The Navy must increase its capability to defend against small-boat attacks—soon. Our adversaries know they cannot compete against us in a war at sea. What they can do is tailor their forces to exploit those areas we have overlooked.
The ships we sail in today, without exception, were built with the bluewater war in mind. Their weapon systems are designed to defeat divisions of Soviet Backfire bombers, nuclear-powered battle cruisers, and nuclear submarines in the open ocean. These threats no longer exist, and we have no genuine competitors on the high seas. Our future enemies will know there is nothing to be gained by challenging the U.S. Navy with conventional weapons.
These future enemies have everything to gain, however, from challenging us in brown or green water. In crowded bodies of water, where we must sector out our Aegis systems and where our Harpoon missiles pose too great a risk to neutral shipping, we become vulnerable. There is a reason the Iranians are spending their research-and-development money on catamaran vessels with short-range antiship missiles instead of on Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers. They know their best chance of getting a kill is with a small vessel that can close rapidly and get off a few quick punches before retreating at high speed. A country or group with access to suicide troops has an even greater chance to strike, as such troops can be disguised in any local vessel. How often do we drive our ships past innocent-looking groups of fishing vessels without so much as a second thought?
Without additional funds to increase the small-arms lethality of our naval vessels and helicopter assets, the Navy will find itself outgunned and outmaneuvered by small, fast, and highly maneuverable opponents in the littoral environment. With the emphasis we currently place on strike-group support for national policy, the inability to ensure access in the littorals because of the small-boat threat should be an unacceptable condition.
Some simple additions to the current U.S. ship inventories could bring rapid improvements to defense capabilities. All U.S. combatants should be equipped with the improved Close-in Weapon System Block 1B that incorporates an optical sight and manual pointing mode to engage nearby surface contacts. Preliminary testing of this system has demonstrated its extreme utility in small-craft engagements. The replacement of standard .50-caliber machine guns with .50-caliber gatling guns (GAU-19) would improve significantly the accuracy and lethality of shipboard small arms to engage threats. Last, increased funding and dedicated time for small-boat defense training are required to allow strike groups to become more effective in small-boat defense.
Several options are available to improve the Navy's rotary-wing defense capabilities to combat the small-boat threat:
* The Navy could purchase dedicated attack helicopters and deploy them on either aircraft carriers or surface combatants. There are numerous existing airframes and weapon systems the Navy could use. The choice need not be as advanced as the Apache Longbow or the Comanche; a variant of the Cobra, the OH-58, or one of the numerous other modified civilian airframes currently being offered might be sufficient.
* The Navy could modify the MH-60S to incorporate the Army's External Stores Support System. Hang-down stubs could be used for minigun and rocket pods and external fuel tanks. Such helicopters could be assigned to aircraft carriers and used in the close-in attack role. The chief advantage here is that the Navy already is purchasing the airframe for the logistics mission, and it will share parts with the MH-60R.
* Firepower could be added to the SH-60B or MH-60R airframes. The GAU-19 minigun already is set up for mounting on these craft. Combined with a door-mounted minigun, this would give these airframes the ability to counter a small-boat threat far more effectively than with current crew-served weapons. With radar for cueing and a forward-looking infrared system, this would give strike groups an all-weather, airborne, day-night option.
* Armed SH-60B or MH-60R aircraft could provide cuing for the MH-60S assets, and then fly in "hunter-killer" teams for mutual support. This option would allow for more flexibility than any of the other choices alone, and also would increase the pool of capable aircraft available for strike group commanders.
Lieutenant Farmer is the operations officer for Helicopter Squadron Light 47, Detachment 5, on board the Princeton (CG-59).