Book Reviews

Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy

Frederick W. Kagan. New York: Encounter Books, 2006. 432 pp. Notes. Bib. Index. $29.95.

Anyone who participated in the volatile policy-making period of the 1 990s and early 2000s will enjoy this fascinating and enlightening study of American defense policy from post-Vietnam to the second Gulf War.

The author's insights on the intellectual developments of the period offer a stark contrast to much of what posed as glimpses of the future and the promises of transformation. Professor Kagan takes particular delight in debunking concepts of John A. Warden, the strategy of "Shock and Awe," and "transformation" as a buzzword. Critical of the substitution of intellectual fervor for historical knowledge, of business practices for operational development of tactical tools, and of inflated expectations of technological advances, his history reflects many of the pitfalls of the period.

The book is dedicated to Colonel H. R. McMaster, with whom the author shared office space at the U.S. Military Academy. Colonel McMaster views war through the prism of soldiers engaged on the ground, and this vision is a fundamental thread that weaves through Kagan's elegant descriptions of the military operations between the Vietnam War and the current wars in the Middle East.

Kagan is more than fair to the Navy and Marines in his evaluations of their strengths and weaknesses in operations during this period, but withering in his judgments of the Air Force's views and decidedly critical of the political leadership in every administration. Among his targets are the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, which, he contends, lacked any real utility.

Network-centric warfare does not escape tarring with the author's brush. But in this issue he reveals his Army-centric view and a lack of appreciation for operational processes that work in an environment he does not understand. Some years ago, in Command, Control and the Common Defense (Yale University Press, 1 990), Colonel Kenneth Allard. in rationalizing the signals and command systems of the different services, illustrated in detail why each of the major services was organized, trained, and operated in particular ways. Allard dismissed "service parochialism" as a buzzword of the ignorant, recognizing that each service's processes and doctrines depend on the particular environment, composition, and technology appropriate to them - not reverence for an institutional culture or tradition. Discussing network-centric warfare. Kagan misses the opportunities that scheme promises, which are second nature to the Navy but have limited application in light infantry operations.

After the experience with "Blue Force Tracking," a fundamental technical tool that was a major factor in the rapid advance on two disparate fronts in the first phase of the Iraq War. his views on the promises of such command and control systems would probably be substantially modified.

Kagan's book is a well written, easily read history of transformation, not transformation as technical improvements, but with particular emphasis on changes in training and tactical development. The last section on more recent developments is not as well expounded, but his observations, while accurate, benefit from the hindsight of a war never envisioned by the planners of the late 20th century. Therein, however, lies much of the value of the book. Transformation was driven by visions of wars that have not yet come.

The book is great background for any policy shop operatives, civilian or military, and is a unique perspective of the history of the period.

The Edge of Disaster

Stephen Flynn. New York: Random House, 2007. 228 pp. Notes. Index. $25.95.

On 11 September 2001, the United States was attacked by an enemy unlike any in its history. On that fateful day. we in America began a dialogue that continues today. We are attempting to understand this new enemy and the challenges and implications of the dramatically new security environment that was ushered into our lives that day. Stephen Flynn has become a relentless contributor to that dialogue, helping us sort priorities and push the development of our thinking forward.

The Edge of Disaster is his second booklength commentary in this dialogue. His first book. America the Vulnerable (HarperCollins. 2004). offered a descriptive review of the extraordinary vulnerabilities of a nation dedicated for 200 years to open borders, an open and welcoming society, and the evermore global economy that links us to the rest of the world. He suggested that the very ideals on which our republic was founded offered this new enemy pathways to those vulnerabilities, and that it would take an extraordinary change dynamic to regain a comfortable reality.

This book picks up that theme and offers solid thought about a way forward. It suggests three fundamental lessons. First, that we have directed dramatically more of our intellectual energy and resources to the offensive campaign "over there" than we have to the design work necessary to defending this homeland. His value judgment is not that we should not have followed the traditional "best defense is a good offense" theorem, but that the wealth of this great nation mandates a better balance in the offense/defense investment strategy.

Second. Flynn builds several very logical and plausible scenarios, arguing that the preparation necessary to cope with such events deserves much more attention than it is currently receiving, including investments in standardization and capabilities at the local first-responder level.

Third and perhaps most important, he suggests that the notion of recovery and resiliency is the genuinely valuable path to regaining that comfortable reality.

If we think back to what actually happened on 9/1 I, beyond the surprise, beyond the tragic loss of life and property, the work that followed was about restoring confidence for the American traveler in using commercial aviation for all the purposes - business, family vacations, saving time - that underpinned American vitality on 9/10. Flynn helps us understand that the lessons learned from the specific events of 9/1 I must be generalized across all segments of our society and its economy. Resiliency, he suggests. has traditionally been a great American strength. He calls on us to focus on government, the private sector, and personal preparedness so as to promote the certainty of recovery and resiliency. That mandates both infrastructure modernization and process review, and activation of the American spirit in ways not evident since World War II.

When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt called Henry Ford and told him this nation needed fewer black Fords and more capability to put bombs on Berlin, the result in 14 months was an assembly line producing a new B-24 every 63 minutes. The Edge of Disaster exhorts us to fast-forward the total national effort on preparedness, and further challenges us to recognize that whether we suffer next a natural or a man-made disaster - and surely either or both will come - it will be the investment we've made in recovery and resilience that will define how quickly we resume our normal lives.

Uriah Levy: Reformer of the Antebellum Navy

Ira Dye. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006. 246 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $59.95.

Steeped in naval lore and written by an experienced author, this biography is a very good book. Its editors claim that no previous biography of Uriah P. Levy is adequate and that this work will become the new standard. In fact, the book is as much a snapshot of the U.S. Navy from the early 1800s to 1862 as a biography of the man. The author claims to have "painted him with warts and all." and he does exactly that to a point where the reader may wonder, at least in the early chapters, if he had any empathy for his subject. As the biography progresses. Dye seems to warm to his subject until the final chapter, titled "The Exit of the Admirable Man." but in many instances he makes little effort to portray Levy in a favorable lijzht.

Part of the problem lies with Levy himself, as, without a doubt, he had a most intemperate disposition and in his younger years was not a person who got along with his shipmates. Dye points out that a number of Levy's problems were caused by misunderstandings but is generally careful not to excuse Levy or take his side while telling the story.

Levy's long struggle to abolish flogging in the Navy, his concern for the welfare of his enlisted men, and his acquisition and preservation of Thomas Jefferson's home. Monticello. are well told. Dye traces Levy's influences to early Navy captains, among them Alexander Murray, who was also against Hogging, and Charles Stewart, who did not hesitate to take the side of an enlisted man against an officer when it was required in the interest of justice.

While the book details numerous instances of prejudice against Levy because he was a Jew. it is almost silent on what being a Jew in a cadre of Christian naval officers meant so far as the practice of his religion. For example, although the author describes Levy running away to sea as a cabin boy at age ten. he never confirms nor denies - in fact does not mention at all - the often told story that Levy returned home at the age of 1 2 to study for his bar mitzvah. He mentions that Levy. as captain of the USS Vundalia. observed "an ecumenical Sunday each week, without a long boring sermon, but rather with the reading, by Levy himself, of a chapter from the Old Testament of the Bible and one from the New Testament."

That the author did his homework is evident in his compilation of 631 endnotes from 136 sources. However, this extensive research was not adequate to fill in all the facts of the life of Uriah Levy and, time after time, the author speculates on matters his research did not confirm, such as Levy may have studied French while a prisoner of war, may have become a Mason, may have been the boarding officer of several captures by the USS Argus, or may have had a hand in various events.

Dye assumes his readers are well versed in the naval lexicon and never explains what a "cartel ship" is, the meaning of a number in parenthesis after a ship's name, or the use of the letters "AP" in the names of various naval officers, although numerous times he explains that the rank of "master commandant" eventually evolved into the rank of commander.

The book goes far beyond its intended purpose as a biography of Uriah P. Levy and presents a scholarly detail of the U.S. Navy prior to the American Civil War.

Shipboard Bridge Resource Management

Michael R. Adams. Eastport, ME: Nor'easter Press, 2006. 186 pp. Illus. Index. $34.95.

Michael Adams has crafted a small, well-researched, and easy to read guide on "how individuals and groups of individuals work together to create a successful voyage." He outlines the fundamental theory of bridge resource management in ten easy to understand principles - Human Factor. Voyage Planning. Standardized Procedures. Situational Awareness and Voyage Monitoring. Stress, Complacency and Distraction. Communications. Fatigue. Pilot Integration. Teamwork and Error Chains - and illustrates them with well-documented real-world case studies. Using both U.S. Merchant Marine and Navy cases, this book could easily be a textbook for either sea-going organization. His theories, while in no way revolutionary, offer the mariner a no-nonsense approach to safety at sea buttressed by multiple examples of how and why ships fail.

The causes of maritime and environmental catastrophes, despite a ship's age or technological advantages, are defined in ten chapters of real, varied, and detailed examples of mishaps at sea. Woven into each chapter is a focus on the traditional operating skills inherent in each mariner and how they are integrated with three main navigation resources - equipment, information, and humans - to ensure a successful voyage. Throughout the book the author provides useful tools to assist the mariner in developing the necessary elements vital to a travel plan, such as voyage planning and predeparture checklists, watchstanding schedules, and elements of a Pilot Information Card.

Adams methodically links the case studies to emphasize the various principles of the bridge resource management theory. Clear graphics provide the reader with accurate timelines, track histories, and sequence of events that led to disaster. Whether it is the Exxon Valdez or the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). the author provides a graphic analysis of what can go wrong in some of the most technologically advanced ships in the world, and how the study of bridge resource management can aid in reducing these mishaps throughout the world's oceans.

At chapter ends, the author provides a critical analysis and summary of the theory and principles along with thought-provoking technical questions that allow for further discussion for bridge watch teams. Included in the book is an instructor's packet CD-ROM. which provides the navigators or instructors with a technical question and answer guide and chart graphics of every case study highlighted to further bridge watch team training.

Never overtly critical of any individual, Adams simply states the facts of each case while, at times, managing to inject some wit into what, to the outsider, could be considered a very dry subject. This book can be easily read by the amateur mariner but also holds much value for the professional. It deserves to be read by anyone serious about going to sea safely and protecting our ocean environment.