Capturing Saddam Hussein was an important event. It was not a watershed, however. After seven months of only poor-quality audiotapes from Hussein and no video, some had begun to believe he was dead. In any event, he had very little control of the resistance against the Coalition. His capture will attenuate the depth of the resistance but will not end it. In the short run, it may result in a brief spike in attacks as the loose collection of Baathis, Arab nationalists, and Sunni malcontents try to prove to the Western media and movers with money in the Arab world they are still a force with which to be reckoned.
Still, the capture of Hussein was a symbolic, psychological event of monumental proportions. He had a legacy of intimidation and fear that has been ingrained into the pysche of the populace. It was strange how the majority of the people reacted to his capture. There were celebrations and some shooting into the air but nothing on the level that occurred when his sons Uday and Qusay were killed. The pictures of a dirty, disheveled Hussein meekly submitting to an intrusive medical examination were beyond cognitive acceptance. His humiliation has destroyed him as a force. He is an Iraqi, however, and any further exploitation of his disgrace would not be in our interests.
The capture of Hussein will not bring a massive shift of support for the Coalition, but it will eliminate one point of defiance. It is clear, however, that many Iraqis still fear the former regime supporters, who are known to be ruthless. The trend we must now handle is the Sunni fear of rising Shia power. Having dominated Iraq through Ottoman and British rule and for the past almost 40 years, the Sunni have no icon around whom to coalesce. The Coalition must carefully monitor the possible Islamization of a Sunni population, which has been relatively secularized. But we cannot back away.
Some "experts" see our Sunni operations as being destructive of any possibility of gaining their cooperation. While there is no doubt that massive sweeps without precise objectives are counterproductive, the continuous use of small-unit operations against well-researched and precise objectives will keep the insurgents off-balance. The Iraqis want order; they want security; and for the near future, they will endure the indignities and inconvenience of Coalition rule. We must not allow any doubt to creep in concerning the ability and capability of the Coalition to use force to maintain order. For now, there can be only one authority—Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer.
A recent Oxford University survey of the Iraqi people provides insight into what the Iraqis think. According to it, 75% of the people do not trust Americans. Still, only 1% wants Hussein back. The undeniable truth here is that 99% of our soldiers want us out of Iraq, but only 17% of the Iraqis do—at least in the short term. The latter statistic is by survey; the survey of soldiers is by anecdotal evidence. These are all contradictions. How can one explain them?
First, Iraqis have an inbred cynicism and a distrust of all authority, and Americans are the only authority in town. The Iraqis never have trusted their rulers. Why would they suddenly bind their lives over to Americans, particularly with our track record of abandoning allies in the recent past?
Second, Americans are not Arabs; we are not Muslims; we are infidels to many of the people here. There is no way to modify these facts. Tolerance is in short supply in this part of the world. Christians are particularly fearful of what comes next. Large numbers of Christian-owned liquor stores have been burned by Shia militants. There is a certain amount of secularism in the urban areas, but this is a very Muslim country. There are Wahhabi influences among the Sunni, and the Shia are enforcing new rules of dress and conduct on their people.
While the Coalition's print media deliver the news fairly, most Iraqis get their news from television or radio. Our inability to realize the importance of this failure and rectify it can be explained only by ignorance of the culture and people. These are information people. They devour the news and political commentary. In the Internet cafes the sites most logged onto are generally anti-American in tone, often drawing on articles from U.S. and British newspapers. There can be no higher priority than coming on line and on the air with a massive information blitz to get the full story in the game.
In the end, the only way the United States can be defeated is to lose the battle for the American people. We need to ensure the stakes of this war are carefully explained, not by slogans or phony patriotic appeals, but by pragmatic reasoning. Whether we should be here at all is a matter for historians; it is not the time for political cheap shots. You cannot say you support the troops but not the war. How do you support the troops about to go on patrol in Fallujah and yet tell them they may die for a worthless ill-considered war?
Our leaders must understand this is a psychological operations/information/civil affairs war. We cannot win this fight with massive "sweeps" a la the Vietnam War, but with special, well-trained political military warriors, soldiers who are as comfortable drinking tea with the tribal leaders as kicking down doors. Coalition troops will be required to do both.
Colonel De Atkine is a Middle East foreign area specialist (FAS). As a FAS officer he spent 8 years of active duty in the Middle East and the past 12 years as an instructor at Fort Bragg in the regional studies course. Presently, he is in Baghdad assisting a psychological operations unit.