The U.S. government has been roundly criticized for procuring three different types of fighter aircraft: the F/A-22 Raptor, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and the F-35A/B Joint Strike Fighter. Indeed, no other nation is attempting to procure large numbers of even two fighter aircraft simultaneously.
Enthusiasm for all three types might wreck the budget in ten years. If one of the three must go, it should be the most expensive and the least flexible: the F/A-22. Like the now-canceled Crusader self-propelled howitzer, it is an excellent weapon, but the wrong one for the wars that the United States is likely to fight. There are four problems with the F/A-22:
- It is not a bomber. Simply put, the Air Force's F/A-22 (despite its recent redesignation as a fighter-attack aircraft) is a $115-million fighter without substantial ground-attack capability. Its limited internal carriage means its payload will be limited to two 1,000-pound bombs; with external stores, the aircraft becomes less stealthy, calling into question its exorbitant price. Concerns in the past four wars (Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) have come from a failure to prosecute ground targets at the pace expected, and never did any of our opponents challenge our air superiority.
- It lacks serious opposition. No country today possesses an air combat arm with the sophistication and size to challenge the United States for control of the skies. The best aircraft outside NATO are the MiG-29 and the Su-27. These aircraft are contemporaneous with the F-15s that would be replaced by the Raptor, but they have unimpressive avionics. On the ground, spending on surface-to-air missiles has declined by 80% from its peak in the 1980s, and almost no enemies of the United States are purchasing new systems.
- It is tied to fixed bases. Witness the difficulty we are having securing regional basing rights for an attack on as thoroughly contemptible a regime as Saddam Hussein's in Iraq. Secure bases for fighter aircraft are not something we should expect.
- It will not help us fight China. A war over Taiwan is the only scenario in which the United States would have to fight a large air force. No land-based fighter, including the Raptor, has the range to cover Taiwan except possibly from Guam or Japan. If that war ever is fought, it will be primarily with carrier-based aircraft.
Americans are being asked to buy 295 F/A-22s, almost $38 billion of combat aircraft meant for the wrong kind of war. The government has better options in two aircraft the Air Force is not buying currently:
- F/A-18E/Fs should replace F-15s. Super Hornets would cost about half as much ($57 million) as the F/A-22s. They would not be as stealthy, but at least they could attack ground targets. Replacing F-15Cs with Super Hornets would increase the number of bomb droppers available to the Air Force. Money also could be saved on common training, maintenance, repair, and spare parts with the Navy.
- F-35Bs should replace F-16s. The Marines' short take-off and vertical landing version of the F-35 offers a superior ground-attack capability, combined with great stealth, at a lower cost than the F/A-22. By shifting from pure fighters (F-15s or F/A-22s) to long-range fighter-bombers (F/A-18E/Fs), the Air Force could obviate the imperative for the greater range of the runway-bound F-35A. The Royal Air Force is prepared to operate its jump jets from the Royal Navy's carriers; why shouldn't the U.S. Air Force be prepared to do the same from U.S. Navy ships?
If the F/A-18E and F are the fabulous aircraft the Navy claims, they should be equally as fabulous for the Air Force. With an appropriate mix of F-35Bs, they would be very effective against the unimpressive threats U.S. forces are likely to face in the air in the next 20 years, and they would perform a much wider variety of missions for much less money than the F/A-22. This is not economy for its own sake, but the economy behind a weapon more relevant to the war the United States can expect to fight.
Mr. Hasik is a management consultant and a former naval officer. He is the coauthor of The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).