The patrol coastal ship program never has been particularly embraced by the U.S. Navy. These ships have proven ideal in counterdrug efforts and should be transferred to the Coast Guard to help intercept the go-fasts and other offenders.
The new Cyclone (PC-1)-class patrol coastal (PC) ship program was intended to enhance the U.S. Navy's capability to conduct coastal patrol, surveillance, and interdiction operations as well as to provide support to Navy special warfare forces (SEALs). After commissioning, many questions were raised as to the need for the Navy to operate such vessels. The PC, however, provides an ideal platform for U.S. Coast Guard counterdrug efforts. The Navy should transfer the majority of its PCs to the Coast Guard for use in this role.
The Coast Guard is experiencing a serious degradation of its deepwater (sometimes referred to as "blue water") capabilities. This degradation is centered on the age and technological obsolescence of both its ships and helicopters. For example, seven of the Coast Guard's nine classes of deepwater assets reach the end of their planned service lives in the next 15 years. The Coast Guard deep-- water fleet of high- and medium-endurance cutters is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval fleets.1 The problems that come with age include inadequate cutter speed, poor sensors and night operations capability on both aircraft and cutters, limited interoperability between cutters and aircraft, and inadequate communications. To remedy this, the Coast Guard has embarked on an ambitious program designated the Deepwater Project.
According to the Coast Guard Deepwater website, the focus of this project is "to ensure the timely acquisition of the appropriate resources that will utilize available technology to satisfy the Deepwater mission needs. This project utilizes commercial and military technologies and innovation to develop a completely integrated, multi-mission, and highly flexible system of Deepwater assets, at the lowest total ownership cost" (www.uscg.mil/hq/ga/Deepwater/project). The Deepwater program presents a long-term solution to the Coast Guard's deepwater needs, but how should the service fill the gap between the present situation and the future arrival of new vessels? This urgent requirement is being met with the transfer of seven PCs to the Coast Guard specifically for use in counterdrug operations in the Caribbean.
Although they were designed by the Navy for littoral operations, the PCs are viable deepwater vessels and will provide a stopgap measure and an entirely new capability to the Coast Guard. The PCs have a narrow 25-foot beam and shallow 8-foot draft that will facilitate operations environments up to sea state 3 (5-foot significant wave height). With a 12,800-gallon fuel capacity, PCs have a 2,000-nautical-mile range that allows ten days of unrefueled cruising at 12 knots. These characteristics are not as hardy as those of a designed deepwater vessel such as the Coast Guard's medium- and high-endurance cutters, but this will likely be rectified with the addition of another fuel tank that will bring fuel capacity up to approximately 18,000 gallons.
Any PCs transferred to the Coast Guard would not be used in the deepwater role, but they could be used to augment the Coast Guard's deepwater capabilities, thus freeing these limited assets from near-shore operations to concentrate on more distant areas. There are only two 378-foot high-endurance cutters stationed on the East Coast, and only one of these is available at any time for counter-drug operations, as the other is usually in port because of crew fatigue and maintenance requirements.
Of specific concern is the interdiction of the go-fast boats operated on a regular basis by drug smugglers. Go-fasts are high-speed boats, usually 35-feet in length and often equipped with two to four 250-horsepower engines. As fuel consumption is considerable, go-fast crews often will carry additional fuel in 55-gallon drums lashed to the stern near the engines. Law enforcement officials estimate that more than 400 go-fasts attempt to reach the United States each year. The Coast Guard estimates it is currently stopping 10-12% of those deliveries.
Benefits of the Patrol Coastal Ships
All PCs were designed to deploy and recover both the 20-foot rigid inflatable boat and the combat rubber raiding craft. The Navy also is retrofitting its PCs with a 9-foot extension at the stem of each 170-foot vessel that will include a combat craft retrieval system with an angled ramp and two doors for the launch and recovery of special warfare boats up to 32 feet long while under way. Bollinger Shipyards was awarded a $5.1 million contract to modify three ships in its indoor fabrication facility at Lockport, Louisiana. While intended to provide a rapid means of delivery of special operations forces in small Zodiac boats (or, in the case of the Coast Guard, the 7.3-meter over-the-horizon rigid-hull inflatable boats), this modification provides an excellent method of casting Coast Guard boarding or law enforcement detachment teams within two minutes.
In employing PCs, the Coast Guard could make use of the PC facilities at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek maintained by the Navy special boat units, which would preclude the need for new construction. Also, there is a close design relationship between the Coast Guard's 110-foot cutters and the PCs. Both are built by Bollinger Shipyards and make use of much of the same equipment, which will cut down on costs both in maintenance and training. It also is feasible that the PCs could be home ported at Coast Guard Station Key West, home of a number of 110s, rather than creating an entirely new facility.
The PC is not equipped with a helo deck, but in the counterdrug role this is not necessary as the ships are able to maintain radar contact with the go-fasts for a long enough period that helicopters can be called in to intercept from whatever platform from which they might be operating. This increased contact time results from the PC's high speed, a capability not previously available to Coast Guard cutters. Thus, the PC can work in tandem with existing Coast Guard helicopters and fast boats to provide a new weapon in maritime drug interdiction.
Operationally, the PC could serve as a patrol boat squadron leader along with two or three 110-foot Island-class patrol boats. With excellent range and sea-keeping capabilities, the Island cutters concentrate on law enforcement—mainly drug and illegal alien interdiction duties. They also are involved in port security, search and rescue, and defense readiness operations. Built in the late 1980s, they are equipped with advanced electronics and navigation equipment. With a top speed in excess of 26 knots and equipped with one 25-mm and two M-2.50-caliber machine guns, these cutters make ideal platforms for pursuits near the coast.
Using its extensive communication capabilities, the PC could be employed as a mother ship for teams of roving interdiction patrols in the Caribbean. Ironically, the mother ship concept was made most popular in maritime interdiction circles when a larger fishing boat or cargo vessel would haul large quantities of narcotics to preplanned locations for offloading to smaller go-fasts. In the case of the PC-led patrols, however, the go-fast would be pursued at top speed until the target approached the coast, at which time the chase could be handed off to a variety of assets, including patrol boats, helicopters, or aircraft.
It should be noted that on some law enforcement detachment operations, two Navy warships use their air-and surface-search radars in tandem so that both vessels can see what the other sees. When they have made radar contact with a potential target, the warships then "box in" the target to maintain contact and also can call on satellite or helicopter radar to further fix the target. The Coast Guard then is contacted and vectored to the target vessel to conduct a boarding. If two PCs took the place of the Navy ships, they not only could carry out the aforementioned monitoring, but could also close on the target and board without the need for reinforcements. Of course, this would apply only to target vessels traveling at a speed equal to or less than 35 knots, the maximum speed of the PCs. In the event that the PCs encountered a go-fast, they also would need to call on helicopter and related support platforms.
On a broad policy level, both the Navy and the Coast Guard actively are engaged in maritime counterdrug operations. From this perspective it should not matter who is operating the PCs, but rather that the PCs are at sea and operating in the role in which they are well suited.
Coast Guard Trials
On 5 March 1998, a Coast Guard crew took command of the USS Thunderbolt (PC-12) at Naval Amphibious Base in Little Creek, Virginia. This dual-commission status marked the beginning of a four-month operational test and evaluation program in which the Coast Guard evaluated the effectiveness of the ship for its rigorous counterdrug and fisheries assignments in the Caribbean and off the New England coast. The ship was returned to the Navy on 17 July 1998.
Commander Kurt Wellington, chief of cutter planning at Coast Guard Headquarters, rated the vessel highly, stating that "overall the captain and his crew were very satisfied with the ship and how it accomplished Coast Guard missions." The program had its beginnings in a series of meetings conducted in 1994-1998 between then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Robert E. Kramek and General Hugh Shelton, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Complaints from the special operations community about the PCs had reached the ear of General Shelton, who conveyed to Admiral Kramek that there might be an opportunity to transfer some or all of the vessels to the Coast Guard.
The Navy initially resisted this plan primarily on the grounds that the PC was a capable interdiction platform and if Navy assets were going to be needed in the Caribbean for counter-drug operations, a PC was a better choice than frigates or destroyers, which were needed for use with carrier battle groups and other requirements. Other critics argued that the Navy should not surrender its PCs for strategic reasons. One argument was that the PCs represented a crucial element of the Navy's littoral capabilities and that to put more expensive assets, such as Aegis cruisers or destroyers, within close proximity to shore presented an unacceptable risk.
Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson disagreed. According to an article in the Navy Times, Admiral Johnson acknowledged Navy plans to cut back to 300 ships by the year 2000, which would preclude the Navy from performing all of its assigned missions. By handing over some of the PCs to the Coast Guard, the Navy would retain the capability but not incur the costs associated with operating the PCs as part of the fleet. This would save the Navy $4-5 million per vessel per year, including maintenance and personnel.
There are additional weaknesses with regard to the PCs operating with the Navy. PCs frequently deploy in two-boat units attached to a major task force. On long deployments, the PCs must refuel continually to stay with the fleet—one refueling every two to three days. In addition, the PC must remain close to an antiair-equipped warship such as a destroyer or cruiser when deployed to hostile areas such as the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf, where the threat of antiship missile fire is a possibility. This presents an increased risk to capital warships when the PC approaches close to shore to conduct special warfare missions.
Another shortcoming of the PCs with regard to naval operations is the restrictive size of the vessel. During an operational deployment to Haiti, one PC was required to carry not only eight SEALs and their operational gear (weapons, ammunition, radios, etc.) but also a minimum of seven special boat unit personnel with their equipment, two additional combat rubber raiding crafts, extra motors, and related gear. This severely overtaxed the resources of the ship and its crew. In addition, overseas deployments, which often take the PCs through heavy, open-ocean sea states, have begun to fatigue the structure of the vessels. This has caused cracks to appear in some PCs that will require longitudinal strengthening.
Transfers and Budgets
The tentative plan is for the Navy to hand over seven of its PCs to the Coast Guard. The Cyclone (PC-1), which was commissioned on 7 August 1993, was delivered to the Coast Guard on 29 February 2000. There is no official date of transfer for any of the other PCs. The primary stumbling block appears to be reluctance at the commanders-in-chief (CinCs) level to release these platforms to another command (regardless of service branch). USSOCOM, in fact, would have kept the Cyclone had it been able to obtain funding for its operation. Congress, however, ordered USSOCOM to take delivery of PC-14 but did not provide funding for its operation. For this reason, the Navy chose to decommission and release PC-1 to the Coast Guard, transfer the funding for PC-1 to PC-14, thereby retaining the newer vessel. It is not clear why the Navy chose not to decrement the budgets for the existing 13 PCs and use these funds to retain PC-1.
If USSOCOM is able to justify its need for the PCs and argue that these vessels are a vital component of naval special warfare, then the Coast Guard likely will not take delivery of any PCs beyond the one already in hand. Conversely, the Coast Guard almost certainly would have no use for all 14 PCs should the Navy decide to release all of them. Budgetary considerations and recent streamlining programs in the Coast Guard have reduced manpower and resources dramatically. This has left very few Coast Guard personnel available to man a full 14-ship fleet, unless more recent Coast Guard efforts to recruit personnel are successful. For this reason, the ideal number for use by the Coast Guard is six or seven ships.
The Coast Guard has requested additional monies to convert one PC, described in the U.S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2001 Budget in Brief as "particularly suited to decreasing the success of go-fast smuggling vessels."
These budgetary requests, however, do not reflect the actual operating costs of the PCs. The actual requirement for funds is approximately $8 million per ship including one-time ship alterations (improvements in fire-fighting equipment, sensor upgrades). This does not include any additional standard or over-the-horizon rigid-hull inflatable boats, which will involve additional expense. The monies cited in the FY01 Budget in Brief will be sufficient only to begin engine overhauls and to keep the PC in hot storage in the Coast Guard shipyard. In addition, each vessel will require approximately $4 million per year for routine maintenance, manning, fuel, and related costs. No spare parts were transferred, so these also will need to be procured eventually.
It is clear that the Coast Guard is in urgent need of new vessels to replace its aging fleet of cutters in the Caribbean region. While not a replacement for these ships, the transfer of some of the Navy's Cyclone-class ships will provide an immediate relief to the Coast Guard in its counterdrug operations. In peacetime, the most logical course of action is for the Coast Guard to take ownership of at least seven PCs to include maintenance, deployments, and manning. There is simply no favorable argument for the U.S. Navy to continue to run the PCs in the counterdrug role when this is inherently a Coast Guard mission. For this reason, the U.S. government should facilitate the budgetary requirements of the Navy and the Coast Guard to make this transition possible in a timely fashion.
Mr. Hunter is a Ph.D. student at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. He is also the owner of SpecialOperations.com, the largest special warfare site on the Internet, and is the author of an upcoming book on Red Cell, the Naval Security Coordination Team. He has authored more than 200 articles on military special operations and counterterrorism.