With the decline of Russian strategic forces the military complex on the Kola Peninsula is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
Because the United States no longer is the main adversary of Russia, the START arms control agreements are based on a now-obsolete mind-set. The United States is abandoning the START regime, and Russian nuclear weapons numbers will come down, with or without START. Russia's land-based missiles are cheaper and easier to maintain and remain a minimum deterrent against its adversaries. As a result, the Kola Peninsula military complex no longer will be as important as conventional wisdom proclaims.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the decline in Russia's economy, Russian military strategists view the maritime threat posed by forward-deployed U.S. and other NATO naval forces, armed with advanced, deep-strike precision systems, as the modernized version of the Cold War threat—but made more serious because of the decline in Russian naval strength from oceanic to maritime littoral.
Thus, several factors have an impact on the Kola complex. The Northern Fleet is less important because of the bloc obsolescence of its ships. It is more vulnerable because of advances in U.S. precision-guided missiles; the U.S. Navy now can destroy the remaining Russian Northern Fleet with advanced submarine-launched cruise missiles without using nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear weapons therefore can be diverted to other targets. The Northern air defense is directed toward the long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) of the B-52H. Most likely it will never be used.
The Russian Dilemma
The Russian problem is block obsolescence in its strategic forces. The impact is greatest in the strategic submarine force. But because their production facilities were located primarily in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, air force bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) also are affected. Russia can choose to keep its lethal SS18 armed with four to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads for another five years. If it goes from its current inventory of 180 missiles to 100, it still could have 1,000 warheads deployed in 2007.
The strategic nuclear submarines are not as easy to keep in service. Typhoon has been a disappointment. Delta I and Delta II have been phased out, and the Borey class is seriously delayed.
No new strategic bomber will be operational before 2005. To avoid dependence on Ukraine and the return of bombers from that country, Russia now is building additional Tu-160 Blackjacks.
The ability and status of Russian bombers are doubtful. Some observers are pessimistic, predicting that the Russian bomber force will be given a sub-strategic task to cover Europe, China, and the southern border states with its long-range cruise missiles. Indeed, the temptation to concentrate on the ICBM force must be great. The ICBMs are ten times cheaper to maintain than submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). They are not subject to the same degree of block obsolescence. The SS-27 Topol is mobile and hence less vulnerable. Altogether Russia currently fields 3,400 strategic nuclear warheads based on ICBMs, more than the total number foreseen in START III. Even so, NATO conventional aircraft using precision-guided conventional munitions could destroy 60% of Russian strategic missile silos and 15% of mobile strategic forces. Since the United States no longer is its main adversary, Russia might foreclose START and keep the simple, reliable ICBM force as a deterrent against China and regional adversaries.
Some important Russian strategists claim that START II is a fundamental error and that Russia should stick to its advantage as a continental power.
The Northern Fleet and the Strategic Nuclear Forces
Estimates of the size and capability of the future Russian sea-based strategic force differ. It is not even clear if there will be one or two strategic fleets in the future. Particularly Nordic observers believe that the nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) will be concentrated in the Northern Fleet. There is consensus on the following issues:
- The Typhoon SSBN has been a disappointment. Only two of six submarines are in service and most likely only one will remain by 2003. She is based in Nerpicha in Zapadnaya Litsa, close to the Norwegian border
- The first Borey-class submarine was laid down on 2 November 1996. But the SS-N-28 missile was a failure and has been abandoned. A new missile launch complex is to be equipped with a solid-- fuel ballistic missile for the submarine. The 12 future Boreys are planned to be commissioned beginning in 2005 but most likely beginning in 2010. Norwegian observers believe they will be based in the Northern Fleet, i.e., not replace the Delta III submarines in the Pacific.
- Delta IV SSBNs remain the most viable strategic submarines. They are based at Gadzhievo, outside Murmansk.
On average, three SSBNs are now deployed on deterrent patrols in waters contiguous to the Northern and Pacific fleets. In addition, one SSBN in harbor usually is on 15-minute alert to launch. Two nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) usually are deployed, one providing antisubmarine security to the SSBN force and one either patrolling west of the Polar bastion or operating against U.S. carrier groups or other ship formations.
Nine hundred twenty-eight nuclear warheads are based in the Northern Fleet and 240 in the Pacific, 16% and 4% of the entire Russian strategic arsenal, respectively. The START talks assumed that the Kola arsenal would constitute 50% of the Russian strategic forces. Now only 20% is likely.
The implications for northern security are interesting. Traditionally, the Kola complex has been depicted as a massive bastion for the protection of the increasingly important Northern Fleet. Considerable air defense and conventional forces have been designed for this function. The entire strategy is based on the Northern Bastion concept. The Russian SSBNs hide in the Barents Sea protected by nature and attack submarines. The new Severodvinsk, several years behind schedule, might be canceled and superceded by a more advanced nuclear attack submarine.
Russia sees SLCMs as part of the nuclear deterrent but also as a conventional weapon. The current nine SLCM submarines in the Northern Fleet have the role of attacking land targets with nuclear or nonnuclear SLCMs. Since the mission is to reduce the military and military-economic potential of a possible aggressor, there are many potential targets in northern Europe and, given the 3,000-km range of the Russian SLCMs, in central Europe as well. The future SSN will have this capability and will be more difficult to detect by the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines because it is so quiet. Notably also, the Borey class also could have SLCMs for this task and thus be used without going nuclear.
Eleven submarines in the Russian Northern Fleet are strategic SSBNs and nine have SLCMs covering most of Europe. But the main threat to the Northern SSBN and SSN fleet no longer is nuclear. Most Russian submarines are rusting at their bases. U.S. submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles present a potential threat to military and economic targets. The Tomahawks can hit stationary land-based targets, strategic missile submarines in their bases, and their logistics facilities with a high degree of accuracy.
Therefore, the United States does not need to allocate strategic resources—ICBMs, SSBNs, bombers—to attack the Russian SSBN fleets at Murmansk or Petropavlovsk. The Los Angeles-class submarines can do the job.
Each Los Angeles-class submarine carries 12 Tomahawks. Assuming 12-14 boats are on station, some 150 Tomahawks would be committed to this task, 7% of the 2,000 in the U.S. inventory. The Seawolf improves this capability fourfold. Each Seawolf could carry 45 Tomahawks and theoretically could launch 4 on each of the 11 Russian SSBNs in the Northern Fleet. Since only one or two of the SSBNs are on station—20% of the fleet-the others in harbor would launch from the pier. As vulnerable sitting ducks they are trigger happy and likely to launch on warning. Currently one SSBN in harbor is usually on 15-minutes alert to launch.
Air Defense
Despite the Russian insight that its submarine fleet is threatened by U.S. submarine-launched Tomahawks, the 6th Air Army maintains a respectable force. There are 280 fighters in the area. The number of air defense regiments has gone from nine to seven but the aircraft are modem Su-27 Flankers and MiG-31 Foxhounds and MiG-29 Fulcrums. The 280 aircraft constitute one-third of all Russian air defense forces. The 525 air defense missiles are about the same number as in 1990, but they are modern, especially the SA-10 Grumble, which is effective against cruise missiles.
Altogether there are 22 military airfields on Kola that could base 500 combat aircraft. The fighter portion of this air force is directed primarily against the U.S. bomber threat and lately also the cruise missile threat from Los Angeles attack submarines. Mostly likely, 150 SLCMs form the threat from the sea, but many of them probably have submarine targets. The 56 operational B-52H bombers carry 1,120 AGM-86B nuclear ALCMs. With a range of 2,400 km, they can be launched over the Norwegian Sea between Trondelag and Lofoten. In SIOP they most likely are accompanied by the 22 B-2A penetration stealth bombers that have entered the SIOP since 1994. Even if the United States were to launch its entire B-52H force against northwestern Russia, an unlikely scenario, there are four Flankers or Foxhounds for each B-52. The range of these fighters, however, is not sufficient to intercept the B-52s in their launching space. In addition, the B-52s are protected by a screen of 58 Norwegian F-16 and several squadrons of U.S. fighters, if time permits.
The aircraft carrier program is yet another failure of the Russian armaments industry. The Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov is the last carrier allocated to the Northern Fleet. She has 2430 Su-27 combat aircraft and 8-10 antisubmarine helicopters. Compared to the air defense force of 280 combat aircraft, this is a marginal and very expensive addition to the protection of the Northern Fleet. Consequently, it was decided in late 1997 to decommission the Kuznetsov.
Ground Forces
There is 1 airborne division and 2 infantry and 1 naval infantry brigade in the Leningrad military district, compared to 12 divisions in 1990. After one year's mobilization, 1 infantry division and 12 infantry brigades could be raised. Although the forces are better organized and equipped than before, Norwegian and Swedish estimates conclude that the Russian forces in place could not take bases in northern Norway without extensive preparations. According to the defense council, the Russian standing forces will be 10-12 motor rifle divisions and 3 airborne divisions. Mobilizable reserves will be of the same size. That Russia would allocate a third of its standing forces to the conquest of northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway or even to protect its increasingly vulnerable Northern SSBN fleet is extremely unlikely.
Nuclear Weapons
The distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is artificial in Russia. The military doctrine adopted in November 1993 has abandoned the policy of no first use. As the conventional forces decay, the temptation to resort to nuclear weapons will increase.
In the Leningrad military district there are three missile brigades.
Pinozero SS-21 12 70-140 km
Kujvozi SS-21 12
Luga SS-21 12
There are 2-4 warheads per missile and probably around 100 all together. The air force has 300 nuclear warheads in the Leningrad military district, 50-200 of which estimated to be based at Kola. With some 100 strike aircraft—25 Tu-22M Backfires and 73 Su-24 Fencers—there are about three warhead per platform.
If the SS-21 brigades are exchanged for SS-26 brigades, there will be about 100 500-km-range nuclear missiles that can reach all potential targets in Finland. Thirty can reach Sweden and Norway in the High North. In all, there would be 400 tactical nuclear warheads based in the Leningrad military district out of an estimated inventory of 4,000. These rather than the strategic nuclear weapons pose a threat to the Nordic nations in time of crises and war.
Reevaluating Kola
Protecting the SSBN base at Kola will not be so important in wartime if Russia breaks out of the START regime, since ICBMs will remain the backbone of the nuclear triad. And because the main threat to the SSBNs is posed by U.S. attack submarines with torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles, grabbing Nordic territory will not solve or even ease the problem. Nordic air bases could improve the air defense situation, but the United States is unlikely to unleash its nuclear forces against Russia. Because Russia does not have the conventional forces to secure Finnish, Swedish, or Norwegian air bases, any Russian operation would have to be denial oriented, i.e., destroying the Nordic targets. Given the air defense resources of Finland, Sweden, and Norway, nuclear weapons might be used, especially if the nuclear threshold has been crossed in the conflict already.
Neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Air Force needs Norwegian territory to strike strategic targets at Kola with nuclear or conventional weapons. The U.S. prepositioned stocks for the Marine Corps in Trondelag and the five bases in Norway are designated to facilitate the defense of Norway. They are not needed for an operation against Kola. And because the Nordic states do not restrain the Northern Fleet in peacetime and because the area has low priority in a European war, the Nordic states are not of conventional military interest to Russia.
With the decline of Russian military power, the potential for a buildup of Northern forces is remote. In particular, a Northern Fleet threatening the Atlantic sea lines of communications and thereby isolating Scandinavia from the West now belongs to the realm of dreams. Both sides now play down the military elements of their relationship and indeed do not see each other as their main adversaries.
The main interest and possible point of tension has moved south—to the Baltic states and their viability as sovereign states and future members of the European Union and NATO.
Dr. Dorfer, director of research at the Swedish National Defense Research Institute, holds a doctorate in government from Harvard University. He has published extensively in the field of international security and has been a guest scholar at the Wilson Center, Brookings, CSIS, IISS, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. In 1992-94, he was special advisor to the Swedish foreign minister.