Combat is replete with hazards. Assessing hazards is the primary challenge of combat operations. It is imperative to develop a process that identifies and assesses all variables before taking a course of action.
Modern warfare requires specialized units that depend on each other for support. When a supported unit requests action from a supporting unit, it is vital that the supported unit understand the level of risk incurred by the supporting unit to carry out the request. Furthermore, for the overall commander in charge of the two units to assess the risk of an operation, it is vital that he understand the specific risks incurred by each participant.
Military helicopters are formidable weapon systems that greatly enhance ground force operations. Understandably, ground forces desire helicopter support to the maximum extent possible. The natural inclination in this relationship leads to a prolific demand for helicopter support with little consideration for the risks helicopters incur to fulfill mission objectives. What needs to be refined and communicated from the helicopter unit to the ground unit is an accurate assessment of unit-specific risks. Improved understanding will reinforce the air-to-ground relationship and make it a more effective combat team.
Helicopter crews have become adept at supporting ground missions in the midst of a substantial surface-to-air threat. Mission requirements routinely dictate that helicopters enter and linger inside threat envelopes for extended periods. To do this, helicopter crews have developed extensive tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter shoulder launched infrared seeking missiles (manpads), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threats.
The process used throughout the military to mitigate risk is called Operational Risk Management (ORM), a five-step process:
1. Identify hazards
2. Assess hazards
3. Make risk decisions
4. Implement controls
5. Supervise
The second step is the most critical. This is the step that assesses unit-specific hazards that must be conveyed to other units and higher authorities. Since risk is defined as the chance of hazard, this step examines the hazard in terms of probability and severity.
Probability is the likelihood of occurrence. In this case, probability is the likelihood the enemy will engage a helicopter with a surface-to-air weapon. The probability spectrum can be further broken down as:
* Frequent-continuously experienced or occurs very often. Expected to occur several times over the duration of a specific mission.
* Likely-occurs several times. Expected to occur during a specific mission.
* Occasional-occurs sporadically. May occur about as often as not during a specific mission.
* Unlikely-Very infrequent occurrences.
Severity on the other hand is described as an assessment of the worst credible consequence that can be caused by a hazard. Degrees of severity can be separated into four categories:
* Catastrophic-loss of life or the complete loss of an essential asset.
* Severe-debilitating injury or irreparable damage to essential equipment.
* Significant-a recoverable injury or repairable damage that degrades operations.
* Minor-a recoverable injury or repairable damage that does not degrade operations.
When assessing the surface-to-air weapon risk to helicopters it is important to acknowledge that the innate instability of a helicopter makes it susceptible to uncontrolled flight if hit by hostile fire. Thus the severity of a successful engagement by shoulder-launched weapons, RPGs, or AAA in all likelihood will result in severe, if not catastrophic damage.
The factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time provide an excellent systematic approach for evaluating risk for specific circumstances. There are seven general conditions that can cause excessive risks to helicopters:
1. Urban flight. This is flight over dense population areas and increases the probability of encountering a surface-to-air weapon. Communication networks within the neighborhoods provide early warning to the enemy and urban lighting improves detection of low altitude helicopters. Structures offer the enemy concealment and are copious sources of false missile warnings.
2. Extended flight in the same general area. This allows an enemy to reposition and set up for an optimum engagement. He can also conduct systematic search and acquisition while coordinating multiple weapons.
3. Flight with a recurring pattern. A predictable profile allows the enemy to select a firing axis and reduces time (battery life) for seeker acquisition.
4. Recurring flight over specific geographical points. This relinquishes the initiative to enemy, thus giving them choice of engagement aspect angle. It also provides them with ample warning time to arrange an attack.
5. Low flight. This makes sound and visual detection of the helicopter much easier and increases exposure to RPGs and AAA fire. It reduces the pilot's reaction time and evasive maneuver space. Aircrew observation is obscured by structures or other obstacles and diverts attention from detection of the enemy to avoiding hazards. The high angle required for bank turns limits gun fields of fire.
6. Slow flight. This increases exposure time and provides easy acquisition and engagement solutions. It also limits maneuverability and evasive options.
7. Highlight conditions (daylight or moonlight). This gives the enemy easier acquisition and targeting solutions.
Shoulder-launched missiles, rocket propelled grenades, and antiaircraft artillery are prolific and lethal threats to helicopters. The ultimate goal for planners and ground force operators to consider when integrating helicopters into missions should be to minimize their exposure time to enemy weapons. Air objectives should be enumerated as primary, secondary, and tertiary with minimum and desired thresholds quantified for each objective. Once the specific air objective is laid out, participants must guard against mission creep. For example, if the primary objective is to provide close air support during an assault, and it takes 20 minutes to accomplish 90% of this objective, then it may be an unnecessary risk for helicopters to remain on station an additional hour after the target has been secured to thwart an undefined threat.
Ground tactics should not compel aviators to absorb risks that exceed the risk threshold of the overall mission. Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than feeling or habit. Planners must understand the severity and probability of the hazards incurred by helicopters when developing concepts of operation. Furthermore, helicopter crews and ground operators must continually reassess the surface-to-air risks as each phase of the mission unfolds. Whenever the risk to helicopters exceeds the acceptable risk of the overall mission, alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures must be considered or helicopter involvement should be deferred until the threat is mitigated.
Commander Tyler is the former commanding officer of Helicopter Combat Support Special Squadron 4 in Norfolk, Virginia. He is presently assigned to the NR CNO Operations and Plans Unit at the Pentagon.