U.S. Navy: Carrier Aviation on the Move: But Going Where?

The debate over the future of the aircraft carrier continues hot and heavy in the pages of Proceedings, the halls of the Pentagon, and the corridors of the U.S. Capitol.¹ But whereas during the Cold War the debate principally centered on the potential vulnerability of carriers, today the principal issues are cost and alternative platforms. To a large degree these issues are interwoven.

The CVN-78, the next large carrier, named the Gerald K. Ford shortly before the death of the former President in 2007, will be costly. The previous nuclear-propelled carrier, the George H. W. Bush (CVN-77). is costing about $7 billion: the Ford's cost is estimated at some $12 billion, in addition to about $12 billion being spent for research and development (R&D) efforts related to the design. Thus, the equivalent of two years of the Navy's shipbuilding budget is being spent to develop and build a single warship, although the R&D will be applicable to future ships of the same design.

The Ford is expected to be completed about 2015 with additional ships of the design to be constructed at four- or five-year intervals. Several factors demand consideration before proceeding with this plan.

* Design. The CVN-78 continues the basic design concepts - with significant improvements - of the late 1940s and the never-completed carrier United States (CVA-58). A large number of more innovative designs have been developed to varying degrees by Navy agencies but have invariably received quick dismissal.

Indeed, our British cousins have had a radically different approach to carrier design in their aborted CVA. 01 and current CVF designs. Remember, the British invented the carrier concept, angled flight deck, steam catapult, and mirror landing system. But all departures from the basic, 60-year-old CVA-58 design are quickly rejected by the U.S. Navy.

* Reconnaissance. Historically carriers have been effective platforms for highperformance reconnaissance aircraft. Long gone, however, are the specialized RA-3B Skywarriors, RA-5C Vigilantes, RF-4B Phantoms, and RF-8 Crusaders.² Today tactical reconnaissance from carriers is undertaken by F/ A- 1 8 Hornets with the shared reconnaissance pod (SHARP) system. But SHARP is limited in capabilities while the F/A-18 pilots do not have the specialized training of recce pilots. Rather, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, and long-range, land-based aircraft - including the venerable U-2 spyplane - now provide effective tactical, theater, and strategic reconnaissance.

* Antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Aircraft carriers had long provided ASW aircraft for fleet defense, both in the context of specialized carriers (CVS) and multi-mission carriers (CV/CVN). In the late 1990s the fixed-wing carrier ASW aircraft, the S-3B Viking, lost its antisubmarine role.

Subsequently, the MH-60R Seahawk multi-purpose helicopter replaced the specialized SH-3 Sea King and SH-60F Seahawk ASW helicopters. The MH6OR has an ASW role, but is also employed in surveillance, antiship. special operations, and other roles. Accordingly, carrier-based ASW capabilities have been severely reduced.

* Strike warfare. With the demise of the carrier-based A-6 Intruder, the strike capability of U.S. carriers is limited to a couple of hundred miles with the F/A-18 Hornet. Today all Navy cruisers, destroyers, and most attack submarines (SSN/SSGN) can launch Tomahawk landattack missiles. These weapons can strike farther than carrier planes, are more accurate, and are less vulnerable to enemy defenses. The new TACTOM (Tactical Tomahawk) can be re-targeted while in flight.

Perhaps most significant, cruise missiles can be launched from about 1 30 surface ships and submarines, not just ten operational aircraft carriers.

* Air defense. In the past, carrier-based fighters have been the stalwarts of fleet air defense. The relatively short range of the F/A- 1 8 Hornet precludes its use as an effective combat air patrol/air defense fighter. At the same time, all U.S. cruisers and destroyers have the Aegis air/missile defense system, with several ships being fitted with a ballistic missile defense system.³

While the two defensive concepts - aircraft and ship-based systems - are not interchangeable, in the post-Cold War environment a major reevaluation of the carrier's role in air/missile defense is warranted.

* Future aircraft. The F-35B configuration of the Joint Strike Fighter (now named Lightning II) will be a short-takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. Like its predecessor, the highly successful Harrier, the F-35B will be capable of operating from smaller ships, especially the Navy's LHA/LHD STOVLhelicopter carriers. The F-3SB will be a high-performance aircraft, comparable with advanced land-based fighter/attack aircraft.

Similarly, the V-22 Osprey STOVL aircraft, which is now being procured by the Marine Corps for assault lift and by the Air Force for special operations, has been proposed for the airborne early warning (AEW) and ASW roles from carriers. Studies conducted since the 1970s indicate the feasibility of these roles. again enabling smaller carriers to operate relatively high-performance aircraft in those roles.

A final factor affecting the procurement - and in some respects the most significant from the viewpoint of U.S. Navy and. increasingly, congressional politics - is nuclear propulsion to the CVN. This issue and potential alternatives will be discussed in this column in the July issue of Proceedings.