"Arm All Navy Helicopters"
(See W. Tunick, M. Weaver, pp. 36-39, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Jeffrey Barta, U.S. Navy-I was glad to read that Commander, Carrier Group Two has initiated plans for developing improved armed helicopter weaponization. I contend that having the systems, weapons, and missions is nice, but effective use them is another matter. With the exception of predeployment work ups, battle group commanders seem hesitant to use armed helicopters for anything other than utility and radar-surveillance missions.
The Navy needs battle group commanders who legitimately accept armed helicopters into the battle group's warfare doctrine to break an apparent mind-set that only the pointy-nosed platforms can carry and fire ordnance.
As a LAMPS junior officer and later as a detachment officer in charge, I found that every ship commanding officer and battle group commander I worked for desired the downlinkable forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) video. None, however, knew or was willing to effectively use the full capabilities of the system. On deployment, they were not concerned about LAMPS until the aircraft went down for maintenance or we couldn't meet an operational commitment. In response to an offer to brief him on LAMPS systems and capabilities, one Commander, Carrier Air Wing went so far as to say, "if I wanted to know about LAMPS, I'd ask the destroyer squadron." The commander of our battle group told me that he didn't care about armed helo training or weapons, because "you're just a helo guy and won't take the shot anyway," and later refused to grant weapons-free authority during a preplanned Hellfire missile shoot during a multinational exercise. If battle group commanders will not let armed helicopter crews train regularly and consistently during exercises and carry live ordnance on a daily basis while deployed, what is to be expected during an actual small boat swarm attack in the Straights of Hormuz when it really counts? F/A-18s sitting on the carrier's deck won't be able to save the day.
I do not believe that I am alone in my beliefs. I have heard that with the exception of opening-day actions against Iraqi oil platforms in the Northern Arabian Gulf, or sealift escort in the Straits of Malacca, LAMPS helos largely were relegated to armed passenger/mail/cargo flights and late-night carrier inner-zone radar-surveillance missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. "Kill orders" were issued once, but not executed because of issues with rules of engagement. The overwhelming majority of assigned missions simply did not use the SH-60's exceptional sensor and weapons suite with optimal effectiveness. Armed helicopters are capable of doing more than just radar floodlight missions, hauling mail, and covering maritime interdiction boardings.
To be fair, I am sure that the growing awareness of armed helicopter capabilities will drive today's battle group commanders to use their helicopters more effectively. The hurdle of the first armed helicopter missions cleared to fire in anger, however, remains to be passed.
Why is this so? I believe the decentralization of armed helo detachments throughout a battle group has not given commanders the required confidence in the helicopter, weapon system, or aircrews. It is hard to effectively appreciate, control, or use an asset that is out of sight and thus out of mind. Confidence can grow only if armed helicopter aircrews get the opportunity to shine by carrying and using live ordnance not only during work ups, but operationally as well. I hope that reorganization of the helicopter community resulting from the transition to the SH-60S and SH-60R, and placing a command element on the carrier, will alleviate this issue over the long term.
It cannot stop there, however. Effective doctrine must be developed and implemented from the top down. Joint warfare publications and planning documents contain few references to using Navy helicopters in any sort of power-projection or force-protection roles. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) needs not only to fund improvements, but also establish the doctrine that goes with them, encouraging use of the platform's capabilities. There are plenty of helicopter community tactics, techniques, and procedures available, but fleet and battle group commanders need to incorporate them into both exercise scenarios and actual war plans. Until such doctrine is developed and employed by battle group commanders, the perception that weapon use is only for carrier-based assets will continue to limit armed helicopter use and the Navy's ability to wage war in all environments. An improvement to a weapon system that already is underused is a waste of money, regardless of the CNO's priorities and requirements. With the sundown of the S-3 Viking, a resurgence in interest in undersea warfare, and a growing small-boat threat, this would be disastrous. Fund the improvements, rewrite the doctrine, and use the systems to their fullest potential.
"Unite the So-Called Total Force"
(See W. Sanders, pp. 68-70, November 2003; J. Mensch, pp. 10-12, December 2003 Proceedings)
H. C. Barnum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs)-I was completely disappointed by this article. The author's comments and illustrations were based on old information and did not take into account all the transformational work that the Navy has engaged in over the past few years. This transformation has not just been focused on active Navy operations as published in such documents as "Sea Power 21" and the "Fleet Response Plan," but it also has been focused on a total redesign of the Naval Reserve with active/reserve integration. The following information will further demonstrate that the article was completely out of touch with today's Navy.
Please notice that I did not refer to the Naval Reserve, but to the Navy, because we are one force, all members of the United States Navy, and what is good for the Navy is good for the Naval Reserve. The dawn of the 21st century found the United States in a geopolitical environment dramatically different than what Mr. Sanders experienced when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs). The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recognized the new reality and initiated many changes. CNO Admiral Vern Clark has provided the road map for transformation with "Sea Power 21," but that was just the first step, and many have been taken since then. Our Navy must change, and so must the Naval Reserve Force if it is to remain viable and relevant in meeting requirements levied by combatant commanders. The focus of these transformational efforts are to enhance the warfighting capability of the 21st-century Navy to maintain, train, and equip combat naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas.
Toward this end, well over a year ago the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) chartered a study to establish the current condition of the Naval Reserve along with a first-level look at both success stories and potential issues for subsequent consideration. The effort was intended to evolve the Naval Reserve into an operationally relevant component fully aligned with and directly complementing the active component.
A year ago last fall, the VCNO took charge of the implementation plan and developed the "Redesign of the Naval Reserve: Top 14 Points," which he released as his plan in a CNO message on 28 August 2003. This plan dramatically changes total force policy and procedures in three key areas: personnel management, readiness and training, and organizational structure. Without going into the details, the Navy ultimately will integrate active and reserve billet structure with the eventual goal of a single personnel and pay system. To initiate this process, the Navy is conducting a review of all billets. Commander, Fleet Forces Command (Admiral William Fallon), now will direct all Naval Reserve readiness and training. Organizationally, the Naval Reserve is aligning under the Navy. There now is only one Naval Reserve staff in New Orleans: Commander, Naval Reserve Forces Command. Both Commander, Naval Reserve Force (Vice Admiral John Cotton) and Commander, Naval Reserve Forces Command (Rear Admiral John Debbout) are officially designated for additional duty to Commander, Fleet Forces Command in their force-provider role and for readiness and training.
As for active/reserve integration, the Navy is aligning all Naval Reserve aviation under Commander, Naval Air Force. In the future, all Naval Reserve aviation squadrons will report directly to Commander, Naval Air Force through either their Naval Reserve wing commander or report through an active wing commander. They may become fully integrated into an active wing in the form of a Fleet Response Unit or into an active squadron as part of the squadron, such as our MH-53 or training command integrated squadrons.
Management of naval reservists is more and more becoming a combined effort by active Navy and full-time support personnel. (Note that active Naval Reserve personnel [formerly TARs] are now called Full-Time Support [FTS] and increasingly are imbedded in active commands across the fleet.) Reserve staffs are aligning with active staffs, such as the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command under the Naval Recruiting Command, or are fully imbedding into active staffs as Commander, Naval Air Reserve (CNAR) will be when it decommissions and becomes part of CNAF.
It seems that the Mr. Sanders has an ax to grind with the FTS community. It is the FTS community that has led this transformational effort while realizing they could be working themselves out of a job in the near future. It took incredible courage to risk their professional community to ensure the Navy would be the beneficiary of a realigned and reorganized Naval Reserve. In the future, I would suggest that Mr. Sanders do better research before he smears a most professional organization, the Naval Reserve component of the Navy, in a public forum. His words are hollow and only speak to the truth of the 1990s.
"P-3s Remain Frontline Combatants"
(See D. Reade, pp. 36-30, September 2003 Proceedings)
"UAVs & UCAVs: Unmanned and Unafraid"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 41-47, September 2003; T. Cassidy, pp. 26-28, October 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Jeffrey Macris, U.S. Navy-The juxtaposition of articles on the P-3's recent wartime experience and the future of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) raised an important question. The former details the enormous value of information gleaned by manned P-3 crews in the aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) role, using advanced photo optics, infrared radar, and inverse synthetic aperture radar equipment. The latter discusses the enormous utility of using long-endurance, relatively inexpensive unmanned craft in the same intelligence-collection role. Read together, one must ask, Why do Navy leaders continue to send large, nonstealthy, manned aircraft over land in hostile settings, when less expensive, unmanned vehicles can now accomplish the same mission, without jeopardizing the Navy's most precious asset, its human crews? In fact, the P-3 might not be doing those missions much longer, for the Navy's maritime patrol and reconnaissance (MPR) aviation community appears to be on track to replace its aging aircraft with a mix of new manned and unmanned vehicles.
For a decade, the Navy has wrestled with the future of MPR. Like many issues of naval strategy and theory, the debate has played itself out in budgetary battles. Which platform should follow the workhorse P-3 Orions, which first entered service in the 1960s, and many of which will be retired in the next decade? After the community's proposed replacement aircraft, dubbed the P-7, was cancelled as the Cold War ended, the Navy evaluated many alternatives, of which four received the most attention: the purchase of a fleet of specially configured commercial airliners; the reopening of the P-3 assembly line, with modest evolutionary changes in a new Orion; the major overhaul of existing P-3s to substantially lengthen the existing fleet's service life; and the replacement by UAVs of the manned P-3 mission.
The challenge of selecting a follow-on to the P-3 is compounded by the new missions the community has picked up. After the Cold War, the P-3 community leaders ably redefined their platform as one that returned to its earliest roots of search and surveillance, which consequently subjugated the role of its Cold War staple, antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The P-3 antisurface warfare improvement package-with long-range optics gear, infrared, and ISAR-made the platform perfectly suited for intelligence collection. This foray into ISR proved very valuable in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, where few other assets could provide similar information. But the placement overland of a large, relatively defenseless aircraft puts P-3 crews in great peril. If this mission can be accomplished equally as well by UAVs, it begs the question of which missions the follow-on to the P-3 will need to perform.
If the primary maritime patrol manned aircraft core competency is defined as ISR, then it probably is time to replace the P-3 with a long-endurance UAV. That technology largely exists today, and would be a relatively low-cost way to accomplish the mission while keeping our manned aircrews out of harm's way. But if the core competency, on the other hand, remains the more labor-intensive and complex open-ocean and littoral ASW specialty, the follow-on platform selection becomes a thornier issue. The demise of the S-3 community over the last decade makes this decision even more critical, for now no other fixed-wing aviation platform handles ASW. All of the airborne long-range ASW eggs, so to speak, are in MPR's basket.
Even if ASW remains a primary mission, why couldn't we extend the P-3 service until UAV technology could take on both ISR and ASW? Although sensible at first glance, this is not the right answer for three reasons. First, the P-3s are aging very quickly, with many in the fleet currently mission limited. Corrosion and stress damage uncovered in recent maintenance and testing, furthermore, suggests that service life extension might not extend the airframes as long as hoped. Second, a recent analysis of alternatives suggests that the long-term remanufacture of existing airframes would be very expensive, perhaps approaching the cost of a new aircraft when new engines, wiring, and rework to a common standard are included. And third, UAV technology in ASW is unproven. Experts agree that no UAV today can detect, localize, track, and attack an underwater target. Are we willing to gamble that that unmanned technology can be conceived, tested, and fielded within the 15-20 years that a major overhaul might add to the P-3's life?
Whereas the P-3 fleet today exceeds 200 aircraft, the manned aircraft follow-on to the P-3 (dubbed the multimission maritime aircraft, or MMA) purchase as envisioned today will total but 100-150. Why so few? The Chief of Naval Operations recently recentered the manned maritime patrol mission back to its Cold War ASW roots, peeling away the ISR role that had become a primary post-Cold War mission. A proposed UAV, which the MPR community aims to administer, will take up the slack.
Large decisions remain. In 2004, Navy leaders choose which plane will replace the P-3 Orion as MPR's new MMA: a new generation of the original Lockheed design, dubbed Orion 21, or a modified Boeing 737. Also, the UAVs have not yet been determined, and might be a variant of the existing Global Hawk long-range, high-endurance UAV. Taken together, these decisions suggest that manned naval aviation has entered its twilight phase, which began in the last decade when Tomahawk land-attack missiles replaced piloted aircraft in the initial strike role. The MMA likely will be the last manned maritime patrol aircraft. In the interim, the Navy should expect to see a mix of UAVs and manned aircraft in MPR's ISR and ASW roles.
"TacAir Integration Must Optimize JSFs"
(See D. Robinson, pp. 52-55, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Donald R. Bouchdoux, U.S. Navy (Retired)-When the Marine Corps and Navy completed their Tactical Aircraft Integration Study in the spring of 2002, it intentionally did not make the decision on the mix of carrier-variant and short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) in the carrier air wings.
One of the key elements in fashioning the overall agreement was the recognition on the part of both services that a requirement existed for each other's version of the JSF. While this might seem trivial in retrospect, it was a subject of considerable churn prior to a briefing to the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps in January 2002. Inherent in the agreement was an acceptance of each service's operational requirements for the JSF. As Colonel Robinson correctly points out, these are different in a variety of areas. The Navy's requirements exceeded the Marine Corps' in range, payload, and bring back. In early 2002, if forced to make a decision on air wing composition, the STOVL JSF would not have satisfied the Navy's requirements. These aircraft, however, were (and still are) in the initial stages of development. As the two variants matured, it was likely that both the requirements and the aircraft's ability to meet those requirements would be far better defined at that point. Given more mature platforms, with demonstrated performance scrutinized under rigorous testing, a decision could be made with far better information in the 2007-2010 timeframe. As a result, the agreement was forged with the understanding that ten Marine Corps squadrons would be integrated, one into each carrier air wing. The version of JSF that those Marine aviators will fly will be determined when that decision needs to be made and not before.
"Take the Roll of the Dice Out of the Selection Process"
(See C. Graham, p. 59, December 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael A. Yates, Limited Duty Officer, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Commander Graham expressed some of my feelings on the selection board process. There are those of us who make the call to our detailers after not being selected only to be told, "I don't know why, there isn't anything obvious." While I did make it to within one pay grade of where I wanted to be when I was a third-class petty officer, the system leaves a little hole with that lack of explanation. After 24 years of service, I deserved a better answer.
It is impossible for me to know that I should have taken a different assignment, or done anything else differently to affect my chances for promotion. I attended several of the dog-and-pony shows detailer's put on as they travel around the country. They provided statistics on the previous selection boards and their guesses of assignments and other choices they hope will give someone the best opportunity for selection at the applicable board. Since there apparently is no comparison with those who didn't get selected, the information is questionable at best.
Each selection group has a top 10-15% and a bottom 7-10%. Of the vast group in the middle, almost all are capable and can perform well in most assignments. Therefore, since the selection boards are drawing a line based on the number required, little difference exists between the last few to get promoted and the next few that did not. It would be interesting to see selection boards' numbers or evaluations on the subject.
I agree with Commander Graham that it would be nice to see some of the secrecy come off the system. I envision a category that nonselectees could be given to provide the individual with an answer and the detailers with some statistics. The "not selected due to" categories can include obvious "poor fitrep/performance" as well as things like "assignments not varied enough," and "ranked below number required." I'm sure people that have served on selection boards can round out the list, keeping it to no more than ten meaningful explanations.
I believe it is an issue of fairness. If someone gives a professional organization 20 years of commendable service that is shortened involuntarily, I believe the individual deserves an explanation other than non-select for the next pay grade. Unlike Commander Graham, however, I don't believe my career was a professional failure; nor do I believe his was.
"Civil Affairs Is the Invisible Force"
(See A. Spira, P. Beckart, D. Woodard, pp. 40-43, November 2003 Proceedings)
Major Michael D. Woods, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-The authors of this article are correct when they say there is too little civil affairs capability for the kinds of conflicts we are likely to encounter in the future. But a large pool of experienced people is available-retirees like myself. Most of the retired officers I know have a background that could be helpful. It would mean having 55-year-old majors on active duty, but experience takes time. You'd get mature people whose postmilitary careers are like mine-CPA, officer of small- and mid-sized industrial corporations, and work in local government. We're recallable, glad to serve, and at least some of us still fit local government. We're recallable, glad to serve, and at least some of us still fit in our uniforms and could handily pass the physical fitness test.
"Revitalize ASW"
(See R. Farrell, pp. 40-43, December 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Michael F. Morrison, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-Commander Farrell has addressed effectively the need for revitalization at a time when antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces are in rapid decline. His broad recommendation to "create an ASW doctrine that bridges all communities and conducts ASW jointly" is particularly important, but his specifics sound a bit like an expansion of past practices and probably are unaffordable given current warfare priorities. Having spent my civilian career in ASW research and development and seen the warfare communities fight for development dollars to the detriment of overall ASW cost effectiveness, I have a slightly different opinion as to where to go from here.
Over the past 40 years, ASW has been a very expensive, seldom-used, warfare capability. It has involved hull-mounted or towed sonars on most warships, led to the development of dedicated weapons and aircraft types, and driven manning and training requirements. Its undersea surveillance "cousin" also was extensive but achieved strategically important results against the Soviet ballistic missile nuclear submarine fleet and supported important acoustic sensing and signal processing advances. Successful ASW resulted occasionally when favorable factors existed; such as adequate cueing, sufficient resources, deep water with a usable sound channel, and noisy, unsophisticated targets. More than anything else, the ASW problem has been one of trying to catch up with submarine technology advancements.
Since the end of the Cold War, ASW skills and hardware have been almost dismantled. Not so for submarine technology. We may have seen the end of high-speed, deep-diving, goliath nuclear submarines, but diesel-electric (D/E) technologies continue to grow and proliferate. During World War II, German D/Es finally were beaten by radar-equipped aircraft because of their need to spend so much time on the surface. Today, air independent propulsion D/Es are operational that can remain submerged on battery at slow speed for three to five days. Future versions are expected to submerge for up to a month. Their threat to us is vastly compounded by their probable deployment in the littorals (shallow water) for area denial where our ASW sensors, weapons, and skills have never been adequate. Advancements in antiship torpedoes, such as fire-and-forget long-range wake-homers, will make us reluctant to send high-value ships into these defended littorals. This could pose a big problem for future Navy operations overseas.
Current trends are negative: proliferation of submarine technology, quieted acoustic signatures, harsh shallow-water environments, reduced surveillance cueing, fewer ASW resources, and reduced training. Future ASW should be approached differently as we probably cannot afford to convert our Cold War (deep-water) forces to defeat the shallow water D/E. Instead, we should look at new methods and technologies that capitalize on our unchallenged air, space, and communications strengths.
Specific approaches should be debated and decided without platform politics but I will offer the following suggestions:
* Retain the best from our ASW/integrated undersea surveillance system forces and collect them into ASW-dedicated units, perhaps within the Naval Reserve. Place emphasis on air ASW because of its potential for rapid wide-area effectiveness and invulnerability versus the D/E.
* Combine these assets for training purposes into hunter-killer squadrons and exercise them against foreign D/Es as recommended by Commander Farrell.
* Increase ASW research and development to develop new shallow-water methodologies and keep pace with the changing threat. Emphasis should be on ASW torpedoes; long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance roles; airborne surface- search radar including synthetic aperture and periscope/mast detection; autonomous distributed and arrayed in-water sensors; active multistatic acoustics; environmental adaptation using acoustic inversion; secure cellular sensor data relay using UAVs; all-source information correlation, contact association, and data fusion; and generation of composite, real-time maritime threat pictures.
"Don't Silence Navy Chat"
(See T. Jara, M. Lisowski, pp. 52-55, September 2003; D. Trinque, pp. 18-22, November 2003; J. Thomas, pp. 18-22, December 2003 Proceedings)
"Fix Net Centric for the Operators"
(See D. Hardesty, pp. 68-71, September 2003; H. Honaker, pp. 14-16, November 2003 Proceedings)
Commander T. J. McKearney, U.S. Navy (Retired)-These two outwardly disparate, but actually complementary, pieces have cleverly tricked us into thinking concretely about a topic usually given to theory. Vague concepts about what "the network" are being swept aside by the reality of how individual programs and deck-plate initiatives are building the command-and-control architecture of the present. We've heard about the myths of network-centric warfare; these two articles give us the opportunity to come up with some of the truths:
* The devil is in the details. Or the corollary, "it's not just the bandwidth, stupid." Putting networks together is a complex business: it's not simply a pipe but, as Captain Hardesty points out, a bunch of discrete elements treating bytes and radio frequency in different ways. Although some of our naval units are, by most standards, "bandwidth limited," the real challenge is identifying, selecting, tailoring, testing, and installing the applications and services we need to hang on the bandwidth we do have to make it work efficiently. This takes smart procurement before we put to sea and smart bandwidth management in real time once under way. Before we talk about the glory of open architecture and the limitless potential of Internet protocol, we need to look at packet loss, utilization, certification, and a bunch of technical issues that frankly are boring until they crash the network.
* One size does not fit all. No doubt about it-chat has had a major impact in contemporary command and control. And I feel Commanders Jara's and Lisowki's pain, particularly as it relates to the Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) and NetMeeting. NetMeeting, with a conference-server configuration or other DCTS-compatible alternatives, might never beat a chat tool for the simple exchange of textual information. The functionalities offered by these tools, however, are demonstrably needed in command-and-control operations at certain levels in the chain of command. While chat may serve tactical needs within the force, a host of users exist who need more sophisticated collaborative tools: shared applications, common whiteboard, imagery, file sharing, etc. Combat information center or even joint operations center watch Standers may be happy with only chat, but planning shops, intel cells, targeting boards, and others need a more complex tool kit for collaborating within the force and with other agencies.
* The organizational implications need to be addressed head on. Read "If We Run Out of Batteries, This War is Screwed," in the June 2003 Wired magazine. Discussions of policies for the issuance of formal orders over chat aside, the reality is that the use of collaborative networked systems has blurred the command lines when it comes to information sharing and decision making. Reactionary efforts such as requiring voice confirmation will not change this, and the only alternative is to redefine the meaning of command and control for the networked force and let the technology do its job by providing the quality-of-service tools needed for security, validation, authentication, etc. We keep saying we have the best people in the world in terms of training, experience, and intelligence. It's time to trust them to make the right calls in real time.
Perhaps the lesson in both articles is that network-centric warfare is here now and being built, like most advances, incrementally during routine operations. Captain Hardesty's comments about contractors with a debilitating future vision are dead on, even though I risk characterization as one of them. We need to push forward with a wary eye toward what is possible and an optimistic sense of how command and control can be improved through better networks and information applications for those networks.
"Interview: Lieutenant General James T. Conway"
(See 1. Conway, pp. 32-35, November 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Rich Rodriguez, Naval Special Warfare Officer, SEAL platoon officer deployed to Desert Shield/Storm-This interview highlighted some of the common misconceptions that "regular" force commanders have regarding Special Operations Forces.
In my experience, a lack of knowledge and understanding of Special Operations among regular force commanders often compounds a lack of desire to learn because of time constraints. These misconceptions often manifest in a negative view of the operators and operations without a factual basis. General Conway should not be faulted for his misconceived impression of Special Operations and their record of performance in the "previous Gulf War." His is a common view among force commanders not attached to Special Operations commands.
Without denigrating the outstanding job of Marine Corps forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the statement by General Conway in reference to his knowledge of Special Operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm must be addressed.
"We were cautious up front because many of the Special Operations Forces used in the previous Gulf War had been rolled up, killed, or captured," the General said.
I am not sure which "previous Gulf War" the General references. I can comment, however, on the true professionals from the Army Special Forces, Air Force Special Operators, and Navy SEALs who performed admirably and successfully throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. To my knowledge none was "killed, captured, or rolled up" in the manner the General implied in the interview and which he used as at least part of his basis for developing reconnaissance strategy and tactics.
My personal experience with Marine Force Recon is limited to acting with other SEALs as lifeguards during Force Recon beach insertions and, during the battle of Khafji, leading a SEAL platoon to recover the communications gear and crypto of a Marine Force Recon platoon that had inadvertently left it behind after being "rolled up" by oncoming Iraqi Forces.
These two incidents aside, I would never attempt to blanket the professionalism or capabilities of the some of the finest infantry soldiers in history-the United States Marines-on the basis of this limited experience.
"Even the Army Can Come . . . From the Sea"
(See 1. Sanford, pp. 56-59, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Rick Denny, U.S. Naval Reserve-The United States already possesses a military force trained and equipped for mobile and sustained operations from the sea: the U.S. Marine Corps. Clearly there will be a reevaluation of roles and missions across the Department of Defense; the presence of Marines in Kandahar points toward this needed review. In an effort to address needed changes, former Army General Eric Shinseki began a transformation effort to make the Army more lethal, mobile, flexible, and sustainable. These characteristics sound a lot like the Marine Corps, but duplicating the Marine Corps within the Army clearly was not Shinseki's intent. That, however, is exactly what this article proposes.
The author was generous when he stated that current amphibious ship numbers are insufficient to support concurrent Marine Corps and Army deployments. To enact the author's plan would require a massive shipbuilding effort. In addition, significant portions of the Army's inventory are unsuited for operations from amphibious ships (Patriot, for example).
The Army does have forced-entry forces. The 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Mobility divisions are trained and equipped to seize airfields. The Marines are equipped and trained to seize beachheads and ports. Army operations from the sea should consist of maritime prepositioning ship offloading Army equipment in a port controlled by the Marines. Army personnel should fly into seized airfields and match up with that equipment. Combat-ready Army forces then pass through Marine lines to prosecute the war.