First Honorable Mention, Armed Forces Joint Warfighting Essay Contest
Since 1986, the armed services of the United States have improved their ability to work closely together to achieve military success. There remain, however, many examples of friction and inefficiencies that hamper joint military operations.
To enhance joint combat readiness, I recommend establishing multiservice standing joint task force headquarters (SJTF HQs) in each regional combatant command. I applaud the effort by the Department of Defense to create such headquarters, but current plans do not go far enough in creating a readily deployable headquarters that immediately can assume command of major operations.
We Can Do Better
The Goldwater-Nichols Act made major changes to the defense establishment that have gone far toward realizing the benefits of jointness while maintaining strong service identities. Since 1986, U.S. armed forces have conducted successful joint operations in Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999) and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan (2001-2002). Joint integration also has been important in numerous military operations other than war such as those in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Nonetheless, military operations since Goldwater-Nichols also illustrate continuing problems of interservice rivalry and inefficiency. Significant problems with joint execution can be traced to poorly designed command-and-control structures. Rather than relying on joint headquarters to direct joint operations, service and functional components have been given responsibility for discrete portions of operations. The execution of joint operations therefore suffered because of lack of close integration and coordination of service and functional components.
For example, during Operation Desert Storm, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf chose to retain operational command without creating a joint task force. The result was the use of the theater-strategic combatant command headquarters also to run the major joint and combined offensive. The joint and combined operation ultimately was successful, but not without some important costs. The secondary attack by the Marines in eastern Kuwait achieved too much success, and routed the Iraqis from the Kuwait theater. By continuing to press the Iraqi forces and exploit their initial success, the Marines pushed the Iraqis back in a manner that diminished the effect of the Army VII Corps' flanking attack—the ground attack's main effort—which was meant to trap the Iraqi Republican Guards. This allowed the Iraqis to escape with a greater portion of their force intact. Disputes over the positioning of the fire support coordination line in the closing stages of the ground war similarly hampered effective coordination of air and ground attacks on Iraqi forces. A clearly focused operational warfighting headquarters, such as a joint task force headquarters, could have prevented these problems.
Among military operations other than war, the operation in Somalia is an example of multiple, overlapping, and poorly integrated command-and-control arrangements. Varied and disjointed U.S. command-and-control mechanisms added to an already complicated United Nations command-and-control structure. The most obvious negative example of this arrangement was the difficulty of forming and launching the rescue effort to relieve the Army Rangers during the "Blackhawk Down" combat action of 3-4 October 1993. A clear joint task force structure incorporating all U.S. forces might have prevented the disconnect between the Rangers and the relieving force.
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo also exposed some notable flaws. This included the creation, at the last minute, of a Joint Task Force HQ (JTF Noble Anvil) using as its core a U.S. headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNavEur), untrained for warfighting leadership. As with other potential core HQs that could have been designated as JTF HQ, USNavEur was dominated by one service, in this case the Navy. Moreover, making the JTF HQ functional required significant augmentation of personnel from other commands and the reserves. This created a headquarters to manage combat operations that was ad hoc and unevenly staffed. Specific difficulties included poor integration of the Apache helicopters in Task Force Hawk and the poor use of intelligence generated by Task Force Hawk.
An Effective Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
The creation of a JTF headquarters below the level of the combatant commander is a valuable way to provide focused leadership for clearly defined operational missions. This leaves the combat commander (regional commander-in-chief) free to exercise overall direction within his area of responsibility. Providing the combatant commander with a standing JTF headquarters ensures that focused leadership is readily available, with minimal disruption and delay, when a major operation begins.
In recent practice, JTF headquarters typically were drawn from the service component headquarters designated to lead the JTF—normally a fleet, corps, or numbered Air Force. The JTF headquarters also retained control of its original service component with the commander therefore wearing two hats. The joint character of the staff usually came from augmentation by specialists drawn from the commander-in-chief's (CINC's) assets and through the attachment of service liaison personnel from the other units in the JTF.
This ad hoc arrangement creates disparities in experience, standard operating procedures, and staff cohesion. The time-sensitive nature of execution places enormous demands on such ad hoc organizations. Frequently, the operations retain the definition and flavor of the service that provided the JTF commander, who in turn relies on the staff with which he is already familiar. Lack of joint team training and cohesion is most relevant in the initial phases of operations. In situations with low or no warning, this lack of experience and training creates a major risk to mission accomplishment.
In February 2002, Joint Forces Command established the first Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The proposed element, however, is not a complete headquarters. The 55-person group is a collection of "operational planners and information command-and-control specialists." This provides a valuable element of expertise to augment a headquarters, but it falls far short of providing a coherent headquarters. The current concept is missing the most important element of a warfighting headquarters—a command element.
To ensure joint effectiveness, the standing joint task force headquarters must be a well-trained, cohesive organization around which a joint task force can be built. To accomplish this, the SJTF HQ should be able to assume control of any major combat operation or smaller-scale contingency within a regional combatant command. This should include a separate JTF commander who has no other command role with the combatant command. In other words, the JTF commander should not be the commander of a subordinate service or functional element within a regional combatant command (for example, an Army corps or Navy fleet).
The SJTF commanders should be assigned to the regional combatant commands to work closely with the regional commanders they will support. One approach would be to assign these individuals as assistant commander-in-chief (ACinC), SJTF. The ACinC, SJTF should have three-star rank and have a permanent, joint staff assigned to him in order to assume immediate command and control of a JTF in a crisis or other short-warning situation. The permanent commander and staff would comprise the SJTF HQ. The ACinC, SJTF should be senior to the commanders of operational-level service forces apportioned to the combatant command. The position should be a joint critical billet and filled by an individual designated as a joint specialty officer who does not require a waiver. In peacetime, the members of the SJTF HQ should be part of the combatant command's staff but should regularly train and operate as an independent element. It must be able to detach from the combatant command staff without disturbing overall operations. In peace or non-crisis situations, the SJTF personnel provide useful depth to the combatant-commander's staff. In particular, the standing JTF HQ would be an excellent tool for leading a combatant command's participation in joint warfighting exercises and joint experimentation exercises. This would allow the SJTF HQ a valuable means to hone its skills through command and control of forces during exercises.
For major combat operations or small-scale contingencies, the SJTF HQ provides the CinC the flexibility to assume command and control of service forces for the operation and still retain his primary staff for overall combatant command responsibilities. The SJTF staff becomes the established hub into which the assigned elements of the joint task force plug in. Furthermore, in situations where the CinC decides to retain overall command and control of an operation—such as General Schwarzkopf did in Desert Storm—the SJTF commander and staff still provide useful capabilities to the CinC that can be used to manage operational level command and control of forces and leave the CinC free to focus on theater-strategic or political concerns.
In situations when the SJTF HQ is activated, it becomes the central processing unit of the operation's command-and-control network. Service forces should be able to join the JTF and operate as easily as a plug-and-play component added to a personal computer. To do this effectively, the standing JTF staff must include service-specific operations and logistics elements. Ultimately, these elements of the JTF staff will coordinate closely with the service components of the combatant command. There must be integrated joint teams within key staff sections (for example, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations elements within the J3 and J5 directorates). Similarly, within the J4 (logistics), the services must provide officers and service-specific cells that can integrate service supply and acquisition systems into the joint task force's requirements. With respect to logistics, this is a requirement because services provide the logistical needs for their forces. This will easily and effectively meet the requirements outlined in joint doctrine.
The core of this SJTF HQ should be 75-100 individuals assigned on a full-time basis. Upon activation of a JTF, the SJTF HQ likely will require augmentation of technical specialists such as intelligence analysts and communications specialists to permit high-tempo, 24-hour operations. Augmentees may also include reserves or individuals from other combatant commands. The rest of the joint task force plugs into this core SJTF HQ element. The SJTF HQ does not fall in on a component unit.
For mission execution, the joint task force commander should have broad latitude to establish command relationships. With a strong joint staff comprised of representatives from the services, it should be possible to flatten the organizational command-and-control architecture. Flatter organizational hierarchies streamline the chain of command and facilitate rapid execution, and are better suited to exploit the concepts of network centric warfare.
Joint forces are required to have service component commanders. In accordance with Joint Publication 0-2, "all joint forces include service components, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through service components." It is possible to accomplish the intent of maintaining clear linkages to service-- specific logistics networks without necessarily requiring an intermediate level of command. Instead, these coordination requirements could be moved to the JTF staff directorates, particularly the J4 (as described previously).
The imperatives for streamlined joint command-and-control architectures and standing organizations for execution are consistent with the expected demands of network-centric warfare, which recognizes the need for speed of communication and the ability to act and decide within the enemy's decision cycle.
The ability to generate a common operating picture and achieve self-synchronization in support of the joint task force commander's intent provides a strong argument against the maintenance of multiple layers of redundant command and control. In this concept, the JTF commander and his staff would serve less as coordinators for service and functional commands and instead would more directly orchestrate the actions of subordinate sea, land and air assets. Such orchestration would occur through mission-type orders and clear understanding of the commander's intent-not micromanagement of subordinate units. In place of component and functional elements working in different stove pipes under the leadership of service commanders, the services and components would be represented on the JTF staff within the existing structure. The joint staff is not an array of purple-suited officers but a strong combination of service experts more analogous to a strong blade of Damascus steel.
This proposal may raise concern regarding the span of control for joint task force commanders. Instead of using service and functional component commanders to manage forces under his control, the JTF commander would have greater direct control of service and functional elements. The span of control does not really change, but the locus of action moves from the compartmentalized service or functional component headquarters to the better integrated joint staff under the JTF commander. Moreover, this proposal does not preclude the establishment of service or functional component commands. Although discouraged in order to prevent the proliferation of command echelons, there may be times when the size or scope of a particular service or function would benefit from the assignment of an additional commander.
A key factor is the qualifications and experience of the service representatives on the joint task force staff. Ultimately, effective integration of a joint staff rests upon foundations of service expertise and the unique service perspectives resident on the staff, not the death of unique service cultures. Representatives must have a well-developed expertise in their service before they can be effective advocates and integrators at the joint staff level. These recommendations do not envision the creation of joint officers similar to the classic German general staff system. Instead, improved combat readiness relies on well-qualified officers of the military services who are simply brought together more closely to integrate the joint actions of their services.
Successful joint integration and orchestration—not just coordination—requires improved command and control. Standing joint task force headquarters with seasoned commanders and strong staffs can rapidly assume effective command and control of diverse operational units. By welding the seams of our joint forces together more tightly, we improve our overall combat readiness.
Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement is a faculty member at the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval War College, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions in both heavy and light artillery units.