The heated debate over littoral warfare is being confused by a big ship-small ship controversy that ignores the limitations of deep-draft ships in restricted waters. This argument holds that critical systems, such as ballistic defense missiles and large guns, cannot fit in small ships, and small craft, such as Streetfighter, cannot do the job. The analysis is correct insofar as war at sea is concerned. It assumes, however, that big ships are as effective in the littorals as in deep water—that they can dominate the beachfront property where maritime conflict is most likely to occur in the war on terrorism.
Although a strong blue-water fleet is essential to maritime supremacy, given today's threats and the increasing importance of the world's littorals, the Navy needs hull forms best suited for the missions it expects to accomplish there. Thus, a feasible high-low mix of ships should include ships and craft designed specifically to operate inshore and survive at acceptable levels of risk.
Current Naval Scenarios
Today's maritime threat lies in littoral areas of the world that are near the hot spots of discontent-the shallow waters where sonar does not work and capital ships are vulnerable to shore-based aircraft and weapons, low-cost mines, and small suicide boats laden with explosives. Terrorist threats in the littorals are asymmetrical because, like guerrillas, terrorists avoid set-piece battles. In the littorals, minor powers and movements that cannot operate in blue water are able to employ inexpensive weapon systems to great effect.
The foremost naval challenge in the next 10 to 15 years will be to more effectively and efficiently support operations that are primarily amphibious in nature. Modern U.S. Navy combatants cost nearly $1 billion; it makes little sense to send them to waters where they can be put out of action by $1,500 floating mines—as happened in the Gulf War—or targeted readily by silent diesel submarines. Although the USS Cole (DDG-67) was hit at the pier, she could have been attacked in the narrows by the same inflatable boat when entering or leaving port.
Littoral operations require relatively compact, inexpensive vessels that can be configured for a wide range of missions. They should be modular in construction to accommodate various arrays of weapons, logistic suites, communications, and troop support facilities. These lightly manned, maneuverable craft should have drafts of less than 15 feet, low electronic reflectivity characteristics, and be capable of speeds of 50 knots. In addition, they must be able to operate in high sea states.
Littoral Craft Missions
Discounting recent operations in Haiti, the Navy last conducted sustained littoral warfare in Operation Market Time during the Vietnam War. Large combatants could approach Vietnam's coast with little risk of mines, submarines, or missile attack from the shore. But this is not the case today, when our elusive adversaries are well financed and have access to the numerous sophisticated weapons available in the underground arms market.
Resupply of forces ashore has to be conducted without endangering high-value ships in unsecured near-shore areas. A Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) or Littoral Support Craft (LSC) designed specifically for in-shore operations could rearm and refuel helicopters that support U.S. forces, thus eliminating long round-trips to the amphibious forces at sea, saving time and fuel, reducing aircrew fatigue, and—most important tactically—increasing time on station. It could function as a communications and intelligence relay between tactical units and shipboard headquarters, and perform close-in fire support missions with guns and missiles. Further, the LCS would be an excellent platform for launching and recovering naval and joint force unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are proving themselves to be more useful than imagined before the war on terrorism. In addition to these vital missions, littoral warfare craft could:
- Insert and extract special operations and conventional forces
- Intercept and interdict high-speed surface threats
- Augment close-in air defense of forces ashore
- Support noncombatant evacuation operations and medical civic-action projects
- Perform mine countermeasure and shallow-water antisubmarine warfare functions
- Provide situational awareness and wide-area surveillance and targeting for forces at sea and ashore
- Conduct blockade and ship boarding-and-search operations.
- Function as afloat medical evacuation platforms
- Provide repair, maintenance, and sustainment capabilities for other ships
Naval Special Warfare Requirements
Naval special warfare forces include SEAL teams, SEAL delivery vehicle teams, and special boat teams. The SEALs' missions include direct actions (offensive), special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism. Special boat teams operate Mark V special operations craft, rigid hull inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding craft, and special-mission craft for coastal patrol and interdiction. They transport, insert, and extract special operations forces, usually SEALs. The SEAL delivery vehicle teams operate the Mark VIII SEAL delivery vehicle (open water, requiring self-contained underwater breathing apparatus [SCUBA] gear) and the advanced SEAL delivery vehicle (closed and dry).
Under plans announced last year in "Naval Special Warfare 21," these three units combine their specialties in one task organization for training, work ups, and deployments. Because they operate primarily in the littorals and make extensive use of specialized weapons and equipment, design and development of any littoral warfare craft must encompass their needs:
Diving operations are difficult and inherently dangerous; they must be coordinated thoroughly to ensure the safety of the divers. Afloat requirements for supporting diving are extremely stringent and exacting. The LCS will need space to stow SCUBA and diving suits, underwater communications equipment, electronic compass boards, and other equipment that might be needed for specific operations. The SEAL delivery vehicles and their batteries must be stowed on board the LCS and space allotted for their maintenance. A special site would be reserved for safe launching and recovery of the vehicles (and other raiding craft). And, as in all diving evolutions, a recompression chamber is desirable for diving emergencies.
Demolitions operations require temperature-controlled space for stowage of explosives. In addition, protection against electronic hazards will be paramount because some military ordnance is incompatible with shipboard electronic emissions.
The LCS will need high-technology planning and briefing spaces for missions and convenient stowage rooms for weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Berthing quarters should be designed for at least 40 personnel, but should be flexible enough to handle more people, depending on the mission assigned.
Extensive command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) support is needed to integrate properly with conventional forces at sea or ashore. While complete redundancy is impossible in LCS-class ships, they must have communications suites that are compatible with national-level headquarters. Littoral combat ships to be employed as forward operating bases for joint special operations task forces will need the most advanced C31 suites available, as well as sensitive compartmented intelligence facilities for highly classified material.
What Is the Right Hull?
Since the earliest days of navigation, propulsion has gone through many evolutions. But the principal maritime design for piercing the water has remained the monohull. Proceedings Naval Systems columnist Edward J. Walsh noted in the March 2002 Sea Power (p. 40) that "the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has funded a number of demonstrations of small, fast, high-sea-state-capable craft that could provide design options for a notional LCS." The hull form he cited is a catamaran, with a flat deck that lends itself to helicopter and UAV operations. It clearly is more desirable for inshore operations than a monohull.
The new DDX class of ships incorporates a low-end mix to operate in the world's littorals. Inexplicably, the ONR design and the resources expended on it were lost in the rush to award a DDX design contract that specifies the same littoral requirement. Given soaring shipbuilding costs, the high-end ships of the DDX class will be too expensive to expose to inshore threats and their operational characteristics would be marginalized by coupling them to littoral roles.
The Littoral Combat Ship with catamaran hull is the best way to project U.S. presence in the world's restricted littorals. It should be the Navy's first choice. Catamarans have been proven around the world in commercial service and can be adapted easily to military use. The time to cover our bets on this critical warfighting mission is long overdue.
Rear Admiral Worthington, a former SEAL and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, is a defense consultant in San Diego, California. His commentary on this subject is in the October 2002 Proceedings.