After nearly 50 years of turbulence, U.S.-Indian relations are growing stronger as both nations recognize their overlapping security interests.
Even before the tragedies of 11 September, U.S.-Indo relations had grown stronger than at any time since the Chinese-Indian war of 1962. The impetus behind this change has been an increased commonality in security interests, including the growing threat of international terrorism, the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, China's increasing capabilities in South Asia, and arguably most important, protecting the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication, which provide access to vital oil and other economic resources. Given these overlapping concerns and their ability to affect stability in the Indian Ocean region, both countries have come to place greater importance on their naval presence in the area. Consequently, the possibility of building a strong U.S.-Indo naval friendship or partnership has been explored quite extensively.
The 1990s had been the most promising period in the history of U.S.-Indo naval relations-until May 1998, when the Indian government exploded five nuclear weapons at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert. Progress in building naval relations halted immediately, as U.S. sanctions under the Glenn Amendment/U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 took effect. These sanctions cut off all military cooperation between the nations.
The damage, however, was temporary. Since President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, relations between the nations gradually have warmed, and U.S.-Indo naval cooperation has begun to develop again as well.
The challenge now is to determine how U.S.-Indo naval relations can avoid similar setbacks in the future, to allow those ties to strengthen. To do this, we must address four central areas: (1) where U.S.-Indo naval relations have been in the past decade and in what ways progress has been made or stymied in bringing the nations' maritime branches closer; (2) the potential for U.S.-Indo naval relations in the coming years; (3) possible barriers to achieving this potential and how they can be avoided; and (4) why either nation should desire such a partnership and the stakes involved.
U.S.-Indian Naval Relations, 1991-2001
In November 1991, U.S. Army General Claude Kicklighter visited India with a goal of increasing military-to-military exchanges, joint exercises, and information sharing. From his meetings with Indian defense officials, Joint Service Committees (JSCs) were established to explore these possibilities.
Of particular importance for U.S.-Indo naval relations was the creation of a Naval Steering Committee, which met in Delhi in March 1992. Two months after this meeting, the United States and India conducted Malabar I, their first ever bilateral naval exercise. Its success led to Malabar II and Malabar III in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Malabar II was especially significant because it was a full-scale exercise combining naval air, surface, and subsurface assets. The United States brought in P-3C reconnaissance aircraft as well as the nuclear-powered submarine Birmingham (SSN-695) to join conventional surface combatants. India included the conventional submarine Shankush as well as surface combatants. In addition, U.S. Marines and Navy SEALs trained with Indian Commandos in September 1994 and October 1996.
Another significant step was taken in May 1994 when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and President Bill Clinton agreed to develop even closer defense ties. Following their meeting, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry signed an Agreed Minute that established three bodies to facilitate further discussion and interaction between the nations' militaries: the Defense Policy Group, the Joint Technical Group (JTG), and a modified version of the JSC. The JTG was the most important addition because it led to technological cooperation focusing on discussing and coordinating research and development, production, procurement, and logistical issues.
For U.S.-Indo naval relations, the JTG applied in two main areas: (1) the possibility of U.S. assistance in providing testing equipment and parts for India's developing programs, primarily its Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), and (2) discussing India's keen interest in U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle technology. Joint work on the LCA was bolstered by the creation of the U.S.-India Technical Advisory Group to monitor progress and technological transfers in this area.
South Asia Goes Nuclear. From 11 to 13 May 1998, India detonated five nuclear devices. These tests led to an immediate break in U.S.-Indo naval relations, and shortly thereafter, sanctions were imposed that stopped defense cooperation (foreign assistance, military sales, and international military education and training [IMET]).
Fortunately for U.S.-Indo naval relations, some of the restrictions were short-lived. The DoD Appropriations Act of 2000, signed into law on 25 October 1999, gave the president authority to waive certain Glenn Amendment sanctions, and President Clinton lifted the ban on IMET funds almost immediately. IMET had been a crucial component in defense cooperation between the nations and has become even more so since the waiver. Consider that the IMET budget for India has been grown from $208,000 in fiscal year 1995 to more than $650,000 per year today. And this number does not include the $250,000 India was awarded under the Extended Relations Program last year. Such funding has allowed India, over the past ten years, to send nine senior officers to the U.S. Naval War College (one is there now), as well as to a number of other joint training schools and commands.
President Clinton also lifted restrictions on U.S.-Indian cooperation at the operational level. In December 2000, for example, he waived limitations on bilateral exercises to allow an Indian Navy SeaKing to land on board the USS Hewitt (DD-966) for a medical evacuation. According to the Indian press, a U.S. naval officer's life was saved when the helo rushed him ashore after he developed acute appendicitis while approximately 100 miles off of the Indian coast. More recently, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee granted U.S. warships authorization to refuel in Indian ports during the war in Afghanistan.
Both nations also have agreed once again to exchange visits from high-level military officials. In November 1999, head of the Indian Army, General V. P. Malik, came to the United States. Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Forces, traveled to India during January 2000, September 2000, and November 2001 to meet with top defense officials. General Henry Shelton, recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, visited India in June 2001. These meetings have led to a revival of naval cooperation, including the INS Mysore's participation in the U.S. Millennium Fleet Review in New York City and the USS Cowpens (CG-63) aid to earthquake victims in Gujarat while in the region for India's International Fleet Review. Most recently, from 12 to 15 December, the U.S. and Indian Navies conducted joint search-and-rescue exercises off the east coast of India. There also has been an increasing number of subject matter expert exchanges, as well as more defense college visits by both nations (an American is at the National Defense College in New Delhi now). Perhaps the best illustration of how far relations have come is India's offering the United States overflight access, refueling ports, and air bases to use in the war against terrorism.
U.S.-Indian Naval Relations, 2002 and Beyond
Considering the steps that have been taken in building a U.S.-Indo naval partnership in the past decade, the prospects for the future are bright. One senior U.S. government official commented that he would not be surprised if India were to participate in U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises in the near future. Likewise, the United States could join India in exercises involving the 19 members of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation, as the same official noted that Asia is moving in the direction of naval cooperation and the United States is moving with it.
Another area of likely future cooperation is sharing naval intelligence throughout the Indian Ocean region. This would help both navies with two growing security issues: piracy and the increasing presence of the Chinese Navy in South Asia (and possibly tracking fleeing al Qaeda and Kashmir-based terrorists). Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the waters surrounding India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have gone from 0 in 1992 to more than 150 in 1999. And Chinese naval presence in South Asia has gained a greater foothold in the Indian Ocean over the past few years. China now has submarine basing facilities and at least four electronic listening posts in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea; one of these posts, located on Great Coco Island, provides China with the ability to monitor the telemetry of Indian missile tests and to keep a close eye on Indian naval and Air Force movements. In addition, Chinese military presence and influence in Myanmar raises the prospect that India could have another threat on her eastern flank.
Cooperation and participation in naval exercises would go far in developing trust between the United States and India, something often missing and thus detrimental to relations during the Cold War. Once a high level of trust is in place, significant transfers in technology could follow. In addition to U.S. assistance with its LCA and UAV programs, India also has expressed a desire for airborne early warning reconnaissance aircraft such as the P-3C Orion, weapon-locating radars, and engines for its advanced light helicopter. Recently, following President George Bush's announcement on U.S. pursuit of a national missile defense capability, India surprised many with its show of approval, which likely was linked to its hoping to obtain similar defense technologies from the United States in the coming years.
The United States could gain from a more trusting and cooperative relationship, as well. The U.S. Navy has requested the Indian government make Goa and Cochin permanent ports of call for U.S. warships transiting the Indian Ocean. U.S. naval officials also have expressed interest in using the shipyard at Mazagoan Docks to repair U.S. vessels deployed in the region; given the lack of demand for India's shipyards (primarily because of high prices), accepting the U.S. request could provide relief for this industry.
Possible Obstacles
Although the U.S.-Indo naval relationship has developed rapidly and appears to be moving quickly along this track, there are factors that could lead to another breakdown. Most center around the decisions made, not by the U.S. or Indian militaries, but by each country's political leaders. Currently, both nation's politicians have expressed a strong desire to further relations. Indian Foreign and then-Defense Minister Jaswant Singh's March 2001 visits with President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, while former President Bill Clinton was visiting Prime Minister Vajpayee in New Delhi, are testament to this fact; rarely, if ever, will one nation receive such attention from the world's lone superpower. Political influence on the naval relationship has not always been so positive, however.
For example, following the August 2000 loss of the Russian submarine Kursk, the U.S. Navy offered to help the Indian Navy develop submarine rescue capabilities. The offer was accepted by the Indian Navy, but when it came time to land a U.S. C-5 at an Indian airport and transport the testing and training equipment to the designated port, local politicians denied the U.S. team access to the roadways.
Similarly, in the early 1990s the United States tried to bring Indian officers over for joint training and to attend high-level command institutions. India's Joint Secretary for Training, a civilian in the Ministry of Defense, was not a supporter of these programs and only a very limited number of exchanges took place. Fortunately, the current Joint Secretary for Training, S. Rajkumar, and his boss, Jaswant Singh, are strong proponents of military-to-military exchanges, which has allowed unprecedented cooperation between the nations.
U.S. leaders at times also have made fostering a naval relationship difficult. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld once identified India, along with Libya and North Korea, as a potential proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. Given India's clean nonproliferation record, it was no surprise the comment angered many senior leaders in New Delhi. Thus, it is critical for both nation's political leaders to say and do the right things if the U.S.-Indo naval partnership is to have a chance to reach its potential.
External factors also could have a major impact on how relations proceed. India's long-time dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir comes to mind, especially in light of the increased tensions of late. Former President Clinton once described South Asia as "the most dangerous place in the world" because of the possibility of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. For U.S.-Indo naval cooperation to flourish, India must show Washington that its dispute over Kashmir will not lead to nuclear warfare and that it is ready to work with Pakistan to seek a solution. If a resolution cannot be found in the near future, India still must avoid any escalation of the dispute. One U.S. government official expressed this point exactly when noting that India's restraint the Kargil War in 1999 had an enormous influence on the increased ties between the U.S. and Indian navies.
U.S. relations with Pakistan are another potential problem. India was not pleased with U.S. P-3C and Harpoon missile sales to Pakistan, or with the sudden renewed relationship that has developed between Washington and Islamabad since 11 September; however, a strong argument can be made that the last thing India wants is for the United States to lose all influence with Pakistan. If this happened, China might look to Pakistan more than it already does to gain a foothold in South Asia. This could involve more transfers of nuclear technology and related materials, as well as conventional capabilities, all of which would pose a threat to Asia (it is widely believed that Pakistan would not have been able to go nuclear without extensive Chinese assistance). Moreover, without U.S. influence, Islamic fundamentalists would face one fewer obstacle to gaining control in Pakistan—like they did temporarily in Afghanistan—possibly leading to more terrorist training camps and increasing clashes over Kashmir. For these reasons, it is important for the United States to continue working with Pakistan, although not just in a manner that could threaten India (i.e., supplying sophisticated military equipment and technology).
Another major external factor that could affect U.S.-Indo naval relations is China. China's gradual emergence as a world power has helped to increase U.S.-Indo cooperation as both nations look to balance against the Communist state. Some scholars argue, however, that if the United States makes a significant push to "use" India as a balance against China, the leadership in New Delhi quickly will reverse the warming trend in relations." Whether this is true is highly debatable. Given the recent tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations (e.g., the EP-3 incident, embassy bombing, and arms sales to Taiwan) and Beijing's stated concern over U.S.-Indian defense cooperation, if such an argument had merit, New Delhi already would be moving away from Washington. That it is not is a clear sign supporting those who argue that the United States and India both desire to balance against China.
The final outside player in U.S.-Indo naval relations is Russia. India's friendship with the former Soviet Union was a central part of its foreign policy for nearly five decades, and India still works closely with Moscow, especially with Russian defense manufacturers. India and Russia signed a $3-billion defense pact in 1998 and now are working on bringing the Russian warship Gorshkov to the Indian Navy. Given Washington's occasional problems with thinking outside the Cold War mind-set, it is not a surprise that some U.S. leaders see this as an obstacle for U.S.-Indo naval relations. Admiral Blair, however, commented about the Russian-Indo relations, "India can make decisions on how it wants to modernize its forces in accordance with its own interests.... in fact, the urge for (U.S.) cooperation with India is pretty great. Thus, the suspected Russian obstacle has been highly exaggerated; even more so considering the increasing ties between the United States and Russia in the past few months.
Why a US.-Indo Partnership?
The United States should seek to build stronger ties with India because of the two nations' overlapping security interests. Beyond this, India is the world's largest democracy and an emerging global economic power, with the fifth highest Purchasing Power Parity in the world's
For India to rise from being an emergent power to a global power, a U.S.-Indo naval partnership is important. Maritime security will be one of the key determinants of whether India is able to reach its potential; consider that 97% of India's international trade, including 90% of its crude oil supply—a prime economic driver—comes by way of the seas. These percentages only will increase in the future. Having a strong maritime force to protect these vital resources will be crucial for India's success. Acquisition of such a force will be greatly enhanced through closer ties with the U.S. Navy.
Conclusion
After nearly 50 years of turbulence, U.S.-Indian relations have blossomed. The State Department has indicated that the last of the Glenn Amendment sanctions imposed against India soon will be lifted. This likely will lead to greater economic investment and cooperation and an even greater need for joint naval cooperation, as most of these economic interests will be linked directly to the sea.
So what does this mean for a U.S.-Indo naval partnership? In the short term, increasing ties will lead to more military-to-military exchanges, high-level visits, and bilateral exercises. The Malabar naval exercises are set to resume shortly, and according to a senior Indian defense official, they will be "far more intensive." As for five to ten years from now, greater technological cooperation certainly is not out of the question. Given U.S. interest in developing interoperability with foreign militaries as ties increase, there is little doubt that the Pentagon will push for such an initiative. In fact, Indian Ministry of Defense officials recently have said that the United States is showing an inclination to provide "more than ever" military technologies and equipment to make this happen.
Finally, in the long term, the U.S.-Indo naval partnership could emerge as an alliance paralleling that of the U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-Japanese navies. One U.S. naval scholar describes the U.S.-Indian relationship as comparable to the U.S.-U.K. relationship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that is, as slowly realizing how much the two nations have in common and how closely their security interests overlap. For both the United States and India, one thing is certain: taking advantage of these commonalties will be instrumental in allowing the world's two largest democracies to rise above the challenging tides that lie ahead.
Lieutenant Cuomo, a 2001 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, recently completed a graduate degree in national security studies at Georgetown University.