Strategic forces, such as this B-1B bomber, are protected from electromagnetic pulse. As for tactical forces .. . good luck.
EMP [electromagnetic pulse] is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences ... It has the capability to produce significant damage ... to the ability of the United States ... to project influence and military power."
This assessment comes courtesy of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack-especially timely in light of the threat posed by global terrorists.
High-altitude EMP, first observed in 1962, is a byproduct of a nuclear weapon detonation at altitudes between roughly 30 to 400 kilometers above the Earth's surface. The resulting high-energy particle interactions within the Earth's upper atmosphere and magnetic fields produce a short-duration wave of electromagnetic radio-frequency energy with extraordinarily high peak power. All electronic circuitry and conductive paths within line-of-sight of the nuclear explosion are potentially susceptible to its destructive effects; people are not affected. U.S. strategic systems have been hardened against the phenomenon, but generalpurpose forces remain largely vulnerable. The electromagnetic fields produced by even low-yield weapons are almost certain to damage irreversibly the unshielded systems on which these forces depend. The total civilian electrical/electronic infrastructure of the United States, of course, is also vulnerable (see following book excerpt).
The United States is a persistent obstacle to the ambitions of nuclear-armed states with territorial ambitions. Notable hot spots where our conventional and nuclear deterrence remain effective include ongoing confrontations such as: radical Islamic states against Israel, China's position on the Province of Taiwan, and North Korea's designs on South Korea. In each case, delayed U.S. intervention might enable adversaries to execute their individual designs and present the world with a fait accompli with minimal escalation.
At the same time, al Qaeda and other absolutist nonstate entities also are endeavoring to neutralize U.S. influence throughout the world. Unlike their pragmatic state sympathizers, these extremists enjoy an unconstrained choice of means, to include nuclear weapons. Given their tendency to form opportunistic alliances with states having coincidental shared interests-that will deny any complicity-we cannot rule out an electromagnetic pulse surprise attack against expeditionary general purpose forces or the continental United States itself. The conditions could be particularly favorable for covert state and terrorist cooperation in coordinating nuclear weapons employment in the near term . . . with a pulse attack the most efficient and deniable application of nuclear weapons.
The commission, most concerned with civilian infrastructure, did address the vulnerability of general-purpose forces. Program managers developing equipment for these forces have often downplayed shielding requirements when forced to make budget-driven tradeoffs, with arguments ranging from dismissive nuclear threat projections to assurances that equipment spares will be available. Yet, it can be argued that the likelihood of pulse attacks has actually increased because of nuclear proliferation and covert technological cooperation. Worse, our vulnerability is increasing because of our growing dependence on unshielded electronics, especially the commercial systems that are the cornerstone of modern high-technology equipment.
Today's network-centric linked conventional forces have achieved unprecedented levels of individual and smal-unit capability. The ability of the Marine Corps to execute distributed operations is a relevant example^. In this transformation, it is technology advances that have enabled "super-empowerment," thereby blurring the distinction between tactical and strategic forces. The time to respond to crises around the globe from the United States has been reduced from weeks to hours. In 2002, General James L. Jones, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, related the impact of this technology-enabled shift on the Marine Corps when he stated: "The amphibious aspect of our history is in the past. The expeditionary aspect is in the present and the future . . . in what I call the expeditionary century."
Recent Marine operations reflect these comments. Past calculations relating to threshold distances and timeframes for equipment replacement, whether lost to conventional operations or EMP, are becoming obsolete. Unshielded electronically-based equipment spares exposed to EMP while sitting on the shelf are hardly less vulnerable than a system powered up and operating. Shielding today may need to encompass all equipment, tactical and strategic.
As early as 1988, Marine Major Michael CaJohn warned us of this increasing vulnerability. In a Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis "Electromagnetic Pulse-From Chaos To A Manageable Solution," he observed that: "The effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warrant increased efforts to neutralize their potential to create chaos with communications systems." Ongoing Cold War relationships determined his scenarios, but his physics reasoning remains current: "As the field of electronics has evolved from the vacuum tube era to today's integrated microcircuits which can handle only minute quantities of voltage [and] current, [communications systems] susceptibility to EMP has increased significantly."
Further microprocessor compaction since 1988 has served to aggravate this vulnerability. In his 1999 Marines Magazine article "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," General Charles C. Krulak projected the global configuration of threats and opportunities evident even today. He foresaw: "The lines separating the levels of war . . . will blur, and adversaries, confounded by our 'conventional' superiority, will resort to asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance." In a tale of superior junior leadership, General Krulak's fictional Corporal Hernandez made decisions of strategic significance on a complex and highly decentralized battlefield. Yet, even Hernandez depended on electronically driven equipmentnamely, a functional radio. Indeed, his unit would have lost any strategic initiative, and perhaps even lost the ability to take effective local tactical actions, had EMP neutralized his electronically driven tools. There is hardly an example of conventional superiority that can function without our sophisticated, vulnerable technologies. This includes image intensifiers, wristwatches, compact computers, cellular phones, and commercial off-the-shelf GPS receivers. Without an attack, however, it is difficult to muster the national will needed to meet the challenge-and there probably won't be a second chance to get it right.
The commission, for example, observed that China and Russia have for decades considered limited nuclear attacks that would paralyze the highly developed and urbanized United States. This commonly understood approach has not escaped the notice of our asymmetric adversaries. Out-classed adversaries and their covert state sponsors may determine that, given just a few nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, it would make more sense to subject U.S. general-purpose forces to an EMP attack from a source difficult to trace than to attempt to destroy a U.S. city. A foreign-flagged freighter under al Qaeda control, carrying widely available Soviet Scud missiles armed with BMP-enhanced, moderate yield, first-generation fission warheads, could conceivably launch an attack today from international waters.
One commission finding is noteworthy: The cost to shield all existing systems may be prohibitive, but new systems can fully integrate shielding during their design phase for a reasonable 1% to 3% of the overall cost.
Industry should embrace the need to build-in verifiable EMP protection to military protection standards without waiting to be compelled to do so by law or formal requirement. In fact, self-regulation with regard to building-in military-standard EMP could very well be in industries' longer-term self-interest. Microprocessor manufacturers have a great responsibility in this regard, as the processor lines of a very few large producers are integrated into a broad range of multi-use products.
Innovative approaches could develop cost-effective means of protecting systems. Federal and state tax incentives should be ion place for for those who market add-on EMP protection that works effectively.
Major Gayl, the science and technology advisor to the deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations at Headquarters Marine Corps, is attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. [The full text of the commission report is available at http://empcreport.ida.org.]