TacAir Trumps UAVs in Iraq

For effective strike support in any mission-regardless of threat, weather, or special circumstances that develop in combat—naval tactical air is unmatched.

With the seemingly endless number of articles published recently on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the tremendous number of UAV ads appearing in publications such as Proceedings, it is imperative that the tactical air (TacAir) community speak up regarding fixed-wing contributions to recent combat operations. A realistic means to provide an effective combat force for future scenarios is slipping away as we dedicate increased spending, provide flight-deck space, and modify tactics and training to incorporate an asset that does not meet the needs of those placed in harm's way.

The only way to develop technology and tactics to properly prepare for combat, that encompass experiences in the recent battle spaces of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, is to talk with the players who were there. What weapons worked and which did not? What tactics do we have or need to develop to properly pair ground and air elements? What technologies do we need to improve or develop to ensure our continued superiority in future conflicts? What can we get rid of in this age of budget constraints?

The Reality of Major Combat

During recent combat operations on the ground in northern Iraq, with the 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups engaged in a daily struggle for survival, we saw every day who could be counted on to deliver ordnance on time, on target, every time, no excuses-naval TacAir.

In northern Iraq, bases from which Air Force aircraft could deploy were unavailable, or it did not make sense to use Air Force aircraft stationed thousands of miles away, provide logistics and refueling to get them over the target to deliver their ordnance, then expend more time and fuel to get them back to their home bases. When Turkey closed its doors to U.S. planners, the carriers Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) moved into the eastern Mediterranean to provide 24-hour coverage by naval TacAir to 500 Army Special Forces troops engaged in battle against 100,000 Iraqi Army personnel in northern Iraq.

The F-15C community flew hundreds (if not thousands) of sorties in Operation Iraqi Freedom, playing a major role in keeping Iraqi aircraft from flying and in deterring the employment of weapons of mass destruction, but saw no combat operations in the direct support of ground forces. Even now, the F-15C community is scrambling to find U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat experts to guide them in equipping their system with air-to-ground ordnance and the infrared laser designator and range finder (LANTIRN) pod, as we did to extend the life the F-14 more than ten years ago.

What our Navy professionals did to give the Tomcat the ability to lead the TacAir community in the delivery of air-to-ground ordnance, both laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), is an example of the right way to do business. We saw what worked and made it work for us. As the recent change in designation for the F-22, now the F/A-22, shows, Air Force developers realized that the days of an air-to-air-only fighter (as good as the F-22 would have been at this mission) are over. The development of the 500-pound JDAM, as well, was done to put a piece of ordnance on that jet that would fit inside its limited internal carriage bays.

In the area of ordnance development and tactical use, consider that Iraqi Freedom was advertised as a precision conflict from day one. Ordnance pairing became a highly contested issue during the close air support campaign. Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions posed more of a problem than they solved, however. JDAM and other precision-guided munitions require precise (mensurated) coordinates to give them accurate placement. TacAir (Air Force and naval) primarily was tasked with supporting U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces encountering mobile threats (enemy tanks, personnel, etc.). Providing mensurated coordinates to strike these mobile threats with JDAM was impossible because ground forces do not carry the massive amount of equipment required to mensurate a target. Nor do they have the time to mensurate coordinates when a T-72 tank is preparing to fire on them.

The bottom line is that in support of ground forces encountering moving targets, GPS-guided munitions are useless. With this in mind, we were able to tell our naval TacAir support that when they were tasked to provide air cover for us directly, we preferred LGBs to JDAM. It worked, and we saw improved results.

The Reality of UAVs in Combat

Because Army Special Forces in northern Iraq did not have the luxury of being reinforced with infantry units prepositioned to travel through Turkey to northern Iraq, they could not quickly and effectively get UAVs in theater. UAVs were used in southern Iraq, primarily because there was enough time to stage support equipment there prior to combat commencement.

Once UAVs did become accessible to U.S. Army field commanders in northern Iraq, it took several days to get requests to those who controlled and deployed them. In the field, we had no way of knowing if our requests had been received or approved—until the UAVs showed up overhead, without warning, making excessive noise. They quite often would give away our position to those we were spotting. At that point, the targets would either change positions or start directing fire against us.

In addition, we often were providing reconnaissance on targets that were highly mobile or changing positions daily. Because we had no ability to talk with those controlling UAVs, when the craft did show up overhead they were unable to acquire any reconnaissance of benefit to us. If the target had moved a few hours or even days before, the UAV controller would have no knowledge of this and thus would direct the entire effort to an ineffective conclusion. Even if we had had a communications link to the controller, the UAVs in northern Iraq did not have ordnance on board to eliminate the target. And in such close proximity to friendly troops, a communications link is essential before ordnance is used. Imagery and results of overhead reconnaissance would take additional days to make it back out to field personnel, completing the loop of ineffectiveness.

So, what did work? Manned reconnaissance provided by U.S. Navy TacAir. Digital images from the F-14's tactical air reconnaissance pod, full capability (TARPS-FCAP), or LANTIRN often were used to beneficial conclusions. Special Forces teams could talk directly to those aircraft designated to support us and plan missions in minutes. Once those plans were transmitted in real time between air and ground units on scene, the mission could commence. Once Navy TacAir obtained reconnaissance, F-14s could transmit those results directly to Special Forces teams equipped with the lightweight video reconnaissance system. Ironically, the F-14 was the only aircraft (Navy or Air Force) equipped with and capable of using fast tactical imagery (FTI). Imagery transfers also could take place by ground units sending targets to air units. We often used this method, either direction, to enhance air support, or quickly to direct strikes against mobile targets.

Where was the UAV? It did not matter, because the capability to do this most basic mission does not exist. That, despite what UAV advocates might tell you, is what we experienced in combat operations on a daily basis in northern Iraq.

If UAVs are purchased, combat lessons attest that we need to ensure they are capable of handling the most basic and essential tasks, rather than equip them with sensors and weapons that have little place in today's battle space. First, we must ensure UAV communication capabilities allow everyone in theater who will be interacting with the UAV to talk with those who are controlling it. Whether that is a Special Forces ground soldier with a satellite radio or an F/A-18F crew with an ultra-high-frequency FM secure radio, the capability must exist at the moment the UAV comes into theater. Second, planning and use of the UAV must be quickly accessible by all involved in the theater. A UAV cannot support air objectives if by doing so it gives away secure ground positions to hostile forces. (Just about every time a UAV showed up overhead one of our positions, we literally had to run for our lives from a vastly numerically superior force.) Everyone has to have immediate access to planners and pilots of UAVs to properly direct their usage. Similarly, once a UAV is scheduled to come over a target area, everyone in that theater must be made aware of it.

But perhaps most important, we should focus on developing the payloads that have the highest payoff. Communications and transmission of imagery and reconnaissance should be addressed before any additional money is spent on equipping a UAV with ordnance. Leave the sensor-shooter, life-and-death issues to those on scene. No amount of bandwidth can communicate the situational awareness that an on-scene aviator or Special Forces team can grasp in minutes when arriving in support of target objectives.

Some UAVs, which originally were to be a cost-effective solution, are now approaching the same cost as manned assets. If it is not cheaper, why do it? Focus on doing the job the UAV was designed to do: provide reconnaissance to everyone on scene, at a fraction of the cost of manned assets, with disposability in mind.

Unfortunately, what seems to be happening instead is that programs that have been proven in combat are being canceled and increased funding is going to UAVs. For example, F-14 TARPS-FCAP has been removed from the fleet and put back on a shelf. The F-14 and F/A-18E/F FTI and SHARP (F/A-18E/F manned reconnaissance replacement for F-14 TARPS) have either been canceled or are in jeopardy. At the same time, the Navy is spending money on UAV overruns and mission objectives that do not model what we need.

The Army has taken a number of lessons learned through direct interaction with naval TacAir in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and is equipping OH-58s and AH-64s with FTI so that ground forces and Army aircraft can directly transfer imagery to better achieve mission objectives. What is the Navy doing? Canceling the program. It is time the TacAir community stands up for what it needs, and what has proved its worth in combat.

What to Do

If a seeker improvement is going to be developed to properly and inexpensively meet our needs in a tactical environment, then image-based seekers such as the Direct Attack Munition Affordable Seeker (DAMASK) and moving target killers such as the seeker in development for the Low Cost Image Guided Rocket (LOGIR) need to be procured in vast numbers. Give ordnance a chance to adapt and locate based on mobile scenarios, irrespective of precision coordinates, which no ground soldier has access to when deployed.

Give existing aircraft the ability to communicate with ground units and whatever technology is developed for future use. Equip all TacAir assets with FTI to transmit intelligence to and from national assets or ground units, by both satellite and ultra-high frequency, in minimum time. Keep the focus of UAVs geared toward inexpensive reconnaissance, accessible to all who need it at a moment's notice. Keep effective reconnaissance on board manned aircraft. When we do not have the time to set up and deploy UAVs, we have to be able to fight effectively with what we have on scene-manned assets.

Most important, strive continually to link the effective use of air power with the needs of ground units in all the services. The real meat-and-potatoes job of TacAir is to support the ground component in any combative action.

We already have some of the pieces in place; we just need to build on those. New equipment must be distributed servicewide before it is put into use, or reliance on technological improvements will be a losing battle. If you train to use a system, it must be available from day one in combat.

Although recent combat scenarios have been difficult for Air Force TacAir assets, our counterparts in the Air Force agree that placing the entire focus of future operations on UAVs is misguided. The difficulties they experience fielding their own TacAir forces do not need to be made worse by placing an asset into this equation that does not meet mission objectives but still requires similar logistical support. Future combat scenarios may lend themselves more easily to Air Force access, and keeping the man in cockpit, armed with capabilities that meet mission objectives, is a goal all TacAir elements share.

If the lessons from Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq are to be reflected in systems procurement, tactical modeling, and doctrinal effect, our primary mission must be to establish an effective link with the ground component. From my experiences on the ground with Army Special Forces, they want nothing to do with UAVs directly supporting them with ordnance and striking power. My team members used to joke about carrying Stinger missiles to protect themselves against our own UAVs.

For an effective, armed strike platform capable of support in any mission, regardless of the threat, weather, or special circumstances that often develop in combat, naval TacAir is unmatched. No one in naval aviation is advocating that technological improvements and systems development be discontinued. None of us individually has the one right answer. But it is our responsibility to stand up and ensure that the direction our leaders and contractors are taking us not only addresses our recent experience, but also gives us assets that will prove useful in future combat scenarios. We have put into motion the training and tactical employment needed to effectively join with Army Special Forces and other ground units. I hope the next time we have to learn the lessons of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it is not feet dry in combat, with peoples' lives on the line.