The incredible versatility of the F/A-18 has overwhelmed Hornet aircrews, reducing their effectiveness at any single strike-fighter mission. A transition to specialization will result in greater readiness and a better warfighting machine.
The F/A-18 Hornet is an unbelievably capable aircraft that can perform an amazingly wide array of strike-fighter missions. High-speed computers have enabled aircraft designers to build in the capabilities that allow the Hornet to be so versatile. Computers do not forget their programming and therefore perform tasks the same whether they practice them every day or just once a year. The aircrews that fly the Hornet, however, need repeated training to remain proficient at all of these missions. Unfortunately, training requires large amounts of fuel, time, ordnance, and most important, money. It has been demonstrated consistently through training and readiness reports and aircrew performance that we simply cannot train every aircrew that flies the Hornet to perform effectively all the mission areas that the F/A-18 can handle. Soon, all of the strike-fighters in each of our air wings will be Hornets. The current plan is for each air wing to have two F/A-18C squadrons, one F/A-18E squadron, and one F/A-18F squadron. This air wing configuration and our inability to effectively train our aircrews suggest that now is the time for us to change how we train and employ the strike-fighters in an air wing.
Readiness
Prior to 1992, air wings consisted of platforms that were very specialized. An air wing was made up of A-7s or F/A- 18s, A-6s, and F-14s. Each had a specific mission that complemented, rather than overlapped, the others. This enabled aircrews to concentrate their training on a specific mission area. The F-14 was purely a fighter and the A-6 was purely a strike platform. The A-7 and FA- 18 were light attack aircraft. Up until 1992, the overall Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)—a measure of readiness—was still at a very high level. After this time, the Navy adopted the strike-fighter mind-set for the training and employment of the FA-18 and the F-14, and both aircraft had to take on new mission areas to cover the gap left by the A-6. This move increased the training requirements for both aircraft but budgets for training remained the same and did not keep pace. The result was reduced training readiness.
In its report, Trends in Interdeployment Training Readiness: A Study of the Bathtub?, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) found that the overall SORTS for carrierdeployable air wings has steadily declined since 1992. This is directly attributed to training shortfalls. CNA found that even with additional money being spent on spare parts and personnel issues, training readiness has continued to dwindle. Squadrons in the middle of the interdeployment training cycle (IDTC) are forced to work harder every year to meet SORTS requirements for deployment. Some have even resorted to intense periods of training during preparation for overseas movement to meet their training requirements. This has affected the Navy's surge capability since the surge air wings are at ever lower levels of readiness. In fiscal year 1994-1995, the average air wing rarely had an overall SORTS rating below three. In fiscal year 1998-1999, the average air wing did not achieve an overall SORTS rating of three until within five months of deployment. Why did this happen? What has changed?
Multimission Aircraft versus Specialized Aircraft
After 1992, the F-14 became a strike-fighter and added the amphibious warfare (AMW) mission to its training and readiness matrix, as well as a large number of new strike warfare (STW) training events (a total of 21 new training events have been added since 1992). The AMW and STW mission areas are both highly resource intensive, and without a correspondingly large increase in the training budget, the overall SORTS for the F-14 declined rapidly. Similarly, as the role of the A-6 was assumed by both the F/A-18 and the F-14, naval aviation traded a highly specialized and traditionally highly ready platform for two overworked and undertrained platforms with lower average SORTS ratings. CNA found that 18% of the reduction in overall SORTS rating was attributable to the replacement of highly specialized aircraft with multimission ones. From this data and pilots' hands-on experience, it can be seen that a return to mission specialization would alleviate these training shortfalls.
This is not unlike the way the Air Force employs its F-16s, F-15Cs, and F-15Es. As a naval aviator it pains me to say that the F-15C community is without peer in the fighter mission area and the F-15E community is undoubtedly the best at performing tactical strike missions. The evidence points to their training specialization as the reason. We know their aircrews are not better and their aircraft are too similar to ours, so it must be the way they train.
So where does that leave us? The F/A- 18 community trains equally to all of the fighter and strike-mission areas. We are forced to divide our training efforts, resources, and dollars between the myriad of mission areas that we are tasked with performing. Aircrews must strive to become equally adept at basic fighter maneuvers and all the other air-to-air missions, as well as at employing high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs), laser-guided bombs (LGBs), stand-off land attack missiles (SLAMs), joint direct attack munitions, joint stand-off weapons (JDAM/JSOW), and general purpose bombs in the strike role as well as in the close air support arena. Never in history has one aircraft/aircrew team been asked to do so much.
In their Operation Desert Fox after-action report, CNA found that aircrews who had laser targeting pods available to them during the strike-fighter advanced readiness program (SFARP) had a 67% success rate with LGBs during the operation. Aircrews who did not have the pods, however, only had a 50% success rate. This points not only to training asset shortages, but also to the need for prioritizing those assets. If all the training assets are spread evenly among all of the strike-fighter squadrons, then a lower percentage of pilots are going to get trained when compared to specialized squadrons where the right assets are prioritized to the squadrons that primarily perform that mission.
What is the answer? Change. We have to do something different. If we take the opportunity to change the way we employ and train our strike-fighters, then we can overcome our training deficiencies and become a more capable fighting force.
Mission Specialization
With the advent of the F/A-18E and F, we have an opportunity to change how we think about strike-fighter integration. When the F/A-l8F joins an air wing, it will represent that air wing's most capable air-to-ground strike platform. With a crew of two, this platform will be much more capable of handling all the tasks involved with fighting into hostile territory and delivering a weapon on time and on target while in a sophisticated integrated air defense system. The F/A-18F also is the obvious choice for the forward air control (airborne) role. The idea that a dedicated strike aircraft should be dual-seat is not new. Remember the A-6, the F111, and the F-15E? The CNA after-action report from Operation Allied Force comes to a similar conclusion. CNA found that in the employment of LGBs, the strike results of the F-14 were significantly higher than those of the F/A-18. CNA suggested that this was likely because of the two-seat cockpit of the F- 14 and the overall better performance of the laser targeting system. From this, it can be inferred that the F/A-18F will be a better strike platform than the other models of the Hornet and that the Hornet needs a better forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR).
As a complement to the F/A-18F in its strike role, the F/A-18E is the perfect choice as a dedicated air-to-air platform. It has almost identical fuel and performance characteristics. Think how difficult it is to mix F/A-l8Cs and F-14s in a strike element because of differences in speed, fuel consumption, and ideal flight profiles. Imagine how nice it would be to integrate the F/A- 18E and F, with each having a specialized role for which it is optimized in structure and aircrew training.
Let us not forget the F/A-18C, still the best light-attack aircraft in the world. Training should be heavily slanted to the close-air support mission as well as the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) role. If this sounds a little like the way the F-16 is employed, do not be surprised. That is exactly the role the F/A-18C should fill.
Does this suggest that the F/A-18F would never train to the air-to-air mission or the F/A-18E would never train to the air-to-ground mission? Absolutely not. This only suggests that primary mission areas be identified for each model of the Hornet and that training be concentrated in that area. Other mission areas become secondary. This enables aircrews to become and remain highly proficient in their primary mission areas while training to the secondary mission areas as time, resources, and money permit. In times of limited training resources, those resources can be allocated appropriately to the squadrons whose primary mission area requires that resource. For example, if there is a limited number of laser-guided training rounds or FLIRs available for training, then the weapons are allocated to the F/A-18F squadrons first. Likewise, F/A -18E squadrons would have the priority for air-to-air missile shoots and the F/A-18C squadrons would be first in line for JDAM/JSOW and HARM. Think of this as an efficient and intelligent way to perform asset allocation.
System Development and Procurement
As new systems are developed and purchased for the F/A- 18, how do we ensure that this will work in all models? The answer is always a compromise. If the various models were given specific primary mission areas, then system design becomes much easier. Want to develop a new FLIR? Optimize it for the F/A-18F. Looking to upgrade the HARM suite? Optimize it for the F/A-18C. Need to improve the air-to-air functionality? Target the improvements to the F/A-18E. This should improve the warfighting capabilities of all F/A-18s and reduce the cost of development and procurement of new systems.
What about future aircraft development and procurement? Many in Congress question the Navy's requirement for the F/A-18F as well as the procurement of both the Super Hornet and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). They wonder why there is a need for yet another version of the Hornet when they all can fulfill the same missions. However, if mission specialization were adopted it could be seen that there is a need for the F/A-18C, the F/A-18E, and the F/A-18F. With a specialized air wing, the Navy would have a primary strike platform in the FIA-18F, a primary air superiority platform and tactical tanker in the F/A-18E, and a light attack and primary SEAD platform in the F/A-18C. Likewise, mission specialization gives the Navy direction in the development of the JSF as a replacement for the aging F/A-18C, not for the F/A-18E/F. The JSF is a single-seat design with a light payload. It can be developed into the perfect light-attack and SEAD aircraft. It will be a great complement to the F/A-18E and F/A-18F, but never a replacement for either.
Manning
Even if we do not change how we employ our Hornets, the difference between flying single-seat and dual-seat aircraft is large enough to warrant keeping the manning processes separated. Aircrew coordination in a dual-seat aircraft is a key ingredient in the success of the mission. This is another case where specialization would greatly benefit the Navy. Wasting time and resources retraining aircrews is an unnecessary expense. More important, reducing the warfighting capabilities of a squadron while a second-tour aviator adapts from single-seat to dual-seat or vice versa can be avoided through proper detailing. Each tour that an aviator completes in the same airframe builds on the last. That aviator is much better equipped to pass on all of his experience. If we adapt to a mission specialization mindset in the Navy, then specialized detailing becomes even more important. Some argue that cross-breeding improves the breed. However, it really only continues to breed a Jack of all trades and never a master of anything. No doubt there will be times when a transition is necessary. This should not be the norm, but the exception.
The Transition
The transition to an all-Hornet air wing will take a considerable amount of time, but a specialized mind-set can be adopted right now. The F-14 is naval aviation's primary precision-strike aircraft (if not by design, then at least in practice.) Each air wing has at least one F-14 squadron. When the F-14s are retired, they are replaced in the air wings with F/A- 18Fs. If a specialization mindset is adopted now, the transition would be seamless. When the air wing's primary strike platform is retired, a new one will be put in its place. Similarly, those F/A-18 and F-14 squadrons destined for the F/A-18E could be designated the air wings' primary air superiority squadrons. Once again, the transition would be seamless.
We have a wonderful opportunity to move naval aviation in a new direction that will alleviate a vast majority of its training and warfighting shortfalls. Be honest, and talk about it in the ready room and wardroom. Every day, naval aviators of all ranks and communities see that we are not meeting our readiness goals. Aircrews rarely are proficient in any one mission (out of seven required), and most of the time they are just barely current. Mission specialization is not a new idea and has been discussed by aviators for years. They all have suggested that this is the direction to take. Change is required, and now is the time to act.
Lieutenant Commander Harris is a recently departed TOPGUN instructor now assigned to VF-102.