This is the second of two columns on reforming the nation's national security apparatus. The first covered the original Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which focused on the Department of Defense. This column centers on the need for a new version of Goldwater-Nichols for reforming the system, organization, and means by which national security policy is formulated, coordinated, and conducted. This is known as the "inter-agency process," long considered broken by many knowledgeable observers. That process is directed by the National Security Council and consists of many committees and organizations that cut across the relevant government departments, including Defense, State. Intelligence. Treasury, Justice, Energy, Transportation. Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security.
Clearly major differences exist between today and 20-some years ago when Goldwater-Nichols was enacted to address allegations of operational and procurement incompetence in the Pentagon. Then, only one department of government - Defense - was under the gun. Today, virtually all departments and Congress are integral parts of this broken interagency process and all these players must be part of rectifying the problem.
Reform back then had been championed by two serving four-star generals - David Jones. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Edward (Shy) Meyer, Army Chief of Staff. Today, no senior government officials are leading a charge for fixing the interagency process as visibly and passionately as did Generals Jones and Meyer.
Reform requires several principal actions. First, the strengths and particularly the failings of the current interagency process must be accurately identified. Personalities and politics can never be isolated or neglected in any analysis. However, the greatest weakness of the process is that the basis for it - the National Security Act of 1947 - remains organized largely for the Cold War, as do the UN, World Bank, and many other international institutions. Reform must start with the 1947 act. But, ultimately, international organizations must also be modernized and brought into the 2 1 st century.
The largest failing is the absence of both accountability and assignment of real responsibility regarding national security. Authority is simply too divided. In Afghanistan, for example, NATO, CENTCOM. and the American ambassador have often overlapping or ill-defined authority. In Homeland Security. Secretary Michael Chertoff has very limited or no authority over other departments as well as states and cities. And in intelligence, despite creating a Director of National Intelligence, authority and accountability are still diffuse. This lack of real accountability must be corrected.
From this tough assessment, real reform must follow. Here are three big ideas. First, Congress must become an equal partner in the interagency process. Thus lawmakers must establish a congressional equivalent of the National Security Council, consisting of senior members who meet regularly with the President and his NSC. This way Congress will be on board for the take-off as well as the landing of new initiatives. Such a council would require reform of Congress, including a paring down of its committee system and the redundant budget, authorization, and appropriations processes. From these changes, perhaps a greater degree of trust and confidence between government agencies will emerge.
Next, the national security adviser should be given the authority to direct Cabinet officers once decisions are made. Possibly elevating the adviser to full Cabinet status should be considered. Alternatively, the vice president could play that role although the backlash, given the influence of the current VP, would probably sink that option.
Finally, in the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs must be given more authority. The Chiefs by law and practice should be declared and used as the senior military decision-making body, in close concert with the combatant commanders. And to bolster the notion of inter-agency cooperation, combatant commanders should be renamed regional commanders.
Our security, already at risk, is made more so by the failings of the interagency process. But who will listen and who will lead the charge for reform?
Mr. Ullman is the author of numerous books and articles on national security.