"Heavy Armor Played an Important Role"
(See N. Friedman, p. 6, June 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Martin McCleary, U.S. Army (Retired)—I believe that the final chapter on armor as we know it is a long way from being written. As a fairly recently retired Army armor officer, I know that several tons of depleted uranium armor provide a pretty good insurance policy when intelligence fails and the rounds start flying. Armor has a shock value that can only be imagined by those who have never been around tanks. It's absolutely awesome. The current sirens of the Army Objective Force and transformation power point briefings would have us believe that intelligence will be near-perfect and allow us to shed our armor in favor of information. A good friend of mine calls this "knowing the enemy to death." The jury is still out on this concept, so let us not be too hasty to discard what works—and clearly wins in the close fight.
"Should Marines 'Join' Special Operations Command?"
(See H. Parks, p. 4, May 2003; B. Brunn, p. 14, June 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Tom Carlson, U.S. Navy—Colonel Parks misses some important points about "joining" the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Joining special operations must be more than just a tour of duty. Officer and enlisted career paths are inherently closed-looped in the special operations community. Special operations Marines primarily would be serving in special operations units instead of conventional Marine units throughout their careers, and it is incorrect to assume that these specially trained Marines would have any measurable positive influence on the training standards of conventional units. The Marines have taken this first step toward a special-operations capability by close-looping their Force Reconnaissance warriors, but they would need to follow with a new Marine officer community. The tyranny of small numbers creates many challenges for any warfare community, but they can reduce those personnel management risks by modeling their officer and enlisted communities and career paths after those of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and Army Special Forces.
I concur with Colonel Parks that there are Marines who can perform to a level consistent with special operations standards. To refine and evaluate Marine Corps special operations capabilities, the Marine Corps and USSOCom have embarked on a proof of concept that involves integration of select Marines into a Naval Special Warfare Squadron. This Marine force contribution is an 86-person unit called the Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One. The goal of this integration is to fully consolidate Naval Special Warfare and Marine Corps detachment battle staffs, achieve a high state of interoperability between the detachment and the squadron, and execute special operations missions. The unit will report to the Naval Special Warfare Squadron six months prior to deployment to conduct interoperability training, and then deploy together for six months. I predict this will be a great success. The Marine Corps detachment will add tremendous capability to the NSW Squadron, and this "super squadron" will be the force of choice in theater.
It will not be sustainable, however, without a full commitment by the Marine Corps to special operations for the long term. As USSOCom's maritime component, NSW has a deployable force structure and a special operations training continuum that support a steady-state, forward-deployed presence in each theater. The core of this capability is centered on the Special Warfare Squadrons that deploy in a one-in-four rotation from each coast, which equates to a requirement for a total of eight Marine detachments. Without dedicating this force structure, the current proof of concept only will prove that the Marine Corps can source its best and brightest for one deployment.
Joining USSOCom also implies that Marine special operations would be under the command authority of USSOCom similar to the other USSOCom components. There would not be any competition for money within the Marine Corps, as stated by Colonel Parks, because the money required to stand-up and sustain a permanent Marine organization within USSOCom would have to be cross-walked from the Marine Corps to USSOCom, along with the manpower and equipment. Service common items would continue to be sourced through service channels, but the Marines would meet unique requirements of special operations through USSOCom funding. The competition at that point is between USSOCom components and not with the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, the command likely will relive the problems that plagued it when it was first created, when the movement of funding, equipment, and manpower from the services was less than perfect. If it is done right, however, it is short-term pain for a long-term return on the investment.
Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—The Marine Corps' direct action platoons of force reconnaissance may be compared to Navy SEALs. There is no comparable Marine Corps mission, however, to duplicate U.S. Army Special Forces. Army Special Forces' primary mission is to train foreign personnel in unconventional warfare. The final exercise of the Special Forces qualification course is an extended stay in the back woods of one state where the local population is paid to role play the enemy and indigenous insurgent forces. There may be some comparison to Army Rangers or Joint Special Operations Command forces, but these forces serve entirely different purposes.
The Marine Corps has had a special-operations capability for almost two decades. In addition, the Marine Corps has worked with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) since its creation. To place Marine Corps personnel full time at USSOCom is only to solidify something that has existed for years. Marines already have taken over some of the other services' assignments for training foreign troops under the auspices of USSOCom.
The shooting budget for the direct action platoons does exceed larger units for a very specific reason. Highly accurate shooting skills are perishable and need constant and rigorous training or they will be lost.
Do not fear Marine officers who take special forces seriously because Marines had better take asymmetric warfare and fourth generation warfare seriously. This will require special-operations capability but not special forces.
There has never been any friction between special-operations capable Marines, enlisted or officers. It was my experience that the special-operations capable Marine expeditionary units train up to deployment, and the evaluation process to become certified as special-operations capable is the highlight of the predeployment training.
Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael Hagee's initiative to place full-time general officers and a staff at Special Operations Command is to be applauded. General Al Gray, the 29th Commandant, was a visionary who started the special-operations capable program in the 1980s. We owe him a great deal of gratitude and appreciation. Now, General Hagee has a vision of the future and is right on the mark.
"Friendless Fire?"
(See D. Walsh, pp. 58-64, June 2003 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—It is difficult to see how Mr. Walsh's lengthy critique of Judge A. Jay Cristol contributes to our knowledge of the Liberty (AGTR-5) incident. He adds little, if any, new information to the discussion as he uses mostly erroneous and unsubstantiated statements for his critique, some of which have been refuted by the historical record. Rather than go through those points one by one, it might be more useful to cite what several highly qualified individuals have said about judge Cristol's landmark study, The Liberty Incident (Brassey's, 2002). Several of these individuals were directly involved in the Liberty affair.
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, a former Director of Naval Intelligence, writing in the Fall 2002 issue of the Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly, said of CristoPs book, "an exquisitely researched and articulately presented analysis of the events surrounding the attack. Judge Cristol confronts all of the folklore surrounding the various conspiracy theories, and disapproves them one by one." And, "His book is a must-read for all who have an interest in the Liberty affair."
The late Vice Admiral Donald Engen, commanding the carrier America (CV-66) in the Mediterranean at the time of the incident, wrote of Cristol, "He's got the most balanced view of anybody I've ever known."
Senator John McCain wrote: "Cristol has reached a similar conclusion to one my father [Admiral John McCain] reached in his June 18, 1967, endorsement of the findings of the court of inquiry. I commend Judge Cristol for his thoroughness and fairness, and I commend this work." From Admiral Leon (Bud) Edney: "Only those with an ulterior motive can still cling to the conspiracy theories after Judge Cristol's excellent coverage documents each detail that led to the tragic mistaken attack."
Writing in the prestigious Foreign Affairs, Eliot Cohen observed: "for those readers of a rational turn of mind, this book ends the debate." The review of Cristol's book in the distinguished Journal of Military History by David M. Witty concludes: "This book is a must for anyone studying the Liberty controversy, which it brings to a close."
To again quote Admiral Brooks, "But conspiracy theories die hard. Americans seem to have a peculiar fondness for the notion of conspiracies." Instead of at-tacking Cristol, one would have hoped that Mr. Walsh and his supporters could have provided some evidence that demonstrates that the attack was intentional and that there was a cover-up.
David Smyth—As a retired newsman and editor of the Associated Press (AP), I read David Walsh's article with great interest. About 20 years ago I did an AP story on the Liberty incident that was published by the Los Angeles Times and a large number of other U.S. newspapers.
I spoke to the following officials (their titles correspond to the positions they occupied at the time of the incident) and they all told me that the Israeli attack was deliberate, not an accident: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Moorer, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Richard Helms, and National Security Agency (NSA) Deputy Director Louis Tordella.
I still would like to know what led them to this unanimous conclusion, but obviously you have no hope of finding out by questioning the nation's top intelligence and security officials. The information is classified, and they are not going to tell you. I was, however, struck by the fact that they all stated their conclusions clearly, forcefully, and without any qualifications, hedging, or ambiguities. Because they had at their disposal the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the State Department, the CIA, and the NSA, I presumed that they had solid grounds for their conclusion.
I might add that I gathered other statements. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told me on the phone that he had "no recollection" of the attack on the Liberty. I found this curious at the time, as I understood him to have the reputation of a man with a filing cabinet memory. I also talked to Admiral Isaac Kidd, who headed the naval court of inquiry. I told him what the others had said, and then asked if he had any opinion. He said, "The giants of that time can speak out. I know when to keep my mouth shut."
Thirty-six years have gone by since the Liberty was attacked. Is it not time for U.S. government agencies to release whatever classified information is in their files and clear this matter up once and for all?
"Net-Centric Fogs Accountability"
(See C. Johnson, pp. 32-35, May 2003; A Bruski, p. 12, June 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William J. Morgan, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Johnson makes some good points in his thought-provoking article. I must disagree with him, however, about spreading the accountability of the command. Regardless of the type of System employed, the commanding officer of a ship must be accountable for his command. Blame cannot be spread around the ship when something goes wrong, despite all the information that might flow to the ship. The commanding officer ultimately is responsible for everything that happens on his ship. It always has been that way, and it must continue to be that way. Any deviation would dilute the authority of the commanding officer and render command not much more than a token responsibility.
The information flow from the Pentagon, from fleet commands, and from the type commands is essential. But the commanding officer must be the final authority. If he does not have sufficient information, or if the information is unclear, then it is his duty to question the originating source until he has a clear picture. That is why logs, journals, and departmental notebooks are vital. With these data being maintained, the commanding officer will have the vital information on which to rely in the event of an error and a court of inquiry. There only can be one person responsible for the end result: the commanding officer of the ship.
"Mine Countermeasures a Success"
(See P. Ryan, pp. 52-53, May 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Peter D. Jones, Royal Australian Navy—Rear Admiral Ryan is right to point out the strong link between the surface forces operating in the approaches to the Khor Abd Allah (KAA) waterway and the mine countermeasures forces. It was very much a coordinated effort in countering the Iraqi mine threat. As maritime interception operations screen commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I would like to correct three points for the historical record, as well as make a couple of observations.
First, the surface forces involved in this operation were not just from the U.S. Navy. The ships came mainly from the multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF) which had been enforcing the U.N. security Council sanctions against Iraq for nearly 12 years. They knew the North Arabian Gulf well and were ideally placed for the operation. The MIF at the time of the war had ships from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and Polish Navy.
Second, the discovery of the covert minelaying operation involving the tugs Jumoira, Al Rayiah, and Naihawa also was a Coalition effort. For example, it was the boarding party from the Australian command ship HMAS Kanimbla that discovered the 68 mines hidden inside the barge.
Third, the naval gunfire support also was a Coalition effort and not just undertaken by the Royal Navy. HMAS Anzac joined HMS Marlborough, HMS Chatham, and HMS Richmond in probably the most accurate naval gunfire support action in naval history.
It is worth considering that in recent years the MIF had maintained a sustained presence inside Iraqi territorial waters. In terms of sanction enforcement, it was tremendously effective. Historians would note a useful analogy with the employment of the close blockade in the later 18th century against French ports by Admiral Sir John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent's. It was a similar unremitting presence that forced the Iraqis to take such elaborate steps to disguise minelaying operations. In the end, Iraqi efforts came to nought. Indeed, for a week or more before the commencement of the war we already were suspicious of the Iraqi tugs and barges. This was because through long presence and close observation we had become very attuned to any changes in shipping traffic patterns. The maintenance of the regular flow of shipping by the MIF into the KAA also served to counter Iraqi minelaying by denying the Iraqis a chance to lay mines before the onset of conflict.
Equally important was maintaining the integrity of the KAA once it was cleared of mines. Riverine patrols were instituted and undertaken by the U.S. Navy patrol boats Chinook (PC-9) and Firebolt (PC-10), the U.S. Coast Guard patrol craft Adak (WPB-1333), Aquidneck (WPB-1309), Baranoff (WPB-1318), and Wrangel (WPB-1332), as well as the MIF small boat teams from another 11 Coalition ships. These riverine operations required considerable work prior to the war to ensure that would be conducted safely and effectively. The need for the patrols was reinforced when the ever-vigilant Chinook found a cache of mines, missiles, small arms, and a suicide boat on the KAA foreshore several days into the conflict.
The operations to support the mine countermeasures force was coalition in nature and founded on more than 12 years of commitment by the successive ships and command teams of the MIF. Finally, the success was dependent on good command relationships. I would like to pay tribute to Rear Admiral Barry Costello and Commodore John Peterson for their fine leadership and support of naval operations in the North Arabian Gulf.
"What Shall It Profit a Man?"
(See K. Eyer, pp. 42-45, May 2003; K. Hagner, p. 12, June 2003 Proceedings)
Chief Gas Turbine Systems (Electrical) Craig Faust, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I started out my formative years in the Navy mess cooking in the wardroom of an old oiler, and so had the opportunity to study closely the other side of the fence. Familiarity did not breed contempt in my case, although I had serious doubts that a future Nimitz or Halsey lived among the junior officers. Years later, as a newly minted gas turbine petty officer, I was assigned to the lee helm on the bridge. It was a job nobody wanted because engineering enlisted men usually are allergic to the rarified world of the bridge. I was the last petty officer to join the ship before commissioning, so the job was mine by default. I grumbled my way through countless sea details and general quarters, but I secretly found the job interesting. Seeing inspired shiphandlers and on-the-spot decision making was some compensation for the long hours of formality and sore feet.
I never minded a stern, no-nonsense officer, nor did I dwell long over unpopular decisions that they made. What I objected to were the screamers and shouters, the throwers of coffee pots and telephones, and the highly agitated ulcer-breeding sweat pumps. Those officers invite contempt from the crew, alienation from the chiefs, and do nothing to convince a junior officer that he has a part in a proud and honorable service. I am talking about the officers who acted that way all the time, not just on the occasional bad day. Any officer who can't enforce standards or tweak a crew into exceeding standards without acting like a nut case should think of going into another profession.
Courtesy, consistency, and self-control in officer enhance their authority with the crew. These virtues are not incompatible with discipline or making tough calls, and do much to smooth the rougher edges of the classic Type A personality. Enlisted people are willing to be led instead of holding town meetings. Officers who know their job, practice loyalty up and down, and don't pass the buck will be respected. They might not be popular, but respect brings a popularity of its own that is better than being everyone's buddy. Call me old-fashioned, but I never wanted officers to get too close to me.
"Who's Hunting the Coyotes?"
(See T. Wiehert, M. Trevelt, pp. 76-77, June 2003 Proceedings)
Stanley Kalemaris, Jr.—Captain Wiehert and Lieutenant Commander Trevett lament the fact that neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard interdicts immigrants traveling from Ecuador to Central America on what might be the first leg of a voyage of immigration to the United States. They also suggest that we pressure South American governments to make it illegal for their citizens to leave on what might be voyages that will culminate in illegal attempts to enter the United States.
As to their first so-called problem, there is no basis for us to interfere with citizens of another country traveling from their home country to a third country. As to their suggestion that we tell sovereign governments to put legal restrictions on the rights of citizens to embark on international voyages, we have a long history of categorizing Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Cuban restrictions on emigration as human rights violations. How can the authors justify telling South American governments to impose similar restrictions on their citizens?
"Using Anonymity Is Dysfunctional"
(See J. van Tol, p. 48, April 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22, June 2003 Proceedings)
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003; V. Addison, M. Collins, D. Richardson, pp. 10-14, April 2003; R. Dunn, J. Mazzafro, P. Hall, May 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22, June 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Jeff Huber, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain van Tol opposed anonymity "because of what it implies about the state of the Navy and the honor of its senior officers." This argument reminds one of the sort of denial often seen in newly diagnosed cancer patients. Denying the tumor exists doesn't make it go away. It just helps it spread.
Reprisal by seniors for controversial opinions published in Proceedings and other periodicals is real. More than enough naval officers (and former naval officers) have the rope burns to prove it. That Rear Admiral Tom Marfiak even brought up the subject of anonymity indicates that a genuine problem exists—a creeping erosion of Proceedings' status as an "independent forum." I have personal knowledge of one officer who came very close to meeting a numbered fleet commander at admiral's mast over a Proceedings contribution in which the officer obliquely criticized a real-world operation.
Captain van Tol decries the 1990s as a "low, dishonest decade" in naval affairs, citing cooked readiness figures, the politicized way in which women were integrated into combat roles, and the Tailhook scandal as the primary causes. I agree that for those reasons the 1990s made for an ugly chapter in Navy history. But his implication is that the dawn of the 21st century marked the end to an era of "officers looking over their shoulders to see who might be listening."
Such is not the case. Recent events in military affairs illustrate that the present climate is even more repressive than the 1990s, and that retribution for refusing to march to the company tune goes well above and beyond the confines of the naval services.
Administration officials vilified retired senior officers who criticized the Gulf War II war plans as irresponsible, disloyal, unpatriotic, and worse. Top-ranking Army officials who publicly defied the agendas of the Office of the Secretary of Defense are out. Their replacements are individuals with established track records of being in lock step with Donald Rumsfeld/Paul Wolfowitz initiatives.
With such a clear "with us or against us" message coming from the highest levels of the defense establishment, what is bright, dedicated Lieutenant Bennett to think? That it's a good idea to write articles that question leadership's warfighting and transformation concepts, or that criticize the establishment's favored programs and doctrines? Not if she hopes to ever become Lieutenant Commander Bennett.
An anonymity policy does carry with it certain risks. In a worst-case scenario, it warps Proceedings into a "forum of the sea services' dirty laundry." Lieutenant Bennett anonymously tells tales of being pawed by her skipper on liberty. Chief Beef, who doesn't like Lieutenant Bennett and is loyal to the skipper, anonymously accuses her of attempting to sleep her way to the top one pay-grade at a time. Anonymous charges and counter-charges fly back and forth, and Proceedings sinks to the lowest levels of tabloid journalism.
But that won't happen. With the oversight of Proceedings' full-time editorial staff and its Editorial Board comprised of active-duty naval professionals (and one retired officer), there's little chance of the magazine turning into the Naval institute Enquirer.
A far greater danger lies in eliminating the use of anonymity altogether. With juniors fearful of taking on the establishment over contentious issues, Proceedings becomes the exclusive domain of flag and general officers whose jargon-laden essays glorify whatever policies roll down from the front office. At that point, Proceedings turns into the "forum of the company line."
No, I don't want anonymity to become the standard practice. I'd hate to see "No-body Asked Me, But . . ." replaced by "You Didn't Hear Me Say This, But. . ." Nonetheless, judicious use of anonymity will ensure that Proceedings remains the home of "lively debate" on sea-service issues.
Discretionary anonymity will not change Proceedings into a glossy imitation of the Navy Times. But with anonymity completely prohibited, it could well become a naval-centric version of Joint Forces Quarterly.
"Bin Laden's Faith Is a Pretext for Violence"
(See M. Tomlinson, pp. 64-65, March 2003; Y. Aboul-Enein, pp. 10-12, May 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joe Fanning, U.S. Navy, Assistant Professor of Military Strategic Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy—Lieutenant Commander Tomlinson writes that "significant numbers of Muslims in the world are expressing their religious zeal by waging a bloody jihad against anyone who is not with them." Lieutenant Commander Aboul-Enein complains that "significant number" is misleading.
Clearly, the phrase "significant number" is subjective. But Commander Aboul-Enein fails to provide any hard data to discredit Commander Tomlinson's claim. There are about one billion Muslims in the world. Say one-half of one percent are jihadists. Five million seems like a significant number to me—greater than three times the number of U.S. military members.
Is the number really one percent? Ten million jihadists? Two percent? Twenty million. Let's be optimistic and suggest one quarter percent: two-and-a-half million. These seem like fairly significant numbers to me.
One would assume that the jihadists' fellow travelers, their morale and financial supporters, are greater in number than the actual warriors. One can reason that they constitute a significant number, too.
Universally, the scope of a problem must be quantified to be understood and combated. While it is inconceivable that a huge percentage of Muslims oppose the U.S. and the West, even relatively small percentages of one billion make for a significant number of motivated enemies.
These are numbers that policy makers, unencumbered with politically correct notions like "religion of peace," should attempt to determine. We should tread carefully and thoughtfully when investigating a religion as a basis for violence; we cannot ignore, however, that terrorists, from the World Trade Center to the Philippines, were Muslim coreligionists. We ignore such a link at our peril.
"UAVs Need Doctrine and Tactics"
(See W. Johnson, pp. 37-39, April 2003; W. Toti, p. 10, May 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Steven Baxter, U.S. Navy—Commander Johnson's thesis is exactly correct when he writes that "the most radical part of unmanned aerial vehicles is not the technology . . . but the application and integration of the platforms into traditional Navy operations." While certainly true, Commander Johnson's look at Navy-centric unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) application and integration should be expanded to more properly focus on joint UAV employment.
Today's UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures can be characterized as platform-dependent and service-centric. Here at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, the Joint UAV Joint Test and Evaluation program office is tasked with development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the integration of tactical UAVs into the joint force commander's campaign strategy.
Just as Navy manned aircraft launch from ships at sea ready for seamless transfer of control to non-Navy entities "over the beach," UAV employment must be similarly joint. This is particularly important during time-critical targeting as it relates to air interdiction/armed reconnaissance, fire support, and personnel recovery. Without a joint focus in the development of UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures, the joint forces commander will not have the tools needed to most effectively employ an increasingly valuable asset.
"New Roles for Littoral Combat Ships"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 4-6, January 2003; J. Vonli, p. 26, April 2003 Proceedings)
Roshdy George S. Barsoum, Office of Naval Research—Dr. Friedman expressed concern about the fire and shock problems of glass-reinforced (GRP) composite construction for future littoral combat ships (LCSs). Although Commander Vonli addressed some of the fire concerns, some issues were not fully covered. The Orkla and many all-composite ships are sandwich construction with a PVC or similar core. PVC has a low melting temperature, and, if not properly protected, melts, drips, and generates heat when it is burning, and also results in large amounts of smoke and toxic fumes. In the case of fire in sandwich construction, PVC can result in skin delamination and to a loss of bending and compressive carrying capacity.
There are three basic materials used for the construction of naval combatants—steel, aluminum, and composites (with GRP being the current choice). If GRP is not acceptable, then the only alternative for fast ships is aluminum because steel is too heavy. Fatigue life is a fundamental design concern, and aluminum has a low fatigue life compared to steel, while single-skin GRP has a virtually infite life. As Dr. Friedman pointed out, the HMS Sheffield, which contained aluminum, was lost to fire from internal combustion. Conversely, the HMS Ledbury, which was GRP, suffered little damage from an engine fire. Some experts believe that in case of a contained fire, a steel hull would suffer more damage than GRP. GRP chars when subjected to fire, and if it is thick enough, the charring acts as an insulator, protecting it from further degradation.
Delamination problems from shock loading have been addressed by the Office of Naval Research over the last decade. The composite community is well aware of the methodology and the design approach to avoid delamination under shock.
GRP can be fabricated for large-ship structures using resin transfer molding, which results in low-cost, high-quality composites. Design studies show that single-skin reinforced GRP can be used in ship hulls up to 280 feet long. Current research sponsored by the Office of Naval Research on new hybrid hull concepts, which use single-skin GRP and steel in hull construction (stainless steel for non-magnetic requirements), can be applied to combatants as well as larger littoral combat ships. The general notion of a hybrid hull (composite and steel) is to use the steel for carrying the major hull-girder sea loads and the composite for carrying the pressure loads. The hybrid concept takes advantage of the stealth properties of GRP and actually increases the hull-girder strength, without any sacrifice to its stiffness. If the hybrid concept is provided with blow-out panels, it presumably would be able to sustain the damage due to internal explosions that Dr. Friedman referred to in his article.
On that note, the littoral combat ship program should look at glass-reinforced composite material as a more reliable material than aluminum, and should consider the hybrid (GRP and steel) concept for larger vessels.