You are commanding a warship in a combat zone and responsible for the lives of 300 crewmembers and millions of dollars' worth of equipment. While executing a sensitive high-priority mission, you find yourself alone and under attack by an enemy ship commanded by a obviously wily, well-trained naval officer. Which would you rather have: more experience in the combat information center (CIC) and expert knowledge of your ship's combat system, or the ability to draw the distilling cycle of your ship's evaporator system from memory?
In December 1998, Proceedings published my article "Oh Canada," which focused on operating procedures of the Canadian Navy's surface force, its command training pipeline, and some unique benefits Canadian sailors receive while on deployment. I was amazed by the subject matter expertise of the Canadian Navy's surface warfare officers (SWOs). Their line officers could both drive and fight the ship exceptionally well; they were not "general practitioners." Their engineering officers did not stand watches in the CIC or on the bridge. When I mentioned my tactical action officer (TAO) qualification to a Canadian engineer, he was shocked I had spent so much time topside.
Some would argue that the U.S. Navy's surface force must be doing something right, given its popularly perceived domination of the world's seas. I submit, however, that we should make a major change and—like the Canadian and British navies—focus on specializing surface line officers in a way that best prepares them to command ships during wartime. The Navy could do so by:
- Ceasing to assign line officers as engineering division officers and chief engineers on board conventional surface ships
- Assigning only engineering duty officers, limited duty officers, and warrant officers as engineer officers on board conventional ships
- Ending all command-at-sea pipeline training for future nuclear-trained surface warfare officers
- Ensuring that future commanding officers get the lion's share of their experience on the bridge and in the CIC.
Advantages of Specialization
Surface line officers would dedicate their training and experience to ship handling and war fighting exclusively; engineering officer of the watch (EOOW) qualification would not be required. The attention of engineering department heads no longer would be divided among engineering duties, topside watches, and the need to earn a TAO qualification. Only officers with extensive dedicated engineering experience would be placed in charge of multimillion-dollar engineering plants.
Much like nuclear-trained officers, engineering duty officers would become dedicated specialists. (Nuclear officers serve as operations, weapons, and combat systems officers on cruisers and destroyers.) This proposal would require engineering-duty officers to serve continuously in nuclear engineering billets; they would have no tours on conventional ships.
The engineering duty community would have to serve in shipboard billets to be promoted and screened. They would attend more specialized training, earn licenses, and learn the skills necessary to ensure that the engineering, combat system, and material readiness of the expensive and increasingly advanced surface fleets are kept at optimal levels. The engineer officer billet—a department head posting—would be achieved at 17 or 18 years of service and would be the pinnacle of the conventional engineering pipeline career. This would improve combat readiness and reduce ships' dependence on the technical advice of port engineers. Some engineering duty officers already volunteer to serve at sea and many of them are former SWOs with experience that could pay huge dividends. (Figure 1 proposes a training pipeline.)
The Down Side
Line officers would be less knowledgeable about the engineering plants of their ships. However, this could be overcome with reinvigorated engineering training as part of the SWO qualification. In addition to basic casualty control cause and effect, line officers on the bridge and in the CIC need a good understanding of the relationship of propulsion, auxiliary, and electrical capabilities and limitations. Experience gained through the SWO qualification would not be as detailed as that of a formal EOOW letter or a division officer billet in engineering, but it would free the officer to focus on ship handling and warfare skill development.
With limited prospects for command at sea, the surface nuclear community could have difficulty recruiting; officers interested in command at sea would probably opt for the submarine community. But a strong shore-duty training and specialization pipeline, combined with experience gained in prototype training, at sea and at nuclear facilities and shipyards, still would attract many officers. With the decommissioning of the nuclear cruiser fleet, there are only ten nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—with the Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)—to provide shipboard surface nuclear engineering experience.
Engineering officers would not be able to command ships. At the same time, a proposal such as this would have to be enacted gradually ("grandfathered") because the nuclear-trained officers on active duty entered the service with the understanding that there would be an opportunity to command at sea.
This transition would be highly controversial. The Navy has operated with the same manning philosophy for years; like all large organizations, it resists change. Many senior officers have served successfully as engineer officers on board conventional ships—they climbed the ladder of success with no small amount of bilge grease on their shoes and might not be open to such a radical change.
Conclusions
This proposal will generate some concerns. Prospective line officers aspiring to command would not be exposed to enough engineering to form an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their plants; or without the opportunity of command at sea, there would be no incentive for men and women to consider a career in shipboard engineering. These concerns would be alleviated by SWO qualification programs that include demanding engineering standards and shipboard engineering programs that feature rigorous training, licensing, and pay incentives.
A system that trains specialists makes sense in today's Navy. For a commanding officer in training, is an EOOW letter or a division officer tour in engineering the best preparation? The Navy needs to look for a higher level of professionalism in surface warfare and engineering. It is time to make a dedicated commitment to groom line officers for command at sea.
Lieutenant Commander Crockett served in several engineering billets, including as a main propulsion assistant and chief engineer.