The U.S. Navy is ill prepared to enter the 21st century. The service is plagued by major personnel problems, too few ships for assigned missions, less-than-optimal aircraft, and, to some degree, a headquarters organization that is unable to develop a unified naval strategy. The Marine Corps, while better off in most respects than the other armed services, is experiencing a decline in amphibious lift and is engaged in several expensive projects that will provide minimal enhancement of its combat capabilities.
Much of this situation is the result of lackluster leadership in the Navy during much of the past decade. In the 1990s the civilian and uniformed leaders of the Navy have produced or adhered to policies that deterred effective fleet development, innovation, and even confidence. The noteworthy exceptions have been the brief tenures of Admiral J. M. ("Mike") Boorda as Chief of Naval Operations (April 1994-May 1996) and Dr. Richard Danzig as Secretary of the Navy (from November 1998).
The leadership problem has been manifested in the lack of articulation of the important and unique role of the Navy in post-Cold War crises, confrontations, and conflicts; the continuation of separate and independent stratagems developed by the Navy's warfare communities or "unions" as they compete for funding; and the significant shortfalls in Navy personnel recruiting and retention.
Significantly, the Navy has been directly involved in every U.S. military operation of the past decade. These have included actions in which the Navy has been the principal or a critical participating force, and others where naval participation has been minimal. (The Marine Corps, like the Army and Air Force, has participated in some but not all operations.)
Within the Navy unions—air, surface, and submarine—there continues a spirit of independence and that each "can do it all." This is different from competition among warfare areas, which is a positive condition and should be encouraged.
In 1992, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso, reorganized the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) in an effort to reduce the independence of the warfare communities. Admiral Kelso changed the heads of the three primary communities from Deputy CNOs at the vice admiral level to warfare "directors" with the rank of rear admiral. This change, ironically, elevated the influence of the submarine community because the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion—a full admiral with an eight-year tenure stipulated by law—became the de facto head of the submarine community although he was not in a "line" position. (The heads of the other warfare communities became the senior type commanders, i.e., vice admirals in the Atlantic Fleet or Pacific Fleet.)
The continued prominence of the unions has inhibited development of an effective overall Navy strategy and creates a continuing internal Navy debate over resources that is more acrimonious than in the other services. Also, new projects that are not obvious components of a specific warfare area are unlikely to be objectively considered or funded. Mine warfare is a classic example of this situation, as aircraft and submarines lay mines, while surface ships and—to a lesser degree—aircraft (helicopters) are the principal mine countermeasures forces.
Similarly, the proposed arsenal ship of the early 1990s failed to gain warfare sponsors after the death of Admiral Boorda. The surface warfare community saw the arsenal ship as a threat to the new Zumwalt (DD-21)-class destroyer program, while the aviation and submarine communities saw the new ship as a threat to their attack/strike roles.
This situation is perplexing. Solutions, admittedly, are difficult. One option would be to return the warfare directorates to three-star rank so they again could be the heads of their respective communities and could more effectively deliberate OpNav issues. They still would report to the three-star Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments.
Further, the unions could be better integrated—as are today's fleet operations. One approach would be to assign the deputy director for each warfare area from a different warfare community, for example, the Deputy Director of Surface Warfare would be an aviation or submarine officer...
In fall 2000 the newly appointed CNO, Admiral Vernon E. Clarke, began a "realignment" of Navy headquarters in the hope of correcting many of these problems.
A final subject of concern in this regard—in part a result of the diverse communities—is the conservative nature of U.S. ship design. U.S. warship design of the 1980s and 1990s has been characterized by a lack of imagination and innovation. The warfare sponsors tend to propose and develop ships that are improvements of and replacements for existing ships. This is demonstrated, for example, by the decision to make the next aircraft carrier an improved version of the Nimitz (CVN-68) class, which traces its design directly to the canceled carrier United States (CVA-58), which was designed in the mid-1940s. The aviation community has resisted several radical carrier design proposals by Navy agencies, while the Director of Nuclear Propulsion has ensured that the carrier will have nuclear propulsion regardless of the potential effectiveness and cost of alternatives.
Likewise, the new amphibious ships of the San Antonio (LPD17) class are highly conservative in design, tracing their lines directly to the Ashland (LSD-1) of 1943, the first U.S. Navy ship with a docking well for landing craft. Several innovations have been proposed—but rejected by the surface warfare community—such as providing a full flight deck and a "dry" docking well. The full-deck configuration, as in the larger LHA/LHD-type ships as well as the smaller Japanese LSTs of the Osumi class, provides for enhanced helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operation, or simply more deck space for transporting helicopters and ground vehicles. The dry well would cost less than a "wet" docking well, have reduced maintenance requirements, and permit a smaller ship, while still enabling the operation of assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs) and air cushion landing craft (LCACs). Only conventional landing craft (LCU/LCM) would be excluded, but sufficient wet wells for those craft will be available in the fleet in LHA/LHD/LSD-type ships.
In the same regard, the now-building nuclear-propelled attack submarines of the Virginia (SSN-774) class are, in many respects, scaled-down versions of the previous Seawolf (SSN21) design. The Virginia design was pursued by the Navy after Congress specifically directed the Navy to instead develop a series of competitive prototypes for the next-generation attack submarine. Thus, the same SSN types that were developed for the open-ocean (and under-ice) operations of the Cold War will be the submarines employed in future littoral operations against Third World nations.
At the same time, the submarine community consistently has rejected any objective discussion of or proposals for the U.S. Navy to procure a small number of nonnuclear submarines for use as targets in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training and for research-and-development work.
Two innovative ship programs were proposed in the 1990s. First came the Surface Combatant 21, which led to the DD-21 land-attack destroyer. While this ship will be larger than the previous Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class, the DD-21 is being designed primarily for operations in littoral areas—that is, the land-attack role in support of ground forces, as well as the strike role—and not for traditional blue-water operations. Also significant, the manning goal for the ship is 95 officers and enlisted personnel—just 25% the size of the crew of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Also, the DD-21 will be the first major U.S. surface warship in some 60 years to have electric drive.
More innovative was the aborted arsenal ship. Developed in the mid-1990s, the arsenal ship was to be a "missile carrier" to complement cruisers and destroyers in a variety of warfare roles. This was the first totally new warship concept since the strategic missile submarine (SSB/SSBN) was developed in the late 1950s. But the arsenal ship died with Admiral Boorda. Significantly, in the presidential campaign of 2000, the arsenal ship was endorsed by candidates George W. Bush and Bill Bradley.
While the Navy—with the two above exceptions—has sought to develop follow-on designs to existing ship types, the U.S. Coast Guard in sharp contrast is attempting a different approach for its next-generation capabilities in the so-called Deepwater Project. The Coast Guard has asked competing industry teams to propose an integrated force "architecture" or "system of systems" to carry out the deepwater missions in an effective manner at the lowest cost. This is a quite different approach than simply seeking a follow-on cutter (surface ship), fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopter to replace the existing force.
Systems that could be considered under the Deepwater Project include surface ships, land-based aircraft, ship-based aircraft (helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and landing [V/STOL], and UAV types), satellites, and even smaller surface craft that could be supported or carried by a larger ship. While the next-generation cutters, aircraft, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C41) systems may be direct follow-ons to their predecessors, they may not be type-for-type replacements.
While new ships generally are more capable and easier to maintain than the ships they replace, the size of the U.S. fleet has declined precipitously in the past decade while becoming more expensive to procure. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Navy is scheduled to have just more than 300 ships in commission. That represents the smallest U.S. fleet since 1931, although the method of "counting ships" has changed several times. However, even the current means of tabulating ships is not realistic. For example, while the Navy is authorized and has "on the books" 12 aircraft carriers, one ship is always undergoing a three-year (nuclear) refueling and overhaul, effectively reducing the force to 11 carriers (with only ten air wings).
The shortfall in carriers—coupled with efforts by the Navy leadership not to exceed six-month deployments because of personnel concerns—led to an awkward situation in the spring of 1999 when the air campaign against Serbia began. A few days before the shooting started, the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65), having been forward deployed for almost six months, departed the Mediterranean en route to her home port of Norfolk, Virginia. The carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) was preparing to depart the East Coast to replace the "Big E" in the Persian Gulf, while the carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) was in the Western Pacific.
When the Kosovo campaign, which most U.S. political and military leaders expected to take only a few days, erupted into a much larger conflict than envisioned, the Theodore Roosevelt was rushed to the Mediterranean and into the Aegean Sea to take part in the air strikes. The Kitty Hawk, meanwhile, rushed south, through the Indonesian Straits, and across the Indian Ocean to fill the Theodore Roosevelt's intended station in the Persian Gulf area. The Kitty Hawk, in conjunction with land-based U.S. air forces in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, thereafter patrolled the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and periodically joined in strikes against Iraqi air defenses.
Because of this shell game, for 86 days there was no U.S. carrier available in the Western Pacific. (A carrier on the West Coast essentially was ready to deploy, but it was felt that her air wing was not ready, and the ship continued her work up for deployment later in the area.) To compensate for the carrier shortfall, it was necessary to deploy U.S. Air Force aircraft from the United States to bases in South Korea.
Funds are provided in the budget for an operational tempo (OpTempo) of 50.5 underway days per quarter for ships forward deployed and 28 underway days per quarter for non-deployed ships. This OpTempo has been difficult to maintain in view of the response to crises and conflicts, along with the continuing operations in the Persian Gulf area and elsewhere. When trouble appears to be brewing virtually anywhere in the world, the first question still asked in the White House appears to be, "Where are the carriers?"
Editor's Note: This is an excerpt from the new edition of The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, which will be published later this month.