For Compassion and Country: Unified Assistance

The day after Christmas began as a good day for the men and women of the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Carrier Strike Group. While we were not home with our loved ones, we were on liberty in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, the sights and sounds of that day soon included news reports of a large tsunami in the surrounding region. Stunned sailors and viewers across the world watched as the death toll from the disaster mounted slowly at first, and then with an almost unbelievable speed.

As amateur video footage rolled, we learned that a tremendous earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, had triggered the massive tsunamis. The devastation left in the wake of the disaster was horrific: more than 300,000 dead or missing in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and other nations. In short order, the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group was making best speed toward the heart of the tragedy.

Providence and Preparedness

The 6,000 sailors of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group left San Diego on 9 October 2004, eight months ahead of schedule, as part of the new Fleet Response Plan, to deploy to support operations in the western Pacific. As an element of this flexible "surge" deployment, the embarked air wing received operational control of an additional helicopter squadron as part of the "Bravo to Sea" (B2C) proof-of-concept for the upcoming Navy-wide rotary wing operational reorganization. As a result, our carrier strike group had four more helicopters than typically would be the case. Matched with the latest command-and-control technologies, a medical capability (including a surgical support detachment), and an incredible "can do" attitude, the carrier strike group was suited well to make a positive difference for the people of Indonesia. On 1 January 2005, Navy helicopters began landing in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, to deliver critical supplies to those in dire need.

The unique geography of the Aceh Province of Sumatra, combined with the rare disaster it had experienced, demanded a unique lift capability to distribute muchneeded aid. Along the northwestern shoreline of the country sits a formidable mountain range. A single north-south road services the entire coastline from the northern tip to the small city of Meulaboh. There, another single road follows an arduous path eastward across the mountainous center of the island to the larger city of Medan. The ferocity of the earthquake and subsequent wall of water eliminated the coastal road, effectively cutting off 110 miles of coast from land-borne resupply. Initially, helicopters were the only way to efficiently move supplies from the logistics nodes established at Banda Aceh and Meulaboh to the more than 60 villages and camps of displaced persons along the coast. Sealift was used later quite effectively to resupply camps along the water that were coincident with suitable landing areas. Thus, the bulk of the effort fell on the carrier strike group's 17 Seahawk helicopters. While only a few of these aircraft were specifically designed for logistics, they served capably in their life-saving role.

With the need for helicopters clearly identified, further establishment of successful operations in Indonesia required two additional components important in any military endeavor: a command-and-control architecture and the establishment of a functioning logistics head. While the Abraham Lincoln's command-and-control capabilities were significant, they needed to be tuned to the mission of humanitarian relief. Watch and planning organizations quickly transformed from supporting strike operations to supporting relief operations. Intelligence shifted from targeting for strikes to targeting for supplies. The carrier intelligence center tracked delivery of relief supplies, determining damage to lines of communication, and developed suggested priorities for future relief operations.

The Operation

The Banda Aceh airport, with its single runway and three small ramp areas, became the primary organizational and logistical hub for the Indonesian relief effort. Airfield traffic increased from 4 to 6 fixed-wing arrivals and departures a day to more than 80 a day in less than one week. C-13Os, C-17s, Il-76s, and every other manner of heavy-, medium-, and light-lift aircraft landed to deliver supplies. Helicopter loading areas were established at multiple locations on the southwest corner of the field.

Each morning, the Indonesians distributed an air-tasking order, listing destinations, types and numbers of helicopters, and supplies or passengers to be moved. Lines of sailors transferred supplies from trucks into waiting helicopters as the pilots determined the maximum cargo they could carry to their assigned destinations. This flexible arrangement allowed each helicopter to fly as many as nine or ten humanitarian assistance missions each day with minimal turnaround times. Prominent in the supplies moved by our sailors were boxes labeled "Food from the American People"-the distinct marking of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Initial food deliveries were fortified biscuits, individual water servings, and packages of noodles. As sophistication and organization in the effort grew, deliveries included medical supplies, clothes, tents, bags of rice, and cooking oil.

Landing sites in the villages and camps along the coast varied dramatically. Soccer fields, sections of intact roadway, tree-lined fields, din roads, and home foundations all were used. Wreckage, dense jungle, and rice paddies made hover deliveries necessary in some villages. Debris in nearly every landing zone made for extremely dangerous conditions. Equally hazardous was the desperate rush of survivors who often charged landing aircraft to ensure they came away with food. Later in the operation, Indonesian military personnel helped control the crowds and protect both people and aircraft. Although the situation was desperate, the spirit of the Indonesians receiving supplies was not broken. Smiles, thumbs-up, or salutes were passed as "thank yous" while the aircraft departed the landing zones.

On the first few days of operations, the Indonesian government passed precise latitudes and longitudes for proposed delivery locations. Aircrews sometimes would report back that the coordinates they had were in error: "That location is underwater." The violence of the disaster had reshaped the geography of the entire coastline.

A Combined Effort

The Navy's helicopters were just one part of the overall aid effort. Sailors eagerly volunteered to work on cargo-handling teams lugging bags of rice in the sweltering heat and humidity. In all, more than 1,000 of the strike group's personnel had the opportunity to fly ashore to help. Local Indonesians working by our sides regularly thanked us for the help we were providing. Our medical teams manned a hospital tent at the airfield and accompanied aircraft on hundreds of relief missions. Leadership teams, led by Carrier Air Wing Two squadron commanding and executive officers, coordinated the landing, loading, and mission assignments of the helicopters in conjunction with various aid organizations. This coordination, although hampered by poor ship-to-shore communications and a lack of specific training, was fundamental to the operation's success.

As the effort continued, the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Essex (LHD-2) dispatched CH-46s, CH-53s, and air-cushion landing craft to the lineup of equipment dedicated to the effort. The USS Benfold (DDG-65) and USNS John D. McDonnell (T-AGS-51 ) conducted hydrographie surveys of the coast to facilitate access by amphibious landing craft. A joint coordination cell, consisting of Marine and Air Force logistics and air operations personnel, Army civil affairs teams, and liaison officers from the ships on station, worked daily with its Indonesian military counterparts. At a meeting each evening, international officers briefed the Indonesian military leadership on the progress of the day's operations. Based on this update and the number of helicopters available for the next day, the Indonesians would prioritize their missions and publish the air-tasking order.

Although our forces were the first to arrive on scene in significant numbers, other countries soon followed. Australia and Singapore mobilized quickly, providing ships, aircraft, and interpreters, and became key partners in establishing procedures for operations. Australian logistics teams worked closely with U.S. and Indonesian personnel to move supplies quickly. Malaysia, Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and France provided helicopters, and South Korea deployed ships. As numbers of helicopters increased, the course rules established by the strike group became the standard and were adopted eventually by the United Nations to help organize the skies over Sumatra for the duration of relief operations. The Spanish, Germans, Russians, Pakistanis, and French established hospitals ranging in size from a 30-person tent care station to a full facility supported by the German hospital ship FGS Berlin. At the invitation of the Indonesian government, U.S. and Australian controllers lent their assistance in the airfield's tower and on the ramp. By the end of the January, Australian air traffic controllers were directing more than 350 helicopter movements at Banda Aceh each day, allowing the Indonesian controllers to focus on the heavy fixed-wing traffic.

From the beginning of relief operations, it was clear we could stabilize the situation only in the short term. Aid organizations were necessary both to accomplish immediate relief and to ensure sustainability during the long-term reconstruction. USAID played a major role by providing the bulk of the relief supplies. By 7 February 2005, USAID had provided more than $41.1 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, logistics and coordination, and rehabilitation activities for affected communities in Indonesia.

A comprehensive U.N.-led assessment streamlined the requirement to transport many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) survey teams by helicopters. The Inter-Agency Rapid Health Assessment Team operated from the Abraham Lincoln, which provided it computer, communications, imagery, and operations support. The team established an overview of specific requirements in the Aceh Province to focus equipment, supplies, and capabilities where they were most needed. The team consisted of specialists from a mix of organizations with expertise in epidemiology, logistics, medicine, public health, and nutrition. From 14 to 19 January 2005, the U.N. health assessment teams visited 19 locations. The resulting reports were made available to all NGOs in the Banda Aceh area and served as the baseline of information for all further relief operations.

Transition

By the beginning of the last week of January, several developments indicated we were succeeding in our efforts to provide enough food to the Indonesians. In some locations people would turn away food, saying they had enough. The Indonesian military no longer needed all the available helicopters, and only a few destinations remained solely accessible by air. Improvements in infrastructure and the arrival of sealift capabilities reduced helicopter-lift requirements along the coast. This reduced lift requirement now could be met by helicopters other than ours: Mi-Ss from Latvia, Pumas from Indonesia, France, Switzerland, and South Africa, and S-61s from Malaysia. As a result, the U.S. military and U.N. leadership cooperatively established an acceptable timeline for U.N. assumption of the various roles the U.S. military had played. U.S. and Indonesian cooperation had brought a structure to relief operations. A team of the carrier strike group officers then worked with Indonesian military representatives to effect an orderly transfer of responsibilities to the developing U.N. and Indonesian structure.

The importance of getting information to the rest of the world about the scale of the tragedy cannot be overstated. Media coverage sparked a world reaction that generated significant financial contributions to relief efforts. The Navy played an important part in helping in this area also. Media embedded with helicopter crews going on missions from Banda Aceh had access to every level of the effort, from the command-and-control organization on board the Abraham Lincoln to the petty officer handing boxes out the cabin of his helicopter to the thankful crowd. Some media representatives even assisted with offloads and translations. This "all access" pass given to journalists had a positive consequence-it exposed the world to the purity of our intentions. The media, allowed to do their own research and draw their own conclusions, showed the world the U.S. Navy was in Indonesia to do nothing more than help fellow human beings. As stated by Marine lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, the Combined Support Force commander, "We did this not for personal gain but because it was the right thing to do."

Leadership

The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group's leadership empowered the chain of command to capitalize on the resourcefulness of Navy sailors and make timely decisions at the lowest possible level. This guidance was communicated effectively and understood by all through two simple words, "Do good." Everyone, from leadership teams at Banda Aceh to aircraft commanders in the field, took action as required with the full support of their superiors. The leadership, with firsthand knowledge of the situation on the ground, made only minor "course corrections" to the operation.

Numerous anecdotes characterize the ingenuity of our sailors. Two are shared here. On 4 January 2005, an Air Asia Boeing 737 hit a water buffalo and fouled the Banda Aceh runway. As the Indonesians made efforts to remove the aircraft, the Abraham Lincoln's, aircraft-handling officer and crash and salvage officer flew in to help. Using a motley collection of equipment-including an aircraft tractor, two forklifts, and a specialized dolly-they removed the airplane from the runway, reopening the sole lifeline of relief supplies into the region. This ingenuity and determination were repeated when the Abraham Lincoln's engineers built a water manifold to fill 20 bottles simultaneously. The manifold provided more than 5,000 gallons of water per hour. The sailors delivered many different kinds of aid, from manual labor to technical assistance-the Indonesians only needed to ask.

The Road Ahead

Seabasing humanitarian assistance whenever practicable is clearly a sound model. A "less intrusive" means of providing support, such missions are more likely to be welcomed by nations concerned with the presence of U.S. military personnel "occupying" bases ashore. Sea-based relief efforts capitalize on the efficiencies gained from the existing support infrastructure of ships (communications, food, shelter, medical facilities, and fuel). Finally, force protection efforts for personnel do not have to be borne ashore 24 hours a day. The return of all personnel each night to the strike group's ships from Banda Aceh prevented the relief effort from becoming a potential target for terrorists.

This operation documented the requirement for enhanced communications, and humanitarian assistance training, and the necessity for a timely response. Sufficient equipment capable of simple and reliable communications (even as basic as commercially available satellite telephones and short-range field radios) needs to be deployed with carrier strike groups. Time is of the essence in humanitarian operations and must be considered as the most important element of any response. Basic training in humanitarian operations can simplify planning and improve response time.

Unified Assistance's primary goal was relief of human suffering. This clarity of purpose and purity of intent were inspirational for all who took part. Focusing on improving the conditions of our fellow humans will naturally bear the fruit of increased political cooperation and military interaction.

Indonesia's announcement on 4 February 2005 that the first phase of the emergency relief operation in Aceh Province was complete coincided with the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group's departure. Our efforts resulted in the delivery of more than 5 million pounds of supplies in 2,800 separate missions, the transportation of more than 3,000 relief workers, media, and displaced persons, and the provision of medical assistance to more than 2,200 patients. Distribution points for aid had been established, supplies were moving up and down the coast by boat and by truck, and heavy machinery was clearing debris. Clearly, the Indonesian recovery was past the crisis stage and moving toward reconstruction.

The men and women who took part in Unified Assistance left humbled and grateful, with the profound sense of satisfaction that comes from an important job done well . . . saving lives. Rear Admiral Doug Crowder, Commander Strike Group Nine, captured the spirit of the moment: "We will leave here taking more than we gave. The tremendous spirit of the people of Indonesia, even in their darkest days, will stay with us forever."