"Don't Make SWO the Default"
(See I. Scaliatine, pp. 87-88, July 2000; T. Darcy, pp. 20-22, August 2000; T. Laurie, pp. 14-16, September 2000; J. Ritenour, J. Clark, p. 29, October 2000; P. Hekman, pp. 22-26, November 2000 Proceedings)
Commander Patrick Allen and Lieutenant Sylvester Steele, U.S. Navy—All of us in the surface officer distribution division (PERS-41) of the Navy Personnel Command pay particular attention to surface warfare officers (SWOs) who tell us how to improve the quality of the service we provide. We get this valuable feedback during individual detailing conversations, by e-mail, during road trips to fleet and shore duty locations, in letters of resignation, and through articles in professional periodicals. The excellent article by Ensign Scaliatine reminded us that we have a perception problem. We have portrayed ourselves as a proud cadre with unique professional challenges and unsurpassed leadership opportunities, but we have not been vigilant gatekeepers for incoming officer-training attrites.
The author's perceptions are representative of many (if not the majority) of our new surface officers. Perception, however, is not reality. Yet we must publicize the reality in order to eliminate false perceptions. We can no longer acquiesce in allowing the surface community to be perceived as anything less than the backbone of the fleet. Our junior officers will elect to walk away from anything less.
At the September 2000 Surface Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC), members approved and funded a PERS41 initiative to revamp the process of redesignating officers from other communities. This new process is in step with recent Fleet Review Board initiatives to invest more responsibly in our afloat commanding officers. PERS-41 now will interview prospective SWOs at their current training commands to determine the circumstances of attrition to eliminate those officers with possible integrity or character concerns. Those continuing to the redesignation process then will be issued two-week, round-trip temporary duty orders to a surface ship for an underway evaluation period. PERS-41 will send a personal message to the ship stating that the commanding officer's recommendation will provide the determining factor in the redesignation decision. After two weeks of observation, orientation, and mentoring, the commanding officer will recommend one of the following courses of action: (1) redesignate the officer to 1165 and send to Surface Warfare Officer School; (2) redesignate 1165, send to Surface Warfare Officer School, and return the officer to my ship for permanent duty, or (3) return to current community for redesignation elsewhere. PERS-41 remains the final 1165 redesignation decision authority. To date, 14 officers have been screened, with 13 being accessed. We have received incredibly positive feedback.
The vast majority of naval officers who come to surface warfare from other communities make superb SWOs. Their caliber is not, and never has been, the issue. In fact, we must continue to welcome those who are serious about applying their skills at sea as surface warfare leaders. We need them and will continue to take them. At the same time, we must establish the price of admission. We must take only those officers who demonstrate a willingness to learn, enthusiasm for serving in ships at sea, and the ability to convince an afloat commanding officer that further investment is warranted.
For those who are redesignated as surface officers, we also must address outdated ways of thinking that stereotype these officers as "fallen angels." This attitude adjustment falls within the purview of command climate, so commanding officers must set the tone by welcoming these officers as professional equals.
Hopefully, the more intense screening and trial evaluation process of the new surface warfare applicant program will be recognized for its influence on the quality of incoming officers.
As the SWO detailers, we are always on the lookout for initiatives, within our sphere of influence, that highlight the many advantages of serving in the surface Navy. Talk to your detailer about any ideas you may have along these lines. We welcome your input.
TriCare from the Inside & Out"
(See L. Hieb, pp. 62-65, November 2000 Proceedings)
Rebecca L. Ryan, Navy family member—Dr. Hieb answered the question I recently posed to TriCare, "Where have all the TriCare providers gone?" After examining a suspicious lump on my face, my primary care manager (PCM) gave me a referral to a dermatologist. I called to make an appointment and was told the doctor no longer was a TriCare Prime provider. Curious, nervous, and awaiting a new referral, I called the nine dermatologists listed in the TriCare directory. Only one on the list was a TriCare prime provider; seven physicians had terminated their contracts, and the eighth doctor was no longer in the area.
After receiving a new referral, I was examined by a dermatologist who suspected basal cell skin cancer and recommended excision. With his arm in a sling because of his own recent surgery, he was unable to do the procedure. He assured me his medical assistant, a trained surgeon from another country and not yet certified in the United Sates, could perform outpatient surgery under his supervision. I opted not to pursue surgery with the unlicensed surgeon.
Going back to the beginning, I called the TriCare Service Center (TSC) and requested a new referral. TriCare responded with the name and telephone number of a plastic surgeon in a nearby city. The phone number was wrong but fortunately a recording provided a new number. I left a detailed message on the doctor's voice mail and waited for a return call. A few days later, I tried the number again only to hear, "This voicebox is full. Please try your call at a later time." In total frustration, I hand delivered a letter to the referral desk of my PCM requesting yet another surgeon. Eleven weeks after I received my first referral, I finally had minor outpatient surgery.
My diagnosis is not unusual. According to the American Cancer Society, I am one of 1.3 million Americans with basal or squamous cell skin cancer this year. With these statistics, there must an abundance of physicians who treat patients with skin cancer. But if providers are not getting authorizations or appropriate reimbursement, as was the case with Dr. Hieb, TriCare beneficiaries will find it increasingly difficult to find participating physicians.
As Dr. Hieb stated, the issue is complex and I think the patients, the providers, and the system are all to blame to some extent for the problems. I also believe we must all be part of the solution. I sent a letter to the business department of the naval hospital that oversees the regional TriCare contract and a copy to the TSC. I received a quick response from the hospital representative and an invitation to attend a medical town hall meeting. From where I sat, I saw only active-duty members and retirees. I may have been the sole active-duty family member. Surely I am not the only family member in this large military community who has concerns. Beneficiaries need to talk loudly and write clearly to TriCare officials and advocacy offices before all the good doctors disappear and the present system completely collapses.
Dr. H. James T. Sears, executive director of the TriCare Management Activity—We are deeply concerned whenever any physician decides to leave our TriCare network. We are particularly distressed that a physician with Dr. Hieb's record of military and medical service, and her dedication to the needs of our TriCare beneficiaries, no longer wants to see our patients.
We have asked our TriCare regional contractor to conduct a full review of all claims and prior-authorization requests submitted by Dr. Hieb. Research indicates that many of Dr. Hieb's concerns could have been specifically addressed if she had contacted her local TriCare regional contract representative or a member of the TriCare Lead Agency in her region.
The payment amounts Dr. Hieb received for her healthcare services were agreed to when she signed her contract with her physician group to become a TriCare network provider. If these rates or requirements for preauthorization were unacceptable, she should have addressed her concerns or renegotiated with the contractor. Like essentially all other healthcare systems, we believe authorizations for medical services are important and necessary to ensure the appropriateness and continuity of quality health care that our beneficiaries expect.
We agree with Dr. Hieb that TriCare has had significant difficulties with timely claims processing in the past. Having recognized this problem several years ago, we accomplished a complete overhaul in our process in 1998, and have become one of the industry leaders in claims processing. TriCare processes more than 36 million claims per year with an average provider payment time of just 14 days. Ninety-seven percent of our claims are paid within 30 days, and essentially all claims are paid within 60 days. We are willing to specially address any claim problem with any of our providers at any time as long as the provider will contact us with the specifics of the claim.
We wholeheartedly disagree with Dr. Hieb's recommendations to limit family members covered by TriCare, require more cost sharing, or establish a strict rationing of services. In fact, we are moving in the opposite direction, unlike our civilian healthcare counterparts. TriCare is improving and extending the scope of benefits while reducing the out-of-pocket costs for our beneficiaries and maintaining unimpeachable quality.
We encourage Dr. Hieb to give us another chance. As a fully informed provider she may find TriCare much easier to use if she will use the system we have established to help. We are dedicated to a positive and constructive relationship with all of our TriCare providers. We appreciate Dr. Hieb's comments and will use her article as feedback to work on our provider relations.
"The Debate on Ethics Must Continue"
(See C. Krulak, p. 96, December 2000 Proceedings)
Commander Ward Carroll, U.S. Navy, Director, Company Officers Masters Program, Ethics Instructor, U.S. Naval Academy—It is ironic that General Krulak, the man who fired the initial volley in this battle (a verbal shot that cued the fusillade into the walls of Luce Hall that followed) now says that NE-203 "has gained far too much attention and has obscured the real issues." If there are any so-called cultural Marxists eroding the moral fabric of the Brigade, they couldn't have asked for a better ally than the General. He has led the charge away from any real issues by making NE-203 the focal point of alumni and pundit criticism regarding the Naval Academy's ability to create leaders ready to fight the nation's wars.
Two years ago, General Krulak was given unfettered access to the Division of Professional Development at the Naval Academy, access that the military faculty in the building were excited about. The officers waited for the feedback, perhaps an executive session with the principals responsible for ethics and leadership curricula, and hoped the General would be candid and pointed with his concerns. The feedback never came. Instead, the General chose to use a Washington-area Naval Academy Alumni Association luncheon as the forum for the airing of his criticism, an action that many on the faculty took as a signal that he was not as interested in effecting change at the Naval Academy as his rhetoric might have suggested. He was, however, interested in creating an effort that would look to him as spokesman, which makes his statement that he has "been associated with a portion of the ongoing debate" grossly disingenuous. He hasn't just been associated with the debate; he's almost single-handedly conducted it.
There has been and always will be tension between the desires to make midshipmen college students and naval leaders. The unbridled intellectual exchanges of academia often fly in the face of the practice of leadership, or, as is often demanded of midshipmen around the Yard, followership. If we believe that the Naval Academy offers a rigorous intellectual challenge and awards respectable bachelors degrees (and it had better with the price tag of $253,000 per graduate) then how is exposure to great thinkers such as Kant, Locke, Socrates, Plato, and Epictetus a problem? It worked for leaders such as Vice Admiral James Stockdale.
I agree with General Krulak that leadership is best taught by example and suggest the example he set during this debate speaks louder than any explanations he may offer about what he was really trying to do.
"Combating Terrorism"
(See T. Rancich, pp. 66-69, November 2000; W. Parks, p. 14, December 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Elmer W Dailey Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Like all patriotic Americans, I am outraged at the act of war against the USS Cole (DDG-67). I also am outraged at the feet shuffling and dodging among the President, Vice President, and the military high command to avoid any fault underlying this tragedy.
While the commanding officer of the Cole is ultimately responsible for the safety of his ship, ordering him to refuel in Aden is the fault of others in our government and no amount of scapegoating the commanding officer for the extremely poor judgment exercised by the Defense and State Departments should be tolerated. Why anyone would arrange for refueling of U.S. Navy ships in Aden is beyond me. Yemen is a chaotic country with a weak central government only effective in the cities, and the countryside is governed by tribes and has been likened to the lawlessness existing in the American Wild West of the 1800s. Radicals and other-country nationals move freely about the country and some work within the government and the cities.
The Navy Fleet Commander in the area should be reprimanded. Why did he not insist that ships reporting to his command be refueled at sea or in a friendly Red Sea port? The Saudis have three ports capable of refueling our ships: Yambu in the north, Jeddah in the central, and Jizan in the south, near the border with Yemen.
The U.S. embassy in Yemen also must share in the blame. Whenever a ship is scheduled for a port visit to a country in the Middle East, someone from the embassy or consulate should be on hand to monitor the situation. Every embassy has CIA agents assigned, and they should be gathering local intelligence, nosing out threats against our interests, and casting a watchful eye over our business in the area. Where were they? I bet embassy personnel assured the Mid-East Commander that Aden was a perfectly safe place to refuel and that surveillance was not necessary. From my experience in the Middle East, I found that the ambassadors and embassy personnel are concerned with high-level diplomatic relations and know little and care even less about the mundane things such as protection of locally employed Americans, housing, obtaining entry and departure visas, etc.
Americans are dumb when operating or doing business in a foreign environment such as the Middle East. Having spent five years in Saudi Arabia (two with the Peace Support Group supporting the Saudi F-15 aircraft program and three with a joint U.S.-Saudi company supporting ship repair, supply function, and SEAL team training at the Royal Saudi Naval Base in Jeddah), I can attest that the military and business environments are totally different from anywhere else. My first contact with a Saudi national was on an airplane en route from Dhahran on the Gulf to the capital city of Riyadh. He was returning home after earning a business degree at a university in the United Sates. As we talked, he gave some good advice.
First, don't act like an American. Americans are too trusting, he explained. We accept people or situations at face value because we want to be liked and friendly. In the Middle East, don't trust anyone or any organization you do business with including the government until you have known them a long time and they have earned your trust.
He told me Americans are worried about time, in a hurry to conclude agreements, negotiations, or actions. In the Middle East, time is not as important, especially in business and government.
He noted that Americans are creatures of habit, leaving for work about the same time, driving the same route, eating lunch at the same time, and leaving work and driving home the same route each day. He told me to vary my times of departure and arrival, to drive a different route, and change daily habits so that anyone observing could not predict my movements.
Finally, he told me to realize that Saudi Arabia is the guardian of two of three Muslim holy cities and is the caretaker of the religion, so I should study the Koran to have an understanding of the culture and the basis for the laws.
Looking at the Cole affair, it is obvious that we fell into "American" habits. We trusted Yemen to be secure. The Navy prides itself on arriving on time (on every ship I served in, we dropped the hook on the precise second). If a fuel service company is given an estimated time of arrival, the ship's commanding officer considers it a matter of pride to put the first line over on time. Thus, we telegraph our movements and allow a potential enemy to plan. A ship scheduled for refueling in a doubtful port should be directed to arrive early on occasion, or as much as two days late. Navy operations in this part of the world should be such as to render any enemy's plans based on ship or unit movement uncertain. Anything that can be done to avoid creating a predictable operational pattern should be authorized. After arriving in the fueling or pier area, the ship should always launch her rigid-hull inflatable boats with armed personnel to patrol and warn off any craft not readily identifiable. The challenge of small boats and craft approaching a refueling or moored Navy vessel should be routine.
"Saving Naval Aviation"
(See S. Rowe, pp. 30-34, September 2000; J. Hood, p. 12, October 2000; R. Allen, A. Withers, pp. 14-18, November 2000; R. Poore, J. Lyons, pp. 16-18 December 2000 Proceedings)
Commander Frank G. Coyle, U.S. Navy—Admiral Allen criticizes Proceedings for publishing Lieutenant Commander Rowe's article, and his rebuttal is representative of efforts to silence those who would offer thought-provoking debate about the capital ship and its mission.
Commander Rowe wrote a clear, concise, and well-documented article demonstrating the decline of carrier battle group resources. The loss of S-3B antisubmarine warfare capabilities was only part of his thesis; antisurface warfare, tanking, overland surveillance, suppression of enemy air defenses, and command and control also were discussed in equal detail. The author succeeded in informing and alerting readers about the battle group's reduced aviation capabilities.
In Admiral Allen's retort, he repeats the author's main points, adding, with some sarcasm, that the commander does not know his subject. No counterarguments, however, are put forth. Furthermore, he suggests that Commander Rowe needs a tour on the Chief of Naval Operation's staff to gain a better appreciation for the tremendous work taking place to maintain naval aviation's preeminence. The underlying implication is that perhaps the author could better espouse the party line had he served on the CNO's staff.
Admiral Allen also laments that Proceedings favors controversial writings at the expense of the Navy and suggests more editorial control to provide a "proper" forum for discussion. Proceedings is the proper outlet for Commander Rowe's essay and others like it. The magazine is an "open forum" for the sea services and not a vehicle for promoting the status quo. Official Navy publications such as All Hands serve us well in that regard.
For Admiral Allen to state that an author wrote "inaccurate," "misleading," and "nonexistent" facts, yet not offer any facts in rebuttal, does not promote an open forum for discussion. It serves only to chastise those willing to speak out and may even assist them in their decision to stay Navy or separate.
Colonel Lawrence R. Stack, U.S. Army (Retired)—As an Army officer and life member of the Naval Institute, I always have envied Navy officers their access to a professional forum such as "Comment and Discussion." The Army has many excellent professional journals that feature the lively exchange of opinions, but these tend to be much more narrow than the wide-ranging discussions in Proceedings. I have frequently been impressed by the manner in which contributors put forth strong, controversial opinions even in this era of "go-along." Your services are much the better for it.
Consequently, I was disappointed in the tone of Admiral Allen's response to Commander Rowe's article. While I certainly lack real knowledge of the merits of the author's views, Admiral Allen never addresses the substance of the issues raised. Instead, he merely recaps Rowe's points, states that he doesn't know what his superiors know, and asserts that he is 11 carrying a grudge." Admiral Allen makes no effort to refute Rowe, but simply seeks to delegitimize him—without success, in my opinion.
Admiral Allen's "argument" reminds me of the comments that I and my fellow captains used to hear in Vietnam when we questioned the strategy and tactics we were implementing, but which seemed at variance both with our training and common sense. We always were assured that "higher levels" knew far more than we, and that we should "shut up and move on." We did, but our loyalty and sacrifice did not make up for errors at "higher levels."
Finally, Admiral Allen seems to figuratively twirl his mustache and berate Proceedings for publishing incorrect information. He does not, however, point out where the errors exist, relying instead on assertions. He then states that the magazine should be "for" and not "against" the sea services, and that Proceedings should, in effect, "get on the team." (Another Vietnam echo.)
I am sure that Admiral Allen feels deeply hurt that a subordinate does not agree with decisions that were no doubt honorably made. This unfortunately led to a response that, had he reflected more on it, Admiral Allen would see to be harmful to that great service that Proceedings provides as a forum for the free exchange of informed professional opinion.
"Logistics Support Doesn't Work"
(See R. Freeman, p. 128, October 2000 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Andrew A. Giordano, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Freeman's conclusion is on target: "Excessive interest in a low-cost logistic system" delivers "one that may be lower cost, but does not work." Clearly, a low-bid mentality that ultimately promotes "taking from procurement accounts" to support operational requirements is a short-term recipe for failure. The dismal metrics submitted by Admiral Freeman vividly show the folly of following this recipe.
Unfortunately, the solution to this vicious funding cycle is not so simple. Turning on the funding spigot will not transform the logistic system. Nor will it improve weapon system readiness. Before we start to fully fund the logistic system, we must be certain that it is capable of converting those dollars into readiness. The logistic system needs to be reeingeered so that it applies the principles of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) to all our combat weapon systems.
In the mid-1960s, the Department of Defense gave birth to the concept of ILS. Simply stated, weapon system design decisions were supposed to be influenced by their logistical implications. Tradeoffs were to be made between the three legs of the ILS stool: reliability, maintainability, and spare parts. Logisticians were to become fluent in all three of the disciplines, not simply specialists in one of them. Finally, the cost of a weapon system was to include its life-cycle support cost.
Admiral Freeman asks, "What happened to Integrated Logistics Support?" The short answer is that it never happened. More than likely it was diverted by the logistician's love affair with highpriced information technology and related systems for tracking nonexistent spare parts.
Let's get back to the fundamentals of ILS. Before we start throwing real money at the problem, let's be sure we understand the logistical costs of weapon system design decisions. Only then can we begin to break the self-destructing cycle of borrowing from procurement to pay for operations.
"A Plague on Both Your Houses!"
(See A.Webb, pp. 38-42, October 2000 Proceedings)
Dennis Noonan—Andrew Webb begins his article on gays in the military by giving the impression that he is going to present a balanced argument. Unfortunately, Mr. Webb then proceeds to present a very unbalanced view in favor of the continuation of current military policies toward gays.
As an ex-naval officer and someone who is gay, I agree with many of the points Mr. Webb makes. I agree that President Clinton was pandering to a large voting block when he promised to open the military to gays. I did not need my full four years of service to realize how intractable military personnel—at all levels—would be on this issue. I also agree that the military "should not be made a vehicle for social experimentation." It should change as the greater society it reflects changes.
What Mr. Webb fails to acknowledge is that the greater society around the military has begun to change—indeed, it has changed tremendously since I took my oath in 1982. Many states, including my current home state of Massachusetts, have antidiscrimination clauses amended to their state constitutions prohibiting bias in employment and housing. More and more companies are recognizing sexual orientation as part of our culture's diversity and granting the benefits and rights afforded to all other individuals. While there is still tremendous ground to cover, our society has made great strides in its acceptance of gays and its recognition that we are entitled to the same rights and privileges—as well as protections from persecution—to which all other U.S. citizens are entitled by the Constitution.
And while Mr. Webb accurately points out that "there is no constitutional right to serve in the military," it is not the question of the right to serve that bothers me most about his argument, but the fact that he does not acknowledge the issue of the opportunity to serve. It has long been acknowledged that a military career can be a tremendous stepping stone in a person's life. You need only look at how heavily companies recruit junior officers and senior enlisted personnel for proof of this.
I joined the Navy because I wanted very much to serve my country, to develop skills that would serve me my whole life, and to experience things that few people would. And for those reasons, especially the first, I lied during my indoctrination so that I would not be denied the opportunity to serve by shortsighted policies. I should have the same opportunity to serve that any other qualified person would have. There are no studies to show that the acceptance of gays would lead to a breakdown of good order and discipline in the ranks or that gays would be any less capable than straights. In fact, gays have proven over and over again their abilities to serve as well as and even better than their straight shipmates.
There is another side to this opportunity argument that Mr. Webb leaves out: If I should be denied the opportunity to serve because I am gay, does that make me exempt from my duty to serve in time of war or national emergency (my age notwithstanding)? If, as a gay man, I am not acceptable to the military in peacetime, why would I be any more acceptable in wartime? The answer clearly would seem to be that I am not, but we know from experience that those who tried to draft dodge in Vietnam on the basis of being gay often were drafted anyway. I also know, from friends who are still in the service, that service members have tried to use homosexuality as an excuse for breaking their service contracts. Neither one of these situations is acceptable or right.
I am a citizen of the United States of America and as such I should have the same rights, responsibilities, and opportunities as any other citizen, and my sexual orientation should have absolutely no more bearing on that than the color of my eyes. I proudly gave up almost four years of my life so I could serve my country and in that time my sexual orientation had no bearing on my performance as an officer. As a U.S. citizen, I should have the opportunity to serve my country in peacetime and in war. Despite his arguments to the contrary, keeping me out of the Navy would have been as morally wrong as it was to segregate the armed services on the basis of color: blacks were born black and I was born gay.
In the end, I was troubled that Mr. Webb cast so much more of a "plague" on the gay "house" than the military's. Society is changing and the military needs to continue to evolve with it, not dig in its heels and maintain the status quo. I agree with Mr. Webb that gays in the military should not be the cornerstone of the gay rights movement. It is important enough, however, to continue to devote a truly balanced effort to achieving a morally equitable resolution.
"A Hostile Sub Is a Joint Problem"
(See C. Brigger, pp. 50-55, July 2000 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W J. Holland Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—While almost any discussion of the problem of antisubmarine warfare is welcome and important, Lieutenant Commander Brigger makes two allegations in relation to submarine operations that, while so common as to be accepted as conventional wisdom, simply are wrong.
The nuclear submarine is less handicapped when operating in shallow waters than a conventionally powered submarine, since it has power and endurance that allow it to compensate for all the difficulties the author enumerates. What matters is not the size of the ship but the ratio of displacement to power and the size of control surfaces—a ratio always in favor of the more powerful nuclear-driven ship.
The author further infers that the littorals are universally shallow without defining that term and that it is too dangerous for nuclear submarines to operate in them. Many littorals have water depths more than 100 feet close to the beach. This is an arbitrary minimum for submarine work and could be shallower, but much depends on the bottom gradient back to deeper water and the mission to be performed. Many submarines operated in waters of this depth during World War II and later.
Finally, air independent propulsion (AIP) systems do not increase a submarine's speed at all and range by very little. AIP adds submerged endurance. AIP systems power hotel loads—not propulsion motors. The world "propulsion" was added by salesmen, not operators or engineers.
"Presence with an Attitude!"
(K. Dimaggio, B. Freniere, M. Landers, B Mysinger, P. McVety, M. Becker, pp. 76-80, October 2000 Proceedings)
Steve Kurak—The insert to this article entitled "Communications Hardware" gave me reason to pause. To those who are not familiar with either the digital modular radio (DMR) or the joint tactical radio system (JTRS), the brief description of these two systems might make one think that they are a panacea for networked communications. They are not.
Although both radios are designed as multimission, multimode radios, both are limited in the frequency spectrum and the data rates at which they will operate. The operational requirements document (ORD) for JTRS, which is also the basis for DMR performance specifications, calls for an operating frequency range of 2 MHZ to 2 GHZ, or in other words, medium frequency, high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultra high frequency (UHF). DMR, in the configuration being delivered to the Navy, will operate in the VHF and UHF ranges only. This point is important because in the satellite communications (SatCom) mode, communications data rates are limited to approximately 32 kilobytes per second (Kbps). A recently approved SatCom military standard (MilStd) will increase the theoretical data rate of UHF SatCom to 64 Kbps. By comparison, Navy IT-21 strategy requires a ship to have 128 Kbps data throughput capability to be considered IT-21 "enabled."
Much of the network connectivity required to implement the information exchange envisioned by the authors will rely on the big pipes, currently provided by the super high frequency (SHF) defense communications satellite system and commercial C-band Links, such as Challenge Athena. Forthcoming military strategic and tactical relay system extremely high frequency medium data rate service, and Ku-Band global broadcast system also will allow many military users to exchange large amounts of data at high speeds. These are the networks that permit the transfer of real-time video from the unmanned aerial vehicle flying over the Balkans back to the Pentagon, and then broadcast to units deployed worldwide, within seconds.
These systems, however, require satellite earth terminals that have transmit power and antenna aperture beyond the capability of small land or sea-based units. Commercial Ka-band satellite constellations may, some day, play a role in supporting network-centric warfare. Commercial systems are being developed to provide two-way high-speed Internet access to home users that use less power and smaller antennas than currently required to access military high data rate systems. These commercial developments may be leveraged for military use. Until that day, the grunt in the mud and other small platform units will continue to rely primarily on the limited throughput available via UHF.
The authors are correct in stating that DMR and TRS are great improvements over the MF/HF, and UHF equipment in use today. Deployment of DMR and JTRS will go a long way toward eliminating legacy single-circuit radios and cryptographic, thereby reducing integrated logistic support costs, reducing the physical footprint required for communications equipment, and permitting an increased amount of automation to establish communication links. But DMR and JTRS are only one piece of the puzzle. Miniaturized earth terminals, with small aperture antennas, that are capable of operating with the SHF, EHF, and emerging Ku and Ka satellite constellations, suitable for military use, must be developed before the totally integrated warfighting network envisioned by the authors can be fully realized.
"Not In Our Submarines"
(See C. Trost, p. 2, September 2000; L. Manning, p. 28, October 2000; J. Nugent, December 2000 Proceedings)
Captain K. H. Wieschhoff, U.S. Navy (Retired)—This commentary strikes me as an early step in a group-think approach to resolving a contentious military problem. This is exemplified by Admiral Trost's assertion that "too much has been written about women in the military—or in this case, women in submarines—by too many people who know too little about the subject." It is my view that until we achieve a consensus we have not yet written too much about the subject. Instead, we should write more and judge the merits of each idea put forward solely on content rather than on the perceived competence or experience of its author.
It was my experience in the 1970s, when commanding officer of an aviation training squadron, that to our quite unwarranted consternation, the percentage of our manning by women increased significantly. No differentiation in the performance of men and women was readily identified except that the women had fewer disciplinary problems. In some areas the women's quality of performance exceeded that of the men. I concede that mixed-gender manning problems in an aviation squadron are different from those in a submarine. Although problems did exist, they could be overcome with management skills or leadership. (I trust we know the difference.)
To describe the placing of women on submarines as social engineering is specious. Disappointingly, the essay showed an absence of any argumentation to support its position that the "voices of experienced military leaders are being overridden by faulty social philosophy." Perhaps readiness can be enhanced by including women in the pool from which crew members are selected.
- Can the submarine, without mission degradation, be satisfactorily modified or even redesigned to house a mixed-gender crew for lengthy periods of submerged operations?
- Can quality fleet manpower requirements be met without turning to mixedgender submarine manning?
- Should those women who are attracted to a Navy career in submarines be precluded from the opportunity to serve their country in submarines? If so, are there overriding reasons why this is so? Is there something at issue other than the apprehensions of the wives of male crewmembers? Female crewmembers could have apprehensive spouses also.
- Can any negative impact of mixed-gender crewing on readiness be quantified? We don't want to shoot from the hip on this issue.
"Man of Honor"
(See C. Brashear, p. 79, December 2000 Proceedings)
Master Chief Frank Mazzola, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was on board the USS Opportune (ARS-41) in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1955, and I was a total screw-up. Chief Brashear had the quarterdeck watch one night when I was coming on board. I was 19 years old, and Chief Brashear talked to me for several hours and inspired me to take the test for third class. Because of his inspiration and kindness, I became a chief in 1961. I have never met a kinder person, and I thank him for all he has done for the Navy, its sailors, and me.
Linda Morelli—I was a pilot with the Riverside Sheriff's Department in Riverside, California, when my helicopter lost an engine and crashed almost two years ago. I broke my back, but I remember lying in the emergency room asking the surgeon when I could ride my horses again.
I was very impressed with Chief Brashear's story and determination to get back to diving after his accident. I wish there were more people with his strength of character and spirit. His story has sincerely inspired me and given me more resolve to believe that nobody can destroy the will of the human spirit if we believe in ourselves. As I told my husband, my heroes have never been people who quit. I know regardless of the mess I am in right now, I will not give up.
Editor's Note: An excerpt from Master Chief Boatswain's Mate Carl M. Brashear's oral history is available on the Naval Institute's website at www.usni.org. Copies of the full history can be purchased by e-mailing Ann Hassinger at [email protected], or calling her at 410-295-1023.
"Cruise Missile Defense from the Sea?"
(See B. Byrum, S. Truver, pp. 42-45, July 2000 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—The employment of maritime aerostats is not new. The U.S. Coast Guard evaluated their effectiveness in drug interdiction in 1984.
Senator Paul Hawkins of Florida suggested to Rear Admiral Daniel Murphy, Vice President George Bush's chief of staff, that a "Fat Albert" aerostat be based on a barge positioned in the Windward Passage. The Coast Guard was well aware of the capabilities of "Fat Albert," which was land-based in the Florida Keys, but a maritime version was not considered feasible. On the other hand, a smaller aerostat based on an offshore supply ship might have merit in drug interdiction. It was decided to evaluate this configuration, and within five months of concept approval, a leased aerostat and an offshore resupply ship were on station in Mona Passage where a look-down radar was employed successfully to detect ships. The system seemed to be a winner.
Apparently, the operational commander questioned its effectiveness and the concept was discarded after my retirement in 1985. I have not been able to learn the precise reasons it was discarded. Perhaps the loss of an aerostat from a lightning strike precipitated that decision. To the best of my knowledge, the Coast Guard passed a package to the Army detailing its experience.