Once upon a time, the Navy made port calls in dress uniform. Sailors strolled proudly through the port cities of the world, sending messages such as "We come in peace" or "We have the wherewithal to come in the first place." A sailor in dress uniform received myriad messages from the locals in return, everything from "Go home, Yankee" to "Why can't we be like Americans?"
Just as sailors ashore send signals, so, too, do warships represent U.S. might and reach. To become a global power required significant resources, national determination, and the willingness to accept a certain degree of risk. Being the only superpower now is even more precarious. Yet, risk aversion may be compromising vital maritime missions.
Presence, for instance, has been negatively affected by escalated force-protection awareness since the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) and 11 September 2001. Even with all the combat in Afghanistan and Iraq recently, the national ensign and jack are seen less and less in ports in the Middle East. To many Arabs and Muslims, it must seem as though the only U.S. presence in the region is in Iraq as seen on television.
We can learn much from our allies about weighing the costs and benefits of presence against force protection. The United Kingdom, for instance, is well aware of risks, but seems more willing than we are to accept them in favor of showing the Union Jack. Both London and Moscow (another capital leery of Islamic extremism) sent warships in the past year to Aden, Yemen, where the Cole was attacked. If Yemen truly is an ally in the global war on terrorism, the benefits of a U.S. Navy return to Aden might outweigh the risks of terrorist attacks. The symbolic return of the Cole herself would send a strong signal.
For now, however, it seems that the draconian force-protection measures enacted since 11 September 2001 will continue. Instead of maximizing port calls in the Middle East, Navy units steam for months on end, slowly degrading both the gray hulls' material condition and crew morale. Further, naval doctrine seems to be moving toward an almost total reliance on logistics and sustainment at sea. Fewer port calls also mean lower retention and accession rates as the psychological impact of 11 September recedes and the arduous nature of extended sea duty hits home. Similarly, the economic and cultural exchanges that occur when a U.S. warship moors overseas are significant factors in the presence formula. Finally, showing the red, white, and blue from the mast at anchor in a foreign port is not enough—the impact of a pier-side unit with sailors ashore is much greater.
The frenzied national response that followed 11 September was understandable. Now, more than two years later, we need to reassess both the threat and our force-protection posture. What is increasingly clear is that while al Qaeda remains a capable transnational terrorist group with the intent to conduct further attacks on U.S interests, it is not, as the British put it, "ten feet tall." The 11 September attacks did not cripple U.S. global capabilities. If we disengage from the Middle East, we will make Osama bin Laden the victor. Just as we convinced the Soviet leviathan that it could not match U.S. resources, technology, and momentum, the only way to defeat terrorists is to make sure they know their efforts are for naught. We need to be aware of the asymmetric threat, but we do not have the resources to build a fortress around every service member overseas while global presence and engagement wither.
After 11 September, many called for an immediate initiative to build another set of twin towers taller than the first World Trade Center, to show the world we would not be browbeaten by terrorists. In a similar fashion, we should accept the risks and send our ships to Middle Eastern ports other than just Bahrain. We should send the Cole to Aden with her battle ensign flying—with the temerity to play the National Anthem on the 1MC circuit every morning at 0800. I would volunteer to do so, as would many others. We need to send the right message: "Bring it on."
Commander Patch, a former surface warfare officer, is an intelligence officer assigned to the U.S. Central Command. The only port call in the Middle East he ever has made is Manama, Bahrain.