During combat operations in Iraq, the grunts wanted Cobras, and the Marine Corps rotary-wing community obliged, providing close air support and armed reconnaissance. Now it is time to evaluate that battlefield performance to make it even better for the next time.
Operation Iraqi Freedom saw the first use since Desert Storm of the AH-IW Super Cobra in sustained combat operations. During that time, the Marine rotary-wing attack community experienced many successes that validated its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in support of ground forces during high-tempo combat operations. Operations also highlighted specific concerns relating to rotary-wing close air support, command-and-control challenges of rotary-wing aircraft in general, and the influence of prehostilities psychological operations during combat.
As the Department of Defense and civilian policy centers begin to evaluate the utility and employment of attack helicopters on today's battlefield, it is important to define the parameters of mission success-our value to the end user. As an air officer for 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, serving in Iraq stated, "[My job] boiled down to getting Cobras to show up almost every day of the war . . . the grunts only wanted Cobras and I obliged." To improve on past efforts, it is incumbent on Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) officers to examine how we can more efficiently support the ground combat element.
At the commencement of hostilities on 20 March 2003, three Marine light attack helicopter squadrons were in theater in support of Iraqi Freedom. HMLA-169 and -267 were forward based at AIi Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, and HMLA-269 was staged aboard amphibious shipping in the northern Arabian Gulf. During the three weeks of combat, Cobras surged in support of 1st Marine Division while HMLA-269 simultaneously relocated to Forward Operating Base, Jalibah, in southern Iraq.
For those aircrews at Ali Al Salem, typical missions were two-to-four days in Iraq followed by a return to Kuwait for maintenance and aircrew turnover. Fly days during these missions typically included 8-12 hours of flight time per day. In one extreme circumstance, aircrews spent 19 continuous hours in the cockpit supporting ground operations. Because of the distance from Kuwait and Jalibah to the supported units moving forward, it became prohibitive to spend less than 48 hours in support of 1 st Marine Division as it moved northwest to Baghdad.
A majority of close air support missions were conducted during daylight hours. This presented some difficult tactical choices for Cobra aircrews. Immediately, our tactical advantage of "owning the night" was negated, and close air support and armed reconnaissance exposure events (the number of times an aircraft is exposed to enemy fire in the conduct of a tactical sortie) took on new meaning. To fly above the small arms threat invited man-portable air defense (ManPAD) engagement from the enemy. Use of terrain and low-altitude tactics to counter this threat placed aircrews squarely in the small arms threat.
Battle damage reports from Iraqi Freedom indicate 49 incidences of Cobras sustaining damage from small arms and light antiaircraft artillery. Clearly, aircrews were more comfortable dealing with the small arms threat than ManPADs, because they could not rely on their aircraft survivability equipment to protect them from the ManPADs. The AH-IW, for example, is the only Free World attack helicopter that does not have infrared suppressors on its engines to counter passive heat-seeking missiles. For less than the price of one F/A-18 Super Hornet, the entire Marine Corps Cobra fleet of 190 aircraft could be outfitted with the latest, proven, off-the-shelf aircraft survivability equipment. Current TTPs are valid to counter small arms, but Cobras lack the hardware to support them when the threat includes ManPADS. Choosing the lesser of two evils, while necessary during Iraqi Freedom, is not optimal.
There are some, both inside the Marine Corps and out, who question the survivability and utility of attack helicopters on today's battlefield. In a 23 july 2003 article in The Wall Street Journal, for example, Loren Thompson, director of the think tank Lexington Institute, was quoted as saying the Apache "is the most capable attack helicopter ever built, so if it can't operate safely in a place like Iraq, that has to raise questions about the whole concept of attack helicopters." Assuming Mr. Thompson is referring to the failed attack on Republican Guard units by Apaches on 24 March 2003, the Lexington Institute needs to rethink its thinking. One strike mission, in one battle, in one deployment warrants discussion at the tactical and to a lesser extent operational level on the synergy of intelligence deliverables and TTPs. What it does not warrant is calling into question the relevance, effectiveness, and crucial role of attack helicopters on the battlefield. Simply looking at endgame results such as battle damage is misleading.
Where does the perception that attack helicopters are at too great a risk to employ as attack helicopters come from? The Army Apache's challenges in Operations Allied Force, Anaconda, and Iraqi Freedom certainly have created a bit of bleed over to all attack helicopter communities. Battle damage to Marine Corps Cobras during Iraqi Freedom is clearly another source. But there is another part of the story that is rarely articulated.
The MAGTF commander's lack of command and control over the rotary-wing assets at his disposal is a sucking chest wound within the Marine Air Command and Control System. With the extended range of the I Marine Expeditionary Force area of operations during Iraqi Freedom, Cobra aircrews had little to no idea whether they would end up in the British division's area of responsibility near Basrah or conducting close air support along a main supply route north of Baghdad. As a result, Cobras flew large distances to reach different objective areas, increasing exposure time to the enemy. The single best piece of "intelligence" Cobra aircrews had about what they would be doing for the next three days was the 1st Marine Division's intentions message. It was worth its weight in gold. It included consolidation operations over the previous 24 hours; locations of all friendly units and their rate and direction of march; and intentions for the next 24-72 hours, as well as main effort designation. Armed with this information, Cobra aircrews could launch and proceed to the geographic area where the heaviest fighting was expected.
From 20 March to 17 April, Cobras inflicted heavy damage on Iraqi forces in close air support and armed reconnaissance missions. Unfortunately, many combat sorties in support of the ground combat element were dropped or mishandled as a result of rnisallocation of assets and a weak command-and-control architecture for rotary-wing aircraft. During interviews with Cobra aircrews from all three squadrons, not one pilot could recall receiving a routine joint tactical air request (JTAR)-all were "immediate." When aircrews arrived on station, at times transiting more than an hour to get to the objective area, ground units sometimes were in consolidation or unaware of the request. This occurred often enough to waste valuable on-station time that could have been used elsewhere.
How was integration relative to rotary-wing close air support between 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and 1st Marine Division? Utilization certainly was anticipated and planned for, but after helicopters launched from AIi Al Salem or Jalibah it essentially was up to the aircrews to figure things out for themselves. The Direct Air Support Center Airborne (DASC[A]) for the most part was successful in terms of connectivity with Cobras, but information and !askings often were disorganized, dated, or wrong. For example, a typical check in with DASC(A) would include routing instructions, a JTAR, and a threat brief. Often the routing was to a destination the Cobras did not have the fuel to reach and did not include forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) along the route. Prohibitive air defense threat locations were given along with routing instructions and included a mix of latitude/longitude, Military Grid Reference System, and the alpha numeric keypad grid used primarily by tactical fixed-wing aircraft conducting armed interdiction of deep targets. Attempting to plot threats using three different location systems while ingressing hostile territory and flying at night under low-light-level conditions 100 feet off the ground was near impossible. Other times threats passed in the brief were hundreds of miles from the terminal objective area and the route and thus of no consequence. When Cobra aircrews went north to engage the enemy, they knew the information they received was not filtered for relevance or accuracy. Battlefield handovers on squadron frequencies from off-going divisions and sections were the most reliable information available.
At any given point, it was nearly impossible for the 3d Marine Air Wing Tactical Air Command Center in Al Jaber, Kuwait, to determine the disposition and location of rotary-wing assets. This should come as no surprise. We have made precious little investment in the Marine Air Command and Control System to facilitate this situational awareness. There are unique challenges to tracking rotary-wing aircraft over large geographic areas, but dedicated airborne command and control, identification friend or foe, minimum risk routing tracked real time, time-sensitive tasking via JTAR, and Blue Force Trackers can help solve this problem. Placing HMLA squadrons in direct support of each regimental combat team is another option to facilitate support of the ground combat element. Direct support relationships also provide focus of effort that can be built on prior to commencement of hostilities through command relationships. Until this issue is addressed, we should not anticipate being able to quickly task forward-deployed rotary-wing close air support or efficiently manage our rotary-wing assets.
Much has been made of the rate of advance of the ground combat element on Baghdad. Truly, we kept the enemy on his heels, but this rapid acceleration came at a price. Each regimental combat team had its own forward line of troops. Behind these were logistics trains, including FARPs. The key element in this equation was that each supporting element had its own internal security in close proximity. What lay between these individual elements and the rear area, however, was enemy country.
Rotary-wing aircraft cannot overfly or displace laterally these pockets of resistance like fixed-wing aircraft can. Many Cobra engagements, as well as some of the battle damage sustained, were in transit, trying to get to the terminal controller to perform close air support. One Cobra division of four aircraft shot out all its ordnance three times just trying to reach its terminal controller approaching from his rear. One aircraft received enough battle damage that it had to return to base. On this particular day, it took five hours to get to the forward air controller-who was a mere 25 kilometers from the FARP where the helicopters were located. It was not unheard of to be engaged by ground fire minutes after taking off from a FARP.
Many have attempted to compare the amount of battle damage sustained by Cobras during Iraqi Freedom to that sustained by tactical fixed-wing aircraft operating in the same area. A more accurate comparison might be between Cobras and Humvees. AH-IWs and the ground forces they supported encountered the same enemy threat from the same relative perspective. Cobra pilots are taught that the only reason they exist is to support the young Marine lance corporal on the deck. This ethos materialized in spades during Iraqi Freedom, almost to a fault. Cobra pilots executed according to the ground combat element's desires, and when they were called, the Cobras responded.
Often, employment of rotary-wing close air support was not clearly understood by the air officers and battalion FACs of the regimental combat teams. For example, pushing Cobras forward to investigate a small town along a main supply route to locate irregular forces in technical vehicles when the ground combat element is equipped with the most capable and heavily armored main battle tank in the world is not good business. The Cobra has about the same amount of armor as a can of soup. Using its sensors from standoff range to build the situational awareness of the ground commander makes far more sense, followed by a coordinated combined-arms attack.
For a MAGTF, combined arms is our greatest asset. It is not always possible or pragmatic, but it should be the goal. Rarely did I witness suppression of enemy air defenses in support of rotary-wing close air support missions. The best that was offered was direct fire 25-mm from light armored vehicles. At times, this was extremely effective and all that was needed. On other exposure events, aircrews knew they were headed into a hornets' nest with no external support.
The onus is on not only terminal controllers but also aircrews to determine the level of risk pilots accept on a mission. As experts in their specific platform, aircrews must educate a terminal controller, on the fly if necessary, on the most effective way they can be employed in support of the ground combat element's objectives. Risk must be balanced against the tactical advantage of performing close air support without other supporting arms. The litmus test is mission accomplishment in the most efficient manner possible, while limiting exposure of friendly assets. In emergency close air support, when friendly ground units are in danger of being overrun, there is an unwritten understanding that close air support assets will be there regardless. If the tactical situation is in hand, however, combined arms needs to be the standard.
Rules of engagement played a significant role for Cobra aircrews during Iraqi Freedom. What was fairly black and white for fixed-wing tactical aircraft was more obtuse for rotary-wing shooters. As a result of an aggressive psychological operations campaign prior to the commencement of hostilities, enemy combatants knew "how" to surrender to coalition forces. Unfortunately, this became an exploitation weapon for enemy forces. If an Iraqi soldier waves a white surrender flag as a section of Cobras approaches and then engages that section with small arms fire when it comes in range, then drops that same weapon and runs as the Cobras roll in to return fire, when is it legal to shoot? Unfortunately, this is not a hypothetical example. Cobra aircrews encountered this situation on a daily basis. Psychological operations can have ramifications throughout the battle space and must be balanced against rules of engagement to determine what response we want to condition in the enemy.
We must look hard at our performance as a MAGTF during Iraqi Freedom and be our own harshest critic. Maneuver warfare was validated in Iraq. The 1st Marine Division was the most air-centric maneuver force in the history of warfare and again distinguished itself in the face of the enemy. A majority of the issues mentioned here are solved by doing the little things well and practicing what we preach in schoolhouses across our training commands. Transformation is inevitable if we are to ensure the MAGTF stays relevant and ready to answer our nation's call to arms. It is the basic "blocking and tackling" at the tactical level, however, that wins the day.
Captain Grinalds is assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 as an instructor pilot in the AH-IW Division. Previously he was assigned to HMLA-267, a West Coast Cobra squadron at Camp Pendleton, California, and during Operation Iraqi Freedom was attached to HMLA-267 and served as a combat division leader flying approximately 100 hours of combat time.