"TacAir Trumps UAVs in Iraq"
(See R. Harrison, pp. 58-61, November 2003 Proceedings)
Commander William H. Johnson, U.S. Navy-Lieutenant Commander Harrison is a patriot, a warrior, and a proud member of the fraternity of naval aviation. His provocative article injects just the sort of counterpoint required in the debates concerning the future and viability of unmanned aviation in the Navy's arsenal. It also smacks of the same sort of emotional invective promulgated by large elements of the Navy in the precarrier days, after World War I, when a fringe group of officers began advocating a future capability of flying aircraft from ships. This "heresy," extending beyond the status quo, came at some cost to continued capitalization of proven shipbuilding programs.
The author correctly implies that weapon system development, if it is to succeed, must be built on the successes of the past. It is improper, however, to judge a developing program-one that only now is being resourced at a legitimate level to ensure forward movement-against the current capability of established manned aviation. Manned aircraft are a critical component in the Navy's successes in Southwest Asia, but those programs have been in the works for decades. The oldest unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the Navy/Marine Corps fleet was introduced in 1986, and most of the "inadequate" UAVs to which the author refers have been designed, built, and fielded within the past five years. To judge UAV success or failure based on such limited data samples, and without any formally adopted doctrine or tactics for UAV employment, is an exercise in faulty logic.
The resource competition referred to by the author is not a zero-sum process. It is a product derived from our corporate acknowledgment of a need to adapt and evolve to a future battle space while retaining the functional capability enjoyed today. The world is changing, and the Navy has a direct responsibility to constantly evaluate its processes and systems.
Understanding the changing nature of conflict, and developing the attendant technology to meet the demands of that change, is incumbent on every naval professional. UAVs are in their infancy. That any of the variety of unmanned systems were even able to participate in recent conflicts, much less contribute to the effort, is a testament to both their technology and to their future potential.
The debate is not about removing manned aviation, but rather about complementing that capability while keeping aviators alive. Someone once said, "The future is a long time." Certainly this is the case in UAV development.
"Chiefs Are Professionals"
(See D. Hinson, p. 60, September 2003; J. Murphy, p. 12, October 2003; A. McLean, pp. 22-24, November 2003 Proceedings)
Chief Master Sergeant Dave Matthews, U.S. Air Force (Retired)-Chief Murphy's recommendation concerning gift memberships for petty officers is right on target. As a graduate of the Strategic Air Command Noncommissioned Officers Academy, I was given a one-year membership to the Air Force Association (AFA), which until that time I had assumed to be an officers' association. Within months, I became a life member of the AFA, and I have benefited from that membership in many ways. Within just a few years, enlisted membership in the association grew exponentially, no doubt in large part because of the seeding that the AFA did with this policy.
EDITOR'S NOTE: In response to Chief Murphy's excellent suggestion, the Naval Institute now offers three free months of Proceedings to new enlisted members (see ad on page 95). Go to www.navalinstitute.org/proc.htm to take advantage of this offer.
"Unite the So-Called Total Force"
(See W. Sanders, pp. 68-70, November 2003 Proceedings)
Captain John E. Mensch, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-Lip service has been given to the full integration of our naval forces for much too long with little progress. Secretaries of Defense and Secretaries of the Navy come and go, never staying long enough to truly implement all of their policies. Unfortunately, integration of active and reserve naval forces into a total force is not high enough on their priority list to become reality.
As long as the "three elements," as described by Mr. Sanders, perceive the other two as threats to their own institutional survival, total force will not become a reality. The simple solution is the elimination of the Training and Administration of Reservists (TARs) community. The TARs represent an unnecessary and expensive middle layer of bureaucracy that impedes the integration of the active and reserve communities. The author makes a sad but true statement that a Selected Reserve (SelRes) career often is controlled by the TARs and not the active forces they are training to support. This makes no sense.
The elimination of the TARs community through natural attrition should commence as soon as possible. Some might argue that the TARs are active-duty personnel, thus their elimination does not represent change. The concept is to rotate active-duty personnel through training billets for the SelRes and not establish a separate community.
The next logical step is the elimination of many, if not all, of the reserve headquarters. They also represent unnecessary and costly middle management.
If active-duty personnel are assigned to train and integrate SelRes into their own units, the decades old mistrust and animosities slowly will disappear. The active forces then will have a vested interest in properly training the SelRes who might someday be called on to augment with and support them. The TARs do not feel this same vested interest.
The final point made by Mr. Sanders cannot be underestimated. The National Guard has political leverage not imagined or comprehended by any of the reserve components. The SelRes definitely needs much stronger political support at the national level. The SelRes stands ready to make the total force concept a reality through true integration with its activeduty brethren. We must find avenues to make total force a reality.
"Reservists Make a Difference"
(See W. Sanders, p. 69, November 2003 Proceedings)
Allan T. Ames-This sidebar is full of errors. The USS Pensacola (LSD-38) was not in the U.S. Fleet in the Second World War. The USS Pensacola (CA-24), a heavy cruiser, was.
That Pensacola did fight at Santa Cruz in October 1942 but was not damaged and suffered no losses. This fine fighting cruiser was heavily damaged the following month in the Battle of Tassafaronga when torpedoed by a Japanese destroyer. Contrary to Captain Sanders's account, no enemy aircraft were involved. In short, Captain Sanders has described the wrong ship, the wrong battle, and a nonexistent air attack. The Pensacola suffered 125 dead and 68 wounded in this action and deserves to be better remembered.
"It's Time to Transform the Naval Reserve"
(See S. Cvrk, R. Robey, pp. 52-55, August 2003; J. Totushek, pp. 18-22, September 2003; P. Payne, S. Keith, W. Henry, J. Nugent, pp. 12-18, October 2003; D. Haberger, pp. 28-30, November 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Mark Stoffel, U.S. Naval Reserve-The authors of this article thankfully are not in charge of transforming the Naval Reserve. Anyone associated with today's Naval Reserve must realize that a realignment is necessary. I would argue that such realignment has been under way for some time and that some of the author's observations might stem from their respective subcommunities. Regardless, the Naval Reserve has made huge strides in the past several years that stand as evidence that it is adapting to the 21st century-the new order writing system and e-pay are two examples.
I despise the reserve bureaucracy as much as anyone, but that does not justify transferring reserve responsibilities to the active Navy. Had we taken that tack in the post-Gulf War environment, the cupboard would have been bare for reservists supporting Iraqi Freedom. There were too many contingencies in the interim for our active-duty brethren to have maintained the reserve in an adequate state for future readiness. Let's keep the reserve as a separate entity for the foreseeable future.
With respect to the other "myths," I don't really care which levels of bureaucracy we eliminate, just don't send me to tell the reserve flag officers they no longer have jobs. The intermediate echelons appear ripest for cutting. The new order writing system has made many former reserve center functions obsolete. I have yet to be convinced that eliminating the Training and Administration of Reservists (TAR) community would do anything but make selected reservists feel better about themselves for a short period. Realign the TARs? Yes, but don't eliminate them.
We must force senior Selected Reserve leaders to answer why so many of our reservists are so anxious to perform training at locations other than their gaining commands. Why do so many augment units continue to be so woefully misaligned to their gaining commands? Why do so many senior leaders appear to be ignoring the situation? This is where the authors' arguments for bringing the reserve back under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations falls apart. The active-duty Navy is responsible for much of the misalignment between reserve units and their gaining commands. Active-duty manpower management cannot adapt to dynamic manning requirements at many commands.
The rest of the gripes in the article appear to be small peanuts. Homesteading and career paths are not issues in reserve transformation. The article fails to mention any transformation initiatives already under way; the implication is that there aren't any, but this is not the case.
Lieutenant Commander Thomas Salzer, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-There are two factors that must be faced when wrestling with Naval Reserve reform. First, the Naval Reserve as constituted today has significant political support because it brings federal dollars in the form of paychecks and operating funds to congressional districts. Second, reserve commands bring a sense of nationalism to remote areas of the country that don't see much of the Navy, such as Boise, Idaho, which helps Navy recruitment efforts. It would be the tail wagging the dog, however, if these two factors justified the significant costs of the current Chief of Naval Reserve organization.
I also agree that general career paths for reservists are counterproductive. In the 1990s, the Naval Reserve organization coined a saying that 1+1=1, meaning that the active-duty Navy plus the reserves added up to the whole Navy. Today, I believe the active-duty Navy is the Navy of the 21st century, occasionally calling some reservists to assist. Reservists are assets only if they bring skills to active duty. It follows that there is no need for reserve officers to be generalists rotated to various billets to give them a broad perspective because reservists are only needed for specific or special tasks.
Left unreformed, the Naval Reserve is plagued with careerism and a desire to showcase itself to ensure its existence. For example, during the first Gulf War the Naval Reserve staffed a Pentagon logistics information clearinghouse. The reservists responded by manning their office with two senior officers and at least two petty officers 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This level of effort went on through the end of the war in May 1991 and then continued with multiple shifts five days a week until September 1991. The reservists drained every drop of recognition from this effort. This showcasing is a poor use of resources.
"Where Are AH the Coast Guard Pub Is?"
(See R. Desh, p. 67, August 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Brian Penoyer, U.S. Coast Guard-Commander Desh is right on the mark when he says that few, if any, Coast Guard men and women have read Coast Guard Publication 1. But I think the doctrine problem in the Coast Guard runs a bit deeper than command emphasis on Publication 1: we don't really have a doctrine system. When you see Publication 1 or the new Maritime Homeland security Strategy (Coast Guard Pub 3-01), you might be fooled into thinking there's a doctrine system, but there isn't.
As a freshly minted merchant vessel inspector 13 years ago, I was presented with a historical oddity in the Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office New York library: a Marine Safety Manual from the 1950s. It was a single volume, issued by the Commandant, and certainly not over 100 pages. Our current Marine Safety Manual, the principle governing publication for more than 50 Coast Guard Commands, is now ten volumes, each well over 200 pages, and most hopelessly out of date. It is true that marine safety operations are far more complex now, but even 13 years ago I was struck by the enormous growth of the manual. A grinning senior officer explained that "in those days, they just issued policy-they expected you to know how to do your job."
He was saying the old Maritime Safety Manual was pure operational doctrine, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) weren't included. Of course, not having TTP documented was a problem, so Coast Guard Headquarters simply started including TTP in every manual. I challenge anyone to find a publication, except Publication 1 and Publication 3-01, that isn't completely mired in TTP. All that TTP obscures the policy.
Hence the current problem with consistent, up-to-date policy. While I was assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters, I succeeded a string of highly motivated, skilled officers in trying to revise one volume of the Marine Safety Manual. We involved field experts and shopped drafts to civilian and military consultants. It was an incredibly huge task to compile both the operational doctrine and the supporting TTP in a digestable, professional document-and ultimately we failed. That volume (six years later) still hasn't been revised. This year my successor will hand the project off to his successor, and good luck to him or her!
Why does this happen? Because it is hard to find the doctrine among the TTP, and hard to change the doctrine (even when you really need to) because first you have make all the conforming changes to the TTP. And when that change is routed for concurrent clearance (i.e., organizational review and sign-off), other doctrine writers are daunted by a 200-page review well outside their subject expertise. They can't find the doctrine for the TTP, don't have time or expertise to look, and so it is easier simply to stall than to review. And so we are left with publications that are updated only in great need; real policy is issued by message traffic, e-mail, policy letter, and notices to the public (Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars).
So how do we fix it? Simple: adopt a doctrine system, create a doctrine command, and rewrite all of our principle operational and TTP publications. Of course, implementing such an enormous task is impossible without carving out time, people, and money to do it, and the organizational pain would be significant. But we need to compare that pain to the pain our operational and tactical units feel today trying to deal with the cascade of non-standard guidance and doctrine. I've felt the pain on both sides, and my conclusion is a doctrine system is needed not now, but yesterday.
Can the Coast Guard, small as we are, create a doctrine command? Our Training Center in Yorktown, Virginia, has been incredibly helpful in developing the implementing TTP for policy changes. I'd argue that while the intial lift is heavy, we could create a right-sized doctrine command at Yorktown.
Why don't more people read Publication 1? Because they are focused on getting their jobs done, just a tiny fragment of the huge puzzle outlined in Publication l. They focus on the TTP they need to get through the day, and there is no doctrine system to push the ideas of Publication 1 into the daily work routine. Let's get a doctrine system implemented, and let's do it now.
"Don't Silence Navy Chat"
(See T. Jara, M. Lisowski, pp. 52-55, September 2003; D. Trinque, pp. 18-22, November 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Jay Thomas, U.S. Naval Reserve-The authors' description of chat as an increasingly important operational tool makes a compelling case that the Navy should retain the ability to support it with the flexible and bandwidth-efficient Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol. The ever-expanding use of chat makes the shortcomings of various protocols and clients more significant and brings added urgency to efforts to implement chat system standards.
Notably, Commanders Jara and Lisowski mention in passing that the most widely used IRC client, MS Chat, can neither timestamp nor log conversations-when a chat session ends, the information disappears. Of course, different clients have different features, and while timestamping and logging are important to some users, the fact that MS Chat does not have these features is a good indication that commercial and public demand for them is not universal.
It is a problem for the Navy when a chat system used in operational situations is incapable of timestamping or logging conversations. Any information technology (IT) system that can be used to apply combat power must be capable of retaining information for operational reconstruction and analysis, for establishing accountability when things go really wrong (or really right), and for adding to the Navy's historical record. This is not just prudent, but required by law. The statutes and regulations that establish the obligation for federal agencies to document their activities do not distinguish between records kept on paper and those kept with electrons.
Unfortunately, the continuing transition to digital information management, of which operational chat is a part, hasn't done much yet to enhance this bedrock principle of government accountability. To start with, there are many technical issues to solve. The lifespan of storage media, especially magnetic media, is uncertain but might be only decades or less. Unlike a book, where the loss of one page does not necessarily affect the others, corruption of part of a data file often makes the entire file unreadable. Storage media hardware formats change frequently and software changes even more quickly. Data stored in commercial, consumer, and specialized systems, including military IT systems, all are vulnerable to actual loss through media degradation or effective loss through hardware or software obsolescence. Furthermore, few, if any, software packages or information systems are designed to support electronic record management (ERM), even though record management laws apply to all federal IT users.
Beyond the technical issues, few federal agencies, including the Navy, have developed comprehensive strategies for collecting, categorizing, culling, storing, and retrieving their electronic records. The National Archives and Records Administration, which sets record management standards for the federal government, is wrestling with such seemingly basic but actually complicated questions as how agencies should manage their electronic mail. The Navy has begun to address the problem on its unclassified network by including a commercial ERM software package in the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). This software package has not yet been activated, although NMCI is now being put in place throughout the Navy, and its activation will not answer the long-term question of where and how such records will be maintained. Also, it only covers NMCI, not systems such as operational chat.
So how does the Navy ensure that its IT systems help rather than hinder its ability to manage its records?
First, recognize that electronic information has a life cycle based on content, not just on technical considerations. Some information need be retained only for small fractions of a second as it moves from place to place or system to system. Some should be retained forever. Everything else falls in between. Like other commodities with life cycles (ships, planes, bases), information should be managed (and resourced) from cradle to grave.
Second, involve everyone who has a hand in cradle-to-grave information management-system users, archivists, and IT system designers and procurers. Sometimes there can be an unhelpful gulf between those who make and use content and those who make the systems that handle that "content" electronically. Record management is part of information management, which is part of knowledge management, which is what IT systems are for.
Third, have the machines pull their own weight by making record management a required capability of every IT system that manages records. If enough federal IT developers start asking for ERM capabilities, IT vendors will provide it. If the ERM requirement is included from the beginning of IT system procurement, it stands a much better chance of being fully and seamlessly incorporated in the final product. The technical and programmatic challenges still will be there, but they are more likely to be addressed and solved (or worked around) if ERM is treated as a necessity and not an option.
Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the value of chat as a command-and-control tool, and chat demonstrates the ability of war fighters to innovate using commercially available IT products. The standards-based approach to IT system certification discussed by Commanders Tara and Lisowski is the most effective way to let this innovation process succeed, but the standards must include measures to meet our legal record management obligations. If a client system like MS Chat cannot log or timestamp conversations-the basic elements of documentation-it should be replaced by something that can.
"High Speed Is Here"
(See P. Ryan, D. Grimland, pp. 72-73, November 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)-This appears to be another case of "big toys for big boys." What on earth is the mine force doing with a 48-knot vessel capable of carrying 250 troops and a main battle tank? How much support can the Swift (HSV-2) provide the sweeps as a successor to the Inchon (MCS-12)? Probably not much, for she does not appear to have the volume to contain repair shops and stowage for stores and fuel, nor is she structured to handle ships alongside for maintenance.
Wouldn't it be better to employ the Swift as a high-speed operational base for special operations forces? Not only could she get them in and out of striking range in a hurry, given that she can carry two helicopters, but she might provide some emergency evacuation capability as well as a little close air support.
"Rethinking the Principles of War"
(See J. Morgan, A. Mc Ivor, pp. 34-38, October 2003; J. Collins, p. 24, November 2003 Proceedings)
Kim Orr-The authors confuse classical theoretical and philosophical treatises on war for doctrine. The article states that the Nine Principles Guide Doctrine contains "abstractions of the lessons learned from the history of armed conflict." This is a distinct and narrower endeavor than the formulation of principles rooted in strategic theory or philosophical thought.
A more careful reading of On War by Carl von Clausewitz would demonstrate that all of the "new principles" listed by the authors come under consideration by Clausewitz. What makes a theory timeless is its applicability to successive circumstances over time, right up to the present. Clausewitz discusses the "new principles" mentioned by the authors, and he also includes others that we would do well to consider. For example, within a greater discussion of will, Clausewitz states, "If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance which can be expressed as the product of ... the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will."
Clausewitz is concerned with integration of political and military objectives and actions. Again, within a larger discussion, he states that the "political object-the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached, and the amount of effort it requires." he goes on to say that "sometimes the political and military objective is the same ... in other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military object. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations."
These statements are as true in our current world as they were in Clausewitz's time. They provide a brilliant framework for the consideration of strategy and policy. This is a small sample of a much more profound philosophical and theoretical treatment of war. Those who engage in any exercise to "review the traditional principles of war" would do well to engage the classical theoretical and philosophical texts thoughtfully and in depth. They are not how-to manuals. Rather, they provide frameworks for a breadth and depth of understanding that would serve any strategist, policy analyst, politician, or military leader well.
"Mush Morton and the Buyo Maru Massacre"
(See 1. Holwitt, pp. 80-81, july 2003; G. Soils, D. Johnston, pp. 23-25, September 2003; F. Sperry, pp. 24-26, October 2003; D. Adams, pp. 24-26, November 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Eugene R. Fidell, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)-Contrary to Commander Adams's view, Colonel Solis was, if anything, generous in his comments on the original article. What happened in the Buyo Maru incident was wrong both legally and morally. The drawing of tine distinctions about degrees of moral fault is great for philosophers but can be dangerous if it detracts from legal clarity in an operational setting such as that in which Commander Adams and Ensign Holwitt soon will find themselves. Our country properly demands that others turn the squares! of corners when it comes to the law of armed conflict, and the best way to make that happen (along with vigorously prosecuting foreign offenders whenever we can) is to turn those same square corners ourselves. The last thing we need is doubt based on relativistic thinking when we contemplate terrible events such as the Buyo Maru massacre.
"Breaching the Bar-Lev Line"
(See K. Kopets, pp. 92-95, October 2003 Proceedings)
Jonathan Keiler-Captain Kopets claims that Egyptian successes were almost completely attributable to their superior use of combined arms. This is not true. The crucial element of success was the element of surprise that caught the Israel Defense Force (IDF) flatfooted on every level, from the tactical to the strategic. As a result, the IDF's initial responses were confused and often made with inadequate or poorly organized forces. This is like attributing German successes in the first stage of the Battle of the Bulge to superior combined arms tactics while ignoring the element of surprise.
Captain Kopets seems to ignore the most comprehensive and valuable history of the Arab-Israeli wars, Elusive Victory by Trevor Dupuy (Kendall/Hunt, 1992). In his book, Dupuy demonstrates that Egypt's successful assault on Yom Kippur could be attributed mostly to the element of surprise. In fact, Dupuy credibly shows that the IDF's relative superiority over the Egyptians actually increased between 1967 and 1973. To quote him directly: "The apparent anomaly between this quantitative conclusion [that Israeli superiority increased] and the obvious fact that Egyptian performance was generally better in relation to Israeli performance in 1973 than in 1967 is readily explicable in terms of surpise (an Israeli advantage in 1967, an Egyptian advantage in 1973), limitations on Israeli air support in 1973 due to the Egyptians' Russianmade air defense system, and a marked improvement in the higher leadership of Egyptian forces."
That Dupuy is correct is apparent if we consider a simple hypothetical. Assume that the IDF had fully mobilized and been on alert at the time of the Egyptian assault. It is highly unlikely that the Egyptians would have been able to cross the Suez Canal, even if the IDE was heavy on tanks and reliant on air power. As it was, the Egyptian crossing was nearly unopposed at the water's edge because of the vast distances between the small IDE strongpoints and the fact that the Israeli armor did not advance until well after Egyptian antitank infantry and commandos had firmly established themselves along the route of advance.
Nobody could dispute that combined arms operations are desirable when and where possible. But the 1973 war is a case in which the IDF, in part by inclination and in part by coercion, operated in violation of combined arms doctrine and nonetheless prevailed. To claim that Egyptian successes were because of superior use of combined arms and to ignore the influence of surprise on two fronts (Captain Kopets does not mention the desperate Golan fighting at all) misrepresents the determining causes of initial Arab success.
"Books of Interest: Waves of Hate"
(See D. Seamon, p. 114, October 2002; J. Berger, p. 32, October 2003 Proceedings)
Tony Wilshire-Further to Mr. Berger's statement that the English left more than 1,000 Bismarck survivors to die in ocean, I wish to bring the readers' attention to the following entry written by James P. Levy, Ph.D., of Hofstra University, made within his book The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War II (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): "The Bismarck had gone. But hundreds of her crew were bobbing up and down in the oily water, many with grievous wounds. In a brave act of chivalry, Captain Martin ordered his ship to stop dead in the water, making her a sitting duck for any U-boat in the vicinity, while his crew threw every line and net at hand over the side. But the rescue mission could not last long. Dorsetshire's navigating officer thought he saw the puff of diesel fumes from a submerging Uboat. So Dorsetshire reluctantly left the scene of the sinking."
In addition, Levy writes that "the action of the officers and crew of the Dorsetshire and Maori remind us of the fact that men are still at times prepared to risk much to do what honour dictates. Royal Navy sailors who literally extended a lifeline should not be forgotten. Although some criticism was, in later years, voiced about the British 'abandoning' the German survivors, it does not bear up under scrutiny. U-boats were in the area, and Luftwaffe aircraft were on the way. As the senior surviving officer of the Bismarck has stated: 'I am now convinced that under the circumstance, [Captain] Martin had to act as he did.' The Royal Navy's honour was upheld in more ways than one on that day of victory in May 1941."
"U.S. Naval Academy Is Balanced"
(See J. Calvert, p. 26, October 2003; T. Feist, pp. 26-28, October 2003 Proceedings)
Colonel Gerhard Schulz, U.S. Army (Retired)-As I read the recent articles and web traffic critical of some aspects of the U.S. Naval Academy, it seemed there were two topic addressed. The first concerned some of the ethics and leadership programs now part of the curriculum at the Academy as introduced by Admiral Calvert. The second was less defined. I saw messages critical of some liberal arts instructors' treatment of the course material. Admiral Calvert wrote, in effect, that it is difficult to find properly educated college faculty members in today's academic world.
All three service academies have ethics and "respect for others" courses as part of the mandated curriculum. In these instances, the real mandate comes from beyond the academies. Of the three academies, only the Naval Academy has a civilians comprising more than half the faculty (59%). The percentage at the U.S. Air Force Academy is 25% and 21% at the U.S. Military Academy.
At the Military Academy, and I believe at the Air Force Academy, a tour of duty at the service academy is sought by graduates. Such a tour is not considered career stopping. Apparently Navy officers, in striving to become qualified for promotion, view an assignment at Annapolis as undesirable. A career is just not long enough to include a tour at the U.S. Naval Academy. As evidenced by this article on the value of teaching at the Academy, the Navy might be trying to overcome this perception. Perhaps adding more officers to the faculty would be advantageous for the midshipmen and the Navy.
The United States contributes heavily to the 'War on Drugs.' Billions of U.S. dollars are spent each year in Colombia alone. Local citizens, tourists, and law enforcement personnel alike are faced with mortal danger from the myriad guerrilla factions that run rampant throughout the country.
American oil companies have a strong interest in Colombia, too, as only twenty percent of the country's potential has been explored due to the violence. Even so, Colombia's petroleum production now rivals Kuwait's on the eve of the Gulf War in 1991. The U.S. currently imports more oil from Colombia and its neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador than from all Persian Gulf countries combined.
When an American geologist is sent to Bogota to investigate the horrendous 1999 Colombian earthquake, he lands in the middle of a war, a war about oil. Adding to his troubles, he falls for a woman living with a dual identity, each vastly different than the other.
Order from any bookstore, or place your order through the Internet with any on-line bookseller. Available in hardback (ISBN 1-4134-1589-X), Trade paperback (ISBN 1-4134-1588-1), or in ebook format. Prices may vary.
Naval Academy Conference Debates Corporate and Military Ethics
On 28 October 2003, leaders from the military and business worlds gathered at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, to discuss the challenges of promoting ethical behavior in complex organizations and the hard lessons learned from lapses in both worlds. Sponsored by the Center for Professional Military Ethics and the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, the invitation-only conference is seen as a multiyear project to enhance ethics in the corporate arena and share ideas on quality leadership.
This year's seminar was divided into two sessions: "Creating Ethical Cultures in Large Organizations" and "Ethics as a Decision-Making Tool." About 150 attendees of the day-long conference heard speeches by such leaders as Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD); former U.S. Energy secretary Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy (Retired); Ronald D. Sugar, chief executive officer of Northrop Grumman; and ethics expert Amitai Etzioni.