridge (DDG-96) is, to quote another senior naval officer that I have great respect for, "interesting . . . but irrelevant." To think that a warfighting commander would task a DDG to conduct minehunting and potentially remove those ships' vast weapon systems from "adequate use" would be equivalent to tasking a carrier to conduct visit, board, search, and seizure operations. Anyone who does not consider a DDG and her weapon and sensor systems a capital ship has forgotten about the Cole (DDG-67).
Once the desire to conduct "mission fishing" (the addition of tasks to a platform to extend its capability portfolio) on our legacy platforms has ended, then a serious force-structure discussion will be possible. Destroyers were designed and built to conduct force-on-force maritime operations in blue water. As the Navy moves into the green and brown waters, the warfighting construct and the associated platforms that conduct those operations must change. The advent of the RMS must institutionalize the mission module concept. This concept needs to be coupled with recognition of platforms that can support these various packages. While the littoral combat ship is the platform of choice, there remain other possibilities for these systems; as the article describes, it is still "a long way from the tip of the spear." One could argue that minehunting is not the proper "tip of the spear" mission for a DDG.
Low-end, low-cost platforms without the need for extensive survivability systems must be considered for the MIW and ASW mission packages of the future. The High Speed Vessel (HSV), with its capacity to carry the package and the speed and maneuverability to evade an adversary or danger area, is a viable alternative. Additionally, the HSV has a small crew and while not considered "expendable," does not have the weapons package of a destroyer that could be needed elsewhere. While Commander Coughlin's article is valuable for providing a look at current and future warfighting systems, applying that mission to a DDG is short-sighted and dangerous.
DOD on a Glide Path to Bankruptcy
(See J. D. Christie, pp. 22-25, June 2008 Proceedings)
Paul J. Madden—The geometric rise in the cost of military equipment is not a law of nature. It's the result of conscious decisions.
Back in the mid-1970s, a Northrop executive told me that half of the costs you can ever save on a military aircraft are decided by choices made before the first plane is built.
Most of the rest of the potential cost savings are determined by production quantities. Less than half of the cost of a plane is direct labor and materials. The rest is overhead, which doesn't vary much with quantity.
The late President Gerald Ford said he didn't think the defense industry could produce beer for less than $110 per six-pack. That's a gross understatement, considering the way DOD and Congress buy things. What do you think beer would cost if you paid a major defense contractor to produce only 24 six-packs per year? That's the way we buy planes. For ships, we buy one or two per year.
Artificially low cost projections are not a cause of the rising costs. The costs will be there regardless of the fibs we tell ourselves. I doubt if even Congress is fooled. But Congress feigns shock at the inevitable "cost growth." So, they cut quantities, then are aghast at the jump in unit cost. It's comic.
Former Commander Eugene P. Podrazik, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve—John Christie's article falls short in three areas: the role of productivity, knowing the future, and adaptability.
First, the American style of warfare is capital intensive. That is, there is greater reliance on throwing machines rather than men into battle. One of the positive effects of this method is to allow the fielding of smaller military forces relative to America's size, population, and economic might. America's might is the sum of its citizens' creativity. Greater productivity allows this asset to be conserved; capital is cheap, labor is dear.
Second, we don't know the future, yet we design weapons that, like the CVN-21, may have a life cycle of 50 years. As that carrier goes out to sea in, say, 2018, how do we really hope to know what that carrier will face? And what will the world be like in 2065 when it finally heads in to be scrapped? During World War II, a 50-year life cycle wasn't a consideration. Much of what you produced would likely be lost in combat, so design centered on a suite of weapons, a power plant to move it, and a hull or airframe built around squeezing the necessary crew on board. You knew what you needed, designed for that, and bought a lot of it. And won the war.
In some respects, trying to anticipate every future nightmare scenario is probably the single most important factor in extended design cycles and acquisition costs. Instead of trying to know the future, design the best with the knowledge and technology at hand. Then, leave it to the intense creativity of our service personnel to figure out the rest. Creativity on the battlefield is our most fearsome weapon.
You don't even have to know the future to design weapons that will prevail in the future. Know the past. Understanding the general patterns and principles of military history is not planning for the last war. Emphasize air power—keep the high ground. Be stealthy—submarines. Deny access to the sea—we're an island nation; large armies and attendant logistics must travel by water.
Finally, the foremost question in the designer's mind should be, "How adaptable?" America's historical experience is that the first 6 to 12 months of a war is come-dressed-as-you-are. You won't have the correct mission-specific weapons mix. But can the weapons on hand can be modified or adapted to stem the tide of our attacker's initial onslaught? Today's weapons are there to buy time until that next conflict's mission-specific weapons reach the battlefield.
Can the F-22 Raptor be turned into a strike aircraft like the F-15? Can a plucky aircrew, armed with an arc welder, in some forsaken about-to-be-overrun outpost, modify the Raptor in ways that will make its designers cringe, yet with that modification stave off near-certain defeat? The aircraft's original design intentions may be beside the point, but it may be the weapon that bought you the time to survive and, ultimately, win.
Go Operational! Reforming the National Guard and Reserves
(See A. L. Punaro, pp. 16-21, June 2008 Proceedings)
Colonel Ken Jordan, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—It's remarkable to me that Congress has been so passive in acting on the proposals made by the various commissions formed to address critical veterans' and defense issues. Major General Punaro's article pertaining to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve is a glowing example of that passivity. The recommendations made, based on months of hearings, research, and testimony, reinforced by the impressive credentials of the commissioners, are urgently needed to rectify the problems that warriors from the Guard and Reserve experience as they are routinely rotated with the active services to fight the war on terrorism.
Two congressional-formed commissions, the Commission of the National Guard and Reserve and the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission, were formed to study, analyze, and recommend solutions to resolve permanent, ongoing gaps of significant consequence regarding our troops, veterans, and the organization and structure of the national defense effort to execute its mission and care for our warriors in an All-Volunteer Force environment. Both commissions have completed their assigned mission and proposed sound, well-researched, and necessary solutions to Congress. Yet very little has been done to implement those recommendations. Meanwhile, it's business as usual, while "usual" is outdated and marginally functional.
No Good Deed
(See H. Ullman, p. 8, June 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul E. Cornelius, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Ullman makes the recommendation that the Navy should "consider putting a certain part of the force in reserve or standby status" because in the immediate future "America faces no significant adversary at sea." With all due respect, this is a very myopic view of the maritime threats to the United States and the free world. Without going into an extensive dissertation, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to remain at the pier in "cadre" status until it is too late. Additionally, his recommendation that the Navy's officers and enlisted in cadre status can use "simulators and other shore-based systems" to maintain their warfighting skills is really off the mark. While such systems can be a great adjunct to training, there is nothing, repeat nothing, that can replace actual seagoing experience. The old saying that, "Sailors belong on ships, and ships belong at sea," has never been more true. The U.S. Navy needs full-time, seagoing crews, not part-timers.
Opportunity at Hand: New Roles for Carriers
(See R. P. Swan and E. J. Horres, pp. 60-64, June 2008 Proceedings)
Don Richardson—This was a very insightful article, and as I sat and read the piece it finally dawned on me that I had seen this occurrence before. With a little research and looking on my "me" wall here at work, I have an old picture of my ship, the USS America (CV-66), with elements of the USSOCOM 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) on board. The ship was not carrying the normal air wing but instead the Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Little Birds that comprise the SOAR.
On 13 September 1994 the ship was heading for Haiti in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. Orders were received for the invasion but 45 minutes later, prior to launching the mission, then-President Clinton rescinded those orders and the ship and detachment were told to stand down. During the next 30 days, however, 2,000 Army, Air Force, and Marine Special Forces conducted 400-plus sorties with a 96 percent completion rate. The picture tells the tale, as there is nothing but 30 to 40 helicopters on the flight deck. While this certainly is not a new concept, kudos to Brigadier General Swan and Captain Horres for bringing the story to the surface. It seems like an excellent alternative when conventional U.S. Navy air wing support is not needed for the mission profile.
The Royal Navy: Whither Goes Thou?
(See M. K. Banger, p. 12, March 2008 Proceedings)
Commodore C. C. C. Johnstone, CBE, Royal Navy, Director of Naval Staff, Ministry of Defence—The debate about the size and shape of modern navies is an important one, and I am grateful to Commodore Banger for his contribution. He is right to say the British Empire is a thing of the past, but so too is the Cold War. We now live an environment where the UK is in many ways more secure than most countries and more secure than at most times in our history. The threats we face today are principally from non-state actors. The military is but part of a complex coordination of other agencies to counter them. But, as we learned in 1982, and as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously suggested, we cannot know the future and we must retain a minimum insurance level of capability.
A further aspect of the current environment is the expectation of a switch of resources from defense to more immediate social concerns such as health, education, housing, and crime. At the same time, the cost of complex and cutting-edge defense equipment rises faster than standard price indexes. Nevertheless, the UK, far from being a dwarf, is in fact the world's fifth largest military spender based on purchasing power parity comparisons, after the United States, China, India, and Russia.
Commodore Banger is right to talk about quality and quantity; I am in no doubt that quality is paramount. There are two critical areas in this regard: first, the ability to fight in a complex joint and combined multi-threat environment for which it is essential to maintain a "seed corn" capability; second, the industrial capacity to build the most capable modern warships and submarines. We have these two bases covered, and we have the potential to expand to meet new threats in the future.
I do not believe there has been a First Sea Lord in history who would not have wished for more ships. But it would be a foolish First Sea Lord who failed to take account of the prevailing conditions and trim his sails accordingly. Nevertheless, the fact that the Royal Navy of today, which numbers 60 major ships (greater than 3,500 tonnes), is deployed around the world fully justifies its recognition as a major blue-water force. Indeed, our navy's visits to Commodore Banger's own shores number 14 in the past 2 years. There are a further 11 visits planned during the next 12 months. Perhaps the perception of the Indian Navy as a brown-water force is colored by the fact that visits to the UK or dependent territories by Indian naval vessels are very infrequent, with none currently planned that I am aware of.
In the coming years the RN will accept into service the new Daring-class destroyers. These will be the most modern and capable air defense ships in the world, and the two new aircraft carriers will be the largest warships ever built in Britain.
I am not responsible for the UK merchant fleet, but I must correct Commodore Banger here. Since 2000, UK-owned and -operated ships have seen remarkable growth. The UK-owned fleet has increased by some 150 percent, and the UK-flag fleet has more than quadrupled, according to British Chamber of Shipping figures.
Commodore Banger asks "Whither the Royal Navy?" My response is that the RN is a modern, capable, professional, and relevant blue-water fighting force. We face an uncertain future but one that is sure to have a strong maritime focus. I believe the Royal Navy is well-placed to influence events at home and at large, on its own or with alliances.
The United States and Canada: Time to Defrost
(See D. Daglio, pp. 32-27, April 2008 Proceedings)
Reverend Frank Morgret—I am a life member of the Naval Institute, a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, a former Coast Guard officer, and a retired clergyman. I hold Canadian (not dual U.S.-Canadian) citizenship since my pastoral career has been entirely in Canada.
Commander Daglio's article is excellent and long overdue. However, some of its implications need to be made explicit for the reader to grasp the full force of his argument.
Like Iraq, Canada is a sovereign nation. It is not a part of nor a possession of the United States.
Like Iraq, Canada as a sovereign nation is governed by its own laws and by the treaties it has signed, not by the laws of the United States.
Like Iraq and every other sovereign nation in the world, Canada and Canadian companies may sell their products—including Canada's vast natural resources—to whomever they please.
Like Iraq, Canada contains a variety of people holding a variety of opinions, not all of them favorable to the foreign policy of the United States.
Should that foreign policy suggest an armed invasion of Canadian soil to ensure access to Canada's resources, regardless of what the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may say, invading U.S. troops will not be welcomed as liberators.
That being the case, diplomacy and adherence to joint and international treaties will ultimately provide the United States more assured access to Canada's oil, metals, lumber, and minerals than will the failure to abide by those treaties (as has been the case in the past, as Commander Daglio correctly noted) or attempts to seize those resources by force of arms.