There has been much discussion about network-centric warfare (NCW) in military forums. This is fortunate because the U.S. government and military are investing prodigious sums of money and intellectual capital to build the architecture and doctrine that will make NCW possible. If we fail to "get it right," the opportunity cost of mistakes may be an inability to accomplish vital missions except at unacceptable expense. One hopes this theoretical debate soon will become more focused as technological and doctrinal solutions to the challenges of establishing NCW are agreed on.
Accomplishing the training needed to prepare Navy personnel to function properly in an NCW environment is a challenge that demands immediate attention. That is my purpose here: to focus on the necessary training for tactical action officers (TAOs).
I believe NCW has profound implications for all military training. I also believe it fundamentally permits us to practice operational art better than we did in the past. Ideally, NCW enables diverse and far-flung forces to function together seamlessly to execute a common plan that will have operational, and possibly strategic, influence on the enemy. It emphasizes information superiority (IS), speed of operations, attacks on centers of gravity, maneuver, and massing the effects of fires. NCW allows us to exert a more stunning effect on the enemy than past applications of operational art because it so ably supports what retired Colonel John Warden, U.S. Air Force, calls "parallel war": simultaneous attacks on the enemy at all levels of war throughout the battle space. Even so, NCW remains primarily a matter of using proven methods of operational art to defeat the enemy more effectively and efficiently.
The significant difference between the traditional form of operational art and the way it could function with NCW is that its implementation can be more diffused. In the past, the commander and staff planned an operation and gave mission orders to assigned forces. Those forces then set out to plan and execute their discrete parts of the operation. Now, those forces—in our case, ships, submarines, and aircraft—will be able to influence events at the operational or strategic level, well beyond their immediate tactical situation. This will be possible owing to long-range precision weapons, extensive battle space awareness, and better command and control.
However, for NCW to achieve its full potential when the execution of operations is decentralized and self-synchronized, the TAOs who control assets and engage the enemy must know how to think at the operational level. For example, they must know how properly to contribute to operations ashore by providing precision operational fire support with long-range naval guns or tactical missiles. Accomplishing this will require a new kind of TAO. He or she cannot just be "heavy," to use an old expression, in antiair warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), electronic warfare (EW), or antisubmarine warfare (ASW). It will be essential that the TAO understand warfare in all elements, in addition to what it takes to achieve and maintain IS, and how to conduct multidimensional operations from the tactical to the operational level. In short, besides understanding the modalities that make NCW possible, the TAO will have to know the details of operational art, which are not well understood by most U.S. military professionals, let alone officers with the degree of experience possessed by most prospective TAOs.
If TAOs do not have a solid background in operational art, ships, submarines, and even task forces often will not be used to full potential. They will naturally tend to confine their efforts to the tactical level and will not respond with sufficient initiative to events throughout the entire battle space. This is not to say they will not fight well, but that they will not fight as well as they could if trained to fight at the operational level. The deficiency could have disastrous consequences. The proper use of time, operating faster than the enemy, and massing fires at the decisive time and place for the common purpose are critical to operational art. This is even more important to U.S. military forces exploiting NCW, for we are trading force structure and depth for NCW infrastructure and its theoretical promise. In a relatively small force, no matter how lethal, the number of platforms is important. Every platform must contribute optimally to NCW operations. Otherwise, a relatively small force that could prevail might squander its potential and be defeated. The training level of a relatively small NCW-based force is even more critical than in the past, when the U.S. services routinely deployed larger forces.
Furthermore, TAOs who comprehend the theory of operational art will not be successful unless they are suitably trained. This will be difficult even with senior officers, as so few are afforded experience at the operational level. Regrettably, providing adequate tactical level training is not assured. When I took TAO training at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in 1984, the course consisted primarily of memorizing the Soviet order of battle, radars, gun and missile ranges, and the like. The training was inadequate even then. It did not emphasize hands-on tactical ASW, AAW, or ASUW in simulators nearly as much as did the similar course for Royal Navy officers. In like fashion, our TAO training should force students repeatedly to apply their learning in simulators where they can be coached to increasingly higher levels of performance.
Because this level of training can be attempted only with officers who understand operational art as well as NCW, preparation should begin during basic officer training at SWOS. Future TAOs would study concepts such as the center of gravity and operational functions, in addition to IS and the architecture that supports NCW. Later, at department head school, TAO training would be expanded to broader topics, including the details of planning and executing operational fire support and air campaigns. Finally, refresher training and advanced topics would be offered to commanders and executive officers.
It is essential that the U.S. Navy begin developing courses to enable TAOs to function in the NCW future, which gets nearer every day. The foundation for this training must be laid during the initial training of line officers and continued throughout their careers.
Commander Murdock served as executive officer of the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) during Operation Desert Storm and as an ASUW instructor in the United Kingdom. Since retirement, he has worked for Booz Allen & Hamilton and now teaches a graduate-level course on military operations to Royal Saudi Naval Force officers in Saudi Arabia.