Last summer, reporter Vernon Loeb of The Washington Post wrote that U.S. submarine intelligence-gathering missions have increased 30% with the war on terrorism, so we probably need more subs. But at $2.3 billion a copy, we probably are not going to get many of them. More recently, in the March Proceedings, John Byron warned the Navy that it should get on with transitioning from a primary sea-control mission to sea-based land warfare—and acquire cheaper ship alternatives—if the service is to remain relevant. He also believes that the procurement and ownership costs of our current, very expensive submarine classes are more than we can afford, and estimates that about half the current sub numbers are all we really need to meet today's Navy missions.
All the recent submarine classes and designs—the New SSN, Seawolf (SSN-21), Virginia (SSN-774)—basically are the same boat. Because they are built around the only nuclear propulsion design around, and because that design requires a 40-foot hull diameter (more or less), and because you buy submarines, like all fish, by the pound, the submarine force has priced itself out of the market.
Our subs, even the newest ones, are designed to fight the Cold War. Today, we have a new set of patrol orders. Sea control and antisubmarine warfare have gone away, and in their place are missions such as covert insertion, Tomahawk strike, and intelligence collection (this is not a new one, but there is a lot more of it, and in real time). These kinds of missions downplay the need for faster, deeper, larger boats. Sure, big boats are nice to have. So is having enough subs. The reality is that we cannot have both size and numbers.
The submarine designers tinker around the edges, but the answer comes up about the same: $2.3 billion. Aerospace designers have a rule: if you really want to cut costs, start with a clean sheet of paper. Working in the margins produces marginal change.
What kind of submarine might be produced with a clean sheet of paper? Maybe one with a small reactor, in a small hull, driving steam turbo-generators that power an electric motor attached to a propeller. It would be small, simple, quiet (quieter than the Virginia), and slower—but still fast enough. It would be cheaper to build, man, and operate.
So what is the problem? The problem is change—we all made our bones on big boats. It also is about money and time—redesign will take years and cost tens of millions of dollars while the ankle-biters have a field day. And it also will mean a quality drop—who wants to be the submarine force commander known as the "father of the low-mix SSN"?
This is not the submarine community's first call to sanity, but our leaders have not responded, perhaps, because this kind of change requires a fine political touch, humility, and courage. It especially demands the latter; a prophet can speak perfect truth and still get stoned. Ask retired Navy Admiral Bill Owens. We are running out of time, however. Our submarines are getting older and reactor cores are burning out, and so are officers and men. We run the risk of waking up in a few years to a fleet of 20-30 worn out SSNs manned by the second team. Let's find the humility and courage to break out that clean sheet of paper.
Captain Jacobs spent a career in submarines and 12 years in the aerospace industry. Now he writes novels.