How the Twin Is Bent: Developing Young Bubble Heads for the Challenges of Command (See M. J. Dobbs, pp. 28-33, June 2007 Proceedings)
In the Primordial Deep, Embedded on a Submarine (See R. D. Kaplan, pp. 48-53, June 2007 Proceedings)
Commander John K. Hafner, U.S. Navv Reserve-The current dilemma the U.S. Navy faces concerning line officers lacking the necessary experience to successfully (and safely) move up to command at sea is not new, nor is it endemic to one community, as has been illustrated by recent articles in Proceedings lamenting the deterioration of basic seamanship and shiphandling skills in the Navy's officer corps.
Commander Dobbs briefly points out in his article that foreign navies have separate career paths for engineering officers and navigators/weaponeers; however, he fails to follow this up with any discussion or explanation as to why or how it works. In my opinion, this is the root of the problem. By trying to produce a well rounded jack-ofall-trades, we end up with an officer who is, quite literally, the master of none.
What these current training/qualification pipelines ultimately produce is an officer heavily grounded in procedures, checklists, and theory, but otherwise inexperienced and ill-suited for the unforgiving and fluid decision-making environment he/she may someday be thrust into-command at sea.
Why does the U.S. Navy stick to this all-in-one officer paradigm while the rest of the seafaring world doesn't? The real answer, I suspect, was lost generations ago. One thing is certain, though, our current system of training, bridge watch standing, and screening for command does not seem to be producing the experienced and savvy seafaring officers that we expect on board our ships and submarines.
Only radical culture change in the community that produces these officers can reverse this-not ever more training.
GHV Yeakley-As a former boomer Sailor, I'm particularly enjoying this issue. Commander Dobbs' solution included improving the number and quality of simulators. Captain Mark Bock's article ("On Time, On Budget, On Mission") discussed the abundance of SSBNs and how they are being converted to SSGNs instead of decommissioned. Putting the two together, it seems one obvious answer is to convert a sub to a training platform. What better simulator is there than the real thing? I'll leave it to the experts to figure out how it would work, but it seems to me that a three-month, intensive tour on a training submarine, freed of all the administrative burdens a junior officer faces in a "real" tour, would go a long way to meet the needs Commander Dobbs elucidated.
Additionally, I have a few nits to pick with Robert Kaplan's excerpt. First off, if he was leaning forward in a dive, he had to have been standing facing aft. second, unless procedures have changed since my days as a helmsman, at fast speeds we used the fairwater planes to control depth, leaving the stern planes alone. Also, it's rather hard to steer using the stern planes; we tended to use the rudder.
Carrier Aviation on thé Move: But Going Where? (see N. Polmar, pp. 86-87, June 2007 Proceedings)
\Jice Admiral Robert F. Dünn, U.S. Navy (Retired), President of the Association of Naval Aviation-My friend Norman Polmar does a great job when he writes about historic aircraft. When he writes about today's and tomorrow's aircraft carriers, however, he is wide of the mark. In particular, his recent column is sadly replete with misinformation and uninformed opinion. Fortunately, the Congress, National Command Authority, combatant commanders, and much of the public know better.
Mr. Polmar starts out by stating, "The debate over the future of the aircraft carrier continues hot and heavy in the pages of Proceedings, the halls of the Pentagon, and the corridors of the U.S. Capitol." Then he proceeds to reference his statement in a footnote citing only Admiral Stansfield Turner's July 2006 article in Proceedings, an article itself resurrected from the 1980s. There are no citations to back up the "halls of the Pentagon and the corridors of the U.S. Capitol" charge. To the contrary, seldom has there been more backing for large-deck aircraft carriers than what one finds in Congress and the Pentagon today.
Mr. Polmar then levies the charge that there has been little or no change in carrier design from the abortive United States (CVA-58) until now. Where should one begin? What about two-reactor nuclear power with attendant longer range, increased sustainability, and more weapons loadout? Better survivability? Improved command and control? Better launching and recovery systems? Better crew habitability?
The column laments that so many historical carrier innovations originated with the Royal Navy. Does he imply that we should not take advantage when advantage is warranted? On the other hand, the British have taken advantage of several technologies originated in the United States. Should we not exchange ideas with our allies?
His charge that with the F/A-18 Hornet the strike capability of carriers is limited to a couple of hundred miles approaches the ludicrous. Has he forgotten that the initial strikes into Afghanistan were conducted by Hornets launched from a carrier steaming in the Indian Ocean? Does he forget that in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, strikes were launched in support of friendly forces in northern Iraq from a carrier steaming in the Mediterranean?
His statement that the Harrier has been "highly successful" is equally ludicrous. If he means Harriers launched from L-class ships for close-in support, the best that can be said is that the Harrier has been useful. Neither the Harrier ordnance load nor its on-station time can compare with the F/A-18. Then too, one must keep in mind that with, say, eight Harriers on an L-class ship, the most aircraft on station in support of troops is probably three: two in maintenance, three rearming, and three on station. Finally, the Harrier has the highest mishap rate of any U.S naval aircraft, and has for years. "Highly successful"? Indeed!
The scariest part of Mr. Polmar's piece is that he states he'll be writing more of the same in future columns. One hopes that those columns will be longer on fact and shorter on personal bias than the one in the June issue of Proceedings.
Commander David McCampbell
(See T. Cutler, p. 94, June 2007 Proceedings)
From Our Archive
(See p. 96, June 2007 Proceedings)
Hill Cioodspeed, Historian and ArtiM- A. fact Collections Manager. National Museum of Naval Aviation-I received the latest issue of Proceedings and want to commend you for the new look of the magazine. A review of the contents revealed two elements connected to the National Museum of Naval Aviation, one of them a surprise. The first is the photograph of the F6F Hellcat that illustrates lieutenant Commander Tom Cutler's always interesting "Lest We Forget" column. The caption is incorrect in stating that the F6F on display in the museum was flown by Commander David McCampbell during World War II. I wish we were so lucky! Actually, this Hellcat is only painted to represent one of McCampbell's wartime birds, though the famed fighter ace actually posed for photographs in it during a visit to the museum in the early 1970s.
The surprise came in the form of the "From Our Archive" photograph on page 96. In reading the caption, I noted the name of Technical Sergeant John Boitnott. It turns out that he is the father of Mike Boitnott, one of the longest-serving employees at the museum, currently in charge of all aircraft restoration. Service in the Corps is a Boitnolt family tradition, with John, Mike, and Mike's son, Jason, all Marine veterans. Keep up the good work.
Seven Minutes to Midnight
(See D. Adams, pp. 52-56, May 2007 Proceedings)
Ctlonel Mark A. Olinger, U.S. Army-It has been almost six years since the attacks on 9/11. Those attacks demonstrated that a new generation of enemy exists, a sinister one that uses asymmetric warfare to bring death, destruction, and terror to Americans at home and abroad. Since 12 September America has been on guard, showing restraint and resolve, while employing its military and other instruments of power across the globe.
The national security strategy of the United States continues to change in response to the demands of the war on terrorism. Urgent need exists for a multifaceted strategy that encourages other nations to identify hostile non-state actors and help eradicate them. Grafting a systematic and comprehensive strategy aimed at exerting pressure on our enemies will not occur overnight. The strategy requires diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts to swiftly engage our enemies.
Commander Adams' proposal for a new strategy that favors preemption based on Clausewitz and Mahan will appeal to leaders within the military services, Congress, and the executive branch. A strategy based on preemption allows the nation to take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and, in most cases, confront threats before they attack us. Finally, it will perpetuate the long-standing national preference for fighting wars abroad rather than in the homeland.
U.S. Coast Guard in Review
(See B. B. Stubbs, pp. 94-100, May 2007 Proceedings)
Captain Arthur H. Wagner, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)-Stopping and turning around an organization such as the Coast Guard is certainly in keeping with the maneuverability of a supertanker or a ponderous container vessel. It is with a mixture of amusement, sadness, and vindication that I read the description of a new Commandant Intent Action Order (CIAO) for a new Headquarters C^sup 2^ organization. This initiative would organize around mission execution and mission support functions.
In the late 1970s, I wrote a series of articles for the U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association Bulletin addressing promotions, transfers, organization, and challenges facing the Coast Guard. In the January/February 1977 Bulletin, my article entitled "Zero-Basing the Organization" was published, proposing essentially what is to evolve in the near future.
Better late than never.
We Have a Serious COIN Shortage
(See C. J. Dunlap Jr., p. 162, May 2007 Proceedings)
Colonel Todd Fredricks, U.S. Army-I vanted to take the time to respectfully point out to Major General Dunlap a few things he may have missed while advocating the "creative application of America's technological genius" in contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. I should initially point out that "airpower" (and presumptively for General Dunlap, "jointness") is substantially addressed in Annex E.
First, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 clearly states on page 2 that it was written to address a serious deficiency in doctrine, and that the document serves merely to identify common themes and considerations present in all insurgencies. It clearly states that every insurgency is different and requires "contextual" adaptations. 1-68 is very clear that troop-to-task ratios are "very dependent upon the situation." 4-14 emphasizes that COIN requires "continuous assessment" and "adjustments" to be successful. There is nothing in the document that says the FM itself is a specific game plan for a "win" in Iraq.
second, citing Kosovo as an example of "high tech/low cost" success ventures into the absurd. UN 1244 has been essentially forgotten and the continued suggestion of independence for the province raises substantial issues concerning UN Charter mandates and international law. This does not even touch on the serious criminal and terrorist activities that have erupted since the "children of Trenchard and Douhet" bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Oh, and by the way, eight years after the fact, the peacekeepers are still there with no resolution. So much for quick and high tech.
Next, lest we forget, General Petraeus and his council were handed a successful kinetic war that morphed rapidly into a hard, nasty, multi-player-insurgency slog conducted by the Army, with doctrine that they were given; not the Army, or doctrine, that they wished to have. The entire process is and will always be dynamic. As FM 3-24 suggests, it is the well-trained and supported "Strategic Corporals" on the ground that make it work or fail. People sitting in air conditioned command cells in distant countries, betting the farm on UAV optics or Blue Force Tracker symbology, will never get it right. You have to "walk the field" to fight the war.
Finally, having been part of some minor successes of COIN doctrine in Iraq and then having had the "horse shot out from under me" in Kosovo by leadership that frankly had no concept of how to implement successful COIN operations, I am grateful that we finally have leadership that is giving us formal doctrine. After all the GBUs have been dropped and the UAVs have landed, war remains a very human business. It cannot be done long-distance or over croissants and lattes in teak-lined rooms. It is done in the dirt, over chai, conversation, and mutual understanding. It measures its costs in blood and lives. That is why we strive so hard to avoid it.
With all due respect, if Major General Dunlap feels so intensely about the "joint warfighting team," perhaps he should stop addressing his concerns toward General Petraeus and lieutenant General Amos' doctrine and focus those concerns toward his own service by asking just what they can practically, realistically, and successfully bring to the fight. History's truths suggest that in the realm of human conflicts, anything other than boots on the ground is not going to win wars.