Interview: General Raymond G. Davis, USMC (Ret.): 'They Never Faltered or Fell Back'

Two months before his death on 3 September 2003, the former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps spoke with Gordon I. Peterson—on assignment for the Naval Institute—in Atlanta, Georgia. General Davis was awarded the Navy Cross in World War II, the Medal of Honor in the Korean War, and the Distinguished Service Medal in the Vietnam War. He also chaired the Design Committee for the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. (where he stands here), and returned to the battlefields surrounding North Korea's Chosin Reservoir in the 1990s to assist in the location and return of remains of soldiers and Marines still listed as missing in action.

Proceedings: What qualities distinguished the "Old Corps" of 16,000 Marines prior to World War II from the three-division force of nearly 180,000 today?

Davis: Promotions were so rare that some of the captains had been in that grade for 10 or 15 years. The second thing was that the only experiences we heard about in great detail were actions in Central America. We heard very little about experiences in World War I.

People like [then-Captain] Chesty Puller, my leadership instructor at the Basic School, were perfectionists. He would go down the ranks, and if your foot was a small angle out of line, he would stop and explain it to you. He had us try on our uniforms and then inspected us individually. If he could fit a fist inside your belt, it was too loose. Others would lecture us about everything-almost quoting the books to us. Their attention to detail was impressive.

We had no field units before our expansion in World War II. As non-Naval Academy graduates, most of us were sent to sea for our first tour. About 40 Marines were aboard my first ship, the USS Portland (CA-33), a heavy cruiser. The first lesson I learned came when the first sergeant lined up the Marines and introduced me to each one. We reached the end of the line and I asked, "Top, could I have a copy of your list of Marines." He said, "Sir, it's all right here in my head." So I picked up on the idea.

Proceedings: Do some of the traits of the Old Corps transcend the generations to today's young Marines?

Davis: That is the secret of the Corps. We have stuck to the ideals and ideas of "all for one and one for all." That has transpired and continued from my early days until now. That is what marks the Corps as a special unit.

Proceedings: Was Puller as demanding of himself as he was of his Marines?

Davis: I think so. He commanded the 1st Regiment [of the 1st Marine Division] at Peleliu, and I commanded the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment. He actually sought me out to take that battalion, even though I was a junior major. As a commander he impressed me with his total effort to support the troops. Anytime we got in trouble you could depend on him to get support, reinforcements, or whatever it took. Some people say he pressed too hard, but to me he never pressed me or forced me. What he did was to support me, and I appreciated that.

In my experience as a combat commander my first and total interest was in seeing that my units succeeded. I tried to be on the scene to ensure they were supported with reinforcements, increased firepower, or whatever was necessary to make sure they would win every skirmish. A group of Marines, properly supported with artillery and air power, will never fall back or give up. They will seize the objective if you support them.

Proceedings: What were the key lessons learned from the assault at Peleliu in September 1944?

Davis: There were many lessons, but intelligence totally failed us. The Japanese had owned this island since World War I. They had cut five levels of caves with small apertures for machine gun fire, small platforms for mortars, and steel doors that could open for artillery. All of this was concealed. The Japanese had moved all the natives off the island, so they could not tell us anything. We were told to go ashore and upgrade the airfield in order to support [General Douglas] MacArthur's return to the Philippines. We had no idea we would have that kind of combat. They started firing at us as we were approaching the beach. It was just a terrible endeavor against an enemy who was not supposed to be there.

But again, I was very proud of the Marines. They never faltered or fell back. They had to halt now and then to allow for naval gunfire, but they continued in a positive manner to seize their objectives even though the casualty rate was extreme.

Proceedings: What was your most surprising experience in World War II?

Davis: I guess initially it was the surprise of going to Guadalcanal and finding no immediate opposition. At Peleliu, we were told we would go ashore to upgrade an airfield and get some exercise. But on the way to the beach we started receiving fire. The total intelligence failure at Peleliu was the most meaningful surprise of all.

Proceedings: What common elements best describe your combat experiences at varying levels of command in three wars?

Davis: The key is the operation of the small unit. The key for the commander is to support those units-to see that reinforcements, firepower, or whatever is needed is provided to ensure their success.

I had 60 four-man intelligence teams in Vietnam [as commander of the 3d Marine Division in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam], and I kept 20 on the ground at all times to hide for two or three days and then return to tell us what they saw. This is the counter-to know where the enemy is, their supplies, and their outposts. If you have good information, you can destroy the enemy.

Proceedings: You applied innovation to good effect at Camp Pendleton when you took your 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines to war in Korea in 1950. Could you elaborate?

Davis: When the war started the 7th Marine Regiment didn't exist. It had been deleted after World War II, and we needed to form a new regiment. When I arrived at Camp Pendleton in August 1950, [Colonel Homer L.] Litzenberg, commanding officer of the 7th Marines, asked for me and told me that I had five days to form a new 1st Battalion, get it on a ship, and get to war.

Fortunately, we had World War II experience. After our supplies came, we took trucks around to the platoons that had been formed. My officers asked, "Anyone want to go to Korea?" Everyone who was scattered around the base got on the trucks, as we said, with no momma and no poppa. We offered them jobs in the 1st Battalion, and they all got on the trucks. We had a full complement of 800 in one day. I never let them forget that they were volunteers.

Proceedings: Many of these troops had no combat experience when they landed in Korea. How did you shape them into an effective fighting force?

Davis: We had a total of 18 days at sea, and we worked day and night to get the units organized. We put them through drills, communications, and so forth. Then, when we landed in reserve at Inchon [as the reserve battalion of the 1st Marine Division's reserve regiment, the 7th Marines] we had three days to train with attacks on hills, practice with our weapons, and maneuver. Fortunately, the first enemy we met was not very strong, but we had enough experience to further our confidence. We then moved up north of Seoul and had some fire and maneuver against a real enemy. It was a gradual development, and there's no question they developed into a first-class outfit.

Proceedings: In December 1950 you led what has been called one of the most remarkable feats of combat arms-a three-day operation to rescue Fox Company of the 7th Regiment's 2nd Battalion that was surrounded behind enemy lines by a Chinese regiment during its redeployment south from the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. Your battalion also opened a mountain pass for the escape of two trapped Marine regiments. The wind chill was 70[degrees] below zero. What memories stand out most sharply from that epic mission?

Davis: The thing that sticks with me most is the determination of those Marines under those conditions. They continued to press forward because they were going to rescue other Marines. It was all for one and one for all. That was the biggest impression. In my dealings with individuals in the units it was obvious that they were totally committed to the task. It did not matter that they had ice all over their faces or had nothing to eat owing to their frozen food and frozen water. Nothing mattered but that we were going to get Fox Company.

Proceedings: What enabled your Marines to achieve the seemingly impossible?

Davis: It begins at boot camp. I have been exposed to many young Marines. Initially, at boot camp, they act as individuals. They find out immediately that things go much better if they form a team and take care of one another.

Proceedings: Looking back after the passage of more than 50 years, how do you remember your troops?

Davis: Under almost impossible circumstances they never faltered. Now and then I would find a Marine down in the snow, a physical failure, and we would work to get him going again. The whole attitude was to move forward, to fend off the fire-power we were facing, and to take care of one another. To me, the secret of our whole success was their determination and commitment.

Proceedings: In Vietnam, how challenging was it to implement high-mobility operations aimed at engaging and destroying the enemy during your command of the 3d Marine Division?

Davis: I had an advantage because I had served a couple of months as a deputy corps commander [deputy commanding general, Provisional Corps, I Corps region of the Republic of Vietnam, under U.S. Army Lieutenant General William Rosson]. I saw the high maneuver of the Army divisions operating from a rear area. They were not tied down to fixed defenses. When I had orders to take over the 3d Division [in 1968] I became convinced that we would immediately change the total defensive arrangement to generate some offensive force so that when the enemy came in, we would not just push him back but we would surround him and destroy him.

I started this evolution within an hour of taking over the division. The troops who were totally committed to defensive positions were a bit shocked when I said that before night our battalion defensive positions were going to be reduced to company-sized defensive positions. Our "hiding-away" battalions became companies. Immediately we generated an offensive force by reducing the size of the defensive positions. Once this was done, within a couple of days, the troops were pleased and excited about it. For the first time, they were out on the trail looking for the enemy instead of hiding away in their foxholes.

Proceedings: Did the situation on the battlefield change by the time you left Vietnam in 1969?

Davis: Oh yes. This was Quang Tri Province, the northernmost province in South Vietnam and the most exposed. We were able to go into the hills and get all of the enemy's supplies and medical facilities. We went into every village to get the Vietcong and establish small defensive positions. My one-liner was: "They made it safer than downtown Atlanta streets-in four months."

Proceedings: You awarded your son, 1st Lieutenant Miles Davis, his second Purple Heart for wounds received while serving in Vietnam in your division.

Davis: The first thing Miles said to me when we met in Vietnam was that he did not want me interfering with his career. The next thing he said was that he wanted to command a rifle platoon. He was in the field for six months at his own request and insistence. I would get out and visit him from time to time.

Proceedings: When he commanded the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, Army General [Creighton W.] Abrams remarked that, "of the 50 or so division commanders I have known in Vietnam, General Davis has no peer-he's the best." What was it about your leadership that moved General Abrams to describe you in such terms?

Davis: I think the fact that I was able to turn the division overnight into an offensive posture and had great success at a total commitment to the offensive-capturing thousands of weapons and destroying four North Vietnamese divisions in four months-impressed Abrams. In fact, when [U.S. Army General Richard G.] Dick Stillwell, who later became the corps commander, was down in Saigon describing one of my operations to Abrams, he said Abrams was so excited he bit his cigar. He was impressed with what Davis was doing up there.

Proceedings: Looking back over your years of military service, did you seek to cultivate a leadership style and follow through with that vision during your career?

Davis: It impressed me when I went to sea duty and saw the commitment of the first sergeant in knowing each one of his troops. Everywhere I went I tried to be fully aware of the individuals in my outfit. This generated a leadership style that paid off heavily.

Proceedings: Your autobiography [The Story of Ray Davis (Fuquay Varina, NC: Research Triangle Publishing, 1995), written with the assistance of Colonel William J. Davis (no relation)] also describes a leadership style in which you often would make "suggestions" instead of issuing direct orders.

Davis: Some of my subordinates said that, but I think they understood that my suggestions were to be followed. And they were.

Proceedings: Judging from its recent performance in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps has truly institutionalized the art of operational-maneuver warfare to an exceptional degree. What is your assessment?

Davis: From what I have seen and what I have heard, the Marine Corps was the only service prepared to go immediately. This long-range projection of force was the result of the Navy-Marine Corps team, with its total commitment to the combined arms of air and ground. I was surprised with the speed and the efficiency with which they operated.

Proceedings: How has the current political impasse with North Korea affected your efforts to identify and return from North Korea the remains of those still carried on the roles as missing in action?

Davis: As far as North Korea is concerned, efforts to recover our war dead are totally stymied because of the situation relating to that country's nuclear weapons program. My efforts for veterans were based on my experience in three wars. I saw Marines perform and my appreciation for their total commitment multiplied in such a way that I have been devoted to veterans and their causes. The Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington was a seven-year effort.

With the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, I helped form the U.S.-Korea 2000 Foundation, a nationwide commitment to commemorate the end of the war and show appreciation for the veterans. I go to veterans' reunions-the 1st Division on the West Coast in July and the 3d Division in Nashville in August. I formed a coordinating council in Atlanta and Korean War Veterans Chapter.

Proceedings: Is there any one sentiment that comes to you as you consider the 50th anniversary of the cease-fire and armistice?

Davis: For the first time we no longer talk about the "Forgotten War." The memorial in Washington, the commemoration, and identifying those who served have been very positive in terms of finally recognizing the Korean War veterans.

Proceedings: Do you agree with the premise of today's Marine Corps leaders that the Corps enlists a Marine but retains a family?

Davis: The family becomes a part of the Corps-and it must. Our commitment is such that the family at home is one of the keys to our successful efforts everywhere we go.

Proceedings: What main lessons did you learn fighting for your country and the Corps in three major wars?

Davis: The commitment of adequate forces is one. Vietnam was a total disaster, because we made only a partial commitment and never supported our forces there. When the war started I was serving in manpower [in 1965 at Headquarters Marine Corps]. The stated requirement was 500,000 troops for one year to get it done and come home. The politicians said they could not provide the money, and they could not call up the reserves. It took four years to replace the reserves with draftees and four years to get the force out there-contrary to the Persian Gulf [in 1990] when we got the force there in four months.

More than 53,000 mostly young Americans were killed in Vietnam. That was a terrible price to pay for the lack of commitment. I hope it never happens again. If there is a problem somewhere in the world where our country needs to go, we should go with a massive force, get it done, and come home. You do that two or three times and you may not have to go. Overwhelming force is the one lesson I would promote most vigorously.

Proceedings: What would you say to a young Marine officer or noncommissioned officer by way of counsel or advice?

Davis: Know your Marines. Every lieutenant and captain should know those Marines in his command-their names, their backgrounds, their interests. I would tell young Marine officers or noncommissioned officers to respond to that.