"UAVs Need Doctrine & Tactics"
(See W. Johnson, pp. 37-39, April 2003 Proceedings)
Captain William J. Toti, U.S. Navy—Commander Johnson is exactly right when he calls for a Navy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) doctrine, and one is being developed by Navy staff today. January's Giant Shadow experiment demonstrated the value of high- and low-level UAVs. But a few real-world constraints are emerging as we use UAVs. These constraints have to be accepted and adopted in any doctrine we develop:
- Low-level UAVs, including Predator, must be considered "disposable." One of the virtues of UAVs is we can send them in dangerous places where we don't want to send manned aircraft. But survivability costs money. The combination of those two conditions results in a real-world constraint that we will continue to lose UAVs. It might not make sense to continue to fund multimillion dollar de facto disposable UAVs such as Predator. We might have to pursue lower cost UAVs to serve the same purpose.
- If we want to field UAVs in the mid-term, we have to work with what we have. If we want to execute UAV doctrine in the mid-term, we'll have to base these UAVs on platforms that will exist in the mid-term. Hence, we should focus on large-volume sea-basing platforms such as amphibious shipping and guided-missile submarines.
- We can't afford to start with a clean sheet of paper. If we want to move forward quickly and cheaply, then "better" is the enemy of "good enough." There are several low-cost UAVs on the market today. We must spend money on adaptation and procurement, not initial design.
We have to think holistically about architecture. To that end, the UAV "customer" might not be other Navy units, but instead might be a Marine expeditionary unit, a separate Army brigade, or a Tomahawk land-attack missile planner. To that end, we need to work out how the UAV pipes will fit into something few people talk about today—the theater information grid. In doing so, we will again need to leverage existing over-the-horizon systems. Here is another area where a "better" intellectually satisfying solution such as a tactical common data link or global broadcast system might be the enemy of a "good enough" but less interoperable solution such as Iridium.
In short, this is the perfect opportunity to determine whether "spiral development" can be an acquisition method.
"Bin Laden's Faith Is a Pretext for Violence"
(See M. Tomlinson, pp. 64-65, March 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Arabic linguist—Lieutenant Tomlinson brought out several important points in his article about knowing who our enemies are and how they tick. I disagree with his statement that "a significant number of Muslims in the world are expressing their religious zeal by waging a bloody jihad against everyone who is not with them." The words "significant number" are misleading. The reality is that a cadre of educated Islamic militants have packaged the teachings of Abdul-Wahab (founder of Wahabism) as well as Ibn Taymiyyah (a 13th-century commentator on jihad). They pass these writings as theology to young Muslims who are hungry, semiliterate, poor, and whose only opportunity for schooling is madrassahs that preach intolerance.
It is important to heed the words of President George W. Bush, who, on the night of 11 September 2001, said, "I believe there is a reason that history has matched this nation with this time; America strives to be tolerant and just. We respect the faith of Islam, even as we fight those whose actions defile that faith." The President understands that this is a war of extremist ideology in which even Muslims who do not practice the kind of Islam Bin Laden wants have no room in his militant world. Madrassah teachers funded by Islamic militants conveniently wipe out 1,400 years of Islamic thought, and worse, completely disregard important aspects of Islamic history, Prophet Muhammad's sayings (the Hadith), and the Quran.
Madrassahs discuss imagined conspiracies against Islam instead of the importance of Christians in the development of early Islam. The Madrassahs do not dwell on the significance of the Constitution of Medina that Muhammad developed, allowing Muslims, Jews, and non-Muslims to live as one community (a revolution in the seventh century). These schools teach Ibn Taymiyyah's lust for jihad instead of other Islamic thinkers known as the Mutazillites who believed that truth could be attained through logic and reason. If these Muslim youths took the time for proper Islamic education, they would discover that Muslim women in Prophet Muhammad's Medina ran trading houses, organized caravans, and played a pivotal role in Islamic society. They also would discover the historical context in which about 70 "war" verses in the Quran were revealed to Prophet Muhammad as a means of self-preservation from the genocide of Muslims committed by his stronger Meccan adversaries. This theological exploration does not fit the political agenda of bin Laden and other militants, as they choose only elements of Islam out of context to reinforce and justify their campaign of violence. The Quran contains verses that forbid compelling people to religion and also the concept of treating one another with kindness, not on the basis of tribe, but on the basis of being a fellow human being. The Quran also discusses how the murder of a single person unjustly is like killing an entire nation. Bin Laden intentionally has forgotten these verses as he engages in his worldwide carnage and call for death and mayhem.
The challenge is to discredit bin Laden's message and that of his ideologue Ayman Al-Zawahiri, revealing that their Islamic views are violent and harmful to all civilizations. President Bush reiterated this in his 8 November 2001 speech at the World Congress Center in Atlanta, saying, "We [Americans] respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims." This is not just politics but words based on reality. Muslims have a responsibility to discredit Islamic militant slogans. We will, in the end, capture or kill Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. Their message and writings, however, must be discredited just as Hitler's Mein Kampf is viewed with contempt today and is read as a lesson of how not to lapse into fascism. I hope for a day in which Al-Zawahiri's books Knights under the Prophet's Banner and Bitter Harvest are viewed by future generations as how religious extremism was used to entice people into hate, violence, and murder. Giving an alternate message to the violent slogans offered by militants must take place as part of war on terrorism.
"The New Arab Way of War"
(See P. Layton, pp. 62-63, March 2003; H. Archer, pp. 22-24, April 2003 Proceedings)
Professor Brian Loring Villa, Professor of History, University of Ottawa, former Captain, U.S. Army—I was troubled by this article in which the author advocated that the United States adopt counterterrorism tactics along the line of those practiced with little success by Ariel Sharon.
Captain Layton arrives at this recommendation by setting up a false choice: either the United States and the world passively accept Islamic radicalism (which is what Layton intends when he writes of "Arab" radicalism), or it must adopt a policy of counterterrorism by striking back at cities and communities that might harbor a small minority who might support terrorism. Layton accepts that the vast majority of the victims of this action will not have supported terrorism.
The falsity of this choice is that it entirely ignores the real and vital choice of addressing the springs of terrorism. For more than 50 years, the Islamic world has been caught between an inability to accept the desolation of the Palestinian people and the inability to find any way to fight Israel conventionally. Israel's armament program has either been provided or paid for by the United States. This half-century of frustration has now reached the level of incandescent anger that many predicted more than 60 years ago.
A second source is the inability of Islam to achieve what Pope John XXIII called aggiornamento, updating tradition and practice to be consistent with modern society. The two problems are related because the humiliation imposed by Israel, the United States, and the West makes it impossible for modernizers to revise Sharia, which in the circumstances would be seen as apostasy through westernization.
We need, therefore, a twofold approach: a just peace in the Middle East manned by a U.N. peacekeeping force and the establishment of cultural institutes to sponsor interfaith dialogue so that imams may see how other traditional Middle Eastern-derived faiths have managed to adapt and survive in the modern world.
Layton's implied "nuke 'em" will only aggravate these problems.
I would add that Layton's proposal is fundamentally un-American. In the 18th century, colonial elites were won over to the American revolution when Britain, unable to discipline the Sons of Liberty and other radicals, punished the colonies in blanket form with the "Intollerable Acts." The winning argument became that because Britain cannot distinguish between the guilty and the innocent, it has failed to govern, and all allegiance is rightly dissolved. That is at the roots of American independence, and the adoption of Layton's strategy amounts to a betrayal of the revolutionary heritage.
"Pacific Faces Crisis in Intel Analysis"
(See M. Studeman, pp. 64-67, January 2003; K. Dunbar, pp. 14-16, February 2003; C. Schuster, pp. 18-20, March 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Chuck Werchado, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I think Lieutenant Commander Studeman and Lieutenant Commander Dunbar did an excellent job identifying problems in all-source operational intelligence analysis, but they stopped one step short of identifying a potential solution. We cannot allow analysts to be merely a classified CNN, reporting current information, but should not stop with them just being information archivists. I attended the daily intelligence briefs at Fleet Ocean Surveillance Center Norfolk for a year, and was continually frustrated. A foreign activity would occur—say a patrol aircraft flight—and the admiral would ask "why?" Out came volumes of data, noting that this was the first flight since October, it was not a normal training day, or something similar, but the admiral's question was never answered. The reason is that Commander Dunbar is wrong that "a simple spreadsheet with historical activity is all that is needed to provide effective OpIntel analysis." A trained operations analyst also is needed. I ran an all-source fusion center on board an aircraft carrier for three years and completed the Ocean Surveillance Information System/Operational Intelligence course, but I did not became an effective analyst until I left active duty and took probability and statistical analysis courses.
Our community believes that teaching someone about intelligence makes them an intelligence analyst; what it really makes them is an intelligence officer or specialist. We need to rigorously train our personnel in analytical techniques—what makes an event a statistically significant deviation, as opposed to merely background noise. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) at Monterrey has an excellent operations research analysis program, which finally is open to intelligence officers. Realistically, though, the numbers attending are small, and this will never provide enough graduates to staff our all-source fusion centers. NPGS should work with the Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center to develop a shorter operations research course, ideally as part of the basic officer/enlisted intelligence training, and offer an online version for current operational intelligence personnel.
"Total Force 'Outsources' War Fighting"
(See P. Clausen, p. 2, April 2003 Proceedings)
Major General Larry Taylor, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Reserve—Lieutenant Colonel Clausen correctly identifies the symptoms, but he has misdiagnosed the disease. He writes that "the Total Force concept is faulty" because it commits reserves "routinely to daily operations." The very first memo on Total Force from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, however, refers to the reserve components (RC) as "the primary source of augmentation . . . in any future emergency." That memo also makes it clear that the RC "can perform peacetime missions as a byproduct."
It is clear to me that, at least from Desert Storm until 11 September 2001, the intended "byproduct" became the product. The problem is not the Total Force concept, but rather the 1990s perversion of the original intent of Total Force.
I don't, however, want my criticism to detract from his excellent point regarding the need for a strategic reserve. Whenever we hear someone say the reserve component is fully committed, we should ask, "Then what is our reserve?" We learned at the tactical level that when you commit your reserve, one of the first things you do is reconstitute another reserve. I think that is true at the strategic level as well.
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003; V. Addison, M. Collins, D. Richardson, pp. 11-13, April 2003 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn (Retired), President, Naval Historical Foundation, former Chairman of the Naval Institute Editorial Board—Admiral Marfiak asked for opinions on accepting anonymous submissions to our journal. That such a question should ever be asked should rile the blood of any true warrior. If the role of the naval leader is not to "Dann the torpedoes, go ahead," what is it? Can we expect an author afraid of argument or afraid of retribution not to be afraid when the shells explode, the missiles fly, or the torpedoes come straight and true? Courage of convictions is as important as courage under fire. The naval services do not deliver anonymous ordnance on target. Naval authors should not be permitted to deliver anonymous writings to the public.
The argument for anonymity most frequently stems from fear of retribution by an unreasonable senior or the "system." I submit that if retribution happens (and I doubt that it does), or the "system" does in an author, then the senior leadership in the naval services is at fault, and I find that hard to believe, too. No leader can survive without hearing and considering manifold points of view. No leader who has attained the upper reaches of the naval hierarchy could have attained such august responsibility depending upon himself alone. Sycophancy does not help leaders, but honest opinion clearly and forcefully stated does. If such opinion comes anonymously, it's no better than rumor.
On the other hand, there may indeed be some individuals, newly arrived to positions of responsibility, who think their selection has endowed them with superior intellect or who think, mistakenly, that they are "protecting" their seniors by stifling unpopular views or views counter to the current or popular trends. Where this is the case, senior leaders must come down hard on the offenders. Better yet, they can inculcate in new flag officers and prospective commanding officers that a little dissent is okay.
In summary: anonymity is for wimps. Warriors speak their piece and take incoming or credit, as the case may be.
Captain Joseph M. Mazzafro, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Generally, I do not think publishing articles anonymously is a wise practice because the identity of the author informs the reader about the author's viewpoint and motivation. Given the chilly reaction, however, that certain senior serving naval intelligence officers have given to Lieutenant Commander Mike Studeman's March 2003 article ("Pacific Faces Crisis in Intel Analysis"), I have to agree reluctantly that anonymous publishing is necessary on a case-by-case basis if the Naval Institute wants to get it straight from more junior officers. I am concerned that if this well-written article is not viewed by his seniors as constructive criticism to be considered (but not necessarily agreed with), then few in naval intelligence will be interested in taking part in the Naval Intelligence Essay Contest. Or worse, they will stick to noncontroversial discussions. In retrospect, it might have been better had the author been described as a "lieutenant commander with broad experience in the Pacific."
Pruitt Hall—From my perspective, it is telling that of the three responses in the March issue, the retired Army colonel votes for anonymity and the two retired naval officers encourage the opposite. I manage a portion of technology services for an information technology consulting company. I'll take ex-military employees any day. They all exhibit professionalism, courtesy, and determination. Ex-Army professionals, however, do not join groups quickly or provide team discussion and collateral (unless presented by ex-Army people). Every single team meeting seems to start off with a "We did a network like that in the Army, back in Arizona. We should implement that here." The ex-Navy professionals, however, seem to value the discourse of opinions.
Having said that, I agree that Proceedings should not allow anonymous commentary. Proceedings is enjoyed by civilians, government officials, military personnel, and historians alike. The reputation of the magazine depends on its credibility Even as a civilian, I always trust what I read because it carries on the Navy's tradition, as Rear Admiral Holland stated, of "responsible dissent."
I discussed this with an ex-Army professional. He stated, "Proceedings is considering anonymity? Man, that was the one place we could always count on to go to when we had a different opinion than the Army!" I think that says it all.
"Lewis and Clark II: To Explore America's Coastal Oceans"
(See D. Walsh, p. 89, December 2002 Proceedings)
Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Don Walsh has provided a valuable service in highlighting the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as one of the most complex and challenging oceanic "zones." He concisely and correctly notes that this is a zone where a nation has sovereign rights over resources, economic activity, and control of pollution from the surface of the ocean to beneath the seafloor and jurisdiction over other functions. He builds a strong and convincing case for the United States to accelerate efforts to survey this vast area.
By comparing the United States' 3.9-billion-acre EEZ to the land acquired in conjunction with the Louisiana Purchase, however, he may be unwittingly conveying the impression that the United States has rights in the EEZ that approach those on land. Nothing could be further from the truth. In addition, one of the most contentious issues facing the United States in general and the U.S. Navy in particular is the egregious EEZ claims made by coastal nations today—claims that would substantially hinder the freedom of navigation rights so important to our nation and our Navy.
Article 55 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the EEZ as an area where the coastal state has rights, jurisdiction, and duties and where the coastal state shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other states and shall act in a manner compatible with other provisions of the Convention. These other provisions—too numerous to list completely here—include such things as freedom of navigation and overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other rights. While the coastal state has the "first right" regarding exploiting living resources in the EEZ, Article 62 of UNCLOS charges the coastal state to give other states access to those resources that are beyond the capacity of the coastal state to harvest. In addition, in harvesting the living resources of the EEZ, the coastal state does not have carte blanche, but is charged to comply with United Nations and other international agreements regarding fishing and conservation.
Importantly, the EEZ is an area where the coastal state has clearly delineated sovereign rights over exploring and exploiting the resources therein, not sovereignty over the entire oceanic expanse contained by the EEZ. This is an important distinction.
"The International Criminal Court"
(See S. Davis, pp. 70-73, March 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Robert C. Whitten, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—This excellent article covered essentially all of the objections to that body. As Commander Davis points out, the powers of the court are almost limitless and could be construed in such a way as to forbid even criticizing the court. I have thoroughly gone through the web site (http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html) and found the founding statute to be even more mischievous than the author describes it. With respect to congressional action, I would suggest legislation making it illegal for the court to try any U.S. citizen, with a penalty of 20 years imprisonment for any judge, prosecutor, clerk, bailiff guard, or other staff member who participates in such a trial. The president should be authorized to use force to free the accused.
"Coast Guard Essay Contest"
Captain W. Russell Webster, U.S. Coast Guard—The Naval Institute's decision to put the Coast Guard's essay contest in "hiatus" status to increase impact and decrease the organization's administrative burden needs to be revisited.
Sometime around the time of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Naval Institute made the decision to quietly diminish the prominence of the senior continuous seagoing service in Proceedings by eliminating the annual Coast Guard essay contest.
In today's homeland security and national defense context, the Coast Guard has 11 cutters and more than 600 personnel deployed with its sister services overseas. It has been designated the lead federal agency for the maritime security of 95,000 miles of coastline and 351 ports. Coincident with the epochal transition of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security, the Naval Institute's decision appears ill timed.
Further exacerbating the situation—and cause for criticism—was the independent action to make this important decision about a service-wide essay contest without inviting the active debate of its members and subscribers.
There can be no substitute—not even an issue devoted to the Coast Guard—that can take the place of an active, even-keeled forum like that of an essay contest that invites input from all ranks and rates.
"A New Navy for a New World"
(See J. Byron, pp. 86-88, March 2003 Proceedings)
David J. Berger, Contract Administrator, Defense Contract Management Agency Boston—Captain Byron has the right idea when it comes to power projection. Less certainly would be more. In this light, we have a new weapon system coming on line that would be more capable and less expensive then a Tomahawk cruise missile. The new Advanced Gun System would be a perfect fit for the littoral warfare that the author describes.
The munitions from this gun would not be anywhere near as expensive as a missile. Not only could the gun fire at a specific target, such as a ship, just like a missile, but it also could fire for effect for amphibious landings and land-based maneuvering from the sea. The economics are just not there to afford a sustained operation with missiles as the priority weapon for a long period of time.
The munitions also take up less space on a ship. A ship can have more shells for firing, and can replace them more easily during replenishment at sea. I have not seen replenishment at sea for a vertically launched missile platform.
An enemy can shoot down a missile and use electric countermeasures against a missile. I do not know a defense that could shoot down a 155-mm shell hurtling down at twice the speed of sound.
I would not suggest an arsenal ship as Captain Byron does. Though the ship itself would be less expensive then an Aegis cruiser, the amount of rounds the arsenal ship would hold would make it that much more of a target and that much more valuable. Also, these ships, with more than 100 missiles when fully loaded, would be just as expensive as an Aegis destroyer. One well-placed hit, and more than 100 multimillion dollar missiles would be on the bottom of the sea. An arsenal ship would not be able to defend itself as well as a regular combatant because it is made to be a launch platform only.
In conjunction with this new weapon system mentioned above, a new platform should also be used. For littoral warfare, a harder target with armor protection needs to be developed because it would be closer to the enemy. I suggest bringing back the battle cruiser, the gun cruiser, or gun destroyer, with between four and eight of these new guns in single or dual mounts for their main armament and then a secondary allotment of strike missiles for long-range targets.
The cruiser or destroyer would be a great gun platform. We also should have it armored for protection using Kevlar or armor from an Abrams tank. This armor could defeat most antiship missiles that are in today's maritime arsenals. These ships would be cheaper than Aegis, show our presence in the area, and be able to support the Marines in amphibious landings. A commander would be more willing to put this type of ship in harm's way. A smaller crew size would be made possible by the automation of the gun system and a reduced electronics suite. I am not suggesting a new battleship, but there is something to be said for a strong ship with large-caliber guns. Going back to the old ways might be the way to go in the new century.
"Virtual Reality Will Never Replace Live-Fire Training"
(See J. Winkler, p. 128, March 2003 Proceedings)
Major Madison H. Crum Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I wholeheartedly agree that virtual training will never replicate live training. As an airborne forward air controller in the OV-10 Bronco and a ground forward air controller, I can attest that nothing takes the place of using live bombs in close proximity to friendly troops. While virtual training is useful, it is impossible to re-create the fluidity of real people moving on the ground. It is impossible to duplicate the knowledge that a mistake is going to kill people.
"Is Manned Space Flight Worth It?"
(See J. Byron, pp. 120-121, March 2003 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, U.S. Navy, (Retired), former NASA Adminstrator, 1989-1992—In the aftermath of the loss of the Columbia and her astronauts it is proper to ask hard questions about the proper balance between human and robotic capabilities in space. But Captain Byron goes overboard in diminishing the tangible accomplishments of the space shuttle and International Space Station programs, and in belittling the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) motivation for conducting its space research and exploration missions.
Captain Byron's description of the national launch capability decisions following the Challenger accident is oversimplified enormously. During about a six-month period from late 1985 through the spring of 1986, two Titan 34-Ds, a Delta, and an Atlas were lost in addition. The nation's entire space program was grounded. Together, NASA and the Defense Department argued to replace the Challenger and reinvigorate the expendable launch vehicle program. National security missions remained on the shuttle for years afterward.
Yes, the space shuttle is a complex capability that can't be used for all of our missions. But without it, we would not enjoy the Hubble Space Telescope's incredible scientific results, the scientific results realized through microgravity experiments on 111 shuttle missions, the research facility of the International Space Station, or the benefit of the shuttle's contribution to national security.
NASA's motivation in combining human capabilities such as the shuttle and International Space Station with its robotic spacecraft is expressed in the agency's statement of mission goals, which remind us how consequential our knowledge of the universe will be to our future as a species. Those goals are to "understand and protect the home planet, explore the Universe and search for life, and inspire the next generation of explorers."
In my view, NASA is fortunate to be under the leadership of Administrator Sean O'Keefe, who has worked to properly align the agency's capabilities with these mission goals, ensuring that the U.S. public's interests in having a robust but balanced aeronautics and space program are met. In this regard, the importance of NASA's aeronautics research is not being overlooked. For the upcoming fiscal year, the administration is proposing to spend nearly $1 billion on NASA's aeronautics research activities to help develop technologies to create a safer, more secure, environmentally friendly, and efficient air transportation system, and increase performance of aircraft in collaboration with the Defense Department.
These are very difficult times, and Sean O'Keefe and the nation have some excruciating decisions ahead. The independent Columbia Accident Investigation Board must complete its work about the causes of the Columbia accident, and the steps that are necessary to return to shuttle flight operations. Fortunately, NASA is working through its Integrated Space Transportation Plan, developed prior to the loss of Columbia, demonstrating that NASA has been planning for an orderly transition to the next era of spaceflight.
Is human space exploration worth it? You bet it is. As President George W. Bush said during the memorial for the Columbia astronauts, "The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness, and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind is in their debt."
Space flight is risky business, and when the day comes that the shuttle is replaced with new technology, it still will be risky. For now, the proper response to this terrible accident is to learn from the mistakes that contributed to the accident and move forward with space activities that will benefit the lives of millions of people on Earth. That is exactly what NASA intends to do, and the Navy and Marine Corps will be there, too.
"Sea Strike: Projecting Persistent, Responsive, and Precise Power"
(See C. Dawson, J. Nathman, pp. 54-58, December 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Evan Shipe, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I see that we're now up C5ISR(EW) in our attempts to throw every ingredient into this alphabet soup. Where will it end? Using this trend as a benchmark, Davy Farragut won the Battle of Mobile Bay using C2PQSBWSIM (command and control using pens, quills, semaphore, bullhorns, wooden ships and iron men). And I spent my career flying the S3ECBAGWDPMRB3SCFESP (single-seat, single-engine carrier-based air-to-ground weapon-delivery platform employing missiles, rockets, bombs, bullets, and the occasional buddy store, using chaff, flares, and electronics for self-protection)—otherwise known as the A-7.
We should simply call it command and control rather than list every tool we use to get that job done. I recognize this is probably a battle already lost, but if we're going to allow this poor man's acronym to prevail, let's at least put in another "S" for the sailors who make it all happen—and put it up front where it belongs.
"All Ahead Flank for LCS"
(See H. Mustin, D. Katz, pp. 30-33, February 2003; D. Lewis, pp. 10-14, March 2003; J. Metcalf, pp. 18-20, April 2003 Proceedings)
Captain W. Spencer Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Fifteen or so years ago, Vice Admiral Mustin was briefed on the evolving statement of the naval strategy ". . . From the Sea" with its new focus on in-shore and littoral warfare. He was heard to say, "If this is the new strategic emphasis for the Navy, we have built the wrong Navy." His article with Vice Admiral Katz is the product of a great deal of long and profound thought as to future operational requirements and the ship characteristics and capabilities that will be needed to satisfy them. This timely and thought-provoking article should spark more articles of a similar nature on the subject of future fleet and task group operations and employment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and on the operational design and employment concepts for the littoral combat ship (LCS) and other new design ships that will form future fleet capability. Toward that end, the article posed a number of questions that additional articles and discussion might illuminate.
The first concerns the "modular mission payload" design concept that will result in a "focused mission ship." LCSs might be modularly configured prior to deployment so as to bring a balanced range of shallow water and counter anti-access threat mission capability to carrier strike group and expeditionary strike group operations based on current intelligence and threat projections. How quickly can the modular mission payload be changed out to keep pace with an evolving or unforeseen threat development? For example, if more mine countermeasure capability is needed than originally envisioned, how quickly can this modular capability be provided to LCSs already forward deployed or on station? What in-theater base infrastructure will be required to maximize the degree of modular mission flexibility the LCS design brings to the fleet?
Similarly, assuming that the LCS is built with modern technologies that will greatly reduce crew-manning requirements, will the crew also be modular to some extent, with its combat skills focused on the modular mission the ship is configured to perform? Or will a single crew be trained and able to perform all aspects of the various focused mission areas that the ship will be capable of and yet meet goals for reduced manning?
Will the size, mission endurance, and on-station requirements of the LCS call for a return of the tender, deep-draft, or large-deck support ship as one element of sea basing to effect modular mission change in forward areas, crew rotation or modular mission augmentation, necessary upkeep, systems repair, and resupply?
Other questions arise as the exciting and long-needed modular mission capabilities and design of the new LCS evolve. But, as our predecessors of the sailing era, always aware of wind and tide, were often heard to say (and as Admirals Mustin and Katz so strongly underscore in their article), there's not a moment to lose.
"International Navies Photo Contest"
(See C. Kelley, p. 32, March 2003 Proceedings)
Sergeant First Class Frank W. Leslie, U.S. Army (Retired), M-60A1, M-1/M-1A1 Master Gunner—Apparently, neither the photographer nor the seaman manning the M-2 .50-caliber machine gun in the First Prize photograph in the March 2003 issue knows much about the weapon. The first time someone attempts to charge the weapon by having her hand palm down on the charging handle will painfully realize this hand should be palm up by the time the handle is brought fully to the rear. The first knuckle on the right thumb will be ripped open by the charging handle guideway. Properly taught soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen know to grasp the charging handle palm up.
"Buy Super Hornets Instead of Raptors"
(See J. Hasik, p. 96, January 2003 Proceedings)
Mark Bradshaw, Aerospace Engineer—Mr. Hasik's plan is for the U.S. Air Force to buy the F/A-18 E/F instead of the F/A-22s and the F-35B STOVL (short takeoff and vertical landing) instead of the F-35 A CTOL (conventional takeoff and landing). Both parts of that plan are wrong and his assumptions are incorrect.
Mr. Hasik is correct that the plane is not a bomber, but this in itself is not a problem. The F/A-22 was not intended as a bomber. The Air Force already has the B-52, B-1, and B-2 and the F/A-22 is not intended to replace them. The F/A-22 is designed to internally carry either two 1,000-pound joint direct attack munitions plus 2 AIM-9 air-to-air missiles and 2 AIM-120s, or 2 AIM-9s and 6 AIM-120s, which will allow it to effectively replace the F-1 17A (stealth strike with no air-to-air capability) and the F-15C (air superiority fighter, but no air-to-ground capability).
The fact that the Raptor lacks competition is a very strong positive for the F/A-22! I want the U.S. military to lack "serious opposition." That means fewer dead Americans. Who wants to fight a "fair and balanced" war? The fundamental reason for the F/A-22 is to establish air supremacy, not just air superiority. Mr. Hasik states that the main opposition will be countries equipped with the MiG-29 and Su-27, adding that spending on surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) is down from its peak in the 1980s. What about Su-30s and Su-35s? What about today's SAMs being more deadly than the SAMs of the 1980s? How does the F/A-18 stack up as a fighter against the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-30, or Su-35? Following this type of logic to its absurd conclusion, why buy any new military equipment?
The F/A-22 is tied to fixed bases, but again, this is not a problem. Many Navy, Marine Corps, and Army airplanes are tied to fixed bases, but should we stop buying them, too? Every airplane the Air Force flies is tied to fixed bases, and they are pretty good at what they do despite this. There is a reason the Air Force has several hundred tankers and support aircraft. I've never heard of the Navy turning down their assistance because they came from a fixed base.
Mr. Hasik is wrong that the F/A-22 will not help us fight a war with China. The combat range of the F/A-22 is still classified, but most sources speculate that it is more than the combat range of the F-15C and the F-15E, which outrange the F/A-18E. Mr. Hasik even admits that bases in Guam or Japan might allow F/A-22s to cover Taiwan. How about bases in Taiwan itself? Or South Korea? Or the Philippines? Why do you think we are establishing relationships with the countries of Central Asia? Given a war with China, what system is more likely to establish U.S. air supremacy/superiority: F/A-18Es flying from carriers or F/A-22s with tankers? As a Navy supporter, I wish I could say both, but let's face reality. It mainly will be the stealthy F/A-22s plus F-35s.
Mr. Hasik goes on to suggest that the Air Force should replace F-16s with the F-35 STOVL instead of the F-35 CTOL version so that they can operate off Navy "ships." I assume he means amphibious ships—otherwise why not recommend the Air Force buy the F-35 CVOL for use on carriers? The problem is that the Air Force doesn't want to operate from ships, and I don't think the Navy really wants them to either.
If you really want to save money and have commonality, a better argument would be for the Navy to buy only STOVL F-35s and cancel the CTOL F-35. For the F-35, the CTOLs performance is only marginally better than the STOVL version, yet its cost is higher and it will be built in the least numbers. The CTOL can operate only from carriers, while the STOVL can operate from carriers and amphibious ships.
"Shiphandling Training? Ask Your JOs"
(See C. Faller, pp. 104-105, March 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Craig Pearson, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Why wasn't this thought of when I was a junior officer? Though I qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer on my first ship, there were shiphandling evolutions that I felt were lacking in my repertoire. We rarely were given the chance to get under way from the pier or make an approach. These evolutions most often were performed by department heads with experience in not "bending" the ship.
I relished the opportunities to conn the ship during division tactics, underway replenishments, and lifeguard duty during carrier flight operations. When concern about retention is high, setting up this kind of junior officer involvement would go far to increase job satisfaction and professionalism.