As Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding projects face intense scrutiny in Congress, the highly successful SSGN conversion program offers valuable lessons for future efforts.
The Navy's program for the conversion of the first four of the 18 Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to a guided-missile (SSGN) configuration is on time, on budget, and meeting operational requirements. Not only will the program result in important capabilities to support the unconventional war on terrorism and conventional warfare requirements, it has sustained and re-energized critical elements of the Navy-industry design, engineering, and construction base that will be the framework for America's next-generation submarines.
The USS Ohio (SSGN-726) is approaching her initial deployment at the same time that procurement of ships and submarines is receiving significant attention from Congress and the press. The success of the SSGN program offers lessons that should be considered in formulating future shipbuilding programs. Availability of a government and contractor workforce with recent experience in submarine design was a key precondition for the program's success.
Transforming for 21st-Century Needs
During the height of the Cold War, the Defense Department's 1967 STRAT-X study called for as many as 24 new-design SSBNs to be armed with advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Ultimately, from 1984 to 1997 the Navy acquired 18 Ohio-class SSBNs capable of launching 24 Trident missiles each. In 1994, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review concluded that strategic-deterrence requirements could be satisfied by a core force of 14 SSBNs complemented by manned bombers and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Navy plans then called for decommissioning the first four SSBNS—the USS Ohio in 2002 and subsequently the Michigan (SSBN-727), Florida (SSBN-728), and Georgia (SSBN-729)—each with as much as 20 years' hull service life remaining. Looking to an uncertain future of global crises and conflicts, mid-1990s industry studies and informal Navy analysis indicated that the four submarines could be converted to special operations and covert conventional-strike roles at relatively modest cost.As late as 1999, the Navy's budget included no funding to support formal design and engineering studies for converting these ships instead of inactivating them. Interest in the SSGN concept on Capitol Hill increased, and congressional actions resulted in $10 million in Fiscal Year 2000 for concept studies.1 When the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) enthusiastically endorsed the SSGN concept, the Ohio's planned 2002 inactivation shifted to an overhaul and refueling of the submarine's nuclear propulsion plant.2 The Navy immediately initiated concept studies and developed plans for conversion. Navy planners understood that success depended on moving through the acquisition process quickly, coming to closure on the SSGN design, and redirecting the industrial base to take on a large amount of new work.
In what should be viewed as a success for acquisition reform, the SSGN program was reviewed at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level three times in a little more than one year, leading to a production decision. The initial program review in October 2001 resulted in OSD approval of the Navy proposal for a single acquisition milestone. OSD approved the acquisition strategy in January 2002, allowing preliminary design activities and refueling overhaul planning to proceed.
During the next several months, the SSGN program office prepared a formal program cost estimate and met other statutory requirements to support a Defense Acquisition Board review that authorized detail design, long-lead material procurement, and the initial two refueling overhauls and conversions in FY 03. A final board in November 2002 reviewed the completed documentation package and the updated cost estimate, and approved program initiation for all four conversions. This was a clear success for defense acquisition reform and warfighting transformation.
Unmatched Capability
- Strike Warfare—missile tubes, fire control, and launcher systems have been modified to launch TLAMs housed in seven-shot multiple all-up-round canisters in up to 22 missile tubes.
- Special Operations—The conversion installs lockout chambers in the forward two missile tubes and systems needed to operate with the existing dry deck shelters or the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. SOF storage, training, and fitness facilities for lengthy deployments have also been added.
- Connectivity—The SSGNs are receiving upgraded, net-ready IP-based communications capabilities with installation of the Common Submarine Radio Room and the latest multifunction and high data-rate antennas.
Getting It Right
Intense congressional interest in shipbuilding costs goes back to the earliest days of the nation, when the Continental Congress in the fall of 1775 debated whether a proposal to raise a navy would "mortgage the whole Continent."3 Such a focus on getting the cost right has been a constant in the SSGN program since initial concept studies in 2001 and is an important lesson for future shipbuilding and conversion programs.
The Naval Sea Systems Command's (NAVSEA) Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Division (SEA 017) prepared a Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (PLCCE) to support the June 2002 Defense Acquisition Board program review and updated its estimate for the production decision in November 2002. To ensure the greatest cost accuracy and precision, SEA 017 analyzed the SSGN research and development (R&D) acquisition costs into seven categories:
Electric Boat Design Studies and System Development and Definition
Electric Boat Conversion Manufacturing
Conversion Installation
Attack Weapon System
Other Government-Furnished Equipment
Engineered Refueling Overhaul and Associated Costs
System Engineering and Program
Management
The initial June 2002 PLCCE yielded a projected four-ship R&D and procurement cost of $3.8 billion.4 An updated estimate to support the November 2002 production decision revised that estimate to $4.05 billion. Remarkably, the current estimate is $4.1 billion, only 1.2 percent more than the fall 2002 figure.5 Few Department of Defense programs have ever had such success in first estimating and then controlling costs. In return, the nation will garner some 80 SSGN-years of operations for a broad array of critical missions and tasks.
While a responsive acquisition process was needed to implement the aggressive SSGN program schedule and keep costs under control, the Navy also focused on a strategy to maximize use of existing documentation, design workforces, facilities, and conversion labor. The success of the strategy depended on several key pre-conditions. First, inasmuch as design effort on the new Virginia-class attack submarine was already turning down in the late 1990s and early 2000s, submarine design and engineering talent was available at General Dynamics Electric Boat, the original builder of the Ohio SSBNs, to take on the SSGN challenge.
Second, experienced technical oversight personnel from the Seawolf (SSN-21) and Virginia design efforts were in place in the government and could be quickly redirected to oversee the major SSGN design effort. These personnel had pioneered the highly successful major area team/system integration approach on the Virginia, and could apply the same discipline to the SSGN.
Third, advanced computer-based design tools developed for the Virginia, especially Computer Aided Three- dimensional Interactive Application, were available to model those areas of the SSBNs to be modified by the SSGN conversions. Finally, a ship specification for the Ohio SSBNs existed and could be selectively modified to specification change for the SSGNs. With these underlying factors in place, the Navy implemented the strategy that leveraged existing elements of the submarine industrial base to best advantage:
- General Dynamics Electric Boat developed the design for the SSGN and provided overall management of an innovative contractor-public shipyard team to carry out the conversions.
- The SSGNs were overhauled and converted in naval shipyards, two at Puget Sound and two at Norfolk, leveraging the yards' expertise with submarine depot-level maintenance. In addition to performing the overhauls, the naval shipyards provided facilities, services, and direct labor to the conversion effort.
- The complex arrangement between General Dynamics Electric Boat and the two naval shipyards was critically dependent on defining roles, linking the overhaul and conversion schedules, and sharing or combining management information. This teaming arrangement provided the best talent from industrial sources in a partnership that effectively and efficiently allocated capital and human resources.
The agile acquisition process and intelligent use of leveraged assets set the stage for the SSGN program to accomplish the conversions. Two significant factors led to success during program execution: cost control and testing to identify risks. Responding to the relatively short duration of the planned conversion availability, the SSGN program manager requested cost performance information on a monthly basis from the shipbuilder. This allowed for earlier identification of cost risks and more timely funding moves within the trade space available to the program.
The SSGN program office has also conducted frequent scheduled progress and cost reviews with the shipbuilder, as well as ad hoc/emergent reviews when managers detected adverse trends. The SSGN program manager and deputy program manager took a hands-on approach to managing adjustments to the financial execution plan, reviewing proposed adjustments before funding shifts were made.
Finally, the SSGN program office calculated internal ship cost estimates and re-estimates, and validated them using estimates from multiple sources, including the shipbuilder, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, and SEA 017. Even with such significant program office attention and oversight, the Ohio lead-ship conversion did experience cost growth when labor hours exceeded initial predictions. This cost was borne within the program because of offsetting cost-saving performance on design work under the same contract. Later ships achieved sufficient learning-curve increases to hold costs at or below predictions for each, such that overall program growth has been corralled at just 1.2 percent.
Test a Little…Learn a Lot
During the course of the SSGN program, testing and experimentation provided insights into how these ships could be employed and identified several risk areas in time to allow corrections. For example, the Strategic Systems Program (SSP) was the lead for integration of the Tomahawk missile into the SSGN. SSP also led a team conducting ground- and submarine-based demonstration and validation testing to quantify risks associated with launching Tomahawks from an SSBN-sized launch tube. In January 2003, the Florida launched two TLAM Block III missiles from a prototype multiple all-up-round canister, validating that the launch environment would support placing seven missiles in a multiple all-up-round cannister, and identifying debris and connector issues that required redesign of the capsule closure assembly and aft connector on the Tomahawk all-up-round capsule.
Additionally, two of the SSBNs to be converted participated in Sea Trial experiments as surrogate SSGNs prior to entering their conversions. In 2003, the Florida participated as a surrogate in the "Giant Shadow" Sea Trial experiment, deploying SEALs and launching a large-diameter Seahorse unmanned underwater vehicle from one of the missile tubes. In 2004, the Georgia participated in a follow-on Sea Trial experiment, "Silent Hammer," testing a flexible payload module and the stealthy affordable capsule system in a scenario involving networked forces at sea, in the air, and on land. The Navy has planned joint tests and evaluations using a deployed SSGN for 2008.
The close scheduling of the SSGN conversions—four ships delivered in a two-year period—has been efficacious for testing and operational evaluation. The SSGNs must conduct TLAM strike testing as well as SOF testing using the SSGNs' integral lock out chambers or dry deck shelters installed topside. Operational testing has been split between the first three converted ships to allow for correction of deficiencies identified during dockside testing and sea trials and to best take advantage of available test assets. In February 2007, the Ohio completed the first portion of the program's SOF operational evaluation using a dry deck shelter. In April 2007, the Florida successfully completed all-up-round simulator at-sea operational testing. At press time, the Florida was preparing to conduct the test-launch portion of strike operational evaluation, scheduled for May 2007, which will include a salvo of two Block IV TLAMs. Having three SSGNs available to support the test program is a significant factor that should facilitate completion of required demonstrations before the Ohio deploys in late 2007.
Looking Forward
In mid-2007 the SSGN program stands on the threshold of deploying unrivaled military capability just five years after the first boat entered the shipyard to start its overhaul and conversion. All four SSGNs will be delivered by the end of the year. The technical, schedule, and fiscal success of the program depended on quick action by the acquisition system, the existence of a robust submarine design capability, an accurate cost estimate that supported a realistic budget process, highly focused cost controls, and a well-run testing and experimentation program.
The ability of a future submarine new-construction or conversion effort to use in-place design and production labor should not be assumed. The health of the nation's submarine industrial base is an area of congressional concern. Indeed, during a March 2007 hearing on submarine force structure, Representative Gene Taylor, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, said,
the subcommittee is concerned with the nation's ability to retain its valuable industrial capability, especially the professionals who design and engineer submarines. Currently, Virginia-class design work is winding down, and no other major projects are on the way. For the first time in 50 years, the submarine design and engineering base is facing the prospect of not actively working on a submarine project.6
The ready availability of a highly skilled and motivated government and contractor workforce with recent experience in submarine design was a key precondition for the SSGN program's success. Such success will be difficult to duplicate if the design and engineering talent is allowed to atrophy. The ability to control costs and deliver a complex submarine product on schedule is directly linked to the existence of an experienced submarine design community within the government and industry. Thus, a likely hiatus in submarine design work after completion of SSGN conversion is cause for concern. For example, March 2007 testimony by the Navy's leadership discussed plans to support such critical skills and experience through near-term investments in cost-reduction design initiatives for the Virginia-class submarines and accelerated design work on mid-term replacements for the remaining 14 Ohio SSBNs.7
Without a doubt, these initiatives and those that follow should take full advantage of lessons learned from the success of the SSGN program.
Captain Bock, a career submariner has served in numerous submarines, including command of the USS Narwhal (SSN-671). Ashore, he has served in two major Program Manager jobs, one as the Undersea Defensive Warfare Systems Program Manager (PMS-415), and the other, his current assignment, as the SSGN Program Manager (PMS-398), both under the Program Executive Officer for Submarines.
1. House of Representatives Report 106-371, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2561, p. 221. back to article
2. ADM Edmund Giambastiani, "Key Elements of the Nation's Joint Force, The Ohio-class Guided Missile/SpecOps Submarines," Undersea Warfare, Summer 2006, p. 20. back to article
3. Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977), p. 14. back to article
4. NAVSEA Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Division, OHIO Class SSGN Conversion Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, 23 April 2002. back to article
5. NAVSEA Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Division, OHIO Class SSGN Conversion Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate Revision 2, Documenting the MS C Defense Acquisition Board PLCCE of 19 November 2002, 12 February 2003. back to article
6. Statement of Chairman Gene Taylor, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Force Structure Requirements and Alternative Funding Strategies for the U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet, 8 March 2007. back to article
7. Statement of Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs) and RADM William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer for Submarines, Sea Power and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 8 March 2007. back to article
The SSGN program stands on the threshold of deploying unrivaled military capability just five years after the first boat entered the shipyard to start its overhaul and conversion.