"Editor's Page"
(See R. Timberg, pg. 6. May 2007 Proceedings)
Colonel Ken Jordan, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired! - Most Proceedings readers are aware of the significant accomplishments of Bob Timberg. both in the literary field and as a warrior. Accordingly, with that background, his comments about the "Cheating Our Vets" cover story in the U.S. News and World Report pertaining to the complex situation associated with active duty and veterans disability deserves as much or more focus than that of the typical military issues commonly published in Proceedings.
As a commissioner on the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission, cited in Bob's comments, I and my fellow commissioners have been submerged in the various regulatory and political issues related to veterans disability for more than IS months. We are directed to brief our findings to the Senate in October of this year. This is a broad, sensitive, complex, costly, personal, and emotional issue. It might be a surprise for the readers to know that this is the first Veterans Disability Benefits Commission to be chartered in more than 50 years. The last such committee, by the exact title, was the Bradley Commission in 1956. and I'm referring to Omar Bradley!
As disappointing as the matter at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was. in my opinion it may have been a blessing in disguise in that it opened the reality of this issue to the American public, and the resulting publicity has served as a catalyst for action in this very important responsibility. Most, if not all. of the findings of the various "mini-commissions" created as a result of the Walter Reed expose are cascading over to the commission, and will be included in our final report.
In my personal view, the biggest challenge is to direct the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to create an automated interface between their two massive systems so that the oft-used phrase "seamless transition" can actually occur as our active duty members transfer to the VA medical system. While there are numerous special working groups addressing this process, the lime line to actually execute a data merger is still years away.
As long as our government sends its warriors into combat, or charges them lo train for combat, then it concurrently absorbs the responsibility of providing medical and disability care for that citi/.en, and in some instances, their family, for as long as necessary and regardless of the cost. That reality has never been more important than now. when the success of the All-Volunteer Force is dependent on positive referrals from our veterans.
"Challenges for the New Maritime Strategy"
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 14-18, April 2007; J. G. Morgan, pg. 8, May 2007 Proceedings)
Commander John T. Kuehn, U.S. Navy (Retired) - I read with increasing interest the important article by Admiral Holland, whose fundamental argument addresses that age old question. "Why do we need a Navy?" His topic could not be more relevant and timely - it's perhaps the best essay on naval strategy to appear in Proceedings since former CNO Admiral Vern Clark penned Sea Power 21.
Admiral Holland is correct in gauging the temper of the times. The "close fight" (to use an Army term) of the war on terrorism has indeed obscured the vital necessity of our country's maintenance of a globally dominant Fleet. Here at the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth I often run into majors who question the utility or need for an "expensive" Fleet. However, we must be ready to answer the question both with sensitivity and intelligence. Most folks understand, when the time is taken to explain it to them, the importance of command of the sea. The examples of North Korea and sea-based missile defense and the sanctity of the oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz or Strait of Malacca come immediately to mind.
But are these examples, and the history - such as the Korean War or Operation Earnest Will in the 1980s - part of the Navy officer corps' tool kit? I agree that we need technically proficient officers, but we also need officers with knowledge of geopolitics and the history of their magnificent Navy. All too often, and I have been in professional military education for seven years. Navy officers are woefully behind their service peers in knowledge of their own history.
The good news is that they are eager learners with respect to the relevant history that will help them answer Admiral Holland's critical question. What seems obvious to them is not so to others, and I have even seen Navy officers here "go native" because of a lack of counterarguments. Recently, Dr. George Friedman of STRATFOR published a superb article, "The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power," that complements Admiral Holland's views.
Admiral Holland and Dr. Friedman should be mandatory reading in every wardroom and ready room in the Fleet, but even more so in those important jobs ashore that give rise to the fundamental question far more frequently.
"Warlord Loop Reading List"
(See J. Collins, pp. 34-39, April 2007; M. McDaniel, M. Condeno, pg. 8, May 2007 Proceedings)
Commander Jeffrey B. Barta, U.S. Navy - The Warlord Loop reading list is notable for two things. First, the recommended reading material provides a great addition to any professional reading list, regardless of the age of the material or the context in which it was written. Second, there's a notable absence of any active-duty naval officers in the Loop. This speaks volumes for not only where the Navy stands in today's conflicts, but for the impression of where we stand among warriors. Where are men like Jimmy Thach and James Stockdale today? Sadly, they seem to be missing in action.
"Over Its Head in Deepwater"
(See 0. Kreisher, pp. 62-67, March 2007 Proceedings)
"View from the Bridge"
(See G. T. Blore, pp. 68-72, March 2007 Proceedings)
Captain Raymond J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired) - The problems that the Coast Guard has had with Deepwater can in part be related to ingrained ways of doing service business over many years.
Various elements within the Coast Guard, over generations, have never internalized the fact that the service should never be without a major shipbuilding program well under way and the follow-on one beginning. Yet time and again, the Coast Guard has been in just that situation, ever captive to the excitement (and tyranny) of the present moment. If the Coast Guard does not believe that shipbuilding programs should be a constant endeavor, neither will the Congress or the American public.
I recall when the Famous-class cutters were introduced into service. At that time the white fleet averaged 23 years of age. In fact, the oldest ship could be decommissioned and a new ship simultaneously commissioned each year for a decade without changing the average fleet age. I thought then that such a situation would never be permitted to occur again.
Also, the alleged lack of service oversight on contracted work can in part be attributed to the pressure on the Coast Guard - from the Congress and Office of Management and Budget, over the last three decades - to regard outsourcing as the way to save time and money. The current generation of officers grew up amid that mindset.
"Saving Limbs and Lives"
(See M. Vengrow, pp. 20-21, February 2007; M. Baker, pp. 6-8, March 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Morehouse, U.S. Army Reserve - Rear Admiral Baker's comments about MEDEVAC helicopters completely miss the mark, though his perceptions of what should be are, I think, mostly accurate.
He says that our helicopters can no longer fly with impunity. Well, they never could! Anyone who honestly thinks there's ever been a truly safe zone in this war is simply not paying attention.
Our medical helicopters, units, and people are definitely not one-dimensional. But if you take away their ability to properly stabilize wounded troops on the way out of combat, you can't get that same capability back anywhere else. We have dedicated slicks and dedicated gunships; we can certainly afford to have dedicated MEDEVAC.
Rear Admiral Baker states, "Any helicopter in the air needs to be tactical, capable of returning hostile fire, in full communication with other assets. functioning as part of the air-ground combat team, mission flexible, and able to move casualties when the need arises and circumstances permit." making it sound as if they can't do any of these things. That would be a totally false impression. All of these capabilities currently exist in our Army MEDEVAC helicopters.
We really don't expect our helicopters to be "protected." because they don't meet the Geneva conventions' definition for that, (Convention I, Art. 36): "Medical aircraft must be clearly marked and fly only at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed on by the belligerents. Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy-controlled territory are forbidden." Our helicopters fly where they're needed, not limited by the conventions.
Also, they are tactical aircraft, i.e. they operate in a tactical environment and manner. They can certainly be armed. Convention I, Art. 22 states, "Medical units may have personnel who carry arms for self-defense."
Tactically, the Red Cross means nothing, because you just can't see it until the aircraft is well within heavy machine gun or shoulder-launched missile range. By then it's too late to matter.
The crux of the matter is, are we going to continue to evacuate our wounded in the fastest, safest manner possible, the manner that gives the best chance for survival? Or are we going to regress to using only ground vehicles that can be easily blocked or forced to take lengthy, deadly, detours?
Helicopters are getting shot down. That happens in war. But ground vehicles, armored or not, are getting blown up at a much more rapid rate. I'd feel safer, as a patient, flying.
Rear Admiral Baker may be correct that hospital ships. Fleet (and other) hospitals, and other medical and support units are the softest targets on the battlefield. That's irrelevant. If we remove needed units before the enemy can attack them, we've only done his job for him. and weakened our own forces. The challenge is to make these targets less soft, more effective, and even better able to serve the needs of our forces.