China's booming economy supports the purchase of the best available Russian submarines and weapon systems, which in turn could be used to support the Chinese political goal to control of the approaches and seas around Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the South China Sea.
The 12 Russian Kilo submarines purchased by the PLA Navy are a cause for concern. Although the first two delivered were the export version, the remaining ten are of the previously unexported 636 class.1 The PLA Navy has had difficulties operating the Kilo 877EKM submarine. Faulty maintenance has led to problems, and two of the Kilos have been sidelined while their batteries are in Russia for repairs.2 While these difficulties appear to diminish the threat of the PLA Navy submarine fleet, only the Kilo 877EKM was having problems. The Chinese have purchased only Kilo 636s since 1997.3
The Kilo 636 is significantly more advanced than other diesel submarines. It gives the PLA Navy the Klub antiship cruise missile, wake-homing torpedoes, and an excellent fire control system. The most disturbing aspect of the Kilo 636 is its stealth. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, it is as quiet as a U.S. Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarine at low speeds.4 Even a small number of these submarines dramatically improves the quality of the PLA Navy.
The Chinese are aggressively seeking new diesel submarine technologies such as air independent propulsion and improving their acoustic weapons solutions for torpedoes.5 Being able to fire at a target without relying on a periscope solution or having any part of the submarine above the surface would make Chinese submarines much more difficult to detect and attack.
The quality of manpower in the PLA Navy is increasing as well. Officer accession is being restructured to resemble U.S. NROTC; cross training between submarine and surface communities is being instituted; and they are creating a cadre of senior enlisted personnel.6 Some ranks were given 100-200% pay increases to help increase moral and build a senior enlisted cadre.7
The complexity and scope of fleet exercises are increasing, as is realistic training for wartime logistics. Particularly interesting are PLA Navy efforts to resupply submarines from civilian ports, assuming air strikes will have damaged PLA Navy port facilities.8 The PLA Navy also is seeking an over-the-horizon targeting capability by marrying Skymaster "search and rescue" radars to PLA Navy 11-76 aircraft, assessed to be operational by 2005.9 While their training and exercises do not come close to those of the Western navies, even a marginally competent submarine force could create havoc.
The Chinese and particularly the PLA Navy have reoriented strategically. The newest submarines are being shifted from the Koreas and Northeast Asia to Taiwan and the South China Sea.10 The PLA Navy has stated that the U.S. Navy is its next probable adversary and China will use submarines to force carrier battle groups out of the East Asian littoral, with an emphasis on preemptive strikes.11
The U.S. Navy's recent exercises with allied diesel submarines exacerbate concerns. A report by the Congressional Research Service reveals diesel submarines have penetrated Navy defenses and conducted simulated attacks on aircraft carriers and logistics ships. U.S. Navy units could not find Chilean diesel submarines in a 1996 bilateral exercise; in 1997, a Russian Oscar SSGN trailed the USS Coronado (AGF-11) for several days undetected; and several Australian submarines penetrated U.S. Navy defenses during RIMPAC 2000. In addition, the report outlines poor performance in undersea warfare exercises conducted off the coasts of Hawaii and Florida.12
1 John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," The Washington Post, 25 june 2002, p. AlS.
2 Brian Hsu, "China Has Major Trouble with New Kilo Submarines," Taipei Times, 02 july 2002; available at www.taiwansecurity.org/TT/2002/TT070202.htm [accessed 24 March 2003].
3 Congressional Research Service, China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis (10 October 2000), by Christopher BoIkcom, Shirley A. Kan, and Ronald O'Rourke. Library of Congress: open file report RL30700, p. 14.
4 Congressional Research Service, China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions, p. 60.
5 Zhang Luocan, Xu Feng, and Xu Shuangxi, "Hearing the Thundering Torpedo in the Depths of the Sea-An Eyewitness Report on Undersea Torpedo Firing Drill," Beijing Jeifangjun Baoi (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast information Service, KJ july 2002), document number CPP20020711000071 [accessed 18 April 2003], p. 2.
6 Michael McDevitt, "Ruminations about How Little We Know about the PLA Navy," National Defense University Conference on Chinese Military Affairs, Fort McNair, VA, 10 October 2000; available at www.ndu.edu/inss/chinaacenter/paper 14.html [accessed 21 March 2003], p. 9.
7 Dr. LyIe Gold-stein and LCdr. Bill Murray, USN, "China's Subs Lead the Way," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2003, p. 61.
8 Liu Xinmin, Xu Feng, "Chinese Submarine Unit Succeeds for the First Time in Making Use of Civilian Port to Load Torpedoes," Zhongguo Quingnian Boa (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 06 January 2002); document number CPP20020603000058, [accessed 18 April 2003], p. 2.
9 "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill," Defense Link (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 26 February 3999); available at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait_ 02261999.html [accessed 21 March 2003], p. 13.
10 McDevitt, "Ruminations," p. 9.
11 Luocan, Feng, and Shuangxi, "Hearing the Thundering Torpedo in the Depths of the Sea," p. 2.
12 Congressional Research Service, China's Foreign Conventional Arm.1) Acquisitions, pp. 58-64.