The present U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq seems to be validating a basic observation Sun Tzu made more than 2,200 years ago: "I have yet to see a case of cleverly dragging on the hostilities. There has never been a state that has benefited from an extended war."
The United States needs a viable plan to disengage military forces from the Gulf, yet also remove the Iraqi leadership from power. Perhaps the most obvious option is to continue the current policy of containing Saddam Hussein while seeking a new regime to govern in Baghdad. This seems to be the U.S. leadership's most popular choice, because in messy situations for which there is no easy solution it often is comforting to maintain the existing course. This concept parallels the popular stereotype about stubborn male drivers who are lost but would rather remain lost than ask for directions.
Today's strategy rests on three pillars. First, the United States is dedicated to containing Saddam Hussein to reduce the threat he poses to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, the United States is seeking to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of Hussein's refusal to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Finally, the United States is working with forces both inside and outside of Iraq to change the present regime and to help a new government rejoin the community of nations.
An ardent supporter of U.S. policy is Air Force Brigadier General Bob Dulaney, former commander of the combined task force planes conducting Operation Northern Watch from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. "I'll tell you, containment works. I spent my whole career contaming [Communism]," Dulaney says. "I execute [U.N. and U.S. State Department] policy. I'm proud to execute it. I think it's a good mission." He contends that if containment is given a chance, someday Saddam Hussein will fall—although Dulaney does not offer a timeline for this prediction.
Representative Tony Hall (D-OH) visited Iraq from 16 to 20 April 2000 to study the impact of the economic sanctions. He ascertained that the sanctions still were necessary to prevent Hussein from obtaining or using weapons of mass destruction. "Sanctions imposed by the United Nations are partly to blame," he said, "but it is the stalemate—and not the sanctions—that causes the Iraqis to suffer." Supporters of sanctions argue that ending the embargo would not provide much comfort for the Iraqis and that the lifting of sanctions would be irresponsible.
Military advocates also point out the additional value of the "on-the-job training" provided by Operations Northern and Southern Watch. Theater operations have dictated the use of a variety of tactical weapons for suppressing Iraqi air defenses. Most of these live weapons are missing from squadrons' noncombat expenditure allowances for training. In fact, some of these new weapons made their combat debut over Iraq. Thus, Gulf operations provide U.S. aircrews with much-needed live munitions experience, especially after the United States greatly reduced live-fire weapons exercises on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques.
The "why-change-a-thing" option seems to be a good choice, but it comes with an increasing level of risk. The saying, "It's real funny until someone loses an eye," takes on new meaning as the daily combat sorties are flown over northern and southern Iraq. The frequent coalition strikes against Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites, which seldom receive press coverage, would become a front-page story if a U.S. aircraft were lost. Iraqi ground crews reportedly would collect a 5-million-dinar incentive (about $2,700) if they shot down a U.S. or British plane. Since December 1998, more than 40,000 sorties have been flown for Northern Watch alone. It is testimony to the professionalism and proficiency of the U.S. military machine that after nine years and hundreds of thousands of combat sorties, not a single aircraft has been lost over Iraq. This incredible accomplishment occurred not only in the face of hostile fire, but also with the possibilities of engine malfunctions and mid-air collisions inherent in the combat aviation business. Unfortunately, aviation safety statistics suggest this good fortune will not last forever.
Policy skeptics also point out that there is virtually no chance that opposition groups will overthrow Hussein. Past attempts by the CIA and the British M16 to orchestrate a coup from within all met with disaster. Rumors of CIA efforts to instigate a revolt by Iraqi generals in southern Iraq during Operation Desert Fox were accompanied by reports of officers from those units being summarily executed by Saddam's security services. Saddam is thick in the fabric of Iraqi society; in his own words, he is in every glass of milk, whether the taste is sour or sweet. Getting rid of him will not be easy.
The success of U.S. military involvement depends on a clear, definable mission. Use of force in support of national interests is justifiable only if it is likely to accomplish established objectives and if the costs are commensurate with the risks.
Our current ineffective Iraq policy parallels the U.S. experience on the Korean Peninsula. After more than 50 years of U.S. sanctions and military commitment to keep North Korea in check, that economically troubled country still remains a threat to regional stability, with a weapons of mass destruction capability that may include nuclear weapons. Is Iraq going to consume U.S. Air Force and Navy resources for the next 50 years in a similar scenario?
This financially motivated question has led another group of dissenters to argue that a decision to invest in a military capable of defeating Iraq today is a decision not to invest in building a military capable of defeating potential peer competitors 20 years from now. It is safe to assume that in 2020 Iraq will not be a world superpower. The fast-paced technological changes that fuel the revolution in military affairs will play a large part in defining the world order in 2020. It is time to transfer U.S. resources from a low-yield Iraqi theater to the more promising military of the future.
Increase Military Efforts to Enforce Policy
A second strategy offers a solution to the primary Iraqi dilemma, the reign of Saddam Hussein. Former Central Command Commander-in-Chief, Marine General Anthony Zinni, observes that "[Hussein] continues to oppress his own people, particularly in the south with the Shiites. He continues to deny distribution of food and medicine, causing his own Iraqi people to suffer. And I don't see any change in his attitude or his approach." Desert Storm and history in general reveal that one of the few ways to persuade the Iraqi government is with a decisive military campaign. Furthermore, the only long-term solution will be to remove the current leadership from power.
Proponents of aggression argue the United States is the world's leader; if it leads decisively, the world will follow. The United States must make a convincing case that in the future Hussein will be a serious menace to his neighbors. Once Iraq rebuilds its economy and military, and seeks to reestablish itself as a regional superpower equipped with weapons of mass destruction, it will present a real threat. The time to solve this problem is now, when the cost in terms of lives and resources would be far less than in the future. If the only way to prevent Hussein from igniting conflict is to overthrow him by means of military action, then that is what we must do.
Opponents suggest a large-scale military confrontation between Iraq and the United States has been rendered highly unlikely by Operation Desert Fox. The December 1998 bombing campaign accomplished the inconceivable: it renewed the world's sympathy for the Iraqi people and politically isolated the United States. The legal-moralistic argument that was present for Desert Fox now is gone. Today, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) is dead, and the Security Council whitewashes Iraq's failures to disarm itself with vague language about a future monitoring system. Likewise, in the United States, the mobilization of domestic support for a war now seems impossible. What once was an international cause to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction has turned into a squabble between the United States and Iraq.
Existing no-fly zones cover 60% of Iraq and extend into the southern suburbs of Baghdad. In August 1999, British and U.S. aircraft aggressively hit Iraqi targets outside these sectors. France protested loudly and the U.S.-British alliance quietly returned to the original parameters of its operation. The waters have been tested, and they are cold toward this alternative of increased military aggression.
Decrease U.S. Military Involvement
The third alternative focuses on decreasing U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. It has been said that the military might be a great hammer, but not every problem is a nail. It appears the Iraqi situation has been transformed from a nail to a situation better handled through diplomacy. In light of the problems associated with increased military action, the easing of sanctions and the reduction of the U.S. military presence emerge as the ideal option.
The diplomatic engagement option first would require the appointment of a special envoy for Iraqi affairs to establish U.S.-Iraqi talks and broker an agreement. The core of the proposed agreement would be disestablishing the no-fly zones and lifting sanctions if Iraq will: recognize Kuwait and the Iraq-Kuwait border as presently drawn; freeze development of its weapons of mass destruction programs; treat with tolerance the Kurdish people's existence within Iraqi borders; and sign a cease-fire with opposition groups.
The initial exodus of U.S. forces should have little effect on the region's security in light of the ineffectiveness of present efforts. There have not been inspectors in place for more than two years, and evidence suggests there probably will not be any for the foreseeable future. Thus, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction effort will continue unchecked regardless of the size of the U.S. military presence. A halt to the no-fly zone enforcement would reduce Iraqi civilian casualties and improve the global political climate. As for sanctions, they seem to be having their greatest impact on the general Iraqi population, while Hussein's inner circle reaps the majority of the Oil-for-Food benefits. Lifting the sanctions is a necessary step toward restoring the world opinion needed for the United States to increase its popularity in the region.
With the U.S. drawdown, the decimated Iraqi military's capabilities would be kept in check by the region's own balance of power. Should Saddam Hussein violate any terms of the agreement, the United States again would have the moral and political justification for a major military confrontation with Iraq.
In this case, U.S. forces would be postured to begin an immediate response with at least one carrier battle group within five days of the Gulf. In addition, coalition air bases and weapon stockpiles would remain in place for surge operations. The initial action would be a smaller-scale Desert Fox-type operation that would incorporate naval assets as well as the global reach of Air Force bombers. This action would differ from Desert Fox in that Baghdad would be the focus of the bombing campaign in preparation for a U.S. siege following an appropriate force buildup. The achievable military objective would be to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
Proponents contend that Hussein gains his power from the U.S. presence in the Gulf and his ability to thwart the world's greatest military machine. Scott Ritter, former member of the UNSCOM inspection team, insists that "the Iraqi army is in total disarray, capable of little more than manning security pickets along the Iran-Iraq border, in northern Iraq (Kurdistan), and in southern Iraq. I have visited numerous Iraqi military barracks and have seen soldiers in tattered uniforms and bare feet." Thus, a withdrawal of U.S. forces and resolutions also would take away Hussein's leverage and essentially would reduce him to being a leader of an economically destroyed country with virtually no military teeth remaining.
Opponents of this plan are outraged at the thought of packing up and going home. They view anything short of total compliance with the original cease-fire agreement as unacceptable and a blow to U.S. and U.N. credibility. In addition, they believe we must continue to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability. But the ineffectiveness of the United Nations' efforts for the past nine years has had an equal if not worse effect on its credibility. Furthermore, it is too late to prevent an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability, and present involvement is doing little to detect or destroy it.
By engaging Iraq diplomatically, the United States not only would be replacing its failed policy but also would be rebuilding U.S.-Iraqi relations based on coexistence under international law. Thus, the United States could begin a drawdown of military forces in the region and take valid steps toward improving the living conditions of the Iraqi people. Perhaps the best advantage to this plan is that if Saddam Hussein were to violate such an agreement, as anticipated, we would have reestablished domestic and international support for a major military confrontation. In short, this alternative could lead to world-sanctioned military escalation and achieve the permanent solution of removing Saddam Hussein from power.
Lieutenant Commander Martins served with Fighter Squadron 32 during Operation Desert Fox.