Proceedings: What was your perception of the alleged meddling in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by the Office of the Secretary of Defense—especially in the planning process?
Conway: I think there's probably only one man who can answer that question and his name is General Tommy Franks, then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CentCom). If it was happening, it was transparent at my level, with one exception—and I would not call it meddling. It was simply a technique of deployment. We spent probably about six weeks, over three different conferences, preparing the time-phased force deployment data. When it came time to deploy, it actually was done by requests for forces. And each of those was scrutinized, not necessarily by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but by his office. They were lumped and approved in "groupments" of forces for deployment. Not the way we would typically do things; perhaps not the way we would advocate doing them in the future.
That said, we deployed 60,000 Marines in about 45 days, using all manner of strategic lift: Air Force aircraft, Navy ships, and black-bottom shipping. I can't complain about it too loudly because, at least for the Marine Corps, it worked.
Proceedings: Can you tell us about the intelligence support you got—intelligence preparation of the battlefield, both human and technical?
Conway: It was good. We had all the intelligence that a full Marine expeditionary force (MEF) could expect to have, because we had sources from I MEF and II MEF. Marine Force CentCom Commander Lieutenant General Earl Hailston committed what he could. Of course, we had the intelligence resources of higher headquarters to draw on and all the national imagery we could use. As always, you get more information than you do pure intelligence, and there was the distillation process we had to go through.
Proceedings: Were you able to distribute it effectively?
Conway: We were, especially before the war. I think speed of the advance caused some complications from our subordinate units' perspective under way. They weren't always able to set up their means to reach back. We weren't always able to get them a product before they shut down and moved again.
We didn't get a lot of intelligence about the Iraqis per se. For example, we were told they had civilian clothes in their packs and were just waiting to capitulate. When we attacked, they were going to get into civilian clothes and surrender or go home. Well, what they did was get into civilian clothes and fight us, which made things harder. So even with intelligence, you had interpretations that might not have been on the mark. But I would not complain about it overall.
Proceedings: Some observers, including retired general officers on TV, continue to worry that the ongoing U.S. campaign in Iraq will detract from the worldwide war on terrorism. What is your view?
Conway: I really think [OIF] is central to it. Not that we believe there were numerous ties between Iraq and terrorists, although there were some in the country. A certain momentum among the terrorists was gained after 9/11 that caused us to act in Afghanistan, that caused the President to look at that hole in New York City and say, "Never more." I think he looked around and said, Okay, who's the guy most likely to cause this type of event again—based on attitude, weapons availability, intent, which we could never fully gauge—and we went after him. And I think the momentum of terrorism has been slowed.
Proceedings: Would you describe how U.S. and allied command relations
developed for I MEF?
Conway: When we crossed the line of departure (LOD) from Kuwait on 20 March, we had roughly 81,500 people assigned to I MEF. Our to figure was just short of 90,000, about twice the size of a normal MEF.
Proceedings: All services?
Conway: All U.S. services and 20,000 Brits. We started out with the belief we would have an understrength Royal Marine commando brigade assigned to assist us in the south. When the 1st U.K. Armored Division was unable to go ashore in the north, they rotated south and were assigned to us. So, we joined a whole British division, consisting of three brigades: the commando brigade; an air assault brigade; and a U.K. armored brigade, consisting of four battle groups. These were very capable troops, with great equipment. All in all, the relationship was magnificent.
I would contrast that coverage to what we're seeing in the stabilization phase, which is not nearly as positive. I don't know why that is. We've got some folks who don't want to hear good news stories. In fact, we had one reporter tell us, "Hey, good news is no news these days. Go ahead and open your schools and do whatever. I won't be there." Every day you hear about soldiers being killed and the negative aspects of what's taking place. I really think it's starting to have strategic importance, and I hope there would be a better balance in what we're seeing.
Proceedings: How do you account for the Corps' apparently good record of public relations in OIF?
Conway: When a media rep comes to talk to me, or he comes into our camp, we say, "Go talk to the corporal; go talk to the sergeant. He'll tell you all you need to know. And we'll fill in the blanks, all right?" I've yet to see it fail. I met with a newspaper reporter the other day and he said he was absolutely amazed that commanders would have that level of confidence in their troops. He had access to everybody up and down the chain of command.
Invariably the young troops describe it like it is; they provide colorful language and tell their story. At our morning meeting each day, we had a "quote of the day" that some Marine—normally lance corporal through gunnery sergeant—had said the day before. Any officer would be hard pressed to say it better. That relative level of comfort is something that hits home runs—and the troops invariably cast us in a proper light.
Proceedings: A great deal has been reported about severe strains on the services' reserves and National Guard. How have Marine Corps Reserve forces stacked up in I MEF?
Conway: They did great. It was tough to tell the difference between an active battalion and a reserve battalion as soon as their faces got dirty and their gear got dusty. We were delighted with them. There was some difficulty in the initial call-ups and those types of things, but it was chicken feed compared to the overall performance. A battalion on the East Coast and a battalion on the West Coast were called up to assist in force-protection duties before the conflict. Those guys had been on active duty almost a year. When the time came, they didn't want to go home; they wanted to go to Iraq. That level of motivation represents what we saw in all other facets of the reserve establishment as well. I'm told the unhappiest people in the reserves are folks who did not get the call to go.
I received figures the other day verifying that about 48% of the Corps' reserve establishment was called up in one capacity or another. Is there a strain over time? Probably. But I think our program is the model for all services.
Proceedings: Are recruiting and retention in the face of continuing major commitments your biggest challenges today?
Conway: You know, the troops are doing wonderfully. We had a couple of battalions take "head fakes"—they thought they were going home earlier and that got changed. If you go to those units now and ask them, they'll tell you, "Hey, I'll go home when my battalion commander tells me I can go home. We're here; we're making a difference." They even have a sense of ownership about those cities where they are located.
The one thing we face, an age-old problem for the Corps, is simply having enough money to buy everything we need. Although I did discover—and it was a nice lesson to learn—we are probably state-of-the-art in most of our communications equipment and training.
Proceedings: How has the profession—and the Corps' professionals—changed since you graduated from Southeast Missouri State and were commissioned?
Conway: We've got a lot more married Marines than before, which has its impact when you deploy and in how you take care of the families back home. But there are some great programs in place that have adjusted to that new dynamic and we're good to go.
The Corps' ability to deploy any unit and expect it to do great things is far better than it was before. We had an executive conference two months ago, when Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael Hagee met with his three-star generals. I said I knew that senior body is responsible for making adjustments that will prosper the Marine Corps in the long term. But I also said we are closer to institutional excellence than we have been in my 32 years in the Corps, and we should be very careful of things we would change. At this point, our go-to-war capabilities are the envy of the other services.