"'We Were Great': Navy Air in Afghanistan"
(See J. Nathman, pp. 94-96, March 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Jim Conn, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As timely as this article is, and as comprehensive as it might have been, there is one huge omission. Where is the mention of the P-3C antisurface warfare improvement program (AIP) precision surveillance capability? Not only were the P-3s present, but they were arguably the most effective precision surveillance asset in the theater.
Operating from bases in Diego Garcia and Manama, Bahrain, P-3C aircraft modified with the AIP avionics upgrades performed with great effectiveness in joint, coordinated operations throughout the operating area. The sensor systems include the ASX-4 electro-optical system and the APS-137B(V)5 multimode imaging radar. The communications capabilities include satellite, ultra-high frequency, very-high frequency, and high frequency, and real-time video downlink of images developed by the sensors. This is armed surveillance, too, with the AGM-84 SLAM missile being carried and used when other strike assets were not available.
The effectiveness of this upgrade to a venerable old aircraft was worthy of mention during testimony to Congress by Air Force General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an interview in Aviation Week and Space Technology (12 March 2002), Navy Requirements Chief Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn likened the upgrade to a "Swiss Army knife" for the battle group commander, with a blade for every need.
"A Medal for Not Getting in Trouble"
(See C. Williams, p. 128, March 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James P. McGrath III, U.S. Navy—Having been at several commands that "ensured" sailors received their Good Conduct Medals (GCMs) at exactly the three-year point of service, I agree that the significance of the medals to sailors and superiors has degraded over the years. I also have been taken aback when the GCM certificate arrived in my in box for a sailor whose performance had been anything but above average.
Petty Officer Williams's suggestion of requiring a recommendation has merit, but I propose a modification to his plan. I have seen the accomplishments of too many sailors go unrecognized because their superiors have failed to submit recommendations in a timely manner. This is another problem altogether that the officer corps is working to address, but failure by a superior should not deprive the sailor of deserved recognition. Instead of requiring action initiated by the sailor's superior, I recommend that the sailor's record automatically be reviewed at three-year intervals. That review would involve checking the sailor's evaluations from the period under review. The traits called for in the awarding the GCM—leadership, military appearance, and adaptability—are described adequately in the evaluation. Those sailors meeting baseline criteria would have GCM recommendations forwarded to the chain of command by the personnel department for approval. This would serve the purpose of increasing the medal's prestige as Petty Officer Williams calls for, forcing the sailor's superiors to initiate the process.
I am glad to see junior members of the service willing to take a stand like this in Proceedings. I urge Petty Officer Williams to keep up his idealism and strive for the day-to-day excellence that the GCM represents.
"The Navy Isn't Serious about Using UAVs"
(See J. Fenimore, p. 94, January 2002; B. Audler, p. 30, March 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David Petre, Lieutenant Commander Duke Murphy, and Lieutenant Adam Dworkin, U.S. Navy, all deployed on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)—Lieutenant Commander Fenimore's analysis is flawed and represents a non-warfighter's perspective of the battlefield. Pilots fly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) because they are the people in the Navy who are best trained to do the job. Unmanned aerial vehicles, armed or not, are not toys, and they are not simulators. They are an increasingly important part of the modern battle space, and they should not be entrusted to anyone except those with the skills, experience, and tactical judgment to employ them properly.
All aircraft, regardless of whether they are manned or remotely piloted, share common characteristics. The author mistakenly believes that G-forces and ejection seat procedures are the only complicated parts of flying military aircraft, and once eliminated, they make flying in a tactical environment above the battlefield an easy skill to master. She is wrong.
A UAV pilot, just like a conventional pilot, must understand aerodynamics, flight rules, navigation, threat avoidance, evasive maneuvering, launch-and-recovery procedures, and airspace management. These are skills that take years of flight school to learn and cannot be replicated in a "C" school or follow-on school for intelligence officers after they complete the basic course.
Even though unmanned, a collision with a manned aircraft or the ground could be fatal to someone. I can assure you that a pilot who is putting his life on the line will rest easier knowing that the person operating the UAV he shares his airspace with has the same training he does.
Intelligence officers are highly trained and capable, but they are trained to identify and analyze threats in a supporting role. They are not trained to be tactical decision makers, and that is why they are part of the restricted line community. Their role is no less critical than that of the unrestricted line community, but their mission is different.
The intelligence community's role is to provide support to the mission by providing focused intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and an accurate picture of the enemy order of battle. This information, when properly collected and briefed to the war fighter (in this case a pilot), will allow him to properly execute the mission. Use of IPB, provided by intel, can focus a search and assist the pilot in making decisions regarding the planning and execution of the mission. But that does not replace the need to have the pilot on the scene.
Further, without the size and weight restrictions of a cockpit, why is an intelligence officer or specialist not present while the pilot is flying the UAV? In all the exercises that the author cites in her article, why was she not present to provide guidance to the person at the controls? Having someone from the intel community on hand during a surveillance mission is critical to help identify targets and assist the pilot while he does the flying. That is the best solution to Commander Fenimore's dilemma.
Using the logic in the article that intelligence-oriented missions should be under the command of intelligence officers, I can see trouble brewing in other areas. The author soon will be insisting that intel officers fly F-14 TARPS missions, conn attack submarines on recon missions, and take the deck of surface ships simply because they are being used as "surveillance assets." While the intel officers are busy executing those missions, who will be left to prepare intelligence products, threat analysis, and briefings?
"Are Sub Commanders Scapegoats?"
(See J. Byron, pp. 90-92, January 2002; P. Munck, p. 10, February 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Steve A. Swift, U.S. Naval Reserve—As a former submariner and now intelligence officer at Central Command, I remember some of the challenges of submarine navigation, especially going in and out of unfamiliar ports (or the port of Charleston, which was always difficult)!
I agree with the author's recommendations but wish to point out one more reason there are so many difficulties with submarine navigation. The quartermaster rate specialty appears to be going away with the merger of interior communications electrician (IC)/radioman (RM)/and quartermaster (QM) submarine into electronics technician (ET) submarine. When I first heard about this a number of years ago I thought, "Wow, that will last until the first boat runs aground because the navigation ETs were weak in the practice of navigation."
The mechanics of navigation appear to be easy but it takes practice, dedication, and staying active training good petty officers to do the job to the best of their ability and keep the ship out of harm's way. As we continue to get further away from the QM specialty, are we not going to see more and more "challenges" such as those recently experienced by the USS Greeneville (SSN-772)? And when these petty officers become chiefs and are assigned the role of assistant navigator, and they are the final backup on the navigation picture, to whom will the officers turn for help when needed?
The QM rating should be reevaluated for reinstatement because the quartermaster is the one rate that is needed on every ship, no matter the mission.
"Space-Based Weapons Are Wrong"
(See S. Coleman, p. 96, February 2002 Proceedings)
Congressman Bob Schaffer (R-CO)—This article is most distressing. Abandoning space, the author advocates an inferior missile defense for the United States—a posture that leaves the nation unnecessarily vulnerable.
I have advanced the cause of spacebased ballistic missile defense in Congress because I believe my family, my country, and the nation's freedom should have the best defense possible.
On 19 December 2001, I joined a score of other members of Congress in urging President George W. Bush to fully fund a robust ballistic missile defense program employing a variety of technologies—including and emphasizing space.
I asked for an increase in funding to support the Space-Based Laser program at a billion-dollar level annually instead of the $50 million to which it was cut by an unfortunate amendment.
The Space-Based Laser will provide global coverage of ballistic missile threats. This feature is extremely valuable for defending the United States, its armed forces, military bases, and allies. The Space-Based Laser will provide a boostphase interception capability, negating the effect of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and decoys.
I have called for an increase in funding, which will neither take away from current defense spending nor diminish our naval strength.
I have made the case for an increase in funding to restart the Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor program that was successfully developed and tested under the elder Bush's administration. I have suggested annual funding of around $500 million to $1.5 billion to make this program real—a deployed defense.
I have advocated an increase in funding to the billion-dollar level for research and development of ballistic missile defense technology, recognizing the need to concurrently develop second-generation defenses while achieving an initial deployment.
On 13 December 2001, I wrote to Congressman Jerry Lewis (R-CA) as Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense protesting the $400-million cut to space-based ballistic missile defense programs-an uncalled for cut at a time when China has built bases for housing its new road-mobile DF-31 ICBM.
That same day, I publicly warned Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of China's plans to attack U.S. satellites and stressed the urgent need for the United States to prepare accordingly.
The United States should be defended. Americans value their freedom, and I am, therefore, not ashamed to ask for the best defense possible using space. History does not support risking our security to the extent recommended by Mr. Coleman, and Americans should not be complacent to accept such weakness.
"It's Not About Fun"
(See M. Butler, pp. 26-27, February 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Kevin P Miller U.S. Navy—Congratulations to Command Master Chief Mark Butler on his prize-winning essay. I was ready to take issue with the Command Master Chief on his premise that naval service "has never been fun, nor should it be" in response to the slogan "Put the fun back in command." Reading further, his call to challenge our sailors (and officers) by encouraging their professional development, which in turn will motivate most to stay, is right on. This is good old-fashioned khaki leadership at all levels, and while many commands plan for (and actually accomplish) regular professional training and education of their people in the manner Command Master Chief Butler describes, many do not, despite their exhortations.
In my view, "put the fun back in command" is a slogan targeted to commanding officers and above, and deals with the act of commanding or experiencing command. In recent years, the Navy has eliminated a significant number of inspections, paperwork, and training requirements that were considered wasteful. Commanding officers have been given wider latitude to plan their own unit training schedules, and have been delegated a larger amount of control in administering to their own people. Openness with reporting seniors is encouraged to a much greater degree. Innovative thinking also is encouraged, and proposals from below are welcomed. All this has served to put "fun" back in the act of commanding as leaders can spend less time sweating the small stuff from above and invest more time in dealing with things that interest them, molding their commands to their satisfaction, mentoring their people, and pushing these concepts down through their own spans of control. These initiatives are a success story, and hopefully are an ongoing process.
In this sense, "fun" may be seen as setting and accomplishing a mission goal. It is professionally rewarding to plan and lead a complex strike mission, navigate in restricted waters with a bridge team, help staff a proposal that is endorsed, see an aircraft that was down a few minutes ago make the launch because of your teams' efforts, present an award, see your people perform better than expected on a task, or simply mentor a subordinate. Some of these things are not easy, and much effort is put into the drudgery of planning and staffing and learning the system. Sometimes there are tension and risks in all these kinds of evolutions; they can be exhausting, and they may have had several bumps along the way. On reflection, it was probably fun to do, which does not subtract from the professional skill involved in each mission accomplished.
Command Master Chief Butler and I agree that challenging and motivating individuals will keep most coming back for more. I'll concede that people join and stay for a career because of the challenge, pride in service, camaraderie, and knowing they are valued. However, "fun" is not a dirty word in our profession, and is a by-product of professional competence and trust up and down the chain of command. Trust is the word commanders and commanding officers should have in their vocabularies and use often.
"All-Electric Ship: Sirloin or Just Sizzle?"
(See P. Vining, pp. 78-81, January 2002; W. Henrickson, W. Stunkel, p. 31, March 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Timothy J. McCoy, U.S. Navy—Captain Vining should be complimented on an excellent article outlining—from the war fighter's perspective—many of the benefits of an all-electric ship. Truly the best reason to adopt such an architecture is the capability to support the many advanced weapons that are now in the laboratories, such as electric rail guns, directed-energy weapons, electromagnetic aircraft launchers, electric armor, and advanced sensors. If only one of these systems ever makes it to the fleet, it will revolutionize the way we fight our ships at sea.
Captain Vining's insistence on using superconducting homopolar technology for propulsion motors and generators, however, is inconsistent with the rest of his outstanding article. His representation of this technology choice is rather incomplete. Prototypes of these machines have been built and are very power dense, but they do not fit well into a warship architecture. Because they are inherently very low voltage devices, a 40,000-horsepower superconducting homopolar motor would draw several hundred thousand amps of current. For comparison, the Navy's 19MW motor draws -4,800 amps at 4,160 volts. The weight savings in the motor he advertises would be more than offset by the busswork needed to carry that amount of current from the generators to the motors. There are also no circuit breakers in existence or in development that can handle such large currents. It is simply not possible to make meaningful comparisons on a component by component basis. The entire power/ propulsion system first must be wrapped into a ship design, then those ships can be compared with one another. Suboptimizing the power system around a single component will always lead to erroneous conclusions.
Captain Vining's comparison to the Navy's 19MW induction motor also is very misleading. First, he compares existing hardware to a paper design that is yet to be built. Do his volume and weight figures include structure and auxiliary systems or simply the electromagnetic components (magnets and windings)? Second, he is not making any allowances for cooling methods. The Navy motor is air cooled, whereas the superconducting designs he mentions are cooled with de-ionized chilled water in direct contact with the normal conducting copper rotors (a potential maintenance headache and operational cost driver). The overall size of any propulsion motor primarily is determined by the cooling method as the physics of the electromagnetic circuit does not change between motor technologies.
Captain Vining makes a very good case advocating that regardless of the technology selected, we must ensure it is hardened for battle conditions. Of all the technologies being promoted by various potential manufacturers, the superconducting, DC homopolar generator (SCDCHP) is the least well developed and most difficult to militarize. Consider the shock from a nearby underwater explosion. How are the numerous concentric drums (a dozen or more) going to be mounted on bearings that will allow this assembly to withstand a shock event? If the number of drums is reduced, the operating current and thus the system's weight and volume increase. How will the cooling water be transferred to/from these rotating (copper) drums, and how will that connection be made shock resistant? About 20% of the as-built weight of the Navy's 19 MW motor was added from the commercial design to accommodate the Navy's shock requirement.
Captain Vining's article also contains an assortment of incorrect statements. Large generators in the tens of megawatt range suitable for an all-electric ship (such as the GE LM-2500 or WR-21 ICR) have power turbine speeds of 3,600 rpm, not 20-40,000 rpm as stated in the article. Studies have shown the optimum number of generators is three to five, so using a large number of small generators is not feasible. He states the SCDCHP "trades on commercially proven technology." Where is the commercial application for these machines? I've never heard of a single one being sold commercially. Captain Vining also states that superconductors have "essentially no electrical resistance." This is incorrect. Superconductors have absolutely no resistance, therefore no resistive losses.
Proceedings readers should be aware of another salient feature of the SCDCHP motor. It would take days to cool the superconducting magnets from room temperature to cryogenic temperatures needed for operation. One of the benefits of switching from steam power to gas turbines in the 1960s was the reduction in time required to go from "cold iron" to "ready to answer bells." Do we want to go back to bringing the engineering crew on board three days before getting under way?
Our Navy will do well to adopt all-electric ships as the benefits from this architecture will revolutionize our abilities to defeat both existing and emerging threats. However, we must be careful to ensure that we select technology that is truly ready for fleet use. Our sailors are too valuable to send them to sea with unproven technology.
"We Always Must Be Vigilant"
(See E. Robinson, pp. 28-29, February 2002 Proceedings)
Captain W. Russell Webster U.S. Coast Guard, President, Niagara Mishap Analysis Board—Petty Officer Robinson's article accurately captures several key points concerning peacetime service deaths and highlights at least one major recommendation that will help ensure future coldwater immersions are more survivable. The author also correctly points out that most peacetime deaths are preventable and further makes the correct assertion that preventing disaster requires consistently following the procedures as set forth in the manuals.
These two theses are excellent, but Petty Officer Robinson unfairly and inaccurately takes aim at the junior enlisted radio watchstander at Station Niagara. The communications watchstander made his required radio check-in call exactly 20 minutes after the vessel had left the dock, approximately 10 minutes ahead of the 30-minute communications protocol in place at the time, not in arrears as the author suggests. The author goes on to suggest that these reports are required every 15 minutes, which is excessive by most/all standards, especially Station Niagara, which was on a law enforcement mission at the time of the accident. By all accounts, the radio watchstander did his job with professionalism and great care for his shipmates.
The Coast Guard Commandant's final action report for the Niagara mishap indicates that the primary causes for this accident were:
- The crew deviated from the intended area of operation into Lake Ontario without notifying the station of the change, thus hindering the search-and-rescue response and delaying the rescue.
- The crew was unable to safely maneuver the boat in the existing sea conditions.
- The crew's exposure to the cold water resulted was extended because they attempted to reach a nearby buoy and climb out of the water on it instead of climbing aboard the overturned boat.
The investigation also found that three of the four crewmen did not wear their required search-and-rescue/PYRO vests. It also is tragic that the sole MK79 signal kit from the one crewman who did wear his vest had been rendered inoperable prior to the sailing.
Petty Officer Robinson does make a key point about the Coast Guard needing Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) like those the Coast Guard requires some fishermen to have on their vessels. The Analysis Board concluded these and other process enhancements likely will improve the chances of survival for the next crewmembers who find themselves in similar circumstances. Some field commanders already have purchased personal EPIRBs for their personnel and a larger acquisition is planned this summer for the whole Coast Guard.
"Raising the Bar for Advertising"
(See ad, p. 31, January 2002; C. Meyers, p. 10, February 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Charles N. Dashiell, ILS. Naval Reserve (Retired)—By the time Commander Meyers graduated from the Naval Academy, I had completed 17 years of service on active and reserve duty and was drilling as an admissions officer for the Naval Academy and as a Blue and Gold officer. I mention this as a point of reference for our differing reactions to the ad. I am more familiar than many with the quality of the young people who enter the Naval Academy and the personal dedication it takes to graduate.
If I have my math correct, Commander Meyers was not born when the original shows were aired. I do not believe he has a proper historical perspective for the times or the people of the 1940s and 1950s. The actors on both the radio and early television shows in question were ground breakers in the entertainment industry. Having grown up seeing and hearing them with other great comedy acts such as Abbot and Costello, Martin and Lewis, Lucille Ball, The Great Gildersieve, and the Life of Riley, I took no particular notice regarding Amos 'N Andy's caricatures of themselves. The comedy of the times nearly always involved someone being or acting foolish. These are important historical shows and need to be viewed in relationship to the times in which they were produced.
I believe one of the important characteristics of comedy of the time was a lesson in not taking one's self too seriously. That is not to say that you should not be serious and approach life and your responsibilities in a serious manner, just that you should not overstress your importance in the scheme of things. We all are capable of doing silly things at times and sometimes with the best of intentions. I believe this lesson has been lost on many people in our society. We cannot laugh at ourselves for fear of how it may be interpreted by someone, and God help us if we laugh at the mistakes of others. This missing lesson accounts for many of our 11 social problems" of the past 30 years. A sense of humility and a sense of humor were important parts of my early life and were reinforced during my basic training by Marine Corps drill instructors, although I am not sure that was their intent.
The ads that Proceedings chose to pull have been run in numerous military publications for years. I think the decision was not thought through and is another example of political correctness. While offering strong editorial positions on other important matters, Proceedings has disappointed me in this area.
"Naval Reserve Officers: Cheaper by the Dozen?"
(See R. Gross, p. 53, February 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Robert A. Erbetta, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I did a little more than just chuckle about Commander Gross's non-paycheck, and I'm sure many other senior reserve officers relegated to this status did the same. Regrettably, it's a way of life in our Naval Reserve. But still, there is life after losing a pay billet, and there are ways to be productive, promotable, and better positioned for another of those scarce paying billets. The key is to stay well connected and involved.
- Be the Blue and Gold program representative for your local area.
- Initiate a mentoring program for reserve junior officers in your specialty (especially helpful for newly assigned, first-time reserve unit commanding officers).
- Volunteer for the Campaign For A Drug Free America program.
- Get involved with Navy-related community programs such as the Sea Cadets, Sea Scouts, and Young Marines.
- Attend your local high school College night and be the NROTC representative for your alma mater.
- Schedule paid active duty for training at your mobilization site during the first quarter of the fiscal year, when funds are usually more readily available.
- Maintain close, personal relationships with several of your active-duty counterparts, because they usually are in the best position to make recommendations, and sometimes approve requests, for Naval reserve officer-active-duty-for-training assignments.
- Try cutting a deal for a career-enhancing paid-active-duty-for-training or special active-duty assignment, for which you agree to pay for transportation and per them expenses.
"A Legacy of Bravery"
(See M. Files, pp. 60-61, February 2002 Proceedings)
John Reilly Researcher Naval Historical Foundation—I was particularly pleased to read this article. I retired last year from the Naval Historical Center after 30-plus years in the Ships History Branch. In that capacity, I was involved as a spectator, and later as a participant, in the Navy's ship-naming process. It has been gratifying to see the names of African American heroes going to sea with the fleet.
We have long looked at Ensign Jesse L. Brown as the Navy's first African American naval aviator. More recently, however, the Naval Historical Center's Aviation History Branch discovered that Ensign Oscar W. Holmes, trained as a civilian pilot before Pearl Harbor, was commissioned in the Navy in 1942, and designated a naval aviator on 30 June 1943. His story is told in Robert J. Schneller's "Oscar Holmes; A Place in Naval Aviation" (Naval Aviation News, January/February 1998). Thus, though Ensign Brown was the first African American to qualify through Navy flight school, Ensign Holmes was the first to wear the wings of gold.
It also is worth noting that Ship's Cook Doris Miller, called "Dorie" by his shipmates, earned the Navy Cross for his bravery at Pearl Harbor. This award was presented to him by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his "distinguished devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and disregard for his own ... safety."
Three Navy ships have been named for African American Marine Corps heroes. Besides Private First Class James Anderson Jr. and Sergeant Rodney M. Davis, Private First Class Oscar C. Austin was also a Marine. The Secretary of the Navy, who personally makes the final selection of names for Navy ships, always has been concerned to see that the Marine Corps receives the honor it deserves.
Lieutenant Files has done us all a service by reminding us that ship names are not merely words painted on steel. Each of them has its story, and the gallant men who are commemorated are part of the "legacy of bravery," the heritage of honor and commitment shared by everyone who has ever served our country at sea.
"Jack of all Trades, Master of None"
(See D. J. Harris, pp 90-93, March 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph R. Schaaf Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—While the author's concerns about pilot training shortfalls are well taken, I believe the proffered solution would make matters worse. Specializing the Hornet squadrons defeats the purpose of buying multimission instead of specialized aircraft, and would lead to the demise of naval aviation.
The Navy is transitioning to an all-Hornet air wing to take advantage of the multimission capabilities inherent in this excellent aircraft. Cold War air wings contained more than 80 specialized aircraft; modern air wings contain fewer, multimission aircraft. It is the Hornet's mission flexibility that allows the Navy to reduce the number of planes in each air wing; this reduction is necessary if we are to afford maintaining 11 air wings into the cash-strapped future. If we do not take full advantage of the Hornet's flexibility, we will be forced to increase the number of aircraft in the air wing—making the air wing and its large-deck carrier financially unaffordable.
A better solution may be to specialize the pilots themselves—and then augment each squadron with specialists. Recruiting, training, and retaining extra pilots is expensive, but not as expensive as buying larger numbers of specialized aircraft. A typical Hornet squadron could have twice as many pilots as aircraft. The more junior pilots would be minimally trained in all mission areas, but the more senior pilots would specialize in strike, air combat, etc. Hornets returning from a combat air patrol mission and flown by air combat specialists could be landed, rearmed for a strike mission, and flown by strike specialists. On return, the aircraft could be reconfigured for airborne forward air control and flown by specially trained forward air controllers.
The junior pilots in the squadron would fill in the gaps when more aircraft are needed for a particular mission than specialists are available, following the lead of the specialists and learning from their experience. Eventually, a junior pilot would be nominated for specialist training and, on completion, would follow a specialized career path in a single mission area. He or she would always have the advantage, however, of being minimally trained in all mission areas for which the Hornet is capable—allowing the pilot to take advantage of the Hornet's inherent flexibility when occasion demands.
"No More Catch Phrases, Please"
(See J. Murphy, pp. 30-31, February 2002; R. Dunn, p. 14, March 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Dave Nystrom, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, Naval Postgraduate School, prospective Assistant Supply Officer, USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70)—Recent Proceedings authors have raised questions around the topics of Covenant Leadership and Appreciative Inquiry, referring to them as "catch phrases" and as the management speak "du jour."
The covenant that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark refers to is this: Sailors make a promise to uphold and defend the Constitution and obey the orders of those appointed over them. In return, we as leaders promise to invest time and energy to provide for their personal growth and development. This is Covenant Leadership, and we should accept nothing less from our bosses, peers, and direct reports.
The next step is to hold people accountable. The final paragraph in the CNO's Guidance for 2002 states: "We need a standard for the way we evaluate leaders. This is it: I want every leader evaluated on how we keep two promises. First is our personal commitment to mission accomplishment. Second is our dedication to the growth and development of the men and women entrusted to our leadership What our CNO has done by promoting Covenant Leadership is to articulate a standard of behavior for people in leadership positions across the Navy.
So what is Appreciative Inquiry and how does it fit into this puzzle? Appreciative Inquiry is about asking positive questions to value the best of our past such that we advance on and learn from our strengths. This is important because as leaders we set direction through the questions we ask. For example, if we ask questions about when leaders and their organizations were at their worst—i.e., "root cause failure analysis"—we inadvertently invoke negative directional consequence for the organizations. So what would happen if we inquired about when our people and the organizations were operating at their best? How much more could we learn from stories of exemplary leadership? If we uphold this as a positive image of the future, is there a way for us to expand this realm to create more of what we really want? In this case, the Navy's Leadership Summit is what would happen.
The Leadership Summit process first sought examples of outstanding leadership in our Navy, and then used this knowledge to help facilitate pilot programs to improve leadership and leadership development. What we found in the stories were themes that describe what is happening when naval leadership is at its best. The story analysis yielded seven themes—empowerment, treating errors as learning opportunities, the experience of mentoring, the experience of being mentored, appreciation and recognition, opportunities to excel, and teamwork.
All that is new is not a new flavor du jour. Covenant Leadership already is being practiced by many of us, while Appreciative Inquiry scientifically is rooted in psychological research. I believe that most naval personnel see Covenant Leadership as an ideal worthy of our heritage as naval leaders. Further, I believe that Appreciative Inquiry can be both a tool for leaders and a philosophy of living.
To learn more about Appreciative Inquiry, contact the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Positive Change (CPC) at 831-656-3544. To learn more about the Leadership Summit, go to www.cee.nps.navy.mil.
"When Mom Wears Steel-Toed Boots"
(See S. Scarborough, pp. 36-40, February 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Earl J. Higgins, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander Scarborough's excellent article is significant for the Navy of 2002 because, except for the part about the breast pump, it could have been written by a male officer. In and out of naval and military service, women are achieving positions of responsibility that were unavailable to them a generation ago either because of actual bias or cultural discouragement. Their husbands must adjust their own careers and life plans so that their wives can have the freedom to reach their professional goals, too. One of the reasons I, a male officer, left active duty 35 years ago was that the woman I was serious about was in medical school and intended to pursue a medical career. A marriage in which one partner was on sea duty and the other on call at a hospital was unrealistic in 1967.
There is, however, a middle ground that proved successful for me—the Naval Reserve. After 4 years of active duty at sea and 22 years as a reservist, I was as enthusiastic for the Navy as I was when I was commissioned. In the meantime, I also pursued a career as an attorney, from which profession I recently have retired, and I look forward to a new, part-time career as a National Park Service ranger. I recommend that any active-duty officer, male or female, who believes that the pressures of active-duty career and family are too great, should consider the Naval Reserve. A naval career is not all or nothing. Being a reserve officer is a rewarding compromise.
"V-22 Is Right for the War on Terrorism"
(See K. Smith, January 2002; D. Goure, pp. 1214, February 2002 Proceedings)
Colonel Harry P Dunn, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Coordinator V-22 Red Ribbon Panel—As a 1954 graduate of the Naval Academy, former Flight Test Director of the now famous HH-3E "Jolly Green Giant," originator and director of the first in-flight refueling program for helicopters, and former president of the Washington, D.C., chapter of the American Helicopter Society, I believe that publishing an article with so many undocumented half-truths does a great disservice to your readers.
I am currently the coordinator of a group of more than 130 former combat helicopter pilots known as the V-22 Red Ribbon Panel (in deference to the misused and politicized Blue Ribbon Panel) which has been researching the V-22 status and issues for more than a year. We have several flight test pilots (including three former V-22 types), several rotorcraft engineers (including three or four with Masters degrees in aeronautics) and a couple of the best professors and researchers in the country working with us.
When we read an article like this, it immediately gets numerous smiles and head-shakes (or smirks) because of its shallowness and obvious public relations content. Assertions of facts, which have not even been tested (after 12 years of flying and avoidance of critical tests) much less demonstrated or proved, do not deserve to be published.
Some of the upcoming tests, particularly those associated with combat maneuverability (or the lack thereof) at low airspeeds and altitudes were promoted by our organization and reported to the Department of Defense (DoD). The ongoing DoD investigations related to at least one of the accidents, involving numerous innocent deaths, and possible relationships to the cancellation/waivers of critical testing, also were supported by the findings of our research and investigations and reported to DoD.
The fundamental flaw in the design of the V-22 is the compromise of the propeller blade/rotor design coupled with the side-by-side or asymmetrical tiltpropeller (it is not a rotor) layout. Saying that "vertical-lift technology" has a problem with the laws of physics is at best an understatement. Compared to helicopters operating in a combat terminal area (where studies indicate 91% of all casualties occur), the tiltprop has less than half the maneuverability/agility of virtually any military helicopter.
The influence of the physics of unstable/gusting/turbulent air has the habit of not conforming to desires of engineers (or pilots), and can result in asymmetric airflows which result in loss of lift and random uncontrollable behavior—which as we have learned at Marana, Arizona, can cause the deaths of all on board in less than ten seconds!
The attempts at fighting the laws of physics in the case of rotorcraft asymmetric thrust designs have all failed since the Focke Angelis FA-61 in 1937-38. At the end of World War II, a few of the FA-223s were used for research in the Soviet Union, France, and England with no success or follow-up development. The FA-223 had about the same rotor sizing as the current XV-22.
The first Department of the Army competition for a useful operational helicopter was won by Platt-Lepage over the Sikorsky. It was similar to the FA-61 and FA223 designs, and like its forbears was not successful. After the first two years of failed efforts, the Army transferred all remaining funds to Sikorsky, which developed the first practical and useful helicopter, which led to the expansion of helicopter developments and uses for the past 50 years. Since that time, numerous variants using asymmetric rotors and propellers have had essentially similar problems, and were either canceled, crashed or found unsuitable. If the contractors had not gotten Congress and the Marine Corps Reserves involved in the V-22 program, there would be no commercial interest in the V-22. The cost-effectiveness of the V-22 for commercial use is prohibitive, similar to that of the Concord.
We believe that the nonlinear physics of unpredictable, local turbulence, gusts, and winds easily will win over the slogans of "wing-born vertical lift" and "vertical lift technology." The new flight testing to begin in April at the direction of the Undersecretary of Defense is a serious program.
We believe that it is likely that the aerodynamic performance related testing (maneuverability/agility in terminal combat area) will not justify continuing the program. The ongoing Department of Defense investigation also could result in findings serious enough to cause the program's termination.